NCIA Cold War Records

SELECTED ESTIMATES ON THE SOVIET UNION

1950-1959

Editor
Scott A. Koch

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History Staff
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
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Foreword

This collection of declassified intelligence estimates follows the October 1992 publication, *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, the first volume in the CIA Cold War Records series. Our new volume's origins are in former Director of Central Intelligence Robert M. Gates's promise in February 1992 that CIA would review for declassification all National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on the Soviet Union 10 years old or older. The present work publishes 27 estimates—Special Estimates (SEs) and Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs) as well as NIEs—that the Office of National Estimates prepared from 1950 through 1959. These estimates have been selected from the much larger collection that the Historical Review Group in CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence is declassifying for transfer to the National Archives and Records Administration, where they will be open to the public. Originally classified "Top Secret" or "Secret," the estimates in this volume offer a unique insight into how the Board of National Estimates (and its colleagues in what we now call the Intelligence Community) perceived and appraised the USSR.

The Cold War Records Program is the responsibility of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, which has been the CIA's focal point for research and publication since 1975. As reorganized in 1992, the Center includes the History Staff, first formed in 1951, the new Historical Review Group, which has greatly expanded the scope and pace of the program to declassify historical records that former Director of Central Intelligence William J. Casey established in 1985, as well as academic, publication, and conference programs.

This volume is being published in conjunction with CIA's Symposium on Teaching Intelligence, 1-2 October 1993. The study of national intelligence in theory and practice is an expanding academic discipline, and the number of university courses that focus on intelligence issues continues to grow. In recent years research on intelligence in World War II has been encouraged by the release since the 1970s of documentation on the ULTRA and MAGIC codebreaking operations and by CIA's more recent release of OSS operational records. The end of the Cold War, new CIA declassification policies, and the KGB documentation emerging from the Soviet Union's sudden collapse now increasingly focus scholarly attention on the part intelligence played in the long postwar Soviet-American rivalry. This volume of declassified intelligence estimates is another step

in our effort to provide students, teachers, and the general public with a more comprehensive record of CIA's role in the Cold War.

Dr. Scott A. Koch, who compiled and edited this collection of estimates, is the author of both the preface and the notes that precede each part of the volume. A graduate of the University of South Carolina, Dr. Koch took a law degree from that university in 1979 and in 1990 received a Ph.D. in history from Duke University. Before joining the History Staff in July 1992, Dr. Koch served as a military analyst in CIA's Directorate of Intelligence.

We owe thanks to our colleagues in the Historical Review Group who carried out the extensive coordination with other departments and agencies necessary to declassify these documents. We also thank our History Assistant, Ms. Diane Marvin, and the members of the Directorate of Intelligence's Design Center and Publications Center and of the Directorate of Administration's Printing and Photography Group, who together produced this book with such impressive speed and professional skill.

J. Kenneth McDonald
Chief, History Staff
Center for the Study of Intelligence

September 1993

Selected Estimates on the Soviet Union, 1950-1959

Preface

Before World War II the US intelligence bureaucracy did not speak with one voice. The intelligence branches of the State, War, and Navy Departments each sent reports to the President, but each had its own perspective and jealously guarded its sources and conclusions from the others. The President had to evaluate contending departmental reports and decide which to act on.

That approach brought disaster. The Japanese attack on the US Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 raised grave questions about the organization, structure, and purpose of American intelligence. Pearl Harbor was the most serious intelligence failure in US history, and Congress held extensive hearings to determine what went wrong.

This country's experience in World War II, and in its Cold War aftermath, had significant consequences for American intelligence and defense policy. "National security," which became the underpinning of postwar strategic planning, was a much broader concept than the prewar notion of "national defense." As President Truman explained in his annual message to Congress in January 1951:

> Our own national security is deeply involved with that of the other free nations. . . . If Western Europe were to fall to Soviet Russia it would double the Soviet supply of steel. If the free nations of Asia and Africa should fall to Soviet Russia, we would lose the sources of many of our most vital raw materials, including uranium, which is the basis of our atomic power. And Soviet command of the manpower of the free nations of Europe and Asia would confront us with military forces which we could never hope to equal.[1]

Furthermore, Truman argued, if the Eurasian landmass were to fall under a hostile power, the United States would be forced to change its political and economic institutions to meet the threat. A radically transformed American society, President Truman continued, would require "a stringent and comprehensive system of allocation and rationing in order to husband our smaller resources. It would require us to become a garrison state, and to impose upon ourselves a system of centralized regimentation unlike anything we have ever known."[2]

[1] Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S Truman (1951), 8, quoted in Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, The Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 12-13.

[2] *Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S Truman* (1952-53), 194-95, 189, quoted in Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, p. 13.

To prevent the emergence of an international system hostile to the United States and its values, American officials wanted to restructure the intelligence system. One of the lessons they drew from the attack on Pearl Harbor was the necessity for coordinating and centralizing intelligence. The President needed to receive comprehensive reports summarizing *all* known information on a topic.

When President Truman established the Central Intelligence Group on 22 January 1946, he empowered the Director of Central Intelligence to "accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security, and the appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence." RAdm. Sidney Souers, US Naval Reserve, who headed the new Group as the first Director of Central Intelligence, created the Central Reports Staff in February 1946 to gather and summarize all current intelligence into a daily digest for the President. Although Souers intended for the Staff eventually to produce "strategic estimates," it produced no strategic estimates in the five months that Souers was Director of Central Intelligence.

Lt. Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, US Army, succeeded Admiral Souers as DCI on 10 June 1946 and promptly drafted a National Intelligence Authority Directive to strengthen the DCI's power and to enlarge the scope of the Central Intelligence Group. As issued 8 July 1946, this directive authorized the Central Intelligence Group to conduct research and analysis in its own right, and in July 1946 Vandenberg created the Office of Research and Evaluation (ORE) to produce national estimates. Although current intelligence dominated the Office's work, one of its first products was ORE-1, which responded to President Truman's request for an assessment of Soviet capabilities and intentions worldwide. Ludwell Montague, acting head of ORE, wrote and coordinated this estimate in four days, giving Vandenberg the finished product on 23 July 1946.

Unfortunately, ORE-1 was the exception rather than the rule. When General Vandenberg left the Central Intelligence Group in May 1947, his successor, RAdm. Roscoe Hillenkoetter, US Navy, inherited an Office of Research and Evaluation that increasingly published self-initiated and uncoordinated intelligence memorandums.[3] This was the situation when the National Security Act of 1947 created the Central Intelligence Agency and gave it broad powers to advise policymakers on matters of national security.

[3]President Truman wrote Vandenberg on 30 April 1947 that General Eisenhower had requested his return to the Army Air Forces for important duties. Phillip S. Meilinger, *Hoyt S. Vandenberg: The Life of a General* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1989), p. 77.

At the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950, however, the coordination of intelligence was still an ideal and not reality.[4] The invasion of South Korea caught the CIA by surprise, and President Truman decided to replace Admiral Hillenkoetter as Director of Central Intelligence. In October 1950 Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, US Army, took charge as Truman's new DCI. Discovering that three months after the war's outbreak CIA had not yet produced a coordinated estimate of the situation in Korea, Smith moved quickly to ensure that the CIA published timely and effective intelligence estimates.

Since 1948 five separate studies had recommended changes in the Office of Reports and Estimates.[5] John Bross, William Jackson, John Magruder, Ludwell Montague, and William Donovan all had proposed that the Agency create an organization to produce only national intelligence estimates. In 1948 John Bross, a New York lawyer and OSS veteran serving on the Eberstadt Committee,[6] wrote:

> The greatest need in the CIA is [for] the establishment at a high level of a small group of highly capable people, freed from administrative detail, to concentrate upon intelligence evaluation. The Director and his Assistants have had to devote so large a portion of their time to administration that they have been unable to give sufficient time to analysis and evaluation. A small group of mature men of the highest talents, having full access to all information, might well be released completely from routine and set to thinking about intelligence only. Many of the greatest failures in intelligence have not been failures in collection, but failures in analyzing and evaluating correctly the information available.[7]

The Eberstadt Committee incorporated Bross's concept in its recommendations to Congress.

The Board of National Estimates

Aware of these studies, Smith immediately abolished the Office of Reports and Estimates and in November 1950 created a new Office and

[4] In this context coordination refers to the process in which intelligence representatives of the CIA, State Department, and military services meet to confer and agree on intelligence judgments.

[5] Vandenberg changed the name of the Office of Research and Evaluation to the Office of Reports and Estimates in October 1946 after the Department of State complained that research and evaluation were its functions.

[6] The Committee on National Security Organization under Ferdinand Eberstadt (The Eberstadt Committee) was a creature of Herbert Hoover's Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government.

[7] John A. Bross, "Chapter II, the Central Intelligence Agency, National and Service Intelligence," HS/HC-47, quoted in Montague, *General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950–February 1953* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), p. 124.

Board of National Estimates. Appointing an eminent Harvard professor, William Langer, as the Board's first chief, Smith intended for that office, with its small board of outstanding men, to become "the heart of the Central Intelligence Agency and of the national intelligence machinery."[8]

Smith's eight initial Board members were all men of accomplishment and uncommon intellect.[9] Most were not intelligence professionals. Four were eminent scholars, one was a lawyer, one had been a US Army combat commander, and two had experience in coordinating intelligence with other agencies. Five of the eight had doctorates in history and one—Calvin Hoover—had a doctorate in economics.

Board members had no administrative duties. Their only job was to think, to ask the right questions, and to formulate the best answers. When the evidence they had was fragmentary and contradictory, the problem was to differentiate between what the evidence supported and what the evidence suggested. They were careful to distinguish the two in their final product, which then went before the Intelligence Advisory Committee for coordination.[10] Their deliberations resulted in a National Intelligence Estimate.

As the official intelligence community position on a topic, an estimate is the most authoritative analytic product the community produces.[11] An estimate brings together in one place every piece of evidence the community has, records the community's agreed judgments, sets forth dissenting views when appropriate, and creates a formal record of what the community advised policymakers at the time.

An estimate is a working paper for policymakers, not a scholarly paper. Note that in all the estimates published in this volume, the conclusions appear first. The reader then knows the thrust of the paper immediately and can turn to the inside for more detail if he wishes.

[8]Montague, *General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950–February 1953*, p. 129, quoting Smith in Intelligence Advisory Committee minutes (IAC-M-1) of 20 October 1950.

[9]The initial eight members were William Langer; Sherman Kent; Ludwell Montague; DeForest Van Slyck; Lt. Gen. Clarence Huebner, US Army; Calvin Hoover; Maxwell Foster; and Raymond Sontag. See the appendix, "Original Members of the Board of National Estimates," for further biographical information.

[10]The Intelligence Advisory Committee included representatives of the military intelligence services, the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, and the Atomic Energy Commission.

[11]The "Intelligence Community" as we use that term today did not exist in the 1950s. The term gained currency—and initial capitals—in the early 1970s when President Nixon reorganized the US foreign intelligence bureaucracy. The Intelligence Community today includes the intelligence branches of the State, Treasury, and Energy Departments; the CIA; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the Central Imagery Office; the National Reconnaissance Office; the FBI; and the intelligence components of the armed services.

An effective estimate is concise and precise. Expert drafters take care to ensure that every word they use conveys the meaning they intend. They strive for clarity and simplicity, avoiding adjectives whenever possible.

This style is deliberate. An estimate's audience comprises the highest levels of policymakers and planners, including the President. These people have neither the time nor the need to read dissertations on arcane minutiae. They want to know what the intelligence community thinks. According to Sherman Kent, Chairman of the Board of National Estimates from 1952 to 1967:

> The NIE, taking into account the high echelon of its initiators, producers, and consumers, should be the community's best effort to deal with the relevant evidence imaginatively and judiciously. It should set forth the community's findings in such a way as to make clear to the reader what is certain knowledge and what is reasoned judgment, and within this large realm of judgment what varying degrees of certitude lie behind each key statement.[12]

The estimate differs from a scholarly paper in another important respect: as a coordinated document it is not the product of one individual or one intelligence agency. Coordination is a term of art that connotes "a process of consultation with knowledgeable and interested members of the intelligence community for the purpose of getting new information, taking account of differing views, and ensuring the most effective presentation of an intelligence analysis."[13] When drafting and reviewing an estimate, representatives of each participating agency have a duty to see that the document neither ignores intelligence available to them nor contradicts the views of their respective specialists on the topic. The result is the best agreed-upon judgment the intelligence community can make, and this characteristic distinguishes it from all other types of writing.

Agreement should never be forced. Bitter disagreements often arise during coordination meetings. If the disagreement is about a substantive issue, the dissenter has the right to record his disagreement in a footnote—but not in a separate paper. The estimates in this collection contain several examples of this kind of dissent. Special Estimate (SE) 53, *Probable Communist Reactions to Certain Possible US Courses of Action in Indochina Through 1954*, has the following footnote:

> The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, believes that the timing of the Communist reaction to the commitment of US forces in Indochina cannot be estimated with any degree of assurance. He therefore

[12] Sherman Kent, "Words of Estimative Probability," *Studies in Intelligence* 8 (Fall 1964): 50.

[13] Ray S. Cline, "Is Intelligence Over-Coordinated?," *Studies in Intelligence* 1 (Fall 1957): 17.

> believes that a decision by the Communists to follow a cautious policy in the initial stages of the US action should be presented as a possibility, rather than as a probability.[14]

An estimate can cover a crisis or specific issue like the remilitarization of West Germany, or it can deal with such broader concerns as the trends in the relationship between East and West. The time it takes to draft an estimate depends on the topic and the urgency of the issue. Some take months, while others have been written and coordinated in a matter of hours.

Assessing the Soviet Union in the 1950s

The estimates in this collection represent broad areas of Soviet activity that interested the US Government during the 1950s. In that decade the CIA produced approximately 125 estimates on the USSR exclusive of those dealing with Soviet strategic nuclear forces. Of those 125 estimates, we have selected the 27 printed here because they either summarize the issue involved, are the most important positions on the subject, or are the most interesting.

None of the estimates in this book deal with what the West calls strategic nuclear forces. The CIA is now reviewing for declassification a large number of estimates dealing with Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear submarines, and intercontinental bombers. By late 1994, when the CIA expects to transfer and open to research at the National Archives all of those estimates that it has declassified, the Center for the Study of Intelligence will publish a selection of these declassified strategic estimates in a volume similar to this.

The estimates of the 1950s portray the Soviet Union as aggressive but unwilling to take foolish risks. The assumption running through the estimates is that, while the USSR would use every opportunity to extend its influence, it would not do so in areas or ways that could escalate into general war with the United States. The essential intelligence question then became to determine what risks the Soviet Union would be willing to take in any given instance. These estimates reveal that the Office of National Estimates reassured American policymakers and planners that the USSR would not deliberately go to war unless it thought that its vital interests were at stake. The Office counseled vigilance rather than panic in American responses to Soviet moves.

[14]Office of National Estimates, *Probable Communist Reactions to Certain Possible US Courses of Action in Indochina Through 1954*, SE 53, 18 December 1953, p. 2, Records of the Office of National Estimates, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA Archives and Records Center

This volume is divided into four parts. The first section contains estimates on Soviet internal issues: the state of science and technology, the question of leadership succession after Stalin's death, and economics. The second section deals with Soviet foreign policy in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. The third section includes estimates about the global confrontation between East and West: nuclear weapons, balance of power questions, overall Soviet capabilities, and the probability of general war. The last section concerns nuclear arms control. An introductory summary precedes each section, in which the documents appear chronologically.

Because of limitations in space, some of the longer estimates, Documents 3, 6, 7, 17, 21, and 23, are printed only in part and noted as excerpts. The entire documents will, however, be transferred to the National Archives. None of the documents appearing here have been "sanitized," the bureaucratic term for deletions of material that cannot be declassified. To shorten these six estimates, we have omitted appendixes and maps that are not essential to understanding the thrust of the estimate. For example, we print here only 25 pages of NIE 10-58, *Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc*, although the entire document is more than 100 pages long. We have published the core of the estimate and the evaluation of the Soviet Union and have omitted a series of appendixes that analyze, country by country, the resistance potential of Eastern Europe.

Finally, the number appearing on the cover of each estimate designates its subject and the year it was written, not the order in which it was written. The CIA did not number its estimates consecutively and changed its numbering system frequently.

The CIA hopes that publication of these documents will both clarify the US intelligence community's perceptions of the Soviet Union and help reveal how much—or how little—the intelligence community's advice influenced US policy toward the Soviet Union in the dark Cold War years of the 1950s.

Scott A. Koch
Editor

Persons Mentioned

Bulganin, Nikolai	Soviet premier at the time of the Suez Crisis in October 1956. He threatened France and Great Britain with nuclear retaliation if they did not cease their attacks on Egypt.
Gomulka, Wladislaw	Polish Communist leader imprisoned during Stalin's purges of the European Communist parties during 1948-53. Returned to power in 1956 as a national hero, Gomulka narrowly averted Soviet intervention to halt a perceived erosion of Communist authority by promising that Poland would remain part of the Soviet Bloc.
Khrushchev, Nikita S.	Premier of the Soviet Union from 1953 until 1964. Khrushchev succeeded Georgi Malenkov soon after Stalin's death. In October 1964, while on vacation in the Crimea, Khrushchev was ousted by Leonid Brezhnev.
Malenkov, Georgi	Successor to Joseph Stalin after the latter's death in March 1953. Initially, head of both the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government, Malenkov resigned his party post after only 10 days. His colleagues pressured him into giving up the position because they were afraid of concentrating too much power in one man's hands.
Nagy, Imre	Prime Minister of Hungary during the 1956 uprising. Nagy announced liberal economic and political reforms and intended to take Hungary out of the Warsaw Pact. Soviet troops intervened in November 1956 to quell the uprising and keep Hungary in the Eastern Bloc.
Nasser, Gamel Abdul	President of Egypt during the Suez Crisis of October 1956.
Stalin, Joseph	Premier of the Soviet Union from 1927 until his death in 1953. Nikita Khrushchev later accused him of serious mistakes and of encouraging a cult of personality.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

BNE	Board of National Estimates. One of the components of the Office of National Estimates.
CAFIC	Communist Air Force in China. Used to describe Communist air forces during the Korean war, 1950-53.
CIG	Central Intelligence Group, forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency. President Harry S Truman created the Central Intelligence Group in a directive of 22 January 1946. The CIG was to give senior policymakers objective intelligence analysis. RAdm. Sidney Souers was the first Director.
CRS	Central Reports Staff. RAdm. Sidney Souers, first DCI in the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), created CRS in February 1946 to write national estimates. Due to a variety of bureaucratic problems, the CRS was ineffective. In July 1946 DCI Vandenberg replaced the CRS with the Office of Research and Evaluation (ORE).
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence.
ICBM	Intercontinental ballistic missile.
IRBM	Intermediate-range ballistic missile.
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization, founded in 1949.
NIE	National Intelligence Estimate.
ONE	Office of National Estimates. Included the Board of National Estimates.
ORE	Office of Research and Evaluation. DCI Vandenberg established this office in July 1946 to replace the Central Reports Staff. In October 1946 the Office changed its name to the Office of Reports and Estimates.
OSS	Office of Strategic Services. During World War II Gen. William J. Donovan's OSS, progenitor of CIA, conducted propaganda, sabotage, and other clandestine operations in enemy-occupied territory and carried out intelligence research and analysis at home. President Harry S Truman abolished the OSS in October 1945, soon after the war ended.
SE	Special Estimate.
SNIE	Special National Intelligence Estimate.

Sources and Declassification

The 27 Estimates in this collection have been taken from the files of the Office of National Estimates, CIA Archives and Records Center, Job No. 79R01012A. The CIA has previously declassified and released eight of the 27 estimates published here. Of these eight estimates, CIA has declassified seven for publication in the following volumes of the Department of State's *Foreign Relations of the United States* series:

- Document 1, SE 39 of 12 March 1953, *Probable Consequences of the Death of Stalin and of the Elevation of Malenkov to Leadership in the USSR*. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954*, vol. VIII, *Eastern Europe, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 1125.

- Document 4, NIE 22 of 19 February 1951, *Vulnerability of the Soviet Bloc to Economic Warfare*. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1951*, vol. I, *National Security Affairs* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 1046.

- Document 6, NIE 43 of 13 November 1951, *The Strategic Importance of the Far East to the USSR*. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1951*, vol. VI, pt. 1, *Asia and the Pacific* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 107 (excerpts).

- Document 7, NIE 58 of 10 September 1952, *Relations Between the Chinese Communist Regime and the USSR: Their Present Character and Probable Future Courses*. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-1957*, vol. III, *China* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 230 (excerpts).

- Document 9, SNIE 10-4-54 of 15 June 1954, *Communist Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action With Respect to Indochina*. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954*, vol. XIII, pt. 2, *Indochina* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 1702.

- Document 11, NIE 29 of 20 March 1951, *Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951*. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1951*, vol. IV, pt. 2, *Europe* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 1755.

- Document 19, NIE 48 of 8 January 1952, *Likelihood of the Deliberate Initiation of Full-Scale War by the USSR Against the US and Its Western Allies Prior to the End of 1952*. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954*, vol. VIII, *Eastern Europe, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 954.

The eighth previously declassified estimate, Document 20, SNIE 11-54 of 15 February 1954, *Likelihood of General War Through 1957*, was released in 1978 by CIA in response to a request under the Freedom of Information Act.

Part I

INTERNAL ISSUES

The Change in Soviet Leadership

Joseph Stalin's death on 5 March 1953 precipitated a struggle for power within the Kremlin as the Soviet Union made the transition from one-man rule to rule by a small committee (collective leadership). From 5 to 15 March, while Georgi Malenkov held both of Stalin's posts as general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and as head of the Soviet Government, the intelligence community issued SE 39 of 12 March 1953, *Probable Consequences of the Death of Stalin and of the Elevation of Malenkov to Leadership in the USSR*. The estimate demonstrated one of the hazards of instant analysis. Malenkov resigned his party position in favor of Nikita S. Khrushchev three days after the publication of SE 39.

1. SE 39, 12 March 1953, *Probable Consequences of the Death of Stalin and of the Elevation of Malenkov to Leadership in the USSR*

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SPECIAL ESTIMATE

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEATH OF STALIN AND OF THE ELEVATION OF MALENKOV TO LEADERSHIP IN THE USSR

SE-39
Published 12 March 1953

The following member organizations of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.

All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 10 March 1953. See, however, footnotes of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, on page 2.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~~SECRET~~

1. *(Continued)*

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PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEATH OF STALIN AND OF THE ELEVATION OF MALENKOV TO LEADERSHIP IN THE USSR

FOREWORD

This is a provisional estimate. The subjects herein treated will be taken into account in NIE-65, "Soviet Bloc Capabilities through 1957," and treated more fully in NIE-90, "Soviet Bloc Capabilities through Mid-1955."

ESTIMATE

THE INITIAL TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY

1. The problem of transfer of power is one of the most difficult which the Soviet system could face. The important initial step, the formal transfer of authority, with Malenkov as titular leader, has apparently been effected with remarkable rapidity and precision. The smoothness of the transfer of authority and the speed with which the Government and Party posts were filled, suggest an acute awareness on the part of the Soviet leaders of the dangers inherent in the situation,[1] and that the necessary plans to bring about the change were prepared, at least in outline, well in advance of Stalin's death.

2. Malenkov's key position in the Soviet Communist Party throughout the past fourteen years, his conspicuous and apparently planned elevation since 1948, his prominent role at and since the 19th Party Congress, and the accolade accorded him by Beria at Stalin's funeral suggest that there will be no immediate challenge to his position. However, we cannot estimate whether he has the qualities of leadership necessary to consolidate his position and to attain unchallenged power, since he has always operated with the backing of Stalin. Neither is it possible to estimate with confidence the capabilities or probable courses of action of his possible opponents.

3. A struggle for power could develop within the Soviet hierarchy at any time. Given the nature of the Soviet state, such a struggle would probably be carried on within the Party organization and higher echelons of the bureaucracy. In any case, the peoples of the USSR are unlikely to participate actively in the struggle. Even if a struggle should break out in the near future, we believe that

[1] In the new organization, Malenkov apparently now holds the same titular position within the Presidium and the Secretariat of the Party and in the Council of Ministers which Stalin held. In the Council of Ministers, power has been concentrated in the hands of Malenkov as Chairman and four First Deputy Chairmen: Beria, Molotov, Bulganin, and Kaganovich. These five make up the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. It may be significant that this body closely parallels in nature and membership the wartime Committee of State Defense under Stalin. The concentration of power has been increased, and the top party and government organs ha e been reduced in number and size. The new organization of Party and Government and the extensive reorganization and merger of several major industries under Malenkov appear to tighten and streamline the administrative system.

the hold of the Communist Party over the USSR is not likely to be shaken quickly. We do not believe that such a struggle would in itself lead the rulers of the USSR deliberately to initiate general war.[3]

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF DEATH OF STALIN

Effects upon the Bases of Soviet Power

4. The economic and military bases of Soviet power are unlikely to be immediately affected by Stalin's death. However, the new leadership may prove less successful in maintaining and strengthening these bases of Soviet power.

5. The effect of Western diplomatic or psychological moves on Soviet stability and strength cannot be estimated without knowledge of the contemplated moves. However, we believe that the USSR is politically more vulnerable today than before Stalin's death. The new leadership will have difficult policy decisions to face, and these difficulties may be increased by personal rivalries for power which would reduce Soviet strength and the cohesion of the international Communist movement.

Effects upon Soviet Policies

6. In the near future, the new Soviet leadership will almost certainly pursue the foreign and domestic policies established during recent years. In particular, it will probably continue to emphasize unremitting hostility to the West (including the tactic of splitting the West), the enlargement of the Bloc economic base, and the increase of Bloc military power.

7. The death of Stalin removes an autocrat who, while ruthless and determined to spread Soviet power, did not allow his ambitions to lead him into reckless courses of action in his foreign policy. It would be unsafe to assume that the new Soviet regime will have Stalin's skill in avoiding general war. At least initially, the regime will also lack his freedom of action and his ability to manoeuvre, since it will not possess Stalin's immense prestige and authority. Specifically, in foreign policy, the new regime will probably find it more difficult to abandon positions than did Stalin and might feel itself compelled to react more strongly if moves of the West confronted it with the need for major decisions. Conversely, the new leadership will probably exercise caution in the near future in taking action which it thought would force the West to make comparable decisions. If the West should suggest re-examination of the principal issues which have divided East and West, the new Soviet government would probably adhere to established Soviet positions. However, the new government would probably show a less sure hand in dealing with new issues or in handling new Western proposals.[3]

[3] The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes that paragraph 3 should read: "A struggle for power could develop within the Soviet hierarchy at any time. Given the nature of the Soviet state, such a struggle would probably be carried on within the Party organization. However, any serious disagreement could well have much more widespread effects, involving the Army or large sections of the population. If such a struggle should break out in the near future, we believe that the hold of the Communist Party over the USSR is not likely to be shaken quickly. So long as the struggle is confined within the Kremlin, we do not believe that it would lead the rulers of the USSR deliberately to initiate general war."

[3] The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes that paragraph 7 should read: "The death of Stalin removes an autocrat who, while ruthless and determined to spread Soviet power, chose courses of action which although causing the Western world to rearm, did not result in general war during his lifetime. It would be unsafe to assume that the new Soviet leadership will either desire or be able to choose courses of action that will avoid precipitation of general war. At least initially, the Soviet regime may lack freedom of action and the ability to manoeuvre since it does not possess Stalin's immense prestige and authority. On the other hand particularly in relation to foreign policy, the new regime may find it more difficult to abandon positions than did Stalin and might feel itself compelled to react more strongly to moves of the West. If the West should suggest re-examination of the principal issues which have divided East and West, the new Soviet government would probably outwardly adhere to established Soviet positions."

8. The new Soviet regime probably fears that, while it is in the process of consolidating its power, the West may make aggressive moves against the Bloc. It would probably view with extreme suspicion any new moves made by the West, particularly those involving long-range air forces or military forces close to the Bloc frontiers.

Effects upon the Peoples of the USSR

9. The death of Stalin removes the man who had been built up to the status of a demi-god. To many of the people of the USSR, he was the man of steel who had raised Russia to industrial and military power, who had withstood the German attack, and who had led the peoples of the USSR to the greatest military victory in Russian history. Stalin's death will be a psychological shock to large numbers of Soviet people. However, we estimate that this shock in itself will not affect the stability of the new regime.

Effects upon the Bloc and the International Communist Movement

10. For some time, no successor to Stalin will be able to achieve comparable status or similar significance as a symbol of the international Communist movement and as the undisputed leader of world Communism. This may have some effect upon the rank and file, at least temporarily, but the cohesion of the hard core of the Communist movement outside the Bloc is not likely to be impaired. If there should be a struggle for power within the Soviet Communist Party, the cohesion of the Communist movement outside the Bloc would almost certainly be weakened.

11. Kremlin control over the European Satellites is so firm that we do not believe it will be impaired merely by the death of Stalin. However, in the unlikely event that a struggle in the Soviet Communist Party should spread to the Soviet Army and the Soviet Security Forces, Soviet control over the Satellites would almost certainly be shaken.

12. Relations between Tito and Moscow are unlikely to change as a result of the death of Stalin. The antagonism was not personal, but arose from a genuine clash of Yugoslav national interests with the Soviet Communist Party. Moreover, both sides have taken actions and adopted positions which would be extremely difficult to reverse. The Kremlin could not recognize Tito as an independent Communist ally without undermining its position with the European Satellites.

13. We do not believe that Tito's influence within the Satellites or within Communist Parties outside the Bloc will increase, unless there should be a prolonged struggle for power in the USSR.

14. We believe that Stalin's death will have no immediate effect upon Sino-Soviet cooperation or upon Chinese Communist foreign policies. However, no successor to Stalin will have prestige and authority in Asia comparable to his. The stature of Mao as leader and theoretician of Asian Communism will inevitably increase with the disappearance of the former supreme leader. Mao will almost certainly have more influence in the determination of Bloc policy affecting Asia. He almost certainly will not seek leadership of the international Communist movement. The new Moscow leadership will probably deal cautiously with Mao; if it does not, serious strains in Sino-Soviet relations will almost certainly develop.

PROBABLE WESTERN REACTION TO DEATH OF STALIN AND ELEVATION OF MALENKOV

15. We believe that in general the Western European leaders will be disposed for the time being to conduct the East-West struggle with greater hesitancy and caution. They will probably fear that any immediate Western pressure on the Bloc would increase the danger of war and facilitate the stabilization of authority in the USSR. They will also probably hope that, if Western pressure is not exerted, the problems involved in the consolidation of the authority of the new regime of the USSR will bring about at least a temporary relaxation of tensions and enable them to postpone disagreeable policy decisions.

Soviet Science and Technology

Soviet science scored two coups in the 1950s. The USSR detonated a hydrogen bomb in August 1953, only four years after developing the atomic bomb. In 1957 a Soviet rocket put the first manmade satellite into orbit. *Sputnik*, weighing less than 200 pounds and carrying no scientific or military equipment, caused policymakers to reevaluate the relative positions of American and Soviet scientific education and progress.

Shortly after the Soviets announced in August 1953 that they had thermonuclear weapons, the CIA assessed what it actually knew about the Soviet atomic energy program. NIE 11-3A-54 of 16 February 1954, *Summary: The Soviet Atomic Energy Program to Mid-1957*, tried to "estimate the current status and future course of the Soviet atomic energy program on the basis of information available from all sources." The evidence showed that in 1954 the USSR had an extensive atomic energy program, a stockpile of nuclear weapons, and a scientifically sound research program.

National Intelligence Estimate 11-6-59 of 21 July 1959, *Soviet Science and Technology*, was the intelligence community's first attempt to give policymakers a comprehensive survey of the current state and future direction of Soviet science. The estimate discussed administrative factors affecting scientific and technological research, the resources available to support this research, and current (1959) capabilities in a wide variety of fields. The intelligence community believed that the theoretical aspects of Soviet basic sciences were generally strong. Particularly strong in physics, mathematics, and geophysical science, the USSR was behind the West in chemistry, biology, agricultural sciences, and some aspects of medical research.

2. NIE 11-3A-54, 16 February 1954, *Summary: The Soviet Atomic Energy Program to Mid-1957*

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

SUMMARY
THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM TO MID-1957

NIE 11-3A-54
16 February 1954

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The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 16 February 1954. The FBI abstained, the subject being outside of its jurisdiction.

The following member organizations of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Joint Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission.

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2. *(Continued)*

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

JOINT ATOMIC ENERGY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

SUMMARY

THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
TO MID-1957

NIE 11-3A-54

16 February 1954

This is a summary of National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-3-54, dated 16 February 1954, prepared and agreed upon by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee which is composed of representatives of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Joint Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency. The FBI abstained, the subject being outside of its jurisdiction.

A group of expert consultants working with the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee concurred in the conclusions given in this estimate. The estimate was approved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee as of 16 February 1954.

[redacted]

2. *(Continued)*

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SUMMARY
THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
TO MID-1957

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the current status and future course of the Soviet atomic energy program on the basis of information available from all sources.

SUMMARY

1. While the exact extent of the Soviet capability for quantity production of nuclear weapons remains uncertain in some of its aspects, the available evidence establishes the existence in the USSR of (a) a high-priority, extensive atomic energy program; (b) a substantial stockpile of nuclear weapons; and (c) the capability of producing explosions in a range from the equivalent of a few thousand to at least a million tons of TNT.

2. In November 1945 the "First Chief Directorate attached to the Council of Ministers" was organized to plan and carry out the Soviet atomic energy program.

3. The first Soviet reactor capable of quantity production of plutonium probably went into operation during 1948 and by the spring and summer of 1949 the level of total reactor power became significant, thus marking the date of the start of production scale operations for the manufacture of plutonium.

4. The production of uranium-235 apparently lagged behind the plutonium program. Whether this was planned or the result of technical difficulties is not known, as only meager evidence is available that is relevant to the isotope separation phase of the program.

5. The Soviets have demonstrated a capability to accomplish independent research essential to their atomic energy program. While it is no doubt true that espionage activities, German technical assistance, and unclassified scientific and technical literature available in Western countries made substantial contributions to Soviet progress, independent research by the Soviets, required to adapt to their needs the information obtained through such sources, was apparently carried out with a high degree of competence. The evidence is now clear that in a number of instances Soviet atomic energy practices do not follow those of the U.S., the U.K. or Canada.

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6. It is estimated that the total cumulative production of uranium metal available to the Soviet Union from East German production alone up to the end of 1953 was between 10 and 15 thousand tons. It is possible that an equal amount could have been produced from internal and other Satellite sources.

7. The Soviets are depending, for the most part, on very low-grade deposits of uranium. In the Satellites the major portion of the uranium recovered is derived from ores which probably average between 0.03% and 0.3% U_3O_8. Only a vast amount of hand sorting can account for the large output. Comparable grades of ore are probably being extensively worked inside the USSR.

8. It is estimated that the probable total reactor power levels were in the neighborhood of 900 - 1200 megawatts during the period from early 1952 to the end of 1953. Further, it is estimated the total effective reactor power levels will increase during the period of this estimate, reaching a level of approximately 2100 to 2400 megawatts in 1957. It should be noted that this increase is not intended to define the maximum capability for expansion of Soviet plutonium manufacturing facilities.

9. The absence of sufficient evidence from which to estimate installed or planned isotope separation capacity continues to be one of the most serious gaps in intelligence information on the Soviet atomic energy program. It is believed that there are several possible courses of action the Soviets may have taken with respect to uranium-235 production which are consistent with available evidence and which yield general guide lines for the Soviet uranium-235 stockpile. An average value has been taken for the purpose of calculating the weapons stockpile.

10. No evidence is available on Soviet efforts with respect to power applications of atomic energy other than possible implications from Soviet interest in thorium and the high irradiation level of the plutonium utilized in the 3 September 1953 explosion. However, together with continuing research on methods of plutonium and uranium-233 production, some effort will undoubtedly be placed on power applications.

11. It is concluded that the USSR is capable of producing nuclear weapons with explosive powers in the range of the equivalent of a few thousand tons of TNT to approximately one million tons of TNT. Throughout this range thermonuclear reactions were apparently used to increase (i.e. boost) the energy yield from the fissionable materials present without themselves directly contributing substantially to the total energy yield. It is apparent that by the end of 1953 the Soviets had reached a point in weapon technology at which they were capable of producing stockpile weapon types dictated by military requirements.

12. While there is no clear evidence which can serve as a guide to an estimate of the specific types and numbers of each type that the Soviets will actually stockpile, it is considered probable that for the immediate future the specific weapons stockpiled will have the general characteristics and explosive powers of models tested. However, as estimates are projected further into the future, uncertainty is increased by the possible advent of new principles of weapon design or the development of new methods for the production of fissionable or thermonuclear materials.

13. In order to illustrate how estimated Soviet stockpiles of fissionable materials may be utilized, the table below has been based upon two examples of the many courses which are within Soviet capabilities: (a) the continued stockpiling of composite and pure plutonium weapons using principles tested in 1951 and yielding approximately the equivalent of 40,000 tons of TNT each, or (b) the stockpiling of nuclear weapons using the boosting principles tested in 1953, i.e. utilization of plutonium components for medium yield (60,000 tons of TNT) and small yield (5,000 tons of TNT) weapons, and all uranium-235 weapons yielding one million tons of TNT.

Stockpile Examples	End 1953	Mid-1954	Mid-1955	Mid-1956	Mid-1957
(a) Unboosted composite and plutonium weapons 40 KT each	180	240	390	575	800
Total yield (million tons TNT)	7.2	9.6	15.6	23	32
or					
(b) Boosted uranium or plutonium weapons 1000 KT	12	18	34	54	80
60 KT	60	85	125	175	235
5 KT	190	250	375	525	700
Total yield (million tons TNT)	16.5	24.3	43.4	65.6	97.5

14. For comparison with the above, the following table sets forth the stockpile figures which would be applicable if the Soviets fabricated all fissionable material into either large-yield boosted weapons (e.g. uranium-235 weapons yielding 1000 kilotons each, and pure plutonium weapons yielding 60 kilotons each) or small-yield weapons (e.g. composite and pure plutonium weapons yielding 5 kilotons each).

2. *(Continued)*

Stockpile Examples	End 1953	Mid-1954	Mid-1955	Mid-1956	Mid-1957
(a) Boosted uranium-235 weapons 1000 KT each	12	18	34	54	80
Boosted plutonium weapons 60 KT each	120	170	250	350	470
Total yield (million tons TNT)	19	28	49	75	108
or					
(b) Boosted composite and pure plutonium weapons 5 KT each	550	725	1175	1725	2400
Total yield (million tons TNT)	2.8	3.6	5.9	8.6	12.0

15. While the figures given in paragraphs 13 and 14 are considered to be the most probable for the examples stated, in view of the degree of precision applicable to the estimates of fissionable material production, the actual figures for the weapons stockpile examples given above for the end of 1953 (as well as other choices the Soviets can make) may be as much as one-third lower or higher. The uncertainty increases as estimates are projected into the future, and the actual figures for mid-1957 may be as low as one-half or as high as twice the figures given in the tables.

16. The Soviets will probably continue work on small-yield and small-dimension weapons and further developments along these lines could be tested during 1954. In view of this, the possibility cannot be excluded that the Soviets will develop during the period of this estimate nuclear warheads for weapons other than bombs.

17. The Soviets will probably also continue work on the development of weapons with energy yields well in excess of a million tons of TNT. This program could possibly result in a test in 1954. If the Soviets develop weapons in which thermonuclear reactions contribute directly a major portion of the energy yield, the energy yield of a portion of the Soviet weapon stockpile could be considerably increased without any increase in fissionable material production or in numbers of weapons.

3. NIE 11-6-59, 21 July 1959, *Soviet Science and Technology* (Excerpts)

NIE 11-6-59
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 11-6-59

SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission.

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on 21 July 1959. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.

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SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

THE PROBLEM

To assess the current situation and probable future developments in Soviet science and technology during the next 10 years.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Soviet regime will continue to place great stress on scientific and technological progress as basic to the growth of its military, economic, and political power. The regime is allocating a substantial and increasing part of the national product to the Soviet scientific and technological effort which is focused primarily on the building of a strong industrial base and the development of modern military power. As a consequence, the USSR's achievements in certain areas of critical military and industrial significance are comparable to and in a few cases exceed those of the US. We believe that over-all the West still enjoys a scientific lead, but this lead will be increasingly threatened during the period of this estimate. (*Paras. 9–12, 52–53*)

2. During the past three decades, the USSR has laid a solid foundation for scientific advance. The more spectacular Soviet achievements to date have resulted primarily from the concentration of resources in a few high priority programs. However, the USSR now has the capability and apparently the intention to advance on a much broader front. The rate at which scientific and technical resources are increasing will permit some greater attention in the future to consumer goods fields, and perhaps significantly increased technical aid programs abroad. The current Seven-Year Plan, which relies heavily on scientific and technological achievements, probably will lead to a considerable increase in the Soviet scientific effort affecting all important disciplines. (*Paras. 23–26, 35, 39–47, 49, 52–53*)

3. Significant Soviet advances in science and technology are likely to occur with greater frequency than in the past, and we believe that over the next decade the USSR may achieve world leadership in an increasing number of scientific areas. By concentrating effort and resources, the USSR may also achieve a number of "firsts" in certain prestige fields such as direct conversion of heat to electricity, manned exploration of space, and controlled thermonuclear reactions. In ad-

3. *(Continued)*

dition to their economic and military implications, a series of such spectacular successes would have great psychological and political effect throughout the world which would undoubtedly be used by the USSR to support a claim to world scientific supremacy. (*Paras. 48–53*)

4. The number of scientific and technical graduates in the USSR has increased approximately threefold in the postwar period, and is now significantly larger than that in the US. However, we believe that the over-all capability of Soviet scientific-technical professional manpower is still inferior to that of the US. Soviet numerical superiority results primarily from the large numbers of engineers and agricultural experts; the US leads in numbers of physical and biological scientists. The USSR makes extensive use of scientific-technical professionals for tasks which would be handled by nontechnical graduates or even nongraduates in the US. The work of the best Soviet scientists is on a par with that of leading Western scientists, and postwar training in the USSR has steadily improved. However, the majority of Soviet professionals have less experience than their Western counterparts. US graduations in scientific and technical fields are expected to increase, but the USSR almost certainly will continue to enjoy a numerical superiority. On the basis of current trends, by 1964 the USSR would have about one-third more graduates of scientific and technical curricula than the US. At that time, the quality of the Soviet scientific-technical manpower force probably will be generally comparable to that of the US. Soviet numerical superiority will continue to derive from the large number of graduates in engineering and the agricultural sciences. (*Paras. 35–40, and Appendix D*)

5. Since 1957, the Soviet leaders have undertaken major reorganizations of industry, education, agriculture, and science. In science, the major changes to date involve an administrative and geographic decentralization directed toward greater emphasis on practical results of research, closer ties between science and technology, improved planning and coordination of the entire Soviet research effort, improvement in the effectiveness and timeliness of technological innovation, and increased support for regional economic development. We believe that generally the reorganization of science will produce the results desired by the Soviet leaders. The educational reforms chiefly concern primary-secondary schooling, and provide that almost all Soviet children of secondary school age are to have some work experience. The reforms on this level appear to be designed to better prepare the majority of Soviet youths for jobs in industry and agriculture, and should result in an improvement in the quality of Soviet workers. The requirement for work experience in higher education probably will improve training in engineering and applied science. It may have a retarding, but not very serious, effect on studies in pure science. (*Paras. 13–22, 27–34*)

6. Soviet capabilities in the basic sciences are generally good, particularly in the theoretical aspects. Soviet science shows particular strength in physics, mathematics, and the geophysical sciences, and it is in these fields that major Soviet advances are most likely to occur. The USSR generally lags behind the West in chemistry, biology, agricultural sciences,

and some aspects of medical research. However, we believe that by the end of the period of this estimate, Soviet backwardness in chemistry will be eliminated in most important fields, and Soviet medical research and clinical medicine will be raised to a level approaching Western standards. Due to increased official support, research in the biological and agricultural sciences is also expected to improve appreciably. *(Paras. 54–61, and Appendix A)*

7. The USSR is continuing its strong emphasis on military weapons research and development. Recent tests have revealed further advances in Soviet nuclear weapons technology in meeting diversified military requirements. The high priority accorded to the Soviet missile and space programs has assured the availability of capable personnel, high quality research and development facilities, and strong support from associated fields. We expect rapid advances in the Soviet missile and space programs including the achievement of manned space flight within the next few years. Development of ground, air, and naval weapons continues, although lack of sufficient experimental facilities has hampered aeronautical development to some extent and may continue to do so in the future. Soviet electronics research and development has been outstanding, and notable advances in military electronics will continue. The USSR has comprehensive chemical and biological warfare research programs, and future research probably will emphasize new and improved agents, means for dissemination, and equipment for defense. *(Paras. 61–65 and Appendix B)*

8. Soviet industry is characterized by marked qualitative unevenness in technological practices between industrial sectors and even within certain sectors generally well developed. In heavy industry, such as steel making, industrial techniques, and equipment often compare favorably with those used in Western practice. However, industrial practices generally are behind those of the West and often are crude by Western standards. Industrial applications of automation techniques appear to be limited to a few experimental installations, but such techniques probably will be introduced widely in many sectors of the economy over the next 10 years. We believe that the USSR will make important advances in the average level of its industrial technology during the next 10 years. However, in spite of the effort and resources being devoted to this task, the magnitude of the problem is so great that Soviet industrial technology will remain generally behind that of the West during the period of this estimate. *(Paras. 66–67 and Appendix C)*

DISCUSSION

I. ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Attitude of the Regime

9. The Soviet regime has for many years placed great stress on scientific and technological progress as basic to the growth of its military, economic, and political power. Specific scientific and technological goals and the means of their achievement are carefully planned, and progress is closely monitored by the central authorities. Although some increased share of the scientific and technological efforts has been devoted to raising the

standard of living in recent years, by far the major part continues to be directed primarily to the building up of a strong industrial base and the development of modern weapons.

10. The regime has allocated a substantial and increasing part of the national product to the strengthening of science and technology. Over the last three decades, research facilities have been greatly expanded, the quality of Soviet scientific training has been improved, and the number of graduates in scientific and technical subjects has constantly increased. In terms of social position and financial status, Soviet scientists as a class have long constituted one of the privileged groups in the USSR. However, under Stalin, Soviet scientists, like all other elements in Soviet society, were subjected to increasingly rigid and arbitrary controls and ideological interference which had a stultifying effect in certain fields.

11. In the general relaxation which followed the death of Stalin, relations between the scientific community and the regime improved, and political and ideological interference diminished markedly. In contrast to the extreme insularity of the Stalin regime, the Soviet leaders adopted a policy of acknowledging foreign achievement and encouraging maximum use of foreign experience, including contacts and exchanges between Soviet and foreign scientists.

12. More recently, official criticism of Soviet scientists for their "isolation from life" indicates that the attitude of the regime is now being modified somewhat. There are indications that greater emphasis is being placed upon application of the results of scientific research and even that pay scales for scientific research may be more directly related to practical results. Trofim Lysenko, the controversial biologist who apparently epitomizes Khrushchev's ideal of the "practical scientist," has been returned to official favor. Party control of science appears to be tightening. However, despite the check in the post-Stalin trend toward liberalization, there will probably not be a return to the extreme interference which characterized the late Stalin period.

Policy, Organization, and Planning

13. Since 1957, Soviet leaders have undertaken major reorganizations of industry, education, agriculture, and science which appear to be motivated by both political and economic reasons. Politically, these changes point to the shifting of functions away from the central bureaucracy to other organs, the strengthening of the Party's dominant role, and the reduction of the influence of other elite groups in Soviet society. Although these measures are given a deep ideological coloration, they are also justified on the grounds of greater efficiency and increased productivity and thus related to the ambitious Seven-Year Plan. In science, the major changes have involved an administrative and geographical decentralization which, apart from political aims, is apparently directed toward a greater emphasis on practical results of research, closer ties between science and technology, improvement in the effectiveness and timeliness of technological innovation, improved coordination among research facilities, and increased support for regional economic development. We believe that generally the reorganization will produce the results desired by the Soviet leaders.

14. *Academy of Sciences.* The Academy of Sciences, which is directly responsible to the Council of Ministers, remains the most important scientific body in the USSR. The Academy's membership, some 167 Academicians and 361 Corresponding Members, includes the nation's most eminent scientists. Through its 10 departments the Academy of Sciences controls about 130 scientific institutes, and there are associated academies with affiliated institutions in 13 of the 15 Union Republics. This entire complex employs 10 to 15 percent of all scientists in the USSR. The Academy emphasizes theoretical research, and its scientists carry out more than half of all fundamental research done in the USSR. This emphasis probably will continue, but Academy institutes are expected to provide increased scientific support to applied research institutes.

Figure 1.

THE ORGANIZATION OF SOVIET SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH



15. Although the Academy of Sciences still dominates scientific research in the USSR, a trend toward decentralization of the Academy has been underway since the formation of the Siberian Department in May 1957. Steps are being taken to relocate some personnel of the Academy, now concentrated in the Moscow and Leningrad areas, by transferring them to new institutions in widely dispersed areas. The new constitution of the Academy, published in May 1959, reflects an administrative decentralization aimed at reducing the control exercised by the Presidium within the Academy in favor of the General Assembly, the Departments, and the local institutes.

16. *Higher Educational Institutions.* Nearly half of all Soviet scientists are employed in the universities, technical institutes, and pedagogical institutes. These institutions and their scientists are not subordinated to the Academy, but fall under the control of the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education. In the higher educational institutions, scientists are concerned primarily with teaching, and have devoted proportionately less time to research than those in the academies and the research institutes. Since 1956 directors of research in higher educational institutions have been given greater administrative authority, and research is being increased to provide more scientific and technical support for regional economic programs. It has been announced that 80 well-equipped laboratories are being established in the leading educational research institutes to carry out interdisciplinary research on selected problems in radio chemistry, nuclear physics, electronics, transistors, computers, and other areas.

17. *Other Research Institutes.* The remaining 40 percent of Soviet scientists work for institutes which are attached neither to the Academy nor to the institutions of higher learning. Until the economic reorganization of 1957, most of these institutes were subordinated to All-Union and Union-Republic Ministries, and worked primarily on applied research in support of the industrial, military, or other functions of each ministry. With the abolition of many of the ministries, beginning in 1957, the research institutes formerly under their control were transferred to the control of governmental organs on the national, republic, regional, and local levels.

18. Most of the industrial research institutes were resubordinated to the new regional economic councils (*sovnarkhozy*). Institutes which are engaged in research and development programs of national significance are under the control of State Committees for Defense Technology, Aviation Technology, Radio-Electronics, Automation and Machine Building, Shipbuilding, and Chemistry. Central research institutes in certain basic industrial fields, such as steel, have been placed under the control of the State Planning Committee (GOSPLAN). A number of research institutes are still controlled by the remaining ministries, including the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, which controls all defense-connected atomic energy research, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Agriculture. Generally, it appears that administrative control over institutions conducting high-priority research remains centralized, while administration of lower priority research has been decentralized.

19. Current plans to increase the number of scientific institutions reflect the trend toward geographic decentralization. Two new scientific centers, which will be subordinated to the Academy's Siberian Department, are now being constructed in Novosibirsk and Irkutsk. The Novosibirsk center, planned for completion by 1960, will have 14 new research institutes; the Irkutsk center, which is scheduled for completion in 1965, will have eight. Expansion is also underway or planned in a number of other cities. Plans for an expansion of the Academy system call for 34 new scientific institutions in branches of the Academy of Sciences USSR and 134 in the republic academies during the Seven-Year Plan period. A major effort is being exerted to attract competent scientific personnel to the new centers by creating favorable living conditions, establishing excellent research facilities, and assigning certain eminent scientists to these locations. Initially the drain on manpower and resources from the older centers will undoubtedly affect some research programs ad-

versely. In the long run, however, the increased number of scientific institutions, distributed over a wider area, probably will result in an improved scientific and technological capability.

20. The regime is also attempting to improve planning and coordination of the total Soviet research effort. In the past, the USSR has demonstrated its capability to plan centrally and carry out successful programs in high-priority fields such as atomic energy, guided missiles, and electronics. However, in fields of lesser priority, planning and coordination generally has been complicated by the large size and diversity of the total scientific effort and by administrative compartmentalization. With the reorganization there has been some improvement on the top level, at least in the formulation of long-range and nationwide scientific policies and goals. In connection with the Seven-Year Plan, the Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Higher Education, and the State Scientific-Technical Committee for the first time jointly produced a document defining "major directions" of scientific research. At its annual meeting in May 1959, the Academy of Sciences proposed new procedures for planning and coordination of research. Determination of the most important scientific problems are to be made by five new interagency committees for different areas of science and technology. According to these proposals, basic problems are to be handled by "scientific councils" which will coordinate research work regardless of where that work is done.

21. A few of these councils already exist, but their use on a much wider scale was proposed in March 1959 by V. A. Kirillin, head of the Central Committee's Section for Science, Higher Educational Institutions, and Schools. Kirillin envisaged about 100 such councils each linking several dozen research institutes, laboratories, and higher educational institutions engaged in the same relatively narrow field of research. The council would be based at one of these facilities which would fulfill the functions of a head institute, and would consist of representatives from the member institutions, from industry, and possibly from "other interested organizations." The formation of additional scientific councils has also been endorsed by A. V. Topchiyev, vice president of the Academy. However, the future composition and number of such councils is not yet clear.

22. In June 1959, the party's Central Committee called for additional steps designed to "raise the role of science in technical progress, improve the organization of research and experimental work, and step up the introduction of scientific achievements." These measures were explicitly related to fulfillment of the Seven-Year Plan. In the course of a much publicized plenum on problems of automation and mechanization in industry, the Central Committee issued several decrees requiring implementation by appropriate governmental organs including, in most cases, the *sovnarkhozy*. The measures included: strengthening of scientific support to the *sovnarkhozy;* expansion of research work at the *sovnarkhozy* and local levels; improvement of supplies of equipment and materials at all research facilities; improvement in the organization of research and experimental work; and an acceleration in the pace of technological innovation. By 1 January 1960, plans are to be prepared for the establishment of more research institutes at plants, the transfer of certain industrial research institutes to higher educational institutions, and the formation of scientific councils. Also within six months, new estimates of future requirements for specialists with higher education are to be submitted together with plans for expanding the training of such specialists. The setting of deadlines, the unusual circumstances surrounding the convocation of the Central Committee plenum, and Khrushchev's speech before the plenum are indicative of a mounting concern within the party centered upon increasing the scientific contribution to technological advancement.

II. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL RESOURCES

Financial Support

23. Current Soviet expenditures for research and development are estimated to be at least

Figure 2

SOVIET EXPENDITURES FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, 1950-65



*The budgeted part of these outlays is part of the broader allocation for social-cultural activities; those funds not from the budget are from the resources of enterprises. Most of these funds are budgeted.

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2. (Continued)

40 billion rubles[1]—twice the 1953 level. These expenditures represent about two and one-half percent of the USSR's Gross National Product (GNP) which is roughly the same share expended by the US.[2] Although the size of the Soviet research and development effort, in absolute terms, is smaller than that of the US, we believe it to be larger in real terms than the GNP relationship would imply. The Soviet effort has been far more highly concentrated on fields related to national power, while research in consumer products has been proportionately much less. We estimate that about two-thirds of the total Soviet effort is for military or related purposes. As a consequence, the USSR's achievements in certain areas of critical military and industrial significance are comparable to, and in some cases exceed those of the US.

24. Over the last few years, Soviet expenditures for research and development have increased at a slightly greater rate than the GNP. The rate of growth seems to have been particularly rapid during the period 1954–1959 (see figure 2). We believe that the rate of growth over the next five years probably will be somewhat lower than the current rate, but still appreciable. In any event, past trends and announced Soviet plans give reason to believe that strong financial support will continue to be provided for the scientific and technical effort in the USSR and that Soviet expenditures probably will permit full utilization of new personnel and facilities.

[1] Approximately one-half of this amount is included in the Soviet Budget under the general allocation for social-cultural activities and labeled as being for "financing scientific research establishments." We estimate that an equal amount is appropriated for "product development," which includes design and production engineering, experimental production, testing, prototype production, and a variety of associated activities. Funds for these purposes are not explicitly indicated, but are believed to come largely from the budgetary category for financing the national economy.

[2] We estimate Soviet GNP to be about 40 percent of US GNP.

Research Facilities and Equipment

25. Scientific research in the USSR is carried out in about 3,000 scientific and technical institutions. The adequacy of these research facilities varies considerably. In general, the research related to defense and heavy industrial development receives the best facilities and equipment on a priority basis; and in a few fields the USSR has facilities which are comparable, if not superior, to corresponding installations in the West. In priority areas of physics, for example, facilities are excellent and include a 10-BEV proton synchrotron, currently the highest energy accelerator in operation in the world. The average Soviet laboratory is less well-equipped than the average US laboratory, but we believe that scientific facilities in the USSR are generally adequate for the effective utilization of Soviet scientific manpower.

26. Shortages of research instruments continue to exist, particularly in low priority fields, but they probably do not significantly hamper research programs of major importance. Although Soviet produced equipment is often the equal of foreign-produced equipment and occasionally its superior, the USSR will probably continue to import equipment over the next few years for reasons of expediency. At the same time, the USSR will continue to improve its own capabilities in scientific instrumentation. There is evidence that a number of new instrument factories have been established or are planned, and a substantial increase in instrumentation research has been indicated by the recent appearance of a number of new, high-quality publications and the establishment of new institutes in this field. An increasing amount of Soviet scientific equipment will reflect native design concepts, and by the end of the period of this estimate we believe that Soviet development and production of scientific equipment will be sufficient to meet their needs.

Educational Institutions

27. The Soviet educational system, more than any other in the world, concentrates on training scientists, technicians, and skilled labor. This emphasis will be intensified by the edu-

cational reorganization now underway. The Soviet 10-year school is roughly equivalent to the US 12-year school, but the average Soviet 10-year school graduate is better trained in science and mathematics than his US counterpart. The Soviet curriculum is heavily weighted on the side of science and mathematics which comprise more than 40 percent of total course work in the upper grades. The curriculum was changed somewhat in 1954–1955 to include vocational subjects such as shop training, largely at the expense of courses in the humanities.

28. In addition to the regular 10-year school, the Soviet educational system includes various levels of special schools. At the lowest level are short-term factory and trade schools which develop labor skills. At the next level are *tekhnikums*, roughly comparable to technical high schools in the US, which offer on a competitive basis three or four years of specialized training to students who have finished seven years of the regular 10-year program, and which offer two-year training on the junior college level to 10-year school graduates. The *tekhnikums* play a vital role in the training of technicians in almost all occupational categories.

29. Graduates of the 10-year schools are selected by competitive examination for admission to higher educational institutions. During the past few years there have been many more applicants than vacancies in higher institutions, and standards of admission have been raised. Students are channeled into particular fields of study by various means such as propaganda, draft exemptions, quotas, and differential stipends. All graduates of higher educational institutions must accept state directed employment for a period of three years following graduation.

30. There are about 750 higher educational institutions in the USSR. Of these, some 39 universities and 375 technical institutes provide scientific and technical training that is roughly equivalent to that required for a Bachelor of Science degree in the US. Some scientific and technical training is also provided to students in the 200 pedagogical institutes. Soviet higher educational institutions have a total enrollment of about 1,250,000 full-time students, and about two-thirds of all Soviet graduates are in scientific and technical fields. The institutes offer five to six-year courses of study which are geared to the specific requirements of a particular industry (e.g., mining, aviation) or a well-defined vocation (e.g., medicine, agronomy). The universities offer much broader training centered around a major field (e.g., physics, chemistry, mathematics). Courses of study last five years, and graduates may enter the teaching profession or become research scientists.

31. The standards of higher educational institutions, set by the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, have improved considerably over the past 20 years, and today, Soviet higher education in scientific and technical fields is considered to be generally of good quality. Soviet higher educational curricula differ from those in the US primarily in imposing a much heavier load of scheduled hours over a longer period of years. In certain fields such as agriculture, the quality of training appears to be below US standards, but in others, such as the physical sciences, Soviet standards appear equal to those of a good US college. The Ministry of Higher Education is currently engaged in reducing overspecialization in engineering courses, and is encouraging schools to allow students more time for independent research and reading. Various new procedures, such as giving entrance preference to applicants who have had two years work experience, are designed to give more emphasis to practical training than in the past. US educators now tend to evaluate the current Soviet graduates in science and engineering as equal, if not in some respects superior, to US graduates.

32. *Educational Reforms.* The reforms recommended by Khrushchev in September 1958 and approved by the party and government are planned for execution within the next three to five years. Basically the legislation involves a shift away from a system of secondary education which emphasized college-preparatory training to a system in which preparation for college is only one of several

objectives. Eight years of full-time schooling will be required, which may be followed by three years of study in various types of secondary schools. Under present plans, almost all children of secondary school age are to have some work experience. The great mass of the students either will attend the new "labor-polytechnical schools" and receive part-time job training, or will go directly to work and continue their schooling in after-hours training. However, some students will continue full-time schooling at the *tekhnikums* or other schools. Students in higher educational institutions will also be expected to work full-time during a part of their enrollment period. Khrushchev's original proposals have now been modified somewhat, and additional changes probably will be effected in practice.

33. Soviet leaders have justified the reorganization of Soviet secondary schools on educational, ideological, and economic grounds. Among other things, the reforms appear to be designed to better prepare the majority of Soviet youths for the jobs in industry and agriculture which they will eventually hold. Eventually, the major economic effect of the educational reorganization will be a significant improvement in the quality of industrial and agricultural workers. Requiring engineering and other students in applied science to work in the economy during part of their higher education, usually in fields related to their study, is likely to improve the quality of their training, which in the past has often been too theoretical. Work requirements on students in pure science may prove to be a hardship. Nevertheless, the requirements are to be less stringent in their cases, and professors will probably find ways of assigning these students to academically useful work.

34. *Postgraduate Training.* At the postgraduate level, some 460 institutions are authorized to conduct training leading to the *Kandidat* degree, and 250 of these accept dissertations for the higher degree of *Doktor*. Both of these degrees are conferred or confirmed by a special commission of the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education. The *Kandidat* degree requires at least three years of graduate study, two foreign languages, and a dissertation. In the physical sciences, engineering and the health sciences, the quality of the *Kandidat* degree is roughly equivalent to or slightly below that of the US Ph. D. or D. Sc. In the agricultural and some areas of the biological sciences, it is closer to that of a US Master's degree. The degree of *Doktor* represents a qualitative level beyond that of the *Kandidat* or Ph. D. range.

Manpower

35. The number of scientific and technical graduates in the USSR has increased approximately threefold in the postwar period and is now significantly larger than that of the US. As of mid-1959, there are about 1,750,000 employed graduates of university-level scientific and technical curricula in the USSR, about 20 percent more than in the US. The USSR also has nearly 20 percent more holders of advanced scientific-technical degrees than the US. The number of Soviet scientific-technical graduates will continue to increase through 1964. Although US graduations are also expected to increase, the USSR almost certainly will continue to enjoy a numerical advantage. On the basis of current trends, by 1964 the USSR would have about one-third more scientific and technical graduates than the US.

36. As indicated by the accompanying table, Soviet numerical superiority results primarily from the large numbers of engineers and agricultural scientists. Soviet college graduates are less plentiful in the physical sciences, the biological sciences, and medicine. Soviet numerical weakness in physical science is compensated in large measure by the large numbers of engineers who in general have more training in the physical sciences and hold more advanced degrees than their US counterparts. The USSR has more physicians per capita than the US, but fewer personnel with higher education in auxiliary fields of medicine (e.g., pharmacy, dentistry, and nursing), which in the USSR make wide use of technicians with only secondary education. Generally, the same relative positions of the US and the USSR are expected to prevail through at least 1964 although the Soviet lead in engi-

neers and the US lead in physical and biological scientists are expected to increase.

COMPARISON OF MAJOR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL GROUPS, USSR AND US [a]

Estimated Numbers of Employed Graduates of Scientific and Technical Curricula (in thousands) [b]

	1959		*1964*	
	USSR	US	USSR	US
Science				
Physical	112	201	136	297
Biological	22	87	34	117
Medicine [c]	399	461	466	500
Technology				
Engineering	976	522	1,422	638
Agriculture	239	167	331	187
Totals	1,748	1,438	2,381	1,739

[a] Such numerical estimates provide only a rough basis for comparison since: (a) the professional categories are not precisely equivalent in the two countries; (b) the figures do not reflect the broader US supply of scientific and technical personnel who hold no degrees; (c) they give no weight to qualitative differences in training and experience; and (d) practices in the utilization of personnel differ widely.

[b] Estimates of the current total of Soviet scientific personnel are believed to be correct within plus or minus 10 percent. The probable error of certain groups, however, may exceed this amount.

[c] The figure for US medical sciences includes 213,000 persons such as nurses, optometrists, and pharmacists who hold BS degrees, while a significantly larger number of Soviet personnel are excluded because they are not graduates of higher educational institutions.

37. The numbers in the above table provide at best only a rough basis for comparison because of data limitations in both the US and the USSR, greatly differing educational requirements for comparable duties in the two countries, and widely differing practices in utilization of personnel. In engineering and agriculture, for example, the Soviet Union makes extensive use of scientific-technical professional manpower for tasks which would be handled by nontechnical graduates or even nongraduates in the US, such as positions in administration and management which in the US are filled by graduates of business or liberal arts colleges, and positions as foremen or farm managers which in the US are filled by people without extensive college training.

38. The quality of Soviet scientific and technical professional manpower is generally good. There are a few very competent Soviet scientists with prerevolutionary training, but the majority of older personnel, who received their training during the earlier years of the Soviet regime, are considered qualitatively inferior to US professionals. Even persons trained under recent higher standards, who now comprise the majority of Soviet scientific-technical manpower, lack the experience possessed by the generally older US professionals. However, in the USSR as in the West, scientific advances are made by a few brilliant individuals, and the work of the best Soviet scientists is generally comparable to that of their Western counterparts.

39. We believe that the over-all capability of Soviet scientific and technical professional manpower is still inferior to that of the US force. However, this inferiority will diminish and, in some cases, disappear during the next 10 years as the number of Soviet skilled technicians and nonprofessionals increases, as the quality of Soviet training improves, as the older Soviet personnel are replaced by younger, better-trained professionals, and as the postwar graduates acquire more professional experience. As qualitative differences diminish, Soviet quantitative superiority will present a growing challenge to the West.

40. *Nonprofessional Manpower.* Although the Soviets have made considerable progress in training the skilled technicians and mechanics needed in modern science and industry, the USSR is not as well supplied with them as are Western countries where broader sections of the population have acquired these skills over a considerably longer period. The shortage of skilled technicians in the USSR probably will persist at least in certain areas, but the number available should increase significantly as a result of the high proportion of scientific and technical subjects in the lower grades, the increased vocational training on the secondary level, and the emphasis on specialized training after lower school.

Exploitation of Non-Bloc Resources

41. The USSR has an outstanding program for collection and dissemination of scientific and technical information. Thousands of foreign publications in 50 languages from 88 countries pour into the Soviet Union every month. To deal with this flood of information, the USSR has established the world's largest scientific and technical information center, the All-Union Institute of Scientific and Technical Information (VINITI). This center now receives about 3,500 titles and about 12,250 foreign journals every month and publishes about 450,000 abstracts annually. Scientific-technical committees which have been established in the Union Republics and technical information bureaus in a number of the *sovnarkhozy* are responsible for following domestic and foreign developments and channeling the information to appropriate research or industrial groups. As the result of this large-scale effort, Soviet scientists in important research centers now have access to almost all scientific developments reported in unclassified Soviet and foreign language publications.

42. The Soviet information program for exploitation of foreign literature utilizes enormous manpower resources in a centralized system. The USSR is now devoting considerable efforts to mechanization of this program which should be aided by the expanding network of computer centers throughout the USSR. Evidence of Soviet work on such new methods as machine translation, data searching, and data processing indicates that Soviet information handling facilities will improve significantly during this period.

43. In addition to the benefits derived from exploitation of open foreign sources, the Soviets have also profited from espionage in a few key fields. However, on an over-all basis, the performance of Soviet science—especially the number of original concepts and discoveries—reinforces our belief that the aggregate contribution of espionage to Soviet scientific progress has been far less important than the USSR's own achievements.

44. Partly as the result of Western embargoes in the postwar period, overt Soviet purchases of Western technological developments have been largely confined to the acquisition of sample items which the USSR hoped to copy or further develop. The USSR is now attempting to acquire Western breeding stock, seeds, prototypes of agricultural machinery, and technical information on production practices. In a few fields, such as the ferrous metals industry, the USSR has also attempted to buy equipment in quantity, and even whole plants. Soviet efforts to purchase Western equipment in quantity are expected to be intensified by the demands of the current Seven-Year Plan. Noting the need for large amounts of new equipment, Khrushchev has stated that it would be "expedient" to order part of this equipment from capitalist countries, primarily the US, the UK, and West Germany. Fulfillment of the 1965 goals for plastics, synthetic fibers, and synthetic rubber will depend in large measure on importation of equipment from the West. The USSR probably will also attempt to purchase electronic and automation equipment, including controls for use in the chemical industry, microwave communications systems, digital computers, and specialized test equipment.

Utilization of Satellite and Chinese Resources

45. The European Satellites, particularly East Germany and Czechoslovakia, have provided a significant increment to the scientific and technical resources at the disposal of the USSR. They are increasing the number of higher educational institutions and improving their quality, and in 1956 contributed about 15 percent of the Bloc's total of new college-level graduates in scientific and technical fields. The substantial Satellite support of Soviet technology has involved blueprints, production processes, technicians, equipment, and whole plants. Contributions have varied considerably according to the level of science and technology in the individual Satellite. East Germany is strong in pharmaceuticals and biologicals, optical equipment, and synthetic fibers; Czechoslovakia, in electronics and computers; and Poland, in radar, chemistry, and medicine. Hungary, whose scien-

tific capabilities are believed to have been greatly impaired by the 1956 revolt, has made contributions in electronics and pharmaceuticals in the past and probably will do so again. Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania have provided little support.

46. In the past few years, the USSR has attempted to integrate Soviet and Satellite efforts in science and technology under the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). There is evidence that national jealousies and CEMA's lack of authority to discipline its members have impeded effective coordination. However, new agreements concluded in 1958 provide for greater coordination and exchange in research and development activities. CEMA member-nations are assigned major research, development, and production responsibilities for the entire Soviet Bloc in specified fields. Synthetic organic chemicals, railway transport equipment, special machine tools, telecommunications, and food processing have been singled out as areas for contributions by the Satellites in the near future. Satellite scientific and technical resources will continue to grow and to contribute to the Soviet effort, but because of growing Soviet capabilities, these resources will become less important to the USSR.

47. Communist China, because of an extreme shortage of scientific and technical manpower and facilities, is unlikely to make important contributions to Bloc science for some time. The number of Chinese graduates in scientific and technical fields each year roughly equals those graduated by the European Satellites. Although China has made considerable progress in these fields, the number of graduates is exceedingly low in view of China's population and needs. Furthermore, there is evidence that the quality of higher education in Communist China is inferior to that in the USSR and the Satellites. We do not expect Communist China to achieve scientific self-sufficiency within the next 10 years.

Science and Technology as Instruments of Soviet Foreign Policy

48. Soviet achievements in science and technology have greatly enhanced the international prestige of the USSR. The launchings of the earth satellites and the moon rocket, in particular, have provided impressive evidence of the present high level of Soviet scientific capability, and these successes have been exploited by tremendous propaganda campaigns which stressed the theme that the USSR was fast becoming the world's leading scientific power. These achievements have also served to bolster Soviet claims of successes in other fields, particularly in weapons development. This propaganda has been particularly effective in underdeveloped areas, where Soviet scientific successes have been held out as proof of the superiority of the Communist system and its achievements in a nation which was itself underdeveloped some 30 years ago.

49. The USSR has also undertaken technical assistance programs in underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, which are primary targets of Soviet expansionist aims.[1] At least 4,000 Bloc technical experts were present in underdeveloped countries for one month or more during 1958. About 70 percent of these were working on economic development projects. Military advisors and technicians comprise the remaining 30 percent. The USSR has offered technical assistance to India for establishing a pharmaceutical industry and is aiding in the construction of a steel mill. Soviet scientists and technicians are also assisting local personnel in establishing technical educational institutes in India and Burma, irrigation, mapping, and hydroelectric power projects in Afghanistan, and a nuclear physics research laboratory in Egypt. The competence of Soviet personnel involved in these programs has been generally of a high order.

50. *Foreign Students in the USSR.* About 12,000 foreign students are studying in Soviet higher educational institutions, the majority in scientific and technical fields. Most of these students are from nations of the Bloc, including about 5,500 from Communist China. The number of new students sent from Com-

[1] NIE 100-3-58, "The Nature of the Sino-Soviet Bloc Economic Threat in the Underdeveloped Areas," dated 5 August 1958.

munist China has decreased sharply in the last two years, from about 2,000 in 1956 to about 200 in 1957 and 1958. There are less than 700 students from non-Bloc nations, including more than 500 students from the UAR and India. Egypt, Indonesia, and Afghanistan have accepted Soviet scholarships for the study of atomic energy. In 1958, there were also a few students from the US, Western Europe, and Latin America enrolled in Soviet higher education institutions.

51. Soviet participation in international scientific meetings and conferences and in exchanges of scientific delegations has increased markedly during the past two years. The USSR was one of the largest contributors to the International Geophysical Year (IGY) and is still engaged in a worldwide program under the International Geophysical Cooperation—1959 (IGC). Under the IGY and the IGC, the Soviets probably have acquired a tremendous amount of data of strategic value. They have released a considerable volume of general and operational information on these activities, but have withheld data in fields such as gravity and geomagnetism which would be of direct military value to the West. The increased Soviet participation in international scientific activities has, in general, enhanced Soviet scientific prestige and has helped the USSR keep abreast of developments in the West.

III. PRESENT CAPABILITIES AND FUTURE TRENDS IN SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

52. During the past few years, the Soviet Union has strikingly demonstrated to the world its maturity in science and technology. This relatively rapid progress reflects directly a spirit of intense competition with the US and the controls and incentives applied by the regime. The USSR is now one of the world leaders in some strategically important scientific and technical fields such as nuclear energy, ballistic missiles, and electronics. However, we believe that their capabilities in other important areas are advancing more slowly, and that their technology is still behind that of the West. In our judgment, this significant disparity from field to field largely results from a present Soviet inability to carry out simultaneously all the increasingly complex research and development necessary for modern military weapons and industrial programs with the same degree of success that the US is achieving.

53. During the past three decades, the USSR has laid a solid foundation for scientific advance. The more spectacular Soviet achievements to date have resulted primarily from the concentration of resources in a few high priority programs; however, the USSR now has the capability, and apparently the intention, to advance on a much broader front. The current Seven-Year Plan, which relies heavily on scientific and technological achievments, probably will lead to a considerable increase in the Soviet scientific effort affecting all important disciplines. Significant Soviet advances in science and technology are likely to occur with greater frequency than in the past, and we believe that the USSR may achieve world leadership in many scientific areas by the end of the period of this estimate.

54. *Physics and Mathematics.* Soviet research shows great strength in a number of fields of physics and mathematics, particularly in theoretical mathematics, high energy nuclear physics, solid state physics, and acoustics. The competence of Soviet mathematicians and the excellent mathematical training of scientists and engineers has been a major Soviet strength for many years. The USSR has placed greater reliance on mathematical methods for solving engineering problems than on the empirical methods used in the West, and probably will place even greater emphasis on such methods in the future. In physics research, the present emphasis on nuclear physics and solid state physics probably will continue, and major efforts will be devoted to problems related to the nuclear power industry. Soviet research toward controlled thermonuclear reactions has been very impressive and could produce results on a limited scale at any time, although the production of energy in useful amounts cannot be expected for a long time. Research in

physics and mathematics will be materially aided by the wider availability of high-speed calculation facilities which are now available for high-priority problems. Such facilities should be generally available to the research and development community by the end of the period.

55. *Electronics.* The USSR is one of the leading nations of the world in quality and quantity of electronics research and development. Soviet work on radio wave propagation, noise phenomena, nonlinear control theory, and the theoretical aspects of materials research has been outstanding. Soviet research on thermoelectric effects appears to be on the threshhold of technological advances in the direct conversion of heat to electricity having far-reaching military and economic application. Generally, Soviet electronics research will probably continue to emphasize the development of equipment of military and economic importance and instrumentation for other scientific investigations.

56. *Geophysics and Geodesy.* Soviet capabilities in geophysics and geodesy are believed to be generally equal to those of the US and superior in some fields, particularly polar geophysics. Soviet work is also outstanding in seismology, gravimetry, geomagnetism, geoelectricity, and geochemical prospecting. The USSR is working toward the establishment of a world geodetic datum which would be of great importance to Soviet long-range missile capabilities. They have already succeeded in establishing a connection between the Soviet-Satellite geodetic net and the Western European datum. A covert tie to the North American datum, probably has also been made across the Bering Strait. Also of strategic importance is the tremendous amount of geophysical data acquired by the USSR during the IGY. The Soviets are continuing a large program under IGC and probably will make increased efforts in the future to collect geophysical data on a worldwide basis. Emphasis in geophysics will continue to be placed on problems of great economic and military importance and upon support of the Soviet space program. Studies in geomagnetism will probably receive high priority for such application as improving communications and developing military detection devices. Geodesy research probably will continue to be focused on improving geodetic positioning accuracy required for launching long-range missiles. The Soviets have indicated their intention to use earth satellites for establishing intercontinental geodetic ties. Soviet research in weather control and long-range forecasting probably will be expanded. Work in geology will continue to be primarily directed toward developing mineral resources and aiding military and capital construction. By the end of the period, the USSR may have achieved a position of world leadership in additional fields of geophysics including astronomy and seismology.

57. *Chemistry.* The USSR generally lags behind the US in most fields of chemistry. However, Soviet research is of high caliber in certain areas, and in organophosphorous chemistry, critical to the development of nerve gases, the USSR may lead the West by a significant margin. Soviet research in combustion, chemical kinetics, catalysis, and explosives is generally comparable with that of the West, but the USSR lags in pharmaceuticals and in several important areas of nuclear chemistry. There will probably be a major expansion of all chemical research in the USSR, with particular emphasis on areas where the West now leads, such as petrochemicals, plastics, and synthetic fibers. We believe that Soviet backwardness will be completely eliminated in most important fields of chemistry within 10 years.

58. *Metallurgy.* The Soviet program of metallurgical research is extensive, but uneven, due to a concentration of effort on meeting the requirements of industry and the military forces. Soviet research has concentrated on ferrous metallurgy, but less attention has been given to the important light alloy field in which Western progress has been exploited through an extensive monitoring effort. This exploitation probably will continue, although Soviet research is expected to make increasingly important contributions.

The USSR has made considerable progress in the development of fissile and nonfissile materials for use in nuclear weapons and reactors, and continued emphasis is expected in this field. Research probably will also be pushed in those areas of metallurgy related to solid state physics, particularly in semiconductors and materials for use in research on direct conversion of heat to electricity.

59. *Medical, Biological, and Agricultural Sciences.* Except in a few specific fields, the USSR still lags behind the US in the medical, biological, and agricultural sciences. In medicine, research assets have been concentrated in areas of military and economic importance, such as infectious diseases which cause significant labor losses. However, Soviet research in space medicine, underway for about seven years, probably leads that of the US in several respects. Although the Soviets appear to be fairly competent in certain areas of biological research, their general capabilities in basic work are considered low. Biological research has been accorded lower priority than most of the physical sciences and still suffers somewhat from the effects of ideological interference. Soviet agricultural research is also significantly behind that in most Western countries, despite the existence of a large research establishment and a large number of professional personnel.

60. Soviet medical research and clinical medicine probably will be raised to a level approaching Western standards by improvement in the quality and quantity of research facilities and equipment. The Soviets will probably increase their research efforts on human space travel, submarine medicine, radiation effects, viral diseases, neurophysiology, veterinary medicine, biologicals, and drugs. Capabilities in the agricultural and biological sciences are also expected to improve appreciably over the next 10 years as the result of increased official support. However, marked advances in Soviet agriculture can be effected without a major research effort, by applying scientific knowledge and technological achievements already available in the USSR. Biological research probably will place new emphasis on the application to biology of the concepts and techniques of the physical sciences, and will continue to support the space program. We believe that, as the result of a concerted research program, the USSR will be able to perfect a closed biological system by the time that manned space flight of more than limited duration can be accomplished.

61. *Nuclear Energy.*[1] Although Soviet research in nuclear technology is not comparable in diversity and scope to that of the US, it is highly competent in specific fields. There is substantial evidence that the USSR is continuing a high priority expansion of its program for the application of atomic energy to both military and peaceful uses. Evidence from Soviet tests indicates that they have made steady progress in nuclear weapons research, particularly in the design and development of thermonuclear weapons. If testing is resumed they will probably make further significant progress in such areas as weight reduction, higher yields, antimissile applications, and economies in use of fissionable material. They have also made considerable progress in the development of nuclear power and have displayed much interest in nuclear propulsion. The only known application of such a system is in the icebreaker Lenin; however, there is evidence which indicates the application of nuclear propulsion to submarines and the existence of an active nuclear aircraft project. The USSR is also constructing several large nuclear power plants and by 1963 should have an installed nuclear generating capacity of 2,000 electrical megawatts.

62. *Guided Missile and Space Programs.*[2] In the field of guided missiles and space vehicles, the USSR continues to press ahead with an extensive research and development program. There is ample evidence that very capable personnel and high quality research and de-

[1] For further details see NIE 11-3-59, "The Soviet Atomic Energy Program," dated 16 June 1959, Limited Distribution.

[2] For further details, see NIE 11-8-58, "Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles," dated 19 August 1958, TOP SECRET, or the forthcoming NIE 11-8-59.

velopment facilities are available to the missile and space programs and that they enjoy extremely high priorities. They are supported by extensive Soviet research in related fields, including electronics, meteorology, space medicine, astrobiology, astrophysics, and geophysics. Soviet achievements in surface-to-surface ballistic missiles and space vehicles have been particularly impressive. Substantial progress is also evident in the development of surface-to-air and air-to-surface missiles. The Soviets are also believed to have air-to-air missiles operational, although considerably less evidence is available on this type. The Soviets are expected to press forward with their guided missile program in all important categories. We have estimated a considerable Soviet capability for early accomplishments in space, and believe that a major effort will be made to achieve manned space flight ahead of the US.

63. *Other Weapons Development.* The USSR has also made rapid progress in other areas of weapons research and development. The extensive re-equipment program in the Soviet ground forces attests to an impressive development effort in all ground weapon categories, directed primarily to increasing firepower, mobility, and amphibious capabilities. Soviet capabilities in theoretical aeronautical research are generally very good, but their aircraft development capabilities are significantly behind those of the US due to a lack of adequate research facilities and a manufacturing technology generally comparable to that which existed in the West during World War II. Soviet naval research and development is also significantly behind that of the West, although the caliber of their experimental research is improving. Good theoretical work is evident in hydrodynamics and hydroacoustics, and great emphasis is being given to submarine development. There is firm evidence that the USSR is conducting extensive chemical and biological warfare research programs staffed by capable scientists and involving numerous research institutes.

64. Soviet weapons research and development will continue to receive a very high priority during the period of this estimate. The USSR is expected to design and produce advanced aircraft for both civil and military use, but Soviet aircraft development probably will continue to lag behind that of the US over the next 10 years. Although we have no direct evidence, a Soviet decision to emphasize missile and space activities may have resulted in a lessening of effort on military aircraft. In naval weapons development, we believe that significant technological progress will be made in developing guided missile submarines, in the application of nuclear propulsion, and in submarine hull design. Soviet development efforts in antisubmarine warfare probably will be accelerated due to the increasing threat of US missile-carrying submarines. Ground weapons development probably will continue at a rapid pace, with emphasis on defensive weapons against low flying aircraft, air transportable weapons and equipment, weight reduction of existing equipment, and improved armor. Research emphasis in chemical and biological warfare probably will be placed on development of new and improved agents, means for dissemination, and equipment for defense.

65. Electronics development has been proceeding at a rapid pace and there is evidence of a steadily increasing native Soviet capability in all important aspects. More complex and capable ground radars are now being developed, and with the advent of faster aircraft and newer airborne weapons, improved airborne radar is expected to appear. Communications advances are likely to include more complex automatic data handling systems for use in air defense, and possibly for use in the space program. We also expect continued Soviet progress in jamming techniques.

66. *Industrial Technology.* The quality of Soviet industrial technology is very uneven between industrial sectors and even within certain sectors generally well-developed. In many areas of heavy industry, practices are on a par with the best technological practices in the West. In some cases, such as petroleum extraction, blast furnaces, machine building, and prestressed concrete, the Soviets have made pioneering adaptations and developments of note. However, Soviet technological

practices in agriculture, forestry, food processing, textiles, rail and inland water transport, civil telecommunications, and certain aspects of the construction industry are far below Western standards and in some areas lag behind the West by as much as 25 years. Even in the most advanced Soviet industries, some practices which border on the rudimentary or the primitive exist side by side with the most advanced industrial techniques.

67. The USSR has the capability over the next decade to make important advances in raising the average level of its performance. Some indication of the possible magnitude of this advance is the planned capital investment for 1966–1985, which is equal to twice that of the preceding seven years. It is almost certain that the gap between the "best" and "average" practice will narrow considerably over the next 10 years by the broader exploitation of many universally known techniques as well as several Soviet pioneering advances. However, in spite of the effort and resources being devoted to this task, the magnitude of the problem of catching up with the West is so great that Soviet industrial technology will remain generally behind that of the West during the period of this estimate.

Soviet Economics

International trade was one arena of East and West competition in the Cold War. The USSR and its East European satellite states needed imports to expand their industrial base, which would suffer without them. National Intelligence Estimate 22 of 19 February 1951, *Vulnerability of the Soviet Bloc to Economic Warfare*, tried to determine how far the United States and the West could purposely retard Communist development by restricting key exports to the East. This estimate concluded that, while economic warfare was not likely to alter Soviet behavior, it might affect the USSR's ability to fight a general war. The estimate noted, however, that, for such a program to succeed, the Western powers would need "a high degree" of cooperation.

Implications of an Increase in US-Soviet Trade, SNIE 100-8-58 of 7 October 1958, evaluated the effects of Nikita Khrushchev's proposal that the two superpowers increase their trade with one another. Although the Soviets probably genuinely desired increased trade with the United States, their primary motivation was to strengthen their propaganda line of peaceful coexistence, to diminish US ability to maintain Western trade controls, and to cause friction within the West as various countries found themselves competing with the United States for Soviet trade. The drafters of the estimate did not think the Soviet proposal would work. The estimate contended that, although US exports to the USSR could eventually reach $100-150 million annually under relaxed legal and administrative measures, even this amount would have a negligible effect on the Soviet economy. On the other hand, the estimate cautioned, substantial imports of Soviet commodities "might seriously damage the trade or the foreign exchange position of particular Free World countries."

4. NIE 22, 19 February 1951, *Vulnerability of the Soviet Bloc to Economic Warfare*

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

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VULNERABILITY OF THE SOVIET BLOC TO ECONOMIC WARFARE

4. *(Continued)*



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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

VULNERABILITY OF THE SOVIET BLOC TO ECONOMIC WARFARE

NIE-22

The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee have given their concurrence to the estimate. This paper is based on information available on 15 February 1951.

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VULNERABILITY OF THE SOVIET BLOC TO ECONOMIC WARFARE

PROBLEM

To estimate the vulnerability of the Soviet bloc to economic warfare.

FOREWORD

The term "economic warfare" as applied in this paper covers the offensive use in peacetime of measures to diminish or neutralize the war potential of the Soviet bloc.*

The extent to which in the event of war the resources of conquered territories could be effectively utilized and the extent to which they would represent a net gain to the bloc is a problem beyond the scope of this paper. The absence of military operations is assumed as a part of the terms of reference.

Since China is engaged in military operations against United Nations forces in Korea, it is necessary to assess the effect of economic warfare upon China under the existing circumstances.

The measures considered available to the Western Powers to deny exports to the Soviet bloc include the following: export and import licensing, trade manipulation, preclusive buying, black listing, foreign funds control, and the denial to the Soviet bloc of access to non-Soviet maritime and air facilities. The effects of blockade and of the use of the navicert and ship warrant systems are not considered in this paper under the term economic warfare since these measures are usually not employed except in a state of war.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Military Capabilities.

1. A program ** of economic warfare directed against the Soviet bloc, which encompassed selected commodities and services and which received a high degree of cooperation from the Western Powers would, if well coordinated and well enforced, seriously retard and limit the development of the Soviet bloc war potential. Although, because of the advanced state of Soviet preparedness for

* The Soviet bloc is defined as: the USSR, China, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. The vulnerability of Korea, Outer Mongolia, and certain Communist-controlled areas in Southeast Asia is not considered because of the relative insignificance of the economies in these areas; however, it is assumed that economic warfare measures will also apply against these regions.

** No attempt is made to assess the general effectiveness of the control measures that are already in effect, or to suggest wherein they are adequate or need to be supplemented. It should be noted, however, that direct US shipments to the Soviet bloc have already been reduced to relatively insignificant proportions through our export control policies.

war, such a program would not significantly affect the present capability of the USSR to wage initial campaigns, it would, nevertheless, seriously affect the capability of the USSR to conduct a general war of long duration and might correspondingly influence a decision concerning such a venture.

Conduct of Foreign Policy.

2. The total effects of a program of economic warfare are not likely to force a basic change in the aggressive foreign policy of the USSR.

Economic and Political Stability.

3. The effect of a program of economic warfare on the economic and political stability of the USSR and its Satellites and upon relations between the USSR and its Satellites would not be decisive, though such a program would intensify popular discontent, particularly in the Satellite states and would aggravate problems of commodity distribution throughout the bloc. Soviet authority, however, would doubtless be effective in dealing with conflicting claims among the Satellites for scarce commodities. In view of the repressive power of the Soviet bloc security organizations, the political stability of the various regimes would not be seriously jeopardized unless and until other disruptive pressures were brought to bear, in which case the cumulative effect would be serious.

Economic Development.

4. A program of economic warfare would add to the internal economic problems of the USSR and its Satellites and would make it virtually impossible to carry out the planned balanced development of their economies. Such prospects as they now have for narrowing the present great gap between their combined productive capacities and those of the West would be decidedly reduced.

Ability to Reduce the Effects of Controls.

5. To achieve worthwhile results a high degree of cooperation among the Western Powers is essential *; otherwise the Soviet bloc could reduce the effect of an economic warfare program: a) by purchases from Western nations unwilling to engage in parallel action on the economic warfare program; and b) by the employment of covert trade channels to circumvent controls. In any case, the Soviet bloc would attempt to reduce the effects by adjustments within the economy, including reallocation of resources, the use of synthetics and substitutes, and the temporary utilization of stockpiles. There would, however, be a definite limitation on their ability to reduce the effect of controls through such internal adjustments.

Chinese Military Capabilities.

6. The effect of a program of economic warfare against China requires special consideration since China is actually engaged in military operations of major importance. The effect of economic warfare alone would not be a decisive factor in limiting Chinese military capabilities. Combined with the present drain caused by the Korean war, however, economic warfare would substantially reduce Chinese military capabilities (though not to the extent of critically disrupting cur-

* Although it is not actually within the terms of reference of this estimate, it should be noted that effective measures for economic warfare against the Soviet bloc would involve substantial cost. This cost would probably include, *inter alia*, loss of the imports of Western Europe from the Soviet bloc which are of significance to their economies, and would require a redirection of trade. This estimate makes no attempt, however, to balance off the costs of economic warfare against its advantages.

rent tactical operations) and might ultimately affect the Korean war itself. Unless the Soviet Union were engaged in supplying major campaigns elsewhere, it would have the capability, despite certain stringencies in its economy, of supplying China's essential military requirements, but it is uncertain how much the flow of Soviet supplies to China could be stepped up without creating critical transportation difficulties. The effect of these difficulties together with the drain caused by the Korean war might, conditioned upon the degree of resistance, exert a restraining influence upon Chinese plans for further expansion in Southeast Asia or might significantly hamper the execution of such plans if they were put into operation.

Chinese Economy.

7. The industrial centers of China which are largely the product of Western capitalism are peculiarly dependent upon the West for raw materials, for supplies, and for industrial spare parts, and, indeed, even for the maintenance of some of the barest essentials of an industrial type of society. A program of economic warfare, by depriving these centers of their imports, would consequently have a serious effect on their economy and would increase the problems of internal control there. In addition, a well enforced program of economic warfare would make Communist China more dependent on the very limited Chinese rail facilities connecting with the USSR. Such a program would have increasingly serious effects. It would hamper current industrial production, retard industrial development and might seriously limit China's ability to sustain large-scale military operations. If continued for a long enough time, it might even threaten the internal stability of the regime.

DISCUSSION

Vulnerabilities of the USSR and its Eastern European Satellites.*

8. In 1950 the USSR and its Eastern European Satellites imported roughly $1.4 to $1.6 billion worth of goods from the outside world. While the amount is only about one percent of the aggregate national output of the Soviet bloc, it consisted primarily of items essential for military preparedness and for expansion of the basic industries of the Soviet orbit. It included, in particular, equipment embodying Western technical improvements, some of which was imported to serve as models for Soviet copies. Inability of the Soviet bloc to procure essential import requirements would seriously retard economic and technological development in many lines.

* A more detailed discussion of these vulnerabilities is contained in OIR Report No. 5467 of 26 January 1951, *Vulnerability of the Soviet Bloc to Existing and Tightened Western Export Controls.*

Low Industrial Productivity of the Soviet Bloc.

9. The very low per capita income both in the USSR and in the Satellites reflects an economy with a very limited total area for adjustments which might be necessitated by measures of economic warfare directed against the bloc. It reflects on the other hand the existence of an authoritarian regime which has the power to ration consumers to the barest subsistence level and consumers inured to such a low level. This means that adjustments in the Soviet economy which might be necessitated by measures of economic warfare may be feasible even though they have to take place within an area of extremely limited maneuverability.

10. There are very few economic resources within the Soviet bloc which are not in much shorter supply than in the Western bloc. Thus, even in the case of general purpose steel, which is not estimated to constitute a

commodity in critical shortage for the Soviet bloc, both total production and per capita production are for example only a fraction of that of the US or of the Western bloc. Consequently total steel production in the USSR would not at the present time allow, for example, a large merchant ship construction program or a great expansion in the number of automobiles without a drastic curtailment of war materials. This relatively low production of steel thus constitutes a sharp limitation upon the industrial capabilities of the Soviet Union in comparison with those of the US or of the entire Western bloc. The Soviet economy, however, is adjusted to present supplies of steel produced domestically, and since the USSR does not rely to a significant degree upon imports of finished general purpose steel, there is only limited vulnerability to economic warfare in the case of steel or of other commodities in like status.

11. Quite different is the case of most of the commodities and facilities discussed below. In these cases the shortage is deemed critical not primarily because quantities available are low in comparison with those available to the Western Powers, but because a significant proportion of the quantities used by the Soviet economy have been imported and are not likely to be replacable without substantial additional cost to the economy.

Fuel and Power.

12. Of the three main sources of power—coal, petroleum, and electricity—the Soviet bloc is least vulnerable with respect to coal.

13. Petroleum production and stocks are adequate for a reasonable rate of peacetime economic development and for initial military campaigns, but they would probably be insufficient to support the requirements of a large-scale war of long duration involving strategic air operations, especially if some of the refining facilities were destroyed. Expansion of crude oil output in excess of planned goals has been achieved through over-intensive utilization of facilities. There are shortages of many types of oil field equipment, ranging from geophysical prospecting instruments to drills, rigs, and essential pipe and tubing. The shortage of refining capacity for the production of 100 octane aviation gasoline and high grade lubricating oils is of particular importance. At present there are indications that air units are rationed in the use of aviation gasoline, which may be due, however, to transportation difficulties and/or stockpiling as well as to the low refining capacity.

14. In electric power the USSR and its Satellites have not been able to provide the generating capacity envisaged by the state planners, despite large imports of equipment from abroad. Major items in short supply are steam and hydroelectric turbines and generators, switching and control equipment, large power transformers, steam boilers and boiler tubes, electrical indicating and recording instruments, and electric motors of over 200 h.p. Expansion of electric power capacity has a leading priority throughout the bloc, and inability to obtain the equipment necessary would impede the expansion of many other industries and retard the development of reserve capacity so necessary in the event of destruction during war.

Metals, Metal Products, and Metallurgical Equipment.

15. (a) Copper and lead are in short supply in both the Soviet and Satellite economies. Copper is among the most critical of the metal shortages and in wartime direct military requirements in this metal are extremely high. In 1950 Soviet output of copper totaled between 250,000 and 300,000 tons and imports ranged between 50,000 and 100,000 tons. Practically all of those import requirements were supplied by Western sources.

(b) The Satellites continue to acquire tin and tin alloys from the West, although the inclusion of China in the bloc has made such procurement less imperative. Imports of Chinese tin would be sufficient for minimum peacetime needs but would be insufficient to make up the deficit in wartime.

(c) Zinc, tungsten, nickel, bronze, and brass are in tight supply. Soviet requirements for nickel in the atomic energy program make this item particularly important. The deficiency in tungsten can be partly offset by Chinese supplies.

(d) Cobalt, mercury, and cadmium have reportedly been smuggled into the USSR, indicating a shortage of and an intense interest in acquiring these items.

(e) Aluminum capacity is satisfactory with the possible exception of facilities for producing aluminum foil.

16. The Soviet bloc economies have adjusted to limited but increasing supplies of steel. Consequently, even though the quantities available are far below those of the Western Powers, carbon steel is not likely to constitute a critical shortage. There is, however, a particular stringency in high grade alloy steel, and in certain products such as seamless pipes and tubing, and steel wire and cable. Czechoslovak and Polish steel production depend to a considerable degree upon high grade Swedish iron ore. If the supply of this ore were cut off, it would at the least force extensive plant and equipment changes in these countries. The achievement of planned goals for iron and steel production, particularly in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, would be retarded by inability to procure necessary equipment from the West.

Non-Metallic Minerals and Selected Manufactures.

17. In this category shortages are evident in industrial diamonds and other industrial gemstones, graphite and electrodes, piezoelectric quartz, manufactures of mica and possibly asbestos brake lining. Although these shortages affect many key industries in the Soviet bloc, the relatively small bulk represented by several of the above items (particularly industrial gemstones) makes circumvention of controls through clandestine shipments relatively simple.

Chemicals.

18. The USSR and its Satellites are relatively self-sufficient in raw materials for the chemical industry, except for sulphur and pyrites. Production facilities for basic chemicals are adequate for current requirements, although the industry would be hard pressed to supply a major war effort of long duration. The key items in short supply are the special chemicals, many of which the Soviet have attempted to procure from the West. These include plastics, pharmaceuticals, rubber chemicals and carbon black, and chemical cellulose of nitrating grade. In the equipment line, it is believed that export controls on such items as glass lined equipment, special valves, reactors, vacuum and pressure pumps and recording and control apparatus could be an important factor in retarding the expansion of capacity in lines important to the military potential.

Rubber and Rubber Products.

19. Unrestricted purchases of natural rubber during the past three years have enabled the USSR to bridge one of the most vulnerable gaps in its strategic supply position, and, by providing stockpiles for future needs, have greatly strengthened the Soviet military position. Future restrictions on natural rubber shipments would, of course, force the Soviet Union to dip into its stockpile sooner than it intends, both for its own use and for its Satellites. The Soviet synthetic rubber industry presently produces between 220,000 and 270,000 tons of synthetic rubber annually, and thus requires about 75,000 to 90,000 tons per year of natural rubber for admixture. In the production of tires even though rubber stocks are adequate, other difficulties detract from the quantity and quality of tire output. Strict Western control over shipments of all sizes of tires, together with embargoes on tire-manufacturing equipment, tire cord, and carbon black, would be among the most effective means of exploiting this vulnerability.

Cotton, Wool, and Hard Fibers.

20. A Western embargo on cotton and wool fiber exports to the USSR and Eastern Europe would not have a critical effect upon the economy of the bloc as a whole. The impact upon the USSR would not be serious in view of the relatively small share of Soviet imports compared with domestic output. It would necessitate the closing down of some textile plants in such industrial Satellite countries as Poland and Czechoslovakia, which have a well developed textile industry of long standing, but lack the broad domestic raw material bases that the Soviet Union possesses. Some difficulties are likely to be experienced, principally

in the USSR as a result of the loss of high-quality grades of both cotton and wool. The Soviets are aware of this deficiency and have purchased large quantities of wool for stockpile from Australia. Reduced supplies could be partially offset by increased domestic production of synthetic fibers, particularly in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Eastern Germany and by temporary withdrawals from stocks. Military and industrial requirements would be given priority in the allocation of supplies, and the main brunt of any reduction arising out of Western controls would have to be borne by the civilian consumer.

21. Cessation of imports of hard fibers (sisal, jute, and henequen) into the Soviet bloc would create some stringencies, but probably not have any disastrous effect on the industrial and military economy because of the ability to use domestic fibers as substitutes.

Metalworking Machine Tools.

22. Increased restrictions on Western exports of machine tools would seriously impede development of Soviet and Satellite economic potential. Western trade restrictions on certain complex types could create bottlenecks within a short period of time, for example, in the manufacture of precision gears for certain types of aircraft. Soviet bloc efforts to get machine tools of numerous types—multi-spindle automatic lathes, honing and lopping machines, horizontal combination boring, drilling and milling machines, etc.—are strong evidences of the importance of those items to total Soviet economic development.

Electronics Equipment.

23. Although the Soviet bloc has developed most lines of electronics production, it has not been able to develop a comprehensive enough electronics industry to produce a large enough volume of materials, component parts, and items which might well be of critical importance in the prosecution of a war. Intensive efforts have been made to secure raw materials, electronic equipment and components, production equipment and technical information through both overt and covert trade channels. Denial of Western exports in those lines would seriously hamper Soviet bloc electronics development and production. These weaknesses would be felt in the fields of radar, guided missiles, radio, aircraft navigational aids and atomic energy. Internal adjustments by the USSR and its Satellites would not be able satisfactorily to offset this deficiency.

Precision Instruments.

24. The Soviet bloc has the same vulnerability to restrictions on shipments of precision instruments that it has in the case of electronic equipment. The entire orbit is critically short of a number of specialized measuring, analytical, and control instruments essential for a wide range of industrial and military demands. Items in short supply include such basic instruments as spectographs, vacuum measuring gauges and pyrometers.

Abrasives.

25. The impact of increased restrictions of Western exports of abrasive materials would be felt directly in the metal working optical and precision instrument industries. This in turn would affect the output of such items as bearings, range finders and precision gears. Important deficiencies in abrasives include white aluminum oxide, silicon carbide, and certain specialized grinding wheels. Certain Satellite states are currently attempting to develop an abrasives industry, but it will probably not be a significant factor in the economy for at least five years.

Bearings.

26. Current production of all types of antifriction bearings in the Soviet bloc is quantitatively and qualitatively below minimum industrial and military requirements. Industry throughout the orbit is strongly dependent on non-orbit sources of bearing supplies, particularly in the case of specialized and precision type bearings. Since the end of the war the USSR has been forced to import an estimated 10 to 20 million units yearly from Western countries for use in a wide variety of vital machinery and end products including aircraft engines and tanks. In the production of bearings for jet aircraft, for example, the Soviets rely heavily on non-orbit sources. The

sizeable postwar procurement program of the Soviet bloc has probably provided a reserve of some types and sizes; nevertheless, antifriction bearings represent a category which is definitely vulnerable to Western export restrictions. Cessation of shipments would have a substantial impact on capacity for military and industrial production.

Construction and Road Building Machinery.

27. The Soviet bloc is dependent on non-orbit sources for a high percentage of its total requirements for construction and road building equipment, particularly the heavier and more specialized types. If the bloc were forced to rely on domestic production of this equipment, the development of capabilities for the *rapid* construction of such projects as military installations, air strips, and strategic roads will be greatly limited.

Transportation Equipment.

28. One of the greatest shortages in the Soviet bloc's internal transportation system is in railroad rails. This shortage has reduced the normal maintenance replacement of worn rails and is a factor in failures to meet railroad construction plans. This deficiency however would not be a critical limitation in wartime. It is not viewed as acute because right-of-way maintenance is apparently above minimum operating levels, and because new line construction of economic as well as strategic importance has been going on throughout the orbit area. The capacity of the Eastern European Satellites to roll rails has been increased and supply should be easier in 1951.

29. Other shortages include: tank cars, tank trucks, heavy-burden freight cars (including well-cars), tires and tubes, motor vehicle spare parts, motor trucks, locomotives, railway signal equipment, and safety devices. None of these shortages is sufficiently critical to force a breakdown in the system, but they deprive the transportation system of a valuable cushion in wartime and in peacetime cause temporary bottlenecks in the distribution system.

Merchant Shipping.

30. The limited capabilities of the Soviet bloc merchant fleets force a strong dependence upon foreign flag shipping sources and represent a major vulnerability within the bloc. Approximately 65 percent of the value of Soviet bloc imports and about 57 percent of the value of its exports in trade with countries outside the bloc is carried by merchant vessels. The majority of this trade is presently carried by the vessels of non-Soviet nations. An analysis of shipping engaged in trading between Soviet and Satellite ports and the ports of non-Soviet nations during November 1950 revealed that nearly 90 percent of the vessels involved were of non-Soviet registry. Western measures designed to control the availability of shipping to the Soviet bloc through limitations on the export of items for use in expansion of shipbuilding facilities, through refusal to build ships for Soviet account and especially through denial of shipping itself would seriously limit the ability of the bloc to obtain transport both for its imports and exports.

Air Transport.

31. The USSR through its Czechoslovak and Polish Satellites maintains a network of air routes serving the principal European countries in addition to connections with Iran and Afghanistan in the Middle East. A vigorous Western civil aviation policy toward the USSR and its Satellites would not only help contain the Kremlin's efforts to extend its international air network, but would force the retrenchment and cessation of a number of important connections. The effective application of US export controls on aircraft parts and equipment would force changes and reductions in Czech airline schedules and has even caused over-intensive utilization of aircraft and inadequate maintenance. The Soviet bloc economy is not strongly dependent on these airlines, but inability to maintain these airlines would have many non-commercial disadvantages.

Replacement Parts.

32. The entire orbit constantly needs replacement parts for the vast amount of assorted foreign equipment acquired in former years. A large percentage of the inventory of industrial equipment in the Soviet sphere is of foreign manufacture. For example, it is estimated that approximately 35 percent of the machine tools in operation in the USSR are Western built. The bulk of this equipment is now over five years old and is already beginning to present serious maintenance problems because of the non-availability of spare parts and the difficulty encountered in manufacturing them in the USSR or the Satellites. The problem is further complicated by the fact that most of this equipment is of an especially complex type, purposely obtained from abroad because of Soviet inability to produce it domestically. An estimated 75 percent of Soviet specialized machine tools are of foreign make. The constantly growing spare parts problem is, therefore, concentrated in the weakest and most important sector of the Soviet orbit industrial establishment.

Technical Aid.

33. In view of its quantitative and qualitative deficiencies in technical resources, the Soviet bloc would probably gain most by obtaining the services of experienced engineers. Their "know-how" would enable the Soviet Government to make better use of the industrial resources which it controls and to introduce new techniques in those industries which have been developed in the USSR relatively recently. It is very likely that full use of foreign technical assistance, if it were available, would still be hampered by insufficient skilled workers and by political interference; but aside from these two retarding factors, the principal obstacle to technological progress in the Soviet sphere is the lack of sufficient technicians who can bridge the gap between a working model and quantity production, between a flow chart of some new process and the operating installation. Judging by the number and persistence of Soviet attempts to get technical data in recent years, the bloc's most pressing need for technical assistance is in such fields as electronics, specialized metalworking machinery, testing equipment, rubber products, special chemicals, and petroleum refining. Needless to say, the published and unpublished technological literature which the bloc has procured or sought to procure would provide information that is applicable in practically all branches of industry, but the USSR and advanced Satellite countries undoubtedly use such information primarily in the fields just mentioned and in other industries that directly support military production. The problem of enforcing controls to exploit this vulnerability is of course a very difficult and in some cases impossible one.

Major Vulnerabilities.

34. Main obstacles to development of the Soviet bloc economy are the lack of skills, technical "know-how" and fabricating facilities. There are relatively few critical raw material shortages at current levels of production. The USSR and its Satellites are aware of these deficiencies and are exerting strenuous efforts to improve their capabilities for sustained military operations. In addition to their efforts to expand the over-all economic potential for war through increased capacity in such basic lines as steel, electric power, coal, petroleum, and transportation, they are giving special attention to the correction of deficiencies in certain key items * including: certain types of electronic equipment; precision instruments; copper and tin; natural rubber; special chemicals; ball and roller bearings; merchant vessels; special types of production equipment; and a wide variety of replacement parts and equipment components. There is also, of course, an intense effort to procure technical "know-how," materials, parts and equipment for production of a wide variety of weapons.

Cumulative Effects of Vulnerabilities Resulting from Controls.

35. The effect of an economic warfare program which denied significant quantities of critical items to the Soviet economy could be expected to go substantially beyond the mere summation of the separate and direct effects. Shortages would ramify widely throughout

* It is emphasized that there are many deficiencies other than those here enumerated.

the economy and one shortage would in many cases compound the effect of others. The total effect of such a program, well coordinated and well enforced, would seriously retard development of the capabilities of the Soviet bloc to wage a prolonged war and thus might correspondingly influence a decision concerning such a venture.

Soviet Bloc Capabilities to Minimize the Effect of Controls.

36. Largely as a result of export controls, direct US shipments to the Soviet bloc have become relatively insignificant. The Soviet bloc, however, has benefitted from the lack of complete parallel action by other non-Soviet nations. Many Western nations have recently displayed a greater willingness to cooperate on export controls, but progress in the preparation of a sufficiently inclusive list has been slow. The effectiveness of an economic warware program would depend to a large extent on parallel action by the non-Soviet countries.

37. In addition to the lack of parallel controls, a widespread net of more or less covert trade channels has developed in recent years through which the Soviet bloc continues to obtain products on Western control lists. The intense efforts of the Soviet bloc to secure these items by burdensome circuitous and expensive channels is one measure of the urgency of its requirements. On the other hand, the substantial volume of this trade is a measure of the partial ineffectiveness of the current Western control program. This gap in enforcement could be closed to a significant extent through the cooperation of the non-Soviet countries and the application of instruments of economic warfare not widely employed at present, or not employed at all. Those measures would include: preclusive buying; black listing; foreign funds controls; and denial of shipping facilities. Despite these measures some restricted items would, of course, still get through, especially those of small bulk or those with numerous sources of supply.

38. In those cases where it would be impossible for the Soviet bloc to procure vitally needed imports, compensating internal adjustments could in some cases be made. The USSR could order a stricter control over the distribution and utilization of critical items within and between members of the orbit. This procedure would be feasible because of the high degree of integration of the Soviet and Satellite economies. Labor, fabricating facilities, and materials would be reallocated in an effort to produce the products previously imported. Synthetics and substitutes would be utilized wherever possible.

39. The full effect of these measures, however, would not offset adequately the damage resulting from Western trade restrictions. Presumably the bloc, through its planned economies, is operating under a scheme of allocations which has already been decided as the best possible arrangement. Reallocation of labor, materials, fabricating facilities, and products is not always feasible, and when it can be accomplished it is time-consuming, inefficient, and is generally less satisfactory than the previously adopted program. In view of the fact that Soviet plans have already provided for an allocation of resources giving top priority to the development of capacity for military production and heavy industry as opposed to consumers goods, reallocation of priorities can take place only within an already narrowed area. Any general change in the planned pattern of allocation would certainly retard the development of the economic potential for war.

5. SNIE 100-8-58, 7 October 1958, *Implications of an Increase in US-Soviet Trade*



5. *(Continued)*



5. *(Continued)*

CONFIDENTIAL

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IMPLICATIONS OF AN INCREASE IN US-SOVIET TRADE

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the implications within the Bloc and the Free World of an increase in US-USSR trade.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Soviets probably genuinely desire an increase in US-USSR trade. The possibilities for expanding this trade are severely restricted, however, by the limited range of Soviet goods likely to be marketable in the US, by US administrative and legislative measures in the fields of commercial policy and economic defense, and by the uncertainty of private US business reaction. We believe it reasonable to assume that if the US were to modify certain administrative restrictions, especially export licensing, US export to the USSR might expand over the next few years to about $100–150 million annually. While the USSR would probably not be able to balance trade at this level by its own direct export of goods to the US, it could make up the residual amount by reexports, transfers of free exchange, and by selling more gold to the Free World. *(Paras. 5, 7, 9, 14)*

2. An increase in imports from the US of the volume and composition postulated in this estimate would have little impact on the Soviet economy. The consumers goods industry could benefit the most if the Soviet leaders so decided; in some cases, however, the imported machinery and equipment could be used to increase the output of commodities for use in more basic industry. Assuming US control on the export of strategic goods, we believe the postulated increase in trade would have little effect on Soviet military potential. Soviet trade with underdeveloped countries or Communist China would not be significantly affected. *(Paras. 15–20)*

3. The Soviet leaders probably believe that increased trade with the US would strengthen their line of peaceful coexistence, diminish US ability to maintain Western trade controls and a generally strong anti-Communist position, and create frictions in the West as various countries found themselves in competition with the US for Soviet trade. We do not believe that these developments would occur to a significant degree. Most non-Communist countries would favorably view an increase in US-USSR trade as a sign that world tensions were relaxing. This would not be true of South Korea and Nationalist China, however, or among

some elements in other countries. Japan, as well as many underdeveloped countries, would become less receptive than they are today to US advice against expanding economic relations with the Bloc. *(Paras. 8, 21)*

4. In the final analysis the view taken by most countries would depend largely upon the impact which increased US-USSR trade had upon the trade of those countries. It is possible that certain countries would be adversely affected by US competition in the Soviet market or, more probably, by an increase in Soviet raw material exports to the US. We believe that at the postulated levels of trade such effect would in general be small. Nevertheless, substantial increase in US imports of certain specific commodities from the USSR might seriously damage the trade or the foreign exchange position of particular Free World countries. *(Paras. 21–23)*

DISCUSSION

I. INTRODUCTION

5. The possibility of a substantial increase in US-USSR trade was raised by Khrushchev's letter to President Eisenhower, 2 June 1958. Khrushchev proposed that the USSR would buy non-strategic industrial equipment, especially for the production of synthetic materials and consumer goods, and would sell to the US in return basic commodities, including manganese and chrome ore, asbestos, lumber, furs, and possibly some machinery and equipment of modern design. To accelerate the expansion of trade, he suggested that the US provide long term commercial credits. He also proposed the conclusion of licensing agreements, exchange of technical information, and an inter-governmental agreement to regulate economic relations between the two countries.

6. Khrushchev's proposal, although generally businesslike in tone, was probably in the first instance a propaganda gesture. Whether or not it was accepted, it would further the Soviet line of "peaceful coexistence" by appearing to respond positively to US proposals that world trade be increased. It asserted that US industry would be interested in getting orders "now," an obvious reference to the US recession, the impact of which has been overestimated by the Soviets. Moreover, the fact that Khrushchev referred to trade in the "billions" demonstrates the propaganda aspects of the note. He is certainly aware that the Soviet Union does not have exports sufficiently attractive to the US market to support trade at such a level; he must also be aware that there is only the most remote chance that the US, in present circumstances, would extend large and long term credits to the USSR.

7. Nevertheless, we believe that the Soviet Union genuinely desires an increase in its trade with the US — a trade which in 1957 comprised exports to the US of $16.8 million and imports from the US of only $4.5 million. The Soviet effort to strengthen its industrial base and to increase the availability of consumer goods would be facilitated by obtaining technologically advanced machinery and equipment from the US, e.g., for the petrochemical and plastic industries. The Soviets would thus avoid some of the costs of development, and, as Khrushchev pointed out to the Central Committee in May 1958, could save much time by importing plant from the US, UK, and West Germany. If in addition, they could obtain long term US credits, they could acquire the facilities to increase production with a minimum initial drain on their own resources.

8. The Soviet leaders almost certainly also believe that important political gains would flow from a substantial increase in Soviet trade with the US. In their view, it would be likely to strengthen the Moscow line of peaceful

coexistence and to weaken the effectiveness of US efforts to maintain a strong anti-Communist position. The Soviet leaders probably believe that such a development would further diminish the US ability to maintain Western trade controls. They may also think increased trade with the US would create divisive frictions in the West as other Western industrial countries observed the US increasing its share of the Soviet market.

II. POTENTIAL MAGNITUDE OF US-USSR TRADE

9. Despite Soviet desire to expand US-USSR trade, it is difficult to estimate the extent to which this trade might realistically be expected to increase, and to judge the permanence of such an increase if it were to occur. The primary factors involved would be the ability of the Soviet Union to make available for export commodities which could be sold in the US, the willingness of the US government to relax legal and administrative discriminations against trade with the USSR, and the willingness of private US industry to do business with the Soviet Union.

10. Judging by the Soviet goods which we believe potentially available for export to the US, it is almost certain that the Soviet Union would have difficulty in increasing its exchange earning capacity. The US now obtains from non-Communist sources virtually all its imports of the raw materials mentioned by Khrushchev. Further, for manganese and chrome in particular — at one time major Soviet exports to the US — many of the new sources to which the US has turned have been developed by US private and government capital, and supplies appear ample. While the USSR could undercut existing prices of these materials, it would have to be wary of charges of dumping, which could result in additional US restrictions. While the Soviet leaders would probably be willing to sell some types of machinery in which they have made innovations, there would not be enough of such items to yield a significant return. The Soviets would be unlikely to make the effort necessary to market ordinarily competitive types of machinery and equipment in quantity to US importers.

11. Existing US measures tending to restrict US-USSR trade also pose a formidable obstacle to any increase in such trade. Congress has enacted laws under which the import of crabmeat and certain furs of Soviet origin is prohibited and most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment is specifically denied the Soviet Union, thus depriving it of the tariff benefits negotiated since 1934. The lack of MFN tariff treatment would be a most significant obstacle to US imports of manganese ore and ferroalloys from the USSR. More important, perhaps, it would hinder US imports of Soviet goods which have not historically been part of US-USSR trade but which would probably have to enter the trade to finance a really substantial volume of Soviet purchases here. The USSR and other communist countries also place a high symbolic value on MFN treatment and would undoubtedly make it a major objective in any trade negotiations with the US. US export controls continue to be more stringent than those recently agreed to by the members of COCOM. Finally, the Battle and Johnson Acts prohibit governmental and private loans to the USSR; under present legal interpretations US exporters or banks could grant no more than 180-day commercial credit to the Soviet Union.

12. Even if the US government acted to facilitate trade with the USSR, the response of US private industry is uncertain. It would obviously depend in the first instance on the profitability of specific deals. Even so, many US importers would probably be reluctant to switch from established sources of supply, especially in view of their uncertainty as to the permanence and reliability of the USSR as a source. Many US manufacturers would be reluctant to give the Soviets access to equipment embodying advanced technology, fearing that the Russians would choose to compete in third country markets. Others, feeling that trade with the USSR would be sporadic and risky, might be reluctant to undertake the retooling and plant modification necessary to meet Soviet specifications. Finally, American private business often foresees public relations difficulties in trade with the USSR, even though the transaction may

be entirely legal, and therefore would probably move cautiously in the matter.

13. As to the permanence of Soviet desire for expanded trade with the US and other advanced countries, pre-1941 performance suggests that the fear of a one-shot operation, or at least of highly irregular Soviet levels of demand, is well-founded. Khrushchev's offer emphasized the Soviet desire to buy plant, equipment, and technology rather than finished products, and it may be that in many areas the Soviets would proceed to produce their own and not draw further on the West. However, it appears likely that the West will continue to develop a variety of processes attractive to the USSR; imports of Western machinery would also, as a practical matter, ease the pressure which growing internal development and demands from other Bloc countries have placed on Soviet machinery and equipment industries. Hence, the aggregate of Soviet demand for machinery and equipment should continue and even grow at a fairly steady pace. Moreover, while the Soviets still adhere basically to a doctrine of self-sufficiency, they have in fact attained this goal in virtually all key sectors of the economy, in terms of capacity for emergency purposes, and can thus afford to accept a degree of dependence on the West in non-critical fields. Thus, there may be a continuing growth in Soviet willingness to buy finished products from the West.

14. In view of these conflicting factors, it is clearly impossible to make any firm prediction of the extent to which US trade with the USSR might realistically be expected to increase. For the purposes of this paper, we believe it reasonable to assume that if the US encouraged such trade by taking administrative action to liberalize export licensing policy and to minimize import discriminations, exports to the USSR might expand to about $100–150 million annually over the space of the next few years. This figure reflects an estimate of Soviet requirements for imported machinery in light of their Seven Year Plan, and a consideration of the possible magnitude of Soviet exports to the US.[1] While the USSR would probably not be able to balance trade at this level by its own direct export of goods to the US, it could make up the residual amount by reexports, transfers of free exchange, and by selling more gold to the Free World. This assumption of a trade expanded to $100–150 million does not allow for an increase which might occur if US credits and MFN tariff treatment were made available to the USSR — developments which would require legislative rather than merely administrative action.

III. EFFECTS WITHIN THE BLOC OF INCREASED US-USSR TRADE

A. Economic

15. Should the USSR import machinery and equipment from the US in approximately the assumed amounts, it would of course gain certain advantages. We cannot, however, give any exact estimate of the size or extent of these advantages. The total value of the imports — $150 million — is an insignificant percentage of the total value of Soviet domestic production of machinery and equipment — $25 billion. Moreover, the net gain to the USSR would be but a small proportion of the $150 million, since the imports would have to be paid for by exports drawn from the Soviet domestic economy. It is clear, however, that the advantages accruing to the USSR would be greater than these figures indicate to the extent that the Soviet imported complete plants of advanced design, or types of machinery and equipment they themselves had never produced. Such imports would permit savings of development capital and of the time of relatively scarce trained personnel. By importing complete plants, the USSR could reduce the time needed to reach a full production run.

16. The effects of increased trade in terms of output of specific industrial categories or of specific commodities would depend wholly on decisions made by the Soviet leaders. Soviet leaders would be able to use the new equip-

[1] See annex, *Possible Size and Composition of US-Soviet Trade.*

ment either to increase output or to reduce the cost of production at the existing level. The Soviet leaders would also, in some cases, have the option of using the imported machinery either to facilitate an expansion of consumers goods production or to increase output of commodities for use in more basic industries. Importation of plant for the petrochemical industry would assist Soviet efforts to shift from agricultural products to petroleum as the principal source of raw materials for the production of synthetic rubber, alcohol, and other chemical products.

17. With respect to military production, we assume US export controls will prevent the movement to the USSR of strategic commodities. On this basis the increase in trade projected in this estimate would have slight effect on the Soviet military potential. However, improvements in the chemical and synthetic industries, for example, would make for some additional flexibility in the range of materials available for military production and might cut the costs of production of these or other items.

18. Increased trade with the US, of the assumed level and character, would have little effect on Soviet trade with the underdeveloped countries or with the rest of the Bloc. The bulk of Soviet exports to these countries consists of arms and military equipment, raw materials, and basic industrial machinery and equipment; it does not include technologically advanced equipment of the type which the Soviet Union apparently hopes to obtain from the US.

B. Political

19. The postulated expansion of US-USSR trade, by itself, would probably have little or no impact on the attitude of Soviet leaders or of the Soviet public toward the US. Even if the gains from this increased trade were turned largely toward improving the Soviet standard of living, the USSR's own contribution to such a program would be so large that the US contribution, even if publicly admitted, would be almost completely overshadowed.

20. We do not believe that an increase of trade between the US and the USSR would have any appreciable political or economic effect upon the European Satellites or upon Communist China. The governments of the European Satellites might, if they saw US-USSR trade expanding, seek to increase the trade of their own countries with the US, and they would probably expect neither the US nor the USSR to pose any insuperable political objection to such an increase. Some of the people of the European Satellites might be discouraged by evidence of improving relations between the US and the USSR; we believe, however, that such an effect would not be of long-term significance.

IV. EFFECTS ON THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD OF THE INCREASED US-USSR TRADE

21. From a political point of view, most non-Communist countries would probably welcome the prospect of an increase in trade between the US and the USSR. They would view it as a sign that world tensions were relaxing, and that the danger of war was lessening. Many of them would consider that the US had come around to a more realistic trade policy. At the same time, it is virtually certain that some elements in many countries, and the governments at least of South Korea and Nationalist China, would regard the development as signifying another capitulation by the US to the USSR. The Japanese government would be highly resentful that the US government had changed its own policy after pressing the Japanese to move cautiously in their trade with the Bloc and to minimize their political and economic relations with Communist China. Many underdeveloped countries would be even less willing than they are today to listen to US warnings concerning the dangers of expanding economic relations with the Bloc. Reactions would be affected to a considerable extent by the timing and handling of the US move and the circumstances of the international situation. But in the final analysis, the view taken by most countries would depend largely upon the impact which the increase of US-USSR trade had upon the trade of these countries.

22. Should the US export to the USSR the types of goods which we discuss in the Annex to this paper, it would find itself in competition with Western European and perhaps Japanese exporters. If this competition led to a reduction of presently existing levels of Western European or Japanese exports to the USSR it would certainly become an irritant in US relations with the countries concerned. It is probable, however, that the total amount of Soviet imports from the non-Communist world would increase sufficiently to allow not only for the projected increase in imports from the US, but for an increase of imports from other countries as well. Moreover, the US is now in competition with Western European exporters in many third areas without giving rise to serious political problems. We believe, therefore, that increased US exports to the USSR would not lead to significant political difficulty with other non-Communist countries. Nevertheless, it is possible that irritations could arise from this cause, especially if the general level of trade in the Free World was low. There might also be certain particular lines of US exports which would displace the corresponding lines of certain other countries. Finally, the possibility cannot be excluded that the USSR itself would deliberately take US goods and exclude the goods of certain other countries in order to cause friction in the Western alliance.

23. As for US imports from the USSR, some countries selling to the US would be adversely affected by competition of Soviet raw materials in the US market. There would be minor reductions in the dollar earnings in some cases, but at the levels of US-Soviet trade we have postulated the effect would in general be small. It would be necessary to consider, however, whether a substantial increase in US imports of some specific commodity from the USSR might seriously damage the trade or the foreign exchange position of some particular Free World country. For example, substantial US imports of manganese from the USSR might displace imports of the same commodity from India, and imports of forest products from the USSR might displace those from Scandinavia. The degree of such displacement, and its political and economic effects, could only be judged after study of the particular commodities involved and of the trade patterns which would be disturbed.

ANNEX

POSSIBLE LEVEL AND COMPOSITION OF FUTURE US-SOVIET TRADE

A. Level of Trade

In recent years Soviet imports of machinery and equipment have probably averaged six to seven percent of the domestic production of these goods. (See Table I.) Assuming that the ratio remains roughly the same, Soviet imports of machinery and equipment in 1962 from other Bloc countries as well as from the Free World would amount to about 2 billion dollars, more than twice their present volume. However, in part because of increasing Chinese and underdeveloped areas demand for European Satellite machinery exports, the USSR in the future will probably purchase a higher proportion of its machinery and equipment imports from the Free World. In these circumstances, it is not unlikely that by 1962 Soviet imports of machinery and equipment from the Free World could increase to about 30 percent of the total import of such goods or approximately $600 million, as compared to about 25 percent in 1956. (See Table II.) Of estimated total imports from the Free World in 1962, it is assumed that not more than 25 percent, or a maximum of $150 million, would come from the United States — this would amount to an increase in the relative importance of Soviet imports of machinery and equipment purchased in the US from one percent to 20–25 percent of total imports of such goods from the Free World.

TABLE I

SOVIET INVESTMENT, PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS OF MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 1955–57 AND 1962
(Billions of 1955 dollars)

Year	Investment	Production	Imports	Import as a percent of Production	Import as a percent of Investment
1955	12.2	11.9	0.9	8	7
1956	15.5	15.2	0.9	6	6
1957 p	17.3	17.1	1.1	6	6
1962 *	25.0–28.0	24–26.3	1.5–2.0	6–7	6–8

p — preliminary
* — estimate

TABLE II

SOVIET IMPORTS OF MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT
(In million US dollars and percent of total)

	1955		1956		1962	
	Value	Percent	Value	Percent	Value	Percent
Sino-Soviet Bloc	744	82.1	666 *	74.4 *	1,400	70.0
Free World	161	19.6	229	25.6	600	30.0
Total	905	100.0	895	100.0	2,000	100.0

* The decreasing share of the Satellites in total Soviet imports of machinery and equipment was undoubtedly accelerated in 1956 by the economic dislocations of the East European revolts.

B. Composition of Trade

Although Khrushchev made only the most general comments concerning the commodity composition of an expanded trade, we believe that on the basis of known Soviet priorities during the forthcoming Seven Year Plan the following would constitute a reasonable estimate of the major categories of goods involved in the trade.

Percent of total

1. Soviet Imports from the US

20–25% Iron ore processing and steel rolling mill plants and equipment: The USSR has need for such equipment to relieve the strain on the already overburdened machine building industry and it is generally conceded that US has technological superiority in iron ore processing.

20–25% Chemical processing plants and equipment: The low technological level of the Soviet petrochemical industry and plans for its substantial development by 1965 assures a relatively high priority to such imports.

15–20% Refrigeration and food processing equipment: The use of refrigeration equipment for the chemical and food industries (both of which are scheduled for considerable expansion by 1965) and US superiority in this field rank such equipment high on Soviet shopping lists in the US.

10–15% Equipment for production of synthetic fiber and for the production of yarn, fabric, and clothing from natural and synthetic fiber: Soviet interest in such equipment is undoubtedly motivated by desire to improve Soviet standard of living. Although orders for such equipment would more likely be placed in Western Europe, the USSR has already exhibited an interest in purchasing US textile plants.

10–15% Metal cutting and forming machine tools; mining and construction machinery; timber, pulp and paper producing plants and equipment; miscellaneous consumer goods, possibly including foodstuffs.

2. Soviet Exports to the US

20–30% Ferroalloys, ferroalloy ores, and concentrates: The United States has traditionally been a major importer of Soviet ferroalloy ores and concentrates. In the pre-war period, for example, more than 25 percent of total Soviet manganese exports were purchased by the US. Presumably, Soviet exports of manganese and chrome ores could again be expanded to meet any increased US demand. However, because of the hiatus in Soviet-American trade during the 1948–58 period, any resumption of large US purchases would entail a shift from now well-established sources of supply located primarily in underdeveloped areas.

20–25% Coal tar chemicals and petroleum products: Benzene has accounted for approximately 40 percent of Soviet exports to the US in recent years. However, because benzene is consumed in the production of synthetic organic chemicals, production of which will rise rapidly in the USSR by 1965, it is expected that total Soviet benzene exports will tend to level off, if not decline, by 1965. Petroleum and petroleum products, however, will continue to be the most readily available of all Soviet potential exports.

10% Furs and forest products: Traditionally a large item in Soviet exports to the US, in recent years fur exports have fluctuated between 30–60 percent of the total, and presently amount to about $4 million. It is estimated that exports in this group could amount to about 10 percent of the total in 1962 ($10 to 15 million).

5. *(Continued)*

15% Precious Metals (other than gold) (5%), cotton linters and waste (5%) and miscellaneous (5%): Platinum and platinum group metals, like cotton linters and waste, have each averaged approximately 5% of total US imports from the USSR. There is little likelihood that given the absolute increases provided in an expanding US-USSR trade, their relative shares in such trade would measurably increase.

15–30% Residual: A Soviet net import surplus from the US could be settled by means of gold sales, sales in the US of commodities purchased from third countries, or credits. Soviet gold resources are estimated to be adequate to meet a residual on this order of magnitude.

Part II

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

70 A

Asia

The Cold War became hot in Asia in 1950. In June of that year Communist North Korea invaded South Korea to unify the country forcibly. The Security Council of the United Nations voted to send UN military assistance to South Korea. The war continued for three years and ended with an armistice in July 1953. In Southeast Asia the Viet Minh, under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap, waged a guerrilla war to prevent the French from reasserting their control over Indochina. The struggle continued until the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954 and the settlement at Geneva that summer.

Three of the four estimates in this section are products of the Korean war. American policymakers requested an assessment of probable Soviet goals in Asia, and the CIA responded with NIE 43 of 13 November 1951, *The Strategic Importance of the Far East to the USSR*. This estimate determined that Soviet expansion into the region would strengthen the USSR's global position, endanger the United States Pacific defenses, drain Western resources, and impair the West's ability to strengthen Europe and the Middle East.

The Soviet Union and Communist China both supported the North Koreans, but how close were the two Communist giants? *Relations Between the Chinese Communist Regime and the USSR: Their Present Character and Probable Future Courses*, NIE 58 of 10 September 1952, was one of the earliest attempts to examine the possibilities of a Sino-Soviet split. The estimate concluded that for the near-term period of 1952-54, "close ideological ties and continuing mutual involvement in the pursuit of common objectives, particularly the elimination of Western influence from the Far East" far outweighed the possibility of a split.

Increasing frustration with the stalemate in Korea led American officials to request a systematic consideration of all options available for ending the war. On 8 April 1953, the Office of National Estimates published SE 41, *Probable Communist Reactions to Certain Possible UN/US Military Courses of Action With Respect to the Korean War*. The estimate argued that widening the war to Manchuria ran the risk of Soviet intervention. If the UN used nuclear weapons against Communist China, the estimate continued, Moscow would recognize that the West was determined to win, although it was not clear that this would force the Communists to sign an armistice.

After the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954 the earlier Korean armistice was important because many American policymakers believed that, having been stopped in Korea, Communist aggression was now challenging Indochina.[1]

[1] During the siege of Dien Bien Phu (March-May 1954) President Eisenhower resisted calls for American air support. Adm. Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, proposed that 60 US B-29 bombers attack the Viet Minh positions around the besieged French force. The French enthusiastically endorsed Operation VULTURE, but Gen. Matthew Ridgway, Army Chief of Staff, strongly opposed the entire concept. President Eisenhower would not even consider Radford's proposal unless Congress approved and American allies, especially Great Britain, supported the strikes. See George C. Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam 1950-1975*, 2d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), pp. 29-37; Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History* (New York: Viking, 1983), pp. 194-98.

Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action With Respect to Indochina. This document, heavy with dissenting footnotes, was written while Eastern and Western representatives at Geneva were attempting to negotiate peace settlements for Korea and Indochina. The estimate assessed how the USSR and Communist China would react to American military intervention, including nuclear strikes against China. Although the "USSR would also begin at least partial mobilization of its own military forces on a war basis" if the United States attacked Chinese targets, this estimate argued that, even if the US attack on China included nuclear weapons, the Soviets "would probably confine [their] operations to the defense of China so long as the US did not attack Soviet territory."

6. NIE 43, 13 November 1951, *The Strategic Importance of the Far East to the USSR* (Excerpts)

[redacted]

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FAR EAST TO THE USSR

NIE—43

Published 13 November 1951

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

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FAR EAST TO THE USSR

NIE—43

The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 5 November.

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THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FAR EAST TO THE USSR*

THE PROBLEM

To assess the immediate and long range strategic importance of the Far East† to the USSR.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The USSR derives numerous and substantial military and economic advantages from the areas of the Far East now under Communist control. This vast, continuous land mass provides valuable bases for launching attacks against the non-Communist Far East and for further political penetration of adjacent areas, and also provides defense in depth to the USSR. Furthermore, it contains a tremendous manpower potential and considerable, though largely undeveloped, resources of strategic raw materials.

2. The loss of Communist control over any presently-held areas would be regarded by the USSR as a blow to its prestige, and the loss in particular of Manchuria, North China, and/or the northernmost part of Korea, would be regarded as a threat to its security.

3. The expansion of Communist control over all of Korea would provide the USSR with the most favorable base for operations against Japan and would deny the West its last foothold on the Northeast Asian mainland.

4. Communist control of Taiwan would not only eliminate the last territorial stronghold of anti-Communist China and the threat which the island now poses as a base for possible military operations against mainland China, but would deprive the West of a link in the offshore island chain and increase Communist capabilities for operations against other island bases.

5. Militarily, the expansion of Communist control into mainland Southeast Asia would be of limited immediate value. Over the long range, Communist control over mainland Southeast Asia, particularly if extended to include Indonesia and the Philippines, could be of great military importance to the USSR.

6. From an economic point of view, control of Southeast Asia would be of considerable strategic importance to the Communists by increasing their capabil-

* For the purposes of this estimate, it is assumed that the USSR and Communist China will subordinate any differences in their strategic assessment of the various areas of the Far East to the pursuit of their common objectives against the West. An estimate of possible divergencies between Moscow and Peiping is in preparation.

† Throughout the paper, the term "non-Communist Far East" will be used when referring to South Korea, Japan, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia (the Philippines, Indochina, Burma, Thailand, Malaya, and Indonesia). The term "Far East" will include the above-mentioned areas as well as Communist China, North Korea, and the Soviet Far East (east of and including the Lake Baikal area).

ities for weakening the West through denying food to India and Japan and denying strategic raw materials to Japan and the industrial countries of the West. Short of general war, such denial would have most serious consequences because Western countries would find it difficult to adopt sufficiently drastic emergency measures. In time of general war, the West would probably initially suffer less through such denial than it did during World War II; it is impossible, however, to estimate the effects in the event of a prolonged war.

7. The rubber of Southeast Asia is a continuing requirement for the USSR. Denial of access to this rubber would oblige the USSR to draw on stockpiles now believed to exist. Such denial over a prolonged period would create serious problems for the USSR. Furthermore, access to rubber, tin, petroleum and possibly other materials of Southeast Asia would be important to the conduct of a prolonged war by the USSR and would be even more important to a major industrial expansion in a Communist Far East.

8. Of the Far Eastern areas not now under Communist control, Japan is of the greatest strategic importance to the USSR. Japan poses the greatest potential threat to Communist military interests in the Far East and is a key element of the US defense line in the Western Pacific. Moreover, Japan, despite serious deficiencies in food and raw materials, would be an important addition to Communist strength because it has the only substantial industrial plant and the largest pool of trained workers and administrators in the Far East. Finally, it would be an essential element in the realization of the region's potential for long range development into a strong, largely self-sufficient power complex.*

9. The possibility of creating such a power complex is probably an important factor in Soviet long-term planning. If such a complex were created, it would in time of war greatly enhance the ability of the Communists to maintain sustained and large scale military operations in the Far East. Moreover, it would add greatly to the Soviet potential for breaching remaining US Pacific defenses and for attacks against the US and Australia.

10. The USSR would encounter important but not insurmountable economic and political problems in developing such a power complex in the Far East even after it secured control over all areas of the region. In time of peace, the development of this complex would almost certainly require a decade or more; in wartime little progress toward that development could be made.

11. Therefore, in its assessment of the strategic importance of the Far East, the USSR is probably more influenced by short-term than by long-term considerations. Any partial expansion in this area, in addition to materially increasing Communist capabilities for gaining control of the entire region, would have such consequences within the framework of East-West relations as: (1) strengthening the Soviet global position relative to that of the West; (2) endangering US Pacific defenses; (3) draining Western resources; and (4) impairing Western measures to strengthen Europe and the Middle East.

* By "power complex" is meant a country or group of closely associated countries with an aggregate of political, economic, and military strength sufficient to exert a significant influence on the world power situation.

DISCUSSION

I. Geographic Factors of Strategic Importance

12. The Far East is far from the major Soviet power centers in western and central USSR. A single railroad line, an inadequate merchant marine, and air transport over vast distances provide the only means of communication between European Russia and Asia. Thus, poor communications presently limit the direct contribution either region can make to the other.

13. The security of the centers of Soviet power west of Lake Baikal cannot easily be threatened from Far Eastern areas now in non-Communist hands. European USSR is secure from ground invasion launched from the east. That part of the USSR most vulnerable to bombing attacks from the Far East (the area from Lake Baikal eastward) probably contains less than 15 percent of the USSR's primary industrial capacity (see Map III).

II. Strategic Importance of Areas Now Under Communist Control

14. The maintenance and consolidation of the present Communist position in the Far East is probably the most important consideration in the Kremlin's strategic assessment of that area. Over and above any positive strategic advantages provided by presently-held Communist areas, the loss of Communist control over any presently held areas, would be regarded by the USSR as a blow to its prestige, and the loss in particular of Manchuria, North China, and/or the northernmost part of Korea, would be regarded as a threat to its security.

Soviet Far East and China

15. Areas now under Communist control provide the Kremlin with numerous and substantial strategic advantages. The Soviet Far East provides the USSR with air and naval bases from which attacks can be launched against South Korea, Japan, Alaska, and the US. Communist China, in addition to providing defense in depth for the Soviet Far East, has air bases which permit long range aircraft to strike at Japan, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines, the Mariannas, mainland Southeast Asia, and all except the extreme eastern and southern areas of the Indonesian archipelago. (See Map II.) China's long coast line also offers potential for naval bases — especially submarine bases — which could extend the USSR's naval operations in the Pacific. From a defensive point of view, however, the coast of China could impose a formidable commitment upon the USSR in view of the very limited Chinese Communist naval forces. Communist China's large and fairly well equipped army and air force are now an important adjunct to Soviet forces in the Far East. In the event of general war, the enormous population of China would supply the Communists with a tremendous pool of manpower for either labor or military service. The amount of manpower drawn into the military services, however, would be subjected to limitations imposed by the requirements of the Chinese economy and the ability of China and the USSR to equip such manpower.

16. Both the Soviet Far East and Communist China have natural resources, most of which have not yet been fully developed but which are even now playing an important role in increasing the Communist war potential in the Far East. Large quantities of coal are located in the Soviet Far East and in Communist China. There are abundant deposits of iron ore in China and probably also in the Soviet Far East. China is already supplying a large part of the Soviet requirements for tin, tungsten, and molybdenum, and deposits of nickel and copper are located in the Soviet Far East. This area also has large lumber resources. Oil deposits exist in the Soviet Far East and in Northwest China.

Korea

17. The USSR almost certainly regards maintenance of Communist control over at least large areas of North Korea as of great strategic importance. Loss of the northernmost

part of Korea would be regarded by the Communists as a threat to the security and a blow to the prestige of both the USSR and Communist China. On the other hand, Communist control over all of Korea would furnish the Communists with the most favorable base for an attack on Japan, and would provide defense in depth for North China, Manchuria, and the Soviet Far East.

III. Strategic Importance of Non-Communist Areas

Taiwan

18. Political considerations currently give Taiwan special significance to Peiping. Control of the island would also provide the Communists with some economic advantages, but Taiwan's principal significance arises from the threat that it now poses to the Communists as a base for military operations against mainland China or raids on Communist shipping. Communist control of Taiwan would not only eliminate this threat but would deprive the West of a link in the offshore island chain and increase Communist capabilities for operations against such other island bases as Okinawa and the Philippines.

Southeast Asia

19. Militarily, the expansion of Communist control into mainland Southeast Asia, would be of limited immediate value. Communist control of mainland Southeast Asia would provide defense in depth to China's southern flank, but present Communist capability for making use of even the few naval and air bases in mainland Southeast Asia is limited. Furthermore, overland and sea communications with bases in the area would be inadequate and would be vulnerable to Western attack. Even if control were extended to the Philippines and Indonesia, the Communists could gain few immediate military advantages, because neither the mainland nor the island area of Southeast Asia possesses a significant pool of trained military manpower or more than a negligible munitions production capacity. Defense of all Southeast Asia would present formidable difficulties because of the great distances involved, and inadequate Soviet and insignificant Chinese Communist naval forces and merchant shipping, and the obstacles to developing strong defenses from the present resources of China and the Soviet Far East. Over the long run, however, many of these deficiencies could be overcome and Communist control over the entire area would provide great military advantages because such control would provide protection to lines of communication in Southeast Asia and advanced bases for further offensive action in the South Pacific and Indian Ocean areas.

20. In their short run strategic assessment of Southeast Asia, therefore, the USSR is probably more influenced by the immediate advantages to be gained by denying the West access to the area than by the immediate military advantages which would accrue to them. Southeast Asia is currently the major Western source of natural rubber, tin, and copra, as well as a secondary source of hard fibers, shellac, chrome, and petroleum. It is also a major source of food for India and Japan. Short of general war, the Western Powers would have most serious problems in adjusting to the loss of Southeast Asian supplies because they would find it difficult to adopt the necessary emergency countermeasures. By the same token, the loss of Malaya's dollar earnings would be a severe blow to the UK and indirectly to the US. The consequent maladjustments that would be created in the strategic material and in the balance of payment positions of the NATO countries could result in a serious setback in the rate of NATO rearmament. In time of general war, the West would also face difficulties if it were denied access to Southeast Asian raw materials, although the initial consequences would be less serious than in World War II as a result of stockpiles, new technical developments in conservation and substitution, and access to alternative sources of supply. It is impossible, however, to estimate the effects in the event of a prolonged war.

21. The economic and political advantages which the Communists would derive from control over Southeast Asia would increase as a Western-oriented Japan became more de-

pendent on the markets and raw materials of this area. The Communists could also use their domination of Southeast Asia to improve their bargaining position with other non-Communist areas. For instance, Communist control over Southeast Asian food surpluses and raw materials could serve as a lever to bring India into closer association with the Communist world and to obtain relaxation of Western export controls.

22. On the other hand, the immediate positive economic contribution Southeast Asia could make to the Soviet and Chinese Communist economies would be limited by the fact that, like the Soviet Far East and China, Southeast Asia is a raw material producing and capital importing area. Nevertheless, the rubber of Southeast Asia is a continuing requirement for the USSR. Denial of access to this rubber would oblige the USSR to draw on stockpiles now believed to exist and over a prolonged period would create serious problems for the USSR. At present, the USSR and Communist China are obtaining few other strategic materials from Southeast Asia. Present Soviet import requirements of tin can be met from Communist China. Moreover, the rice surpluses of Southeast Asia are normally not urgently needed by Communist China or the Soviet Far East. Access to the rubber, tin, petroleum, and possibly other materials of Southeast Asia, however, would be important to the conduct of a prolonged war by the USSR, and would be even more important to a major industrial expansion in a Communist Far East.

Japan

23. Of the non-Communist areas of the Far East, Japan is of the greatest strategic importance to the USSR and Communist China. Japan poses the greatest potential threat to Communist military interests in the Far East. Japan is the principal operational base for UN prosecution of Korean operations. More important, from operational bases in Japan, anti-Communist forces dominate the approaches to the Soviet Far East and northern China and could attack by air or sea all major industrial and military targets in the Communist-held areas of the Far East. As long as Japan provides the US with military bases, the ability of the USSR to attack the US from the Soviet Far East would be sharply curtailed. Conversely, under Communist control, Japan would pose the greatest threat to the US position in the Western Pacific.

24. Japan also possesses the only significant industrialized economy in the Far East as well as the largest pool of skilled workers, technicians, and administrators. Its steel production capacity is nearly 25 percent that of the USSR, it has considerable facilities for the construction of naval and merchant vessels, and, in time, it could re-establish a substantial aircraft and munitions industry. The industrial plants in the Soviet Far East, Manchuria, and China, though small in relation to that of Japan, comprise the only other important industrial elements in the Far East.

25. A Communist Japan could play a key role in the development of the Chinese Communist economy and could supply Southeast Asian requirements for consumer and capital goods. However, exploitation of Japan's industrial plant would require imports of iron ore, coking coal, manganese, and tungsten, available in China, as well as such other raw materials as rice, petroleum, tin, and rubber from Southeast Asia.

IV. Over-all Regional Considerations

Potential for Development into Power Complex

26. The addition of virtually all the non-Communist Far East to presently-held Communist areas would provide the USSR with a combination of countries which, potentially and over the long run, could be developed into a strong industrial and military base largely independent economically of western and central USSR and capable of exerting a significant influence on the world power position.

27. Creation of such a power complex would greatly enhance the ability of the Communists to maintain sustained large scale military operations in the Far East. Communist control of the region would deny the resources of the area to the West, and would add enor-

mously to Soviet prestige throughout the world. Moreover, such a complex, by adding greatly to Soviet capabilities for breaching remaining US Pacific defenses and for attacks against the US and Australia, would pose a severe additional drain on US strength.

28. Even if the Communists were able to secure control of the entire Far Eastern area without provoking a general war, however, they would probably require at least a decade, after such control had been obtained, to develop such a power complex there. The area might be short of petroleum for some time even with full access to Indonesian oil. Dependence on western and central USSR and on the non-Communist world for certain raw materials such as cotton and for highly specialized industrial items could not be quickly ended. With the exception of Japan, the region is deficient in technicians and skilled industrial workers. Above all, owing to Japan's economic dependence on both China and Southeast Asia, full realization of the area's potential would require construction of a large merchant fleet, as well as the naval and air strength to defend the long and vulnerable lines of ocean communication (see Map I). In time of peace, all of these deficiencies could be removed, but only after years of effort.

29. The creation of a Communist-controlled Far Eastern power complex would also confront Moscow with the difficult, though not insurmountable, problem of working out the future relationships of the USSR, Communist China, and a Communist Japan. A Communist Japan and Communist China would almost certainly vie with each other for leadership in the Asian Communist movement as well as in the exploitation of the more backward areas of the Far East. The fact that Japan would be a primary industrial base of the Communist Far East, combined with Japan's modern experience with administering a "co-prosperity sphere," would threaten China's position and influence in the Asiatic Communist movement. The problem of delineating or restricting areas of influence could strain Sino-Soviet as well as Japanese-Soviet relations. Thus in integrating the Far East, the USSR would be confronted with control problems far more difficult than those it faces in the small states of Eastern Europe. Vast distances, inadequate communications, and the pressures of enormous populations on undeveloped resources would further complicate the problem of maintaining effective control over the region and of preventing the emergence of independent Communist movements.

30. Despite these difficulties, the USSR is probably influenced in its long range strategic assessment of the Far East by the region's potential for being developed into a strong, largely self-sufficient power complex. Communist expansion into any area of the Far East would materially increase Communist strength in the area and Communist capabilities for gaining control of the entire region and thus would be a step toward achievement of this power complex.

The Region's Role in Current East-West Relations

31. In addition to being influenced by these strictly Far Eastern considerations, the USSR is probably more influenced in its strategic assessment of the area because of the opportunities which it affords in the immediate framework of East-West relations for strengthening the Soviet global strategic position. Conditions in the Far East are favorable to the Kremlin in its campaign to divide and weaken the non-Communist world. The fighting in Korea and throughout Southeast Asia, as well as such issues as the Japanese Peace Treaty and the recognition of Communist China, can be exploited in an effort to undermine faith in the UN as an instrument for preserving world peace. These issues can also be used in attempting: (a) to increase non-Communist fears of the inevitability of war unless an accommodation is reached with the USSR; and (b) to create conflict between the US and its Western European allies over the diversion of US strength to the Far East.

32. In addition, the nationalism, poverty, and distrust of the West prevalent in the Far East provide the Communists with propaganda

6. *(Continued)*

opportunities for eliciting the support not only of peoples in the Far East but even of other areas of the non-Communist world. These conditions also make the Far East one of the most vulnerable areas of the world to Communist expansion by political warfare and serve the Kremlin in its campaign to drain Western resources, and to obstruct Western measures to strengthen Europe and the Middle East.

7. **NIE 58, 10 September 1952, *Relations Between the Chinese Communist Regime and the USSR: Their Present Character and Probable Future Courses* (Excerpts)**

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME AND THE USSR: THEIR PRESENT CHARACTER AND PROBABLE FUTURE COURSES

NIE-58

Published 10 September 1952

The following member organizations of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.

All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concur in this estimate as of 4 September 1952, [illegible] over the reservation of the Special Assistant, Department of State, [illegible]

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7. *(Continued)*

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RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME AND THE USSR: THEIR PRESENT CHARACTER AND PROBABLE FUTURE COURSES

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the present nature and state of relations between Communist China and the USSR and to estimate the probable courses of these relations over the next two years.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Peiping regime accepts Moscow leadership in the world Communist movement, and is becoming increasingly dependent on the USSR economically and militarily. However, we believe that the Peiping regime retains some capability for independent action, and is in a position to influence the formulation of Communist policy in the Far East.

2. We believe that Moscow will try to extend and intensify its control over Communist China. However, we believe it unlikely that, at least during the period of this estimate, the Kremlin will be able by nonmilitary means to achieve a degree of control over Communist China comparable to that which it exercises over the European Satellites. We believe it is almost certain that the Kremlin will not attempt to achieve such control by military force.

3. Over the long run, Sino-Soviet solidarity might be weakened as a result of efforts by the USSR to intensify and extend its control over Communist China, disputes over Soviet economic and military assistance to Communist China, divergent views concerning the border areas, Communist Chinese efforts to control and direct Far Eastern "liberation movements," or divergent views over the priority of Far Eastern Communist objectives in relation to other world Communist objectives.

4. We believe that during the period of this estimate these factors will be far outweighed by close ideological ties and continuing mutual involvement in the pursuit of common objectives, particularly the elimination of Western influence from the Far East.

5. Although the Peiping regime will undoubtedly continue to attempt to gain legal recognition internationally, to secure Formosa, and to resume trade and commerce with the West, we do not believe that the existing Sino-Soviet solidarity can be weakened by non-Communist concessions to Communist China.

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Moreover, as we have previously estimated, we believe that Western pressures against Communist China, while weakening her, would not disrupt Sino-Soviet solidarity during the period of this estimate.[1]

DISCUSSION

Introduction

6. Communist China and the USSR present a united front to the world. Since the establishment of the Chinese Communist regime in 1949 there has been no reliable indication that either country has adopted any important course of action of joint concern without the consent of the other. In February 1950, the Chinese Communists and the USSR signed a 30-year treaty of friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance, and this treaty provides the formal basis for current relations between the two states.[2]

CURRENT STATUS OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP

Soviet Communism and the Chinese Communist Party

7. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), unlike the Communist parties of the European Satellites, gained power with little assistance from the Soviet Army. The Chinese Communist claims of independent achievement which allow the USSR credit only for ideological and moral support until the formation of the Peiping regime in October 1949, have some basis in fact although they underestimate the assistance given by the USSR during the period from 1945 to 1949.

8. The high command of most Communist parties in the world has undergone frequent and violent changes, which are believed to have been dictated from Moscow. In contrast, the CCP has exhibited unique stability and continuity in its leadership. This leadership undoubtedly takes pride in its independent rise to power and recognizes that it possesses a capacity for independent action.

9. The Chinese Communists claim for Mao Tse-tung authority in his own right as a Communist theoretician. This claim has been accepted in part by Moscow, and the prestige accorded Mao in this respect goes far beyond that accorded any other contemporary non-Soviet Communist. However, even those Chinese who would place Mao near Stalin in authority profess allegiance to the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist doctrine held by the rulers in Moscow. The CCP leaders have repeatedly and emphatically proclaimed their adherence to Stalinism, their rejection of the "national selfishness" of Titoism, and their debt to the inspiration and example of the Russian leaders and the October Revolution. Common ideology is thus a strong force binding together the Chinese and Soviet regimes. Peiping and Moscow both aim at expelling all Western influence from Asia and at extending Communist control over the entire area. Both desire to spread the Communist world revolution.

[1] The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, believes that the difficult and complex problem of the possible effect of Western actions on Sino-Soviet solidarity requires more thorough study than has been possible in the course of preparing this or earlier national intelligence estimates. He therefore reserves judgment on the validity of paragraph five, preferring to state simply that a significant weakening of Sino-Soviet solidarity is unlikely during the period of this estimate.

[2] The published text of the treaty is appended as Annex "A." The more important clauses of this brief and general treaty provide that: (a) in the event one party is attacked by Japan or any state allied with it and thus is involved in a state of war, the other will immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal; (b) the two parties will consult with each other in regard to all important international problems affecting their common interests; and (c) each party undertakes, in conformity with the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity and noninterference in the internal affairs of the other, to develop and consolidate economic and cultural ties.

Other Soviet Influences in Communist China

10. Soviet political and economic "advisors" are stationed in China at various governmental and party levels. We do not believe that these advisors issue direct orders, but the Chinese have been receptive to their advice, which seems to be given through Chinese intermediaries. Soviet advisors are not only attached to the government and the party and to certain economic and security organs, but are also assigned to specific engineering, industrial, and cultural projects. Neither these advisors nor the Kremlin has criticised, at least publicly, the internal policies of Communist China or the implementation of these policies.

11. The Korean war greatly increased Communist China's economic dependence on the USSR. The adoption of more severe Western trade controls in July 1951 has accelerated the orientation of Communist China's trade to the Soviet Bloc. Although Communist Chinese economic dependence on the Bloc increases Soviet influence in Communist China, the USSR does not directly control the Chinese economy or operate any of the industry of mainland China (outside of Manchuria and Sinkiang).

12. The Korean war appears to be directed from joint Sino-Soviet military headquarters. The Chinese Communists are undoubtedly strongly influenced by Soviet military advisors, and it is probable that no major decisions are made in the Korean war without Soviet approval.

13. Except for captured equipment, the Chinese Communist forces are wholly dependent on the USSR for heavy items of military equipment, and the large scale of Soviet logistic support has presumably further increased Moscow's influence with the Chinese military. The Chinese Communist Air Force is largely a Soviet creation and is wholly dependent upon the USSR for equipment and supply.

Situation in the Border Areas

14. In Manchuria, the influence of Chinese Communist political and military leaders appears to outweigh that of the Soviet personnel in the area. Economic policies also reflect the central planning and directives of Peiping. Nevertheless, the USSR exerts great influence over economic and strategic developments in the area through its military and economic advisors, its intelligence activities, its supervision of rail lines, and its control of the Port Arthur naval base area. According to the Sino-Soviet agreements,[3] Soviet control over Port Arthur and participation in the administration of Manchurian rail lines is scheduled to be terminated in 1952; however, it is probable that such termination would not greatly lessen Soviet influence in Manchuria.

15. Soviet advisors and commercial enterprises in Inner Mongolia have economic and political influence, particularly in Eastern Inner Mongolia which borders on the USSR. However, Peiping has at least administrative control, and the strength of Chinese influence appears to be growing.

16. In Sinkiang, Peiping has stationed 70,000 troops and appears to exercise effective administrative control. For geographic reasons, however, Sinkiang's trade is chiefly with the USSR, and the Chinese need Soviet assistance to develop the resources of the area. The USSR exerts great influence through three Sino-Soviet companies and through Soviet citizens in the service of the provincial government.

17. Soviet influence in the border areas, political as well as economic, is extensive. At the same time, Chinese Communist political and territorial interests have apparently not been sacrificed in the interest of Soviet expansion. The trend since 1950 appears to be towards an increase in Chinese Communist administrative control.

The Character of Current Sino-Soviet Relations

18. From a consideration of the available evidence, we conclude that the Peiping regime — unlike the European Satellites — is not directly and completely controlled by the Kremlin. Sino-Soviet cooperation is based upon Chinese Communist acceptance of Moscow leadership

[3] See Annex "B" for the published text of the agreement between Communist China and the USSR on the Chinese-Changchun Railway, Port Arthur, and Dairen.

in the world Communist movement, a common ideology, and the common objective of eliminating Western influence from the Far East. This relationship is further solidified by common hostility to a resurgent and non-Communist Japan and to US power in the western Pacific. It is greatly reinforced by the Kremlin's need for an ally in the Far East, and by Communist China's need for Soviet assistance in training and equipping its armed forces and in developing its economy.

19. We believe also that the size and potential of China, the strength and cohesion of the Chinese Communist Party, the traditional Chinese xenophobia, and the inherent difficulties encountered by foreigners in exercising control in China, have permitted the Chinese Communists to retain some capability for independent action and a capability to exert an influence upon the shaping of Communist policy in the Far East.

20. The Chinese Communist regime appears willing to subordinate, at least temporarily, those Chinese national interests which are incompatible with the interests of the USSR, to submerge any fears it may have of Soviet expansion at China's expense, and to substitute for China's traditional unilateral policy of playing foreign powers against one another, a joint Sino-Soviet policy of endeavoring to eliminate Western influence from Asia. Chinese Communist leaders probably estimate that close Sino-Soviet collaboration will ensure Chinese security from Western counteraction, and ensure Soviet economic and military aid without ending China's independence.

21. The Kremlin appears to recognize that Communist China now possesses the determination and some capacity to pursue its own interests. Moreover, the Kremlin almost certainly sees in the present relationship the opportunity to use Communist China to weaken the Western position in Asia. On the other hand, the Kremlin probably views the relationship also as an opportunity to extend Soviet domination over Communist China by subversion, by making Communist China economically and militarily dependent upon the USSR, and by Soviet pressure upon the borderlands. Furthermore, a friendly Communist China provides the USSR with a defense in depth, constitutes a valuable potential source of manpower and other resources, and is an important political and psychological asset.

Future Course of Sino-Soviet Relations

22. We believe that the following factors will tend to ensure the continuation of Sino-Soviet solidarity during the period of this estimate:

a. The cohesive force of common ideology will probably continue to bind the two regimes together.

b. The military and economic dependence of Communist China upon the USSR will increase, at least for as long as the Korean war continues without settlement.

c. Continued US assistance to the Nationalist Government on Taiwan, the US-Japan Security Pact, and the ever-present apprehension of US action against Communist China itself will tend to draw Communist China and the USSR together.

d. Neither the USSR nor Communist China now appears capable of altering the current relationship to its advantage without jeopardizing the attainment of its own objectives. A Chinese Communist effort unilaterally to revise the relationship or to leave the Bloc would result in the cessation of Soviet economic and military aid and support and in serious dissension within the Chinese Communist Party and the armed forces. It might lead to armed conflict with the USSR. Similarly, a Kremlin effort to reduce Communist China to the status of the European Satellites might lead to armed conflict with Communist China and would divide and confuse the international Communist movement.

23. On the other hand, the following factors may, sooner or later, weaken Sino-Soviet solidarity:

a. The history of Sino-Russian relations is full of conflicts over Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria. During the last century there has been almost continuous Russian encroachment on Chinese interests in those areas. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950 temporarily

ended such border disputes. It is difficult to believe, however, that such longstanding disputes have been permanently settled. We think that they are likely to recur, in one form or another, and that they must be considered in assessing the probable course of Sino-Soviet relations in the future.

b. Having provided assistance and advice to the "liberation" movements of other countries in the Far East, Peiping may attempt to extend its own sphere of influence. China has traditional aspirations to primacy in the Far East, and there is evidence that the Chinese Communist role in other Far Eastern "liberation" movements has been increasing but has not been permanently defined.

c. At present, the interests of China are for the most part confined to the Far East; those of the Kremlin are world-wide. Hence, the Chinese Communists may view the accomplishment of Far Eastern objectives with more urgency and impatience than do the Soviets, who might postpone action in the Far East because of situations elsewhere in the world. The Chinese Communists might make demands upon the USSR, or even take action, incompatible with long-range Soviet global interests. This is applicable to the Korean conflict which is a potential source of friction to the two regimes.

d. The Chinese Communist program of industrialization and military modernization increasingly depends on Soviet material and technical assistance. Frictions might arise because of Soviet inability or disinclination to supply capital equipment. Soviet conditions for such supply might be offensive to Chinese national pride.

e. We have estimated that the ultimate objective of the Kremlin is the establishment of a Communist world dominated from Moscow. We do not believe, however, that the leaders of Communist China would accept complete Soviet domination of China. Whether future leaders of China will do so is a question; if they do not, a serious clash of interests is certain.

24. We believe that Moscow will try to extend and intensify its control over Communist China. However, we believe it unlikely that, at least during the period of this estimate, the Kremlin will be able by nonmilitary means to achieve a degree of control over Communist China comparable to that which it exercises over the European Satellites. We believe it is almost certain that the Kremlin will not attempt to achieve such control by military force. The military conquest of China would be a long, difficult, and expensive process.

25. We believe that for the period of this estimate the factors tending to divide the USSR and Communist China will be far outweighed by close ideological ties and continuing mutual involvement in the pursuit of common objectives, particularly the elimination of Western influence from the Far East.

26. Although the Peiping regime will undoubtedly continue to attempt to gain legal recognition internationally, to secure Formosa, and to resume trade and commerce with the West, we do not believe that the existing Sino-Soviet solidarity can be weakened by non-Communist concessions to Communist China. Moreover, as we have previously estimated, we believe that Western pressures against Communist China, while weakening her, would not disrupt Sino-Soviet solidarity during the period of this estimate.[4]

[4] The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, believes that the difficult and complex problem of the possible effect of Western actions on Sino-Soviet solidarity requires more thorough study than has been possible in the course of preparing this or earlier national intelligence estimates. He therefore reserves judgment on the validity of paragraph twenty-six, preferring to state simply that a significant weakening of Sino-Soviet solidarity is unlikely during the period of this estimate.

8. SE 41, 8 April 1953, *Probable Communist Reactions to Certain Possible UN/US Military Courses of Action With Respect to the Korean War*

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SPECIAL ESTIMATE

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PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN POSSIBLE UN/US MILITARY COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THE KOREAN WAR

SE-41

Published 8 April 1953

The following member organizations of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.

All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 2 April 1953.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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29 Jan 81

8. *(Continued)*

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PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN POSSIBLE UN/US MILITARY COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THE KOREAN WAR

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the probable military and political reactions of Communist China and the USSR to the following possible UN/US military courses of action with respect to the Korean war:

Course A — The UN/US to continue for the foreseeable future military pressure on the enemy at substantially the present level, while building up ROK forces, with a view to possible limited redeployment of US forces from Korea.

Course B — The UN/US to maintain current restrictions on military operations but increase military pressure on the enemy by stepping up ground operations while continuing aggressive air and naval action, with a view to making hostilities more costly to the enemy, in the hope that he might agree to an armistice acceptable to the US.

Course C — The UN/US to maintain current restrictions on military operations but continue aggressive air and naval action in Korea while launching a series of coordinated ground operations along the present line followed by a major offensive to establish a line at the waist of Korea, with a view to inflicting maximum destruction of enemy forces and materiel in Korea and to achieving a favorable settlement of the Korean war.

Course D — The UN/US to extend and intensify military pressures on the enemy by stages, including air attack and naval blockade directly against Manchuria and Communist China, and, if required, increased ground operations in Korea, with a view to making hostilities so costly to the enemy that a favorable settlement of the Korean war might be achieved.

Course E — The UN/US to undertake a coordinated offensive to the waist of Korea, and a naval blockade and air and naval attacks directly against Manchuria and Communist China, with a view to inflicting maximum possible destruction of enemy forces and materiel in Korea consistent with establishing a line at the waist and to achieving a favorable settlement of the Korean war.

Course F — The UN/US to undertake a coordinated, large-scale offensive in Korea and a naval blockade and air and naval attacks directly against Manchuria and Communist China, with a view to the defeat and destruction of the bulk of the Communist forces in Korea and settlement of the Korean war on the basis of a unified, non-Communist Korea.

SCOPE

This estimate is directed toward the examination of probable Communist reactions to certain UN/US courses of action in Korea. Without prejudging current Communist overtures, which are still to a large degree ambiguous, it is assumed for the purpose of this estimate that the Communist proposals will not result in an armistice.

ESTIMATE

INTRODUCTION: RELATION OF KOREA TO OVER-ALL SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES

1. In order to achieve their over-all objective of weakening and destroying the Western Powers, as well as to consolidate, strengthen, and protect the bases of their power, the USSR and Communist China are united in their intention to expel the West from Asia. In Korea, they have appeared for the past year to be reconciled to the existing military stalemate, possibly estimating that the UN/US would eventually weary of the strain and that a solution could then be obtained leading ultimately to Communist control of all Korea.

2. We believe that the Communist objective eventually to gain control of all Korea will remain unchanged. We also believe, however, that the Communists desire to avoid general war over the Korean issue and that Communist courses of action in Korea will be determined by Communist global interests.[1]

3. Communist reactions, political and military, to UN/US military initiatives in Korea will be conditioned by the following interests:

a. Retention of substantially all Korean territory north of the 38th Parallel.

b. Survival of a Communist regime in a substantial portion of North Korea.

c. Maintenance of Communist military and political prestige.

d. Security of Chinese Communist armed forces in the Korean theater.

e. Security of the Manchurian industrial complex.

f. Security of the Manchurian and Soviet borders.

4. If prior to the onset of any UN/US military course of action, the Communists recognized that they were faced with a clear choice between making the concessions necessary to reach an armistice, or accepting the likelihood that UN/US military operations would endanger the security of the Manchurian and Soviet borders, destroy the Manchurian industrial complex, or destroy the Chinese Communist armed forces, the Communists would probably agree to an armistice. However, it would be extremely difficult to present them with a clear choice of alternatives before such action was begun. Moreover, once such UN/US action was begun, Communist power and prestige would become further involved, thereby greatly increasing the difficulties of making the choice between agreeing to armistice or continuing the war.

[1] The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes that this paragraph should read as follows:

"We believe that the Communist objective eventually to gain control of all Korea will remain unchanged. We also believe that Communist China currently desires to limit hostilities with the UN/US forces to the Korean issue and that the USSR desires to avoid any expansion of hostilities which would put at risk fundamental strengths of the Soviet Union."

PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO UN/US COURSES OF ACTION WHICH DO NOT INVOLVE EXPANSION OF THE WAR BEYOND KOREA

Course A — The UN/US to continue for the foreseeable future military pressure on the enemy at substantially the present level, while building up ROK forces, with a view to possible limited redeployment of US forces from Korea.

5. Communist China and the USSR would probably not be able initially to interpret the intent of the UN/US build-up for such a course of action. The Communists might consider that the UNC was either gradually building up for greatly intensified hostilities, or merely building up ROK strength so that the US could disengage its forces from Korea.

6. In any event, the Communists would almost certainly continue to build up their military strength in the Korea-Manchuria area,[2] and, once it became clear that the US was withdrawing forces, would probably seek to exert additional military pressure in Korea. The Communists would probably estimate that such a UN/US course of action would not threaten any of their principal interests in Korea, and therefore they would almost certainly not feel compelled thereby to make concessions to secure an armistice. Although the Communists may desire to force the US to continue to maintain the concentration of its forces in Korea, the Communists have other objectives, above all eventually to bring all of Korea under Communist control. The substitution of ROK for US forces might be regarded by the Communists as improving their chances for obtaining these other objectives.

7. Course A would probably have little or no immediate effect upon Sino-Soviet cooperation in Korea.

Course B — The UN/US to maintain current restrictions on military operations but increase military pressure on the enemy by stepping up ground operations while continuing aggressive air and naval action, with a view to making hostilities more costly to the enemy in the hope that he might agree to an armistice acceptable to the US.

Course C — The UN/US to maintain current restrictions on military operations but continue aggressive air and naval action in Korea while launching a series of coordinated ground operations along the present line followed by a major offensive to establish a line at the waist of Korea, with a view to inflicting maximum destruction of enemy forces and material in Korea and to achieving a favorable settlement of the Korean war.

8. The Communists would probably not be able initially to interpret UN/US intention with regard to these alternative courses of action. They would probably base their estimate on the size and composition of the UN/US build-up for these intensified military operations and on the degree of mobilization within the US. Unless there were a marked reinforcement of UN/US forces in Korea, the Communists would probably estimate that the UN/US strength and determination for these proposed alternatives would not be great enough to sustain military operations which would seriously threaten their principal interests in the Korean theater.

9. The initial Communist reaction, once such military operations had begun, would be to counter vigorously. The Chinese Communists would make a maximum ground defense effort against these UNC operations, and would also launch strong counteroffensives. They would make a maximum air defense effort over Communist-held territory and would probably launch air strikes against UNC amphibious operations. We have no basis for determining whether during the first phases of the action, the Communists would or would not commit the Communist Air Force in China (CAFIC)[3] to large-scale oper-

[2] See NIE-58, "Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Korea through 1959," dated 3 April 1958, for a discussion of Communist military capabilities in Korea.

[3] The term CAFIC is meant to include North Korean air units and Soviet units which are believed to be operating with the Chinese Communists.

ations over UN-held territory. They almost certainly would not commit Soviet ground forces in Korea or Soviet air forces over UN-held territory. We believe that the Communists would accept substantial losses of men and materiel in countering or containing these UNC operations. We are unable to estimate whether such losses, however great, would in themselves induce the Communists to seek an armistice.

10. If UN forces launched a general offensive, as contemplated in Course C, the Communists would probably estimate that the UN/US was determined to drive the Communist forces from all Korea. If the Communists estimated that they would be unable to halt the UN advance without expanding the war, they might accept the risks of general war involved by committing their air force unreservedly over UN-held territory or even introducing Soviet ground units to stiffen the Communist defense. Before accepting these risks, however, they would probably attempt to secure an armistice which would leave a substantial part of North Korea in Communist hands.

11. If, on the other hand, the Communists retreated without expanding the war or seeking an armistice, and UN/US forces halted at the waist, the Communists probably would reconstitute their forces and continue the war.

12. Courses B and C would probably not affect Sino-Soviet cooperation in Korea.

PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO UN/US COURSES OF ACTION WHICH INVOLVE EXPANSION OF THE KOREAN WAR

Course D — If the UN/US were to extend and intensify military pressures on the enemy by stages, including air attack and naval blockade directly against Manchuria and Communist China, and, if required, increased ground operations in Korea, with a view to making hostilities so costly to the enemy that a favorable settlement of the Korean war might be achieved.

Course E — If the UN/US were to undertake a coordinated offensive to the waist of Korea, and a naval blockade and air and naval attacks directly against Manchuria and Communist China, with a view to inflicting maximum possible destruction of enemy forces and materiel in Korea consistent with establishing a line at the waist and to achieving a favorable settlement of the Korean war.

Course F — If the UN/US were to undertake a coordinated, large-scale offensive in Korea and a naval blockade and air and naval attacks directly against Manchuria and Communist China, with a view to the defeat and destruction of the bulk of the Communist forces in Korea and settlement of the Korean war on the basis of a unified, non-Communist Korea.

13. If, prior to actual initiation of such military operations, the Communists should become convinced that the strength and determination of the UN powers were sufficient to endanger their principal interests in the Korean theater, and that these dangers could not be averted without serious risk of a general war, they would probably make the concessions necessary to reach an armistice.

14. If, as a result of Communist miscalculation of UN/US capabilities and intentions, or because the Communists were not willing to make the compromises necessary to obtain an armistice, the war were expanded to Manchuria and China proper, the Communists would almost certainly assume, particularly if UN ground forces launched large-scale attacks in Korea, that the UN/US was prepared to accept great risks in order to drive the Communists from Korea. The Communists would almost certainly assume that any UNC air attacks against Manchuria or China proper would sooner or later include air attacks against their Chinese Communist industrial complex.

15. We believe that in response to the initiation of any of these courses of action, the Communists would offer maximum resistance, including greatly increased Soviet participation in the air defense of Manchuria and

China proper and CAFIC attacks on UN forces and bases in the Far East. So long as they estimated that they would be able to maintain the security of their forces in Korea, inflict serious losses on the UN air forces attacking China and Manchuria, and protect Manchurian industry, we believe the Communists would not be willing to sacrifice any of their important interests in Korea in order to obtain an armistice.[4] Under these circumstances, their unwillingness to compromise their position in Korea would be strengthened if their political and psychological countermeasures appeared to have the effect of significantly reducing UN and/or US determination to sustain an expanded war in the Far East.

16. If, however, in the implementation of any of the above courses of action, the Communists were unable to counter UN/US air operations against Manchuria and if it appeared to the Communists that the Manchurian industrial complex were threatened with destruction, we believe that the Communists would be willing to sacrifice some of their interests in Korea in order to obtain a cessation of hostilities. If simultaneously with air attacks on Manchuria and China proper, UN/US forces were advancing in North Korea, the Communists, while seeking to negotiate an armistice that secured continued Communist control over a substantial portion of North Korea, might commit Soviet air units over UN-held territory and might introduce Soviet ground forces into Korea. The USSR would, in any event, leave to the UN/US the responsibility for recognizing the commitment of Soviet forces as a *casus belli*.

17. Although we believe these UN/US courses of action would impose strains on Sino-Soviet relations, we do not believe that these courses of action would cause the Chinese Communist leadership to alter basically its alignment with the USSR.

EMPLOYMENT OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

18. We believe that if atomic weapons were employed by UN/US forces in any of the above alternative courses of action, the Communists would recognize the employment of these weapons as indicative of Western determination to carry the Korean war to a successful conclusion. We are unable to estimate whether this recognition would by itself lead the Communists to make the concessions necessary to reach an armistice. We believe that the Communist reaction would be in large part determined by the extent of damage inflicted.

NON-PARTICIPATION OF UN POWERS

19. If UN powers refused to participate in these courses of action, the Communists would be encouraged to resist in the hope of further straining US relations with its western allies and in the hope that US determination to sustain the war alone would falter. The Communists would also feel that the risks of general war would be lessened and therefore they might be less restrained in their military reactions against US operations.

[4] SE-37, "Probable Effects on the Soviet Bloc of Certain Courses of Action Directed at the Internal and External Commerce of Communist China," dated 9 March 1953, concludes that a large-scale and sustained air and naval bombardment of key Chinese Communist transportation lines, in conjunction with a naval blockade, would not in itself induce the Communists to accept a Korean settlement on UN terms.

9. SNIE 10-4-54, 15 June 1954, *Communist Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action With Respect to Indochina*

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SNIE 10-4-54
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SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
SNIE 10-4-54

COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA

Submitted by the

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred in by the

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

on 15 June 1954. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the Director of Intelligence, AEC. The Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of the jurisdiction of the FBI.

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COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Chinese Communist and Soviet reactions to the courses of action and consequent situations indicated below.[1]

THE ESTIMATE

PART I

ASSUMPTIONS

A. The treaties of independence between France and the Associated States will have been signed.

B. A regional security grouping including at least the Associated States, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, France, and the United States, and possibly including also New Zealand and the United Kingdom, will have been formed.

C. The Associated States will have publicly requested the direct military participation of members of the regional grouping in the war in Indochina.

D. The French will have undertaken to continue at least the present level of their military commitment in Indochina.

REQUIREMENT 1

To estimate the initial Chinese Communist and Soviet reactions to the participation of US air and naval forces with French Union forces and token Thai and Philippine forces in coordinated ground, naval, and air operations designed to destroy the Communist military forces in Indochina. Air operations would be limited to targets in Indochina. Nuclear weapons would be employed if their use were deemed militarily advantageous but nuclear attacks on the Indochinese civil population as a target system would be avoided.

Chinese Communist Reaction

1. The intervention of US and allied forces in Indochina probably would cause the Chinese Communists to believe that sooner or later they would have to decide whether to

[1] The assumptions and estimative requirements stated herein were furnished to the intelligence community for the purpose of this estimate. We interpret the hypothetical action as occurring within the next twelve to eighteen months.

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accept the defeat of the Viet Minh or to intervene in force in order to try to prevent such defeat. Their decision would probably rest mainly, though not exclusively, upon their weighing of the risks and disadvantages arising from the Viet Minh defeat against the likelihood of involvement in major war with the US and the probable consequences of such a war for Communist China. Available evidence gives no unmistakeable indication of what the Chinese Communist decision would be. On balance, however, we believe that the chances are somewhat better than even that the Chinese Communist would decide to take whatever military action they thought required to prevent destruction of the Viet Minh, including when and if necessary, open use of Chinese Communist forces in Indochina.[2,3]

2. The nature of the assumed US action is such that ample warning would almost certainly be given in advance of actual operations. The Chinese Communists have the capability now to intervene quickly and in such force as to drive French Union forces out of the Delta. The Chinese Communists might choose to exercise this capability before US intervention could be effected.

3. We believe it somewhat more likely, however, that even if the Chinese Communists had determined not to accept the defeat of the Viet Minh they would not intervene openly immediately following the assumed US intervention. They might estimate that US air and naval forces could not, in the absence of US ground forces, decisively alter the course of the war. They might therefore consider their intervention unnecessary at this point and might postpone final decision as to their course of action until they had observed the initial scale and success of the allied military operations and had estimated the probable nature and extent of US aims in the conflict.

4. In this connection, US use of nuclear weapons in Indochina would tend to hasten the ultimate Chinese Communist decision whether or not to intervene. It would probably convince the Chinese Communists of US determination to obtain a decisive military victory in Indochina at whatever risk and by whatever means, and of the consequent danger of nuclear attack on Communist China. Whether this conviction would precipitate or deter Chinese Communist intervention would depend on the military situation in Indochina at the time, the observed military effect of the use of nuclear weapons, and the observed political and psychological effect of such use, particularly its effect on the coherence of the regional security grouping and the Atlantic alliance.

5. In any case, the Chinese Communists would almost certainly greatly increase their logistic support, delivery of arms and equipment, and technical assistance to the Viet Minh. The Chinese Communists would probably increase their deliveries of AA weapons and might send in Chinese AA gun crews. Moreover, the Chinese Communists would probably deploy ground and air units near the Indochina border in order: (a) to warn the US and its allies, and (b) to have forces ready either to intervene on behalf of the Viet Minh or to defend the southern border of China.

6. While maintaining a posture of military readiness, the Chinese Communists would intensify political and propaganda activities designed to exploit anti-Western and anticolonial feelings of the indigenous population of Indochina and the war-fears of neutralist Asian nations and of certain US allies. They would also seek to label the US as an aggressor. In the meantime and throughout the

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[2] The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, recommends deletion of the last sentence of this paragraph and would substitute the following:

"However, their decision would be largely determined by the Chinese estimate of the probable extent and effect of US initial action."

[3] The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes that the last sentence of this paragraph should read as follows:

"Communist China will probably not choose knowingly any course of action likely to expose its fundamental national strengths in war with a major power. However, we believe that Communist China's strength for conducting various kinds of warfare is such, and the motives and judgment of its leaders are such as to make Communist China's courses of action dangerously unpredictable under outside pressure of any appreciable magnitude."

period of military operations, the Communists would almost certainly agitate and propagandize for a "cease-fire" and political settlement, which would preserve the Communist position and prospects.

Soviet Reaction

7. In the assumed situation, the USSR probably would estimate that the US action, though limited to air and naval forces, would considerably increase the risks of unlimited war between the US and Communist China. The USSR would probably prefer that such a war not develop out of the Indochina situation. Nevertheless, the USSR would assure Communist China of continuing military assistance. The USSR would also give complete diplomatic and propaganda support to Communist China and the Viet Minh regime.

REQUIREMENT 2

To estimate Chinese Communist and Soviet reactions to the success of the operations envisaged in the assumptions above (i.e., to the impending effective destruction of the Communist forces in Indochina).[4]

Chinese Communist Reaction

8. As stated in Paragraph 1, we believe that the chances are somewhat better than even that the Chinese Communist, in the assumed situation, would intervene militarily to prevent the destruction of the Viet Minh. If they decided to do so, we believe that the exact timing and nature of their action would depend on various factors, but principally on the scope and character of the US/allied operations they were seeking to counter.[5] [6]

Soviet Reaction

9. In this assumed situation, the USSR would probably continue to support the Chinese Communists. If the Chinese Communists intervened openly in support of the Viet Minh, the USSR would rapidly increase military assistance to Communist China. The Soviet diplomatic and propaganda campaigns against the US would continue full-scale, and the USSR might ask the UN to condemn the US as an aggressor. Thinly veiled threats of Soviet involvement in the fighting and references to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950 would multiply.

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[4] The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, believes that the results in this requirement could not be achieved by the unbalanced and insufficient forces envisaged.

[5] The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes that this paragraph should read as follows:

"Communist China will probably not choose knowingly any course of action likely to expose its fundamental national strengths in war with a major power. However, we believe that Communist China's strength for conducting various kinds of warfare is such, and the motives and judgment of its leaders are such as to make Communist China's courses of action dangerously unpredictable under outside pressure of any appreciable magnitude."

[6] The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes that paragraph 8 should read as follows:

"Communist China would conclude from the assumed impending destruction of Communist forces in Indochina, by limited forces employing nuclear and conventional weapons, that its open military intervention would invite an extension of similar action to Communist China, and would, therefore, probably not intervene militarily."

PART II

ASSUMPTIONS

A. The treaties of independence between France and the Associated States will have been signed.

B. A regional security grouping including at least the Associated States, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, France, and the United States, and possibly including also New Zealand and the United Kingdom, will have been formed.

C. The Associated States will have publicly requested the direct military participation of members of the regional grouping in the war in Indochina.

D. The French will have undertaken to continue at least the present level of their military commitment in Indochina.

E. The Chinese Communists will have openly intervened with military forces in Indochina in order to counter US direct participation as defined in Requirement 1.

REQUIREMENT 3

To estimate Chinese Communist and Soviet reactions to an extension of allied offensive air operations to include military targets in Communist China directly supporting Communist military operations in Indochina or directly threatening the security of Allied forces in the area.[1] *Nuclear weapons would be employed in these operations if it were deemed militarily advantageous to do so, but nuclear attacks on the Chinese civil population as a target system would be avoided.*

Chinese Communist Reaction

10. We consider it probable that before intervening in Indochina the Chinese Communists would have accepted the likelihood of US air attacks against military targets in China. Consequently, they would not feel compelled to withdraw their forces from Indochina solely as a result of the initiation of the air operations assumed above. At the same time, we believe that the Chinese Communists, in order to prevent further destruction to this area of China and particularly to avoid the spread of unlimited US attacks to the whole of China, would intensify efforts to induce the US to enter negotiations for a settlement which would preserve the Communist position and prospects in Indochina.

11. Meanwhile the Chinese Communists, to the full extent of their capabilities, would prosecute the war on the ground in Indochina and attack allied air bases, aircraft carriers, and other installations directly supporting allied operations in the area. They would, however, probably try to keep the war centered in Indochina and, as a consequence, probably would confine their attacks to such directly supporting bases and installations.

12. The use of nuclear weapons under the restrictions given above would greatly increase Chinese Communist concern about US intentions but probably would not by itself cause them to adopt new courses of military action at this time. However, they would threaten nuclear retaliation. They would also exploit to the fullest resultant psychological opportunities and in particular would

[1] In this requirement we interpret targets "directly supporting" Communist military operations to be generally south of the Tangtze River and to consist primarily of transport lines, troop concentrations, and air fields in the area.

charge that the US was using weapons of mass destruction on the civilian population.*

13. The Chinese Communists would attempt by all means possible to convince other Asian nations that the US had undertaken to destroy the Chinese Communist regime in order to thwart its efforts on behalf of an indigenous independence movement. If the Chinese had not previously done so, they would probably appeal to the UN to brand US action as a threat to the peace.

Soviet Reaction

14. In this assumed situation, the USSR would greatly increase its military assistance to Communist China, especially supplying modern aircraft and small naval vessels, possibly including submarines, with Soviet personnel to train and advise the Chinese and probably to participate in air defense operations. The USSR would probably not openly commit combat units of the Soviet armed forces and probably would not release nuclear weapons for Chinese Communist use.

15. The Kremlin would also continue its diplomatic and propaganda campaigns against the US, undertaking in the UN to brand the US as an aggressor if this had not previously been attempted. The USSR would support Chinese charges concerning the use of nuclear weapons against civilian populations. At the same time, the USSR would probably advise the Chinese Communists to negotiate for a cessation of hostilities on the basis of the status quo at the time and would try to establish a position as peacemaker.

REQUIREMENT 4

To estimate Chinese Communist and Soviet reactions to the following additional allied courses of action, undertaken subsequently to those above:

a. Extension of allied offensive air operations to additional selected military targets in Communist China, including the use of atomic weapons under the same conditions as above.

b. Naval blockade of the China coast.

c. Seizure or neutralization of Hainan.

d. Chinese Nationalist operations against the Chinese mainland.

Chinese Communist Reaction

16. As a consequence of this allied broadening of the war, the Chinese Communists would probably conclude that the US was prepared to wage unlimited war against them. They would continue to defend themselves to the limit of their capabilities and would probably make vigorous efforts to secure the full participation of the USSR. At the same time, they would intensify their efforts to end the war by negotiations, and might eventually indicate in some way their willingness to withdraw from Indochina in order to obtain a cease-fire.* If unable to obtain a cease-fire agreement, the Chinese Communists would accept the fact of unlimited war with the US and would wage such war to the full extent of their remaining capabilities.

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*The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes this paragraph should read:

"Nuclear weapon attacks on Communist China would undoubtedly result in a much greater Chinese Communist reaction than nuclear attacks on the Indochinese battleground. In addition, such attacks would probably indicate to the Chinese Communists a US willingness to exploit its superiority in nuclear weapons and delivery capability to force them out of Indochina. Since the nuclear attack contemplated in this requirement is of a limited nature, the Chinese Communist rulers would retain control of the government and country and, with the initial attacks, they would probably make urgent appeals to the USSR for nuclear weapons and additional military assistance. They might also increase the tempo of their military operations and would undoubtedly endeavor to induce the United States to enter negotiations in the hope of forestalling further attacks. A Chinese Communist decision to withdraw or not would be dependent primarily upon continued or increased US nuclear attacks and other US action as well as upon Soviet reaction. It is believed, however, that the Chinese Communists would be willing to withdraw from Indochina rather than be subjected to further destruction of their homeland."

*The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, and the Director of Intelligence, USAF, suggest that the words "might eventually" in this sentence should be replaced with "would probably."

Soviet Reaction

17. In this assumed situation, the USSR would continue to provide military assistance to Communist China as indicated above, but would probably refuse Chinese Communist demand for full Soviet participation in the war. The Kremlin would strongly urge the Chinese Communists to negotiate for a cessation of hostilities on the basis of withdrawing from Indochina.[10] If the Chinese Communists could not obtain a cease-fire agreement, the USSR would provide Communist China with military assistance in every way short of openly committing combat units of the Soviet armed forces in operations against US and allied forces outside Communist-held territory. The USSR would provide military resources and equipment for Chinese Communist attacks on US bases or US forces anywhere in the Far East. At this stage of the conflict, the USSR might provide Communist China with nuclear weapons and the technical personnel required for their use.[11] [12]

18. The USSR would continue its diplomatic and propaganda campaigns against the US, insisting that the Soviet aim was purely the defense of China against outright aggression. The USSR would also begin at least partial mobilization of its own military forces on a war basis. It would issue thinly veiled threats of general war, suggesting attacks on Western Europe and on the continental US, but would probably confine its operations to the defense of China so long as the US did not attack Soviet territory.

REQUIREMENT 5

To estimate Chinese Communist and Soviet reactions to the success of the foregoing operations (i.e., to the impending effective destruction of the Chinese Communist capability to conduct military operations outside the borders of Communist China).[13]

Chinese Communist Reaction

19. Unless the USSR was willing to make an unlimited commitment of Soviet forces to prevent the success of the assumed US and allied operations, we believe that the Communist Chinese, under the assumed circumstances, would accept any US terms for a settlement which preserved the integrity of China under the Chinese Communist regime.

Soviet Reaction

20. In this assumed situation, we believe the USSR would urge the Chinese Communists to accept any US terms for a settlement which preserved the integrity of China under the Chinese Communist regime.[14] So long as the fighting continued, however, the USSR would continue its aid to China.

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[10] The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, recommends the deletion of "on the basis of withdrawing from Indochina," believing that at this state of the conflict the Kremlin would not willingly acquiesce in the surrender of any Communist-held territory in Indochina or elsewhere.

[11] The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, and Director of Intelligence, USAF, believe that this sentence should read:

"We do not believe that the USSR would release nuclear weapons for Chinese Communist use."

[12] The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, substitute for the last sentence:

"It is also believed that the USSR would give serious consideration to making a substantially greater military contribution including nuclear weapons and the technical personnel required for their use."

[13] The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, believes that the results assumed in this requirement could not be achieved by the unbalanced and insufficient force envisaged.

[14] The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, would add "and retained a Communist foothold in Indochina."

Europe

Germany was the key to Soviet foreign policy in Europe after World War II. Regarding Germany as potentially the most formidable state in Europe, the Kremlin was determined to prevent the resurrection of German power.

German rearmament became an issue only after the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950. Concerned that the war might stretch its military resources too thin, the United States pressed for German rearmament to strengthen the West's defenses in Europe. How would the Kremlin react to a rearmed Germany less than 10 years after Red Army troops tore down the swastika over the ruins of the Reichstag? The CIA answered that question in NIE 17 of 27 December 1950, *Probable Soviet Reactions to a Remilitarization of Western Germany*, one month after large numbers of Communist Chinese troops had entered the Korean war. The USSR, the estimate concluded, would try to divide the Western powers by playing on fears of reborn German militarism. If this tactic did not work, the Soviets might try military demonstrations, including a second Berlin blockade. If the USSR thought that complete German rearmament could not otherwise be stopped, the estimate contended that the Soviets might go to war.

The outbreak of the Korean war also provoked debate within NATO, formed in April 1949, about a possible German military role in Europe. France suggested an integrated European army with minimal German participation; in May 1952 Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, and West Germany signed a treaty establishing the European Defense Community (EDC). On 22 May 1953 the CIA published NIE 81, *Probable Soviet Courses of Action With Respect to Germany, Through Mid-1954*, to assess the Soviet reaction to the projected EDC, which had not yet been ratified by its six signatories. The estimate concluded that, even if German rearmament began under European Defense Community aegis, "the Kremlin will probably believe that the implementation of the EDC agreements and the rearming of Germany will proceed slowly and that there will continue to be opportunities to thwart the Western program." Soviet opposition was expected to be limited to political warfare because during the period of this estimate, May 1953 through mid-1954, "the Kremlin is likely to believe that the German situation is not yet dangerous."

Stalin and the political consequences of his death dominated Soviet foreign policy in Eastern Europe during the 1950s. After Marshal Tito's Yugoslavia asserted its independence from Moscow in the late 1940s, and Stalin seemed ready to invade to enforce the Kremlin's authority as leader of international Communism, NIE 29 of 20 March 1951, *Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951*, considered an invasion in 1951 a serious possibility.

After Stalin's death in March 1953 the new Soviet leadership began a campaign of "de-Stalinization," which, although at first carefully restrained, soon influenced the East European satellite states. The Soviet attitude toward Stalin inspired leadership changes in Eastern Europe as reformers forced Stalinists from their posts. Poland narrowly averted civil war and Soviet military intervention in October 1956 when Wladislaw Gomulka, a former Secretary General of

the Communist Party in Poland who had lost his position in the 1948-53 Stalinist purges of the European Communist parties, again assumed leadership of the government. In Hungary a student demonstration on 23 October 1956 supporting the Poles quickly became a popular revolt that ended only when Soviet tanks moved into Budapest on 4 November 1956.

The Office of National Estimates produced SNIE 12-2-56 of 30 October 1956, *Probable Developments in East Europe and Implications for Soviet Policy*, quickly during the height of the Hungarian and Suez crises. The outcome of both crises was unclear—the Soviets had not yet moved into Hungary—and the situation changed hourly. The estimate concluded that in the short run the Soviets probably would try to prevent further outbreaks of violence in Eastern Europe through vigorous police measures.

10. NIE 17, 27 December 1950, *Probable Soviet Reactions to a Remilitarization of Western Germany*



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

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

PROBABLE SOVIET REACTIONS TO A REMILITARIZATION OF WESTERN GERMANY

NIE-17

The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated in the preparation of this estimate and concur in it (however, see footnote on page 1). This paper is based on information available on 22 December 1950.

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PROBABLE SOVIET REACTIONS TO A REMILITARIZATION OF WESTERN GERMANY

1. The Soviet leaders are probably convinced that if Western Germany should eventually attain a condition of complete remilitarization, and at the same time be in close alliance with the United States and the other members of NATO, the situation would present a grave threat to the security of the USSR and to the achievement of ultimate Soviet objectives.* They doubtless recognize on the other hand that without the use of German manpower Western Europe can neither threaten Soviet security nor defend itself against Soviet attack. A rearmament of Western Germany to the extent now contemplated by the NATO powers, involving the creation of defensive forces only, would presumably not be considered by the USSR as menacing its security, but it would plainly render important Soviet objectives difficult and perhaps impossible of accomplishment.

2. It is unlikely that the Soviets believe that a program of Western German rearmament, once well under way, will stop short of complete remilitarization. They will have faith neither in the ability nor in the desire of the western powers to limit Germany to purely defensive forces. Indeed they may well conceive of the present plans for Western Germany as part of a larger US program, involving also the eventual rearmament of Japan, and ultimately directed towards a united attack by the capitalist countries upon the USSR as the citadel of Communism.

3. The creation of an effective Western German defensive force cannot be accomplished in less than two or three years; to build a strong offensive military establishment would take longer. In the meantime, taking advantage of the many basic conflicts in western opinion, and the degree of intimidation already achieved, the USSR will have available many courses of action which may, without provoking war, tend to dissolve the connections between Western Germany and the western powers, to weaken the cohesion and prevent the strengthening of NATO, and possibly to bring about a unification of Germany on Soviet terms. The immediate objective of the USSR in Europe will be to hinder and delay the progress of German rearmament, and to utilize the conflicts which the problem arouses in Western Europe to gain some ground toward its ultimate objective of a unified Germany under Soviet control.

4. In the Soviet program to accomplish this objective the most important element, on which indeed the general success of the program may well hinge, will be the propagation throughout Europe and the western world of a conviction that Western German rearmament will inevitably lead to war. Since many Germans and Western Europeans already hold this opinion, its further dissemination should not be difficult. The USSR has already made clear the seriousness with which it views Western German remilitarization—most recently in the Prague Declaration, in the note to the western powers asking for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, and in the notes to France and Britain of 16 December. Meanwhile, the European Communist parties have intensified their efforts, especially in Germany, to increase the fear of war and to point out that Germany will surely become a battleground in the conflict. Propaganda along these lines will doubtless be redoubled, particularly exploiting the publicity accompanying western negotiation and acts

*It is the view of the Director of Intelligence USAF that the first sentence should read as follows:

"The Soviet leaders are probably convinced that if Western Germany should eventually attain a condition of complete remilitarization, and at the same time be in close alliance with the United States and the other members of NATO, the situation would present a grave threat to the achievement of ultimate Soviet objectives and possibly a threat to the USSR."

such as the increase of Soviet military forces in Eastern Germany and in the Satellites may be used to reinforce the impression. Suiting their words to their audiences, the Communists will suggest that Western German rearmament will result in Western German aggression, or that it will become an instrument of US aggression, or even that it will so gravely threaten the USSR and its Satellites as to force them to initiate a defensive war. The attempt will be to create a state of general alarm and despondency, in which more positive courses of Soviet action will have their best chances of success.

5. The positive policy which the Soviets now propose consists of a renewal of their earlier suggestions for peaceful re-establishment of German unity through the device of an all-German constituent council. With this the Soviets are seeking to provide an attractive alternative to the war and destruction which they predict if Western German rearmament goes forward. Against the background of apprehension induced by the rearmament program, this appeal to German desires for unity may well have a stronger impact now than formerly. The Grotewohl letter is designed to encourage both East and West Germans to take some initiative towards the achievement of unification, and to submit a common proposal to the consideration of the four occupying powers. The Soviets during the next months will urge not only upon the Western Germans, but upon the world, the reasonableness of their suggestions for German unity, and they will continue to emphasize by contrast and with thinly veiled threats the inevitable consequences which will follow from a failure to settle the German problem "peacefully" at this time.

6. A major and increasing effort will also be made by the Soviets to cause division among the western powers, especially by exploiting the doubts and hesitations which German rearmament has already begun to produce among them. If a Council of Foreign Ministers is held, the USSR will attempt to use it to further this objective. The Soviets will play not only upon the French fear of general war but upon the French fear of German military force. Especially in view of the adverse effects which the Korean situation has had upon French confidence, it may well be that such arguments will be hard to resist. Even the British may find it hard to remain impervious to suggestions for a "peaceful" settlement.

7. If the methods of diplomacy and propaganda thus described prove insufficient to halt the rearmament of Western Germany, the Soviets will probably adopt more drastic measures, involving if necessary progressively greater risks of war. Military and para-military demonstrations will doubtless then be employed, further advertising the seriousness with which the USSR views the problem. Such displays may take the form of ostentatious exhibitions of the military strength of Soviet and Bereitschaften forces, mass demonstrations of Communist youth and labor groups, etc. Outbreaks of violence in West Berlin and Western Germany may also be staged.

8. Western German militarization will be used by the USSR as "justification" for retaining and perhaps increasing its own forces in East Germany and in the other Satellites. At the same time the remilitarization of Eastern Germany will be accelerated in order to increase the over-all strength of the Soviet bloc. Intensified harassing tactics in Berlin, designed to make the allied position difficult or untenable, would be represented as actions of the German Democratic Republic. The creation of a revolutionary situation in Berlin, and a renewal of the blockade, must be considered as possibilities. It is unlikely that the USSR will use overt military action against Western Germany until it is ready to accept the gravest risks of general war.

9. Finally, it is estimated that unless Moscow has already decided to precipitate general war, the Soviets are likely first to exhaust all other practicable means of preventing Western German remilitarization. The USSR will, however, seriously consider going to war whenever it becomes convinced that progress toward complete Western German rearmament, together with the rearmament of the NATO powers, and toward political solidarity between Western Germany and the western powers, has reached the point where it cannot be arrested by other methods.

11. NIE 29, 20 March 1951, *Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951*

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

PROBABILITY OF AN INVASION OF YUGOSLAVIA IN 1951

NIE-29

Published 20 March 1951

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

11. *(Continued)*

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

PROBABILITY OF AN INVASION OF YUGOSLAVIA IN 1951

NIE-29

The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee have given their concurrence to the estimate. This paper is based on information available on 15 March 1951.

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PROBABILITY OF AN INVASION OF YUGOSLAVIA IN 1951

THE PROBLEM

To assess the capabilities and intentions of the USSR and its European Satellites with respect to action against Yugoslavia during 1951.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The ultimate Soviet objectives in Yugoslavia are to eliminate the Tito Government, to replace it by a regime subservient to the USSR, and to integrate Yugoslavia politically, economically, and strategically into the European Satellite structure. The USSR has not, however, indicated that it intends to try to eliminate the Tito regime regardless of the cost or within any specific period of time.

2. It is unlikely that during 1951 the Tito regime could be overthrown by a Soviet-inspired coup or by internal revolt. Therefore, the USSR would have to resort to Satellite or Soviet-Satellite invasion if it intended to overthrow Tito in 1951.

3. The continuing military build-up in the neighboring Satellite states (increase in armed forces, stockpiling, re-equipment, gasoline conservation, stepping-up of war industry, etc.) has reversed the previous balance of military strength between the Satellites and Yugoslavia and has given the Satellites the capability of launching a major invasion of Yugoslavia with little warning.

4. A major, sustained invasion of Yugoslavia employing the Satellite armies under Soviet central direction and given full logistical support by the Soviet Union has the capability of forcing the Yugoslav Army back into the mountainous region along the Adriatic and of gradually extending control of the principal communication lines to the major centers of that redoubt. The Yugoslavs would continue to resist, however, and would conduct guerrilla operations long after the collapse of formal military resistance.

5. Combined Soviet-Satellite forces could successfully invade Yugoslavia, overcome formal military resistance, and eventually render guerrilla operations ineffective.

6. Yugoslav capabilities and morale are such that substantial and continuing Western assistance in military supplies and equipment would probably enable Yugoslavia to maintain organized resistance to a Satellite attack indefinitely, at least in the mountain area. Such assistance could extend the period of resistance even in the case of a full-scale Soviet-Satellite attack. Any Western material sent would have to be adapted to the special requirements of Yugoslav forces. Moreover, to be effective to Yugoslavia in the initial stages of an invasion, it would have to be delivered well in advance of hostilities.

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7. Continuing large-scale Satellite military preparations indicate that the groundwork is being laid for a possible invasion of Yugoslavia. These indications do not, however, provide conclusive evidence of an intention to attack Yugoslavia since there has been a military build-up in the other Satellite states in addition to the ones adjacent to Yugoslavia and since, in the case of Bulgaria and Albania, the military preparations could point to an attack on Greece or Turkey as well as Yugoslavia. Moreover, there is no conclusive evidence that military preparations pointing toward a Satellite attack on Yugoslavia are timed for an attack in 1951. Cominform propaganda since July 1950 has consistently advanced arguments that could be used to justify a Satellite attack on Yugoslavia, but there has been no recent trend in such propaganda suggesting an attack at an early date.

8. On the basis of intelligence available we are unable to determine whether the Kremlin has made a decision to attack Yugoslavia. The Kremlin may estimate that in 1951 such an attack by the Satellites could be carried through successfully without incurring effective Western intervention or precipitating general war. On the other hand, the Kremlin may estimate that the Western Powers would give large-scale support to Yugoslavia, in the event of an attack, thereby making the operation difficult and costly and creating a greater risk of general war than the USSR was willing to accept. Finally, the Kremlin may be fully prepared for the eventuality of general war and may launch an attack on Yugoslavia regardless of the risks involved. Although it is impossible to determine which course the Kremlin is likely to adopt, we believe that the extent of Satellite military and propaganda preparations indicates that an attack on Yugoslavia in 1951 should be considered a serious possibility. We believe further that such an attack, if launched, would be made by Satellite forces with "unofficial" Soviet assistance as required.

DISCUSSION

Soviet Objectives with Respect to Yugoslavia

1. The ultimate Soviet objectives in Yugoslavia are to eliminate the Tito Government, to replace it by a regime subservient to the USSR, and to integrate Yugoslavia politically, economically, and strategically into the European Satellite structure. Soviet control of Yugoslavia would greatly facilitate Soviet efforts to dominate the Eastern Mediterranean area and would eliminate a dangerous salient in the southeast European front of the Soviet bloc. Yugoslavia would offer an approach for Soviet attacks into Greece or Italy; at the same time, it is a potential threat to the southern flank of any Soviet advance into Western Europe. Moreover, the continued survival of the Tito Government as the only Communist regime not subservient to Moscow is an ideological threat to the Kremlin's control of the world Communist movement. The USSR has not, however, indicated that it intends to try to eliminate the Tito regime regardless of the cost or within any specific period of time.

Current Strength and Stability of Tito's Regime

2. Although the Tito regime is presently stable, there are elements of potential instability in Tito's position. Among these elements of potential instability are the following:

a. A majority of the Yugoslav population are non-Communists or even anti-Communists. Living standards are lower now than

before the war. The resentment caused by the nationalization of the economy, by the campaign against religion, and by the development of police state techniques is still strong. In the Party hierarchy there is some criticism of the maladministration of the import program and of unsatisfactory economic progress. It is always possible that some of Tito's followers, though seemingly loyal, may be awaiting an opportunity to improve their fortunes at the expense of their leader.

b. Tito's paradoxical ideological position hampers his freedom of political action. Any considerable retreat by Tito from Communist theory or practice and any conspicuous associations with the Western Powers give substance to the Kremlin's contention that Tito is a traitor to Communism. At the same time, such a retreat might cost Tito the allegiance of some of his more zealous Marxist followers who are indispensable functionaries in his totalitarian regime. On the other hand, if he adheres too faithfully to Communist dogma, he may antagonize the Western Powers and non-Communist elements within Yugoslavia whose support is essential if national independence is to be maintained.

3. Despite these elements of potential instability, Tito's regime is presently stable:

a. Yugoslavia's internal security forces are large and efficient, and have dealt successfully with active opposition elements. Efforts of the Cominform to penetrate and undermine the regime by subversive means have thus far failed. There is no evidence of effective organized opposition within the country and there are no serious personal rivals to Tito himself.

b. The Yugoslav people seem to prefer the present regime to the reestablishment of alien control from Moscow, particularly since the relaxation of some of the more unpopular totalitarian measures. Tito's bold and successful stand in the face of mounting Soviet and Satellite pressure has appealed strongly to Yugoslav national pride. Even the long-standing national minority tensions in the country are relatively quiescent. The improvement of Yugoslav relations with the Western Powers, and particularly with the US, has met favorable popular response. In the event of invasion, the majority of Yugoslavs would probably support Tito and resist the invaders.

Soviet Capabilities for Overthrowing the Tito Regime by Measures Short of War

4. Since the break between Tito and the Kremlin, an economic blockade has been maintained by the Soviet orbit countries against Yugoslavia. The Cominform nations have harassed and intimidated Yugoslav diplomats and have virtually suspended diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia. Cominform propaganda has maintained a continuous campaign against Tito, and has portrayed him as a lifelong "Fascist agent" and a willing tool of Western imperialists in a conspiracy to attack the Soviet orbit. The economic pressure on Yugoslavia was a serious threat to Tito's regime until the Western Powers began to furnish support.

5. Attempts have been made, and will undoubtedly be continued, to undermine Tito's regime by the infiltration of subversive agents and saboteurs. The USSR may still attempt to stage internal uprisings in Yugoslavia, linked with guerrilla raids from the neighboring Cominform countries. It may succeed in subverting some elements of Tito's own party who may hope for an opportunity to attain power under a Cominform regime.

6. Assassination of Tito by Cominform agents is a continuing possibility. Tito's death under any circumstances would be a major blow to the regime, but would not automatically cause its collapse. Tito's chief lieutenants are as much committed against the Cominform as Tito himself. They would probably continue to adhere to the present principles of the regime. Although stresses and strains would eventually develop in the absence of Tito's strong personality and leadership, they would not in themselves be likely to cause the collapse of the regime during 1951.

7. It is unlikely that any of the methods short of war which the Kremlin may use will succeed in eliminating the present Yugoslav regime so long as Western support continues. Past Cominform pressure and the present con-

nection with the West appear to have strengthened Tito's position with the Yugoslav people. The Kremlin will, therefore, have to resort to armed attack to overthrow his regime.

Soviet and Satellite Armed Forces Available for Invasion of Yugoslavia

8. Soviet forces presently disposed in countries adjacent to Yugoslavia consist of six line divisions—two each in Austria, Hungary, and Rumania—and are insufficient by themselves for a successful invasion of Yugoslavia. Additional forces could, however, readily be drawn from the USSR to make up a force adequate for an invasion.

9. The armies of Albania, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria have been steadily enlarged and now total approximately 460,000 men, organized in 35 divisions. Since 1 January 1950, the army strength of the individual Satellites has undergone the following changes:

	1 January 1950	*Present*
Albania	45,000	45,000
Bulgaria	87,000	145,000
Hungary	38,000	65,000
Rumania	186,000	205,000
	346,000	460,000

(In addition, the following internal security forces are militarized to a considerable degree and are suitable for combat: Albania, 10,000; Bulgaria, 43,500; Hungary, 5,000; and Rumania, 66,000. Bulgarian, Rumanian, and Hungarian army strengths are in excess of peace treaty limitations.) With partial mobilization over a period of at least 30 days, total Satellite army strength could be increased to 925,000 men, organized in 47 line divisions, 11 combat brigades, and supporting independent regiments. Additional equipment would be required, which might be supplied by the USSR. The armed forces of these four Satellites are now estimated to be equipped with approximately 1,600 tanks, and reinforcements might be obtained on short notice from the estimated 800 tanks now with Soviet forces in these Satellites. Satellite air forces total approximately 750 combat aircraft but their combat effectiveness is low. Satellite naval forces are negligible.

10. The combat effectiveness of these Satellite forces would be relatively good, provided they operated under Soviet central direction and had the major advantage of extensive and timely Soviet logistical support.

11. The armies of Czechoslovakia and Poland might provide a substantial Satellite reserve in case of need. However, the political and logistical problems involved in their use against Yugoslavia are so great that this possibility seems remote.

Yugoslav Military Forces Available for Defense

12. The Yugoslav Army has a current strength of approximately 275,000 men, organized in 33 divisions, and could be expanded in 30 days to 600,000 men organized in 40 divisions. Yugoslavia has a further mobilization potential of up to 1 million men within six months, but units beyond 40 divisions could be armed only with light infantry weapons and some field artillery. However, this additional manpower would assure an adequate flow of replacements. Yugoslav Army weapons are generally serviceable, but heterogeneous. Soviet and German World War II types predominate. Quantities are adequate to bring at least existing divisions up to T/O strength in most categories, with a surplus of small arms. Some ammunition stocks are believed to be sufficient for several months of war. However, Yugoslav combat effectiveness would rapidly deteriorate after D-day because of inability to obtain material to replace that lost in combat. Yugoslav combat units appear to be short of crew-served antitank weapons (including self-propelled guns) and tanks, and are seriously deficient in antiaircraft artillery.

13. The Yugoslav Air Force received an estimated 800 aircraft and a two-year level of supply from the USSR about four years ago, but this equipment is now of doubtful value for sustained combat operations. Lacking Western military assistance, the capabilities of the Yugoslav Air Force will continue to decline during 1951. As air forces in general convert to jet aircraft, the Yugoslav Air Force

will become increasingly obsolescent. Aircraft now assigned to the air force are estimated at 650, of which approximately 350 are in tactical units.

14. The Yugoslav Navy is small and inefficient but is nevertheless capable of successfully opposing any Satellite naval operation.

15. Yugoslav forces are capable of good combat performance, and would be especially effective in the defense of the mountainous area of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro. Many of the officers and non-commissioned officers had combat experience in World War II and have had fairly good training since then.

16. In present circumstances, only limited improvement can be expected in Yugoslav military capabilities during 1951. The Yugoslavs are currently attempting to purchase arms and equipment from foreign sources, particularly ammunition and spare parts for Soviet and German equipment now in use. Some materiel is manufactured locally, but production is limited, and it will be some time before new equipment can be produced in adequate quantities.

Vulnerability of Yugoslavia to Invasion

17. Most of the areas along Yugoslavia's extended frontiers are highly vulnerable to invasion from the neighboring Satellite states. Northwestern Yugoslavia, including Slovenia and northern Croatia, could be quickly cut off from the rest of the country by a drive southward from Hungary through Zagreb toward Fiume. The country north of the Sava River between Zagreb and the Danube could also be easily invaded at a number of points along the Hungarian frontier. The Danubian Plain north of Belgrade is especially vulnerable to armored attacks from either Hungary or Rumania. The Belgrade area would be hard to defend against attacks across the Danubian Plain or from the south through the Morava River valley. Yugoslav Macedonia might be cut off by an attack from Bulgaria.

18. The industrial centers of Yugoslavia, on which the army currently depends for supplies, are located for the most part in the lowland areas that could be overrun soon after hostilities had commenced. A considerable effort has been made to develop new industrial installations in less vulnerable areas, as around Sarajevo. The production of these new plants would, as long as they could be kept in operation, partially offset the loss of those in more vulnerable areas. The better agricultural lands are also in the lowland areas and food would, at the outset, become a critical problem. Rail and motor routes from Trieste and Fiume could be cut off at an early stage of the operations by an attack from Hungary.

19. The large mountainous area which includes Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro is suitable for the maintenance of a strong defense. Food and munitions are now being stored in the mountainous regions, but these supplies would probably not suffice for prolonged hostilities. Defense of this area, therefore, would depend on such Western aid as could be supplied through several moderately good ports and airfields along the Dalmatian coast. Transportation facilities from these ports are, however, extremely limited. Similarly, the road and rail routes from Salonika in turn could be cut off by attack from Bulgaria and Albania.

Probable Outcome of a Satellite or Soviet-Satellite Invasion of Yugoslavia

20. The combined armies of Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Albania, if given central direction and full logistical support by the USSR, could mount a sustained invasion of Yugoslavia which would force the Yugoslav Army back into the mountainous regions of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro. The Satellite forces could gradually gain control of the principal lines of communication even in these mountainous regions. The Yugoslavs would continue to resist, however, and would conduct guerrilla operations long after the collapse of formal military resistance.

21. Under present conditions joint Soviet-Satellite forces could successfully invade Yugoslavia, overcome formal military resistance, and eventually render guerrilla operations ineffective.

22. Yugoslav capabilities and morale are such that substantial and continuing Western assistance in military supplies and equipment would probably enable Yugoslavia to maintain organized military resistance to a Satellite attack indefinitely, at least in the mountain area. Such assistance could extend the period of resistance even in the case of a full-scale Soviet-Satellite attack. Such assistance, however, would have to include aid in the form of equipment which could be readily integrated into Yugoslav units (which are now chiefly equipped with weapons of Soviet, German, and Yugoslav manufacture), would have to be delivered several months in advance of an attack, and would have to be on a continuing basis. In particular, the acquisition of certain types of equipment, such as antitank weapons and rocket launchers, could materially improve Yugoslav combat capabilities, but only after Yugoslav personnel had been trained in their use. In the last analysis, Western support would have to be on a scale large enough to neutralize the effect of Soviet logistical support to the Satellite forces.

Likelihood of Satellite or Soviet-Satellite Invasion of Yugoslavia During 1951

23. Since early 1950, there have been indications of increasing military preparations in the Satellite states. The strength of their armed forces has been substantially increased. These forces have been largely re-equipped with Soviet material and have engaged in increasingly large-scale maneuvers, occasionally in conjunction with Soviet occupation forces in Hungary and Rumania. Except for Albania, they have substantial numbers of Soviet T-34 tanks. Recently, JS heavy tanks and self-propelled guns have appeared with the Hungarian forces. Extensive gasoline and food rationing points to stockpiling operations. Civilian defense measures have been undertaken. Increased registration for military service, including the medical profession, has been instituted, and security measures have been tightened. There have been recurrent concentrations of Satellite troops along the Yugoslav border and border incidents have increased. There have been rumors from Cominform circles of an impending attack on Yugoslavia this spring. Cominform propaganda since July 1950 has consistently alleged that Yugoslavia intends to attack Albania and Bulgaria. For the first time, Tito has begun to admit uneasiness. He is seeking arms from Western European powers and has attempted increasingly to tie Yugoslavia to the UN program of collective security. He has improved his relations with Austria, Italy, and Greece.

24. The foregoing developments suggest that the groundwork is being laid for a possible invasion of Yugoslavia. They do not provide, however, conclusive evidence of an intention to attack Yugoslavia because there have been military build-ups in Satellites other than those adjacent to Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the preparations in Bulgaria and Albania could point to an attack on Greece or Turkey as well as on Yugoslavia. Neither is there conclusive evidence that preparations for an attack on Yugoslavia are timed for 1951. Finally, although Cominform propaganda since July has consistently advanced arguments that could be used to justify an attack on Yugoslavia, there has been no recent trend in such propaganda suggesting an attack at an early date. Despite the fact that current indications are inconclusive, however, they are nevertheless of sufficient magnitude to require that a Satellite attack on Yugoslavia in 1951 be considered a serious possibility.

25. The Kremlin may estimate that the advantages to be gained from a successful invasion of Yugoslavia would be greater in 1951 than at a later date. The Kremlin might believe that such an invasion would serve larger Soviet purposes by demoralizing and intimidating the peoples of Western Europe, by forestalling the implementation of NATO plans, and by rendering European governments susceptible to accommodation to the USSR.

26. The Kremlin may estimate further that there would be a better chance in 1951 than later that an attack on Yugoslavia could be carried through without incurring effective Western intervention or precipitating general war. The Kremlin might believe:

a. That Yugoslav forces could not maintain successful organized resistance without military supplies from the Western Powers, and

that Western military supplies of appropriate types and in sufficient quantity probably would not be forthcoming in time to be effective during 1951;

b. That the present unpreparedness of the Western European Powers and their consequent fear of general war at this time would prevent effective UN intervention, leaving the US confronted with the dilemma either of intervening unilaterally or of refraining from intervention in order to maintain Western unity;

c. That the US, in view of its commitments in Korea and its obligations to strengthen the defenses of Western Europe, would be unlikely to allocate sufficient forces to the defense of Yugoslavia; and

d. That the American people would not countenance general war with the USSR in defense of Tito.

27. On the other hand, the Kremlin may estimate that an attack on Yugoslavia would be difficult and costly and would involve more serious risk of general war than the USSR was prepared to accept during 1951. The Kremlin may conclude:

a. That in view of US-UN action in Korea, there would be immediate intervention in Yugoslavia, thus creating a serious drain on the resources of the Soviet orbit and involving grave risk that the conflict might expand into a general war;

b. That the US would launch an immediate atomic attack on the USSR. The USSR might find support for this conclusion in the strong US reaction to the Korean invasion, the extent and speed of subsequent US rearmament, US moves to rearm Germany and Japan, public statements by certain US officials advocating a preventive war, President Truman's general warning of July 1950 regarding future Communist aggression, and Secretary Acheson's recent specific statement with respect to US interest in the preservation of Yugoslavia's independence. The Kremlin might also believe that US military leaders would welcome an occasion to use their atomic capabilities before the USSR had further built up its defensive and retaliatory capabilities.

28. Finally, it is possible that the Kremlin already is, or in 1951 will become, fully prepared for the eventuality of general war. In such a case, the USSR might launch an attack on Yugoslavia regardless of its estimate of the risks involved.

29. On the basis of evidence available, it is impossible to determine what course the Kremlin is likely to adopt. However, the extent of Satellite military and propaganda preparations indicates that an attack on Yugoslavia in 1951 should be considered a serious possibility.

30. If the Kremlin decides to launch an attack on Yugoslavia in 1951, we believe that it will probably employ Satellite forces alone, with "unofficial" Soviet aid. A Satellite attack on Yugoslavia would have the apparent advantage of great flexibility; it would offer scope for increasing or decreasing the scale of Soviet intervention and leave open the possibility of negotiating a settlement of that conflict if it threatened to expand into a general war which, at the time, the Kremlin was unwilling to accept.

31. On the other hand, it is possible that the Kremlin might decide upon a combined Soviet-Satellite attack on Yugoslavia, in the belief that it could thus achieve such prompt and decisive results as to confront the Western Powers with a *fait accompli* before they could effectively intervene.

12. **NIE 81, 22 May 1953,** ***Probable Soviet Courses of Action With Respect to Germany, Through Mid-1954***

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY THROUGH MID-1954

NIE-81

Published 22 May 1953

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PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY, THROUGH MID-1954

THE PROBLEM

To estimate probable Soviet courses of action with respect to Germany, through mid-1954.

ESTIMATE

1. We believe that current Soviet "peace" tactics do not indicate any change in the ultimate Kremlin objective with respect to Germany, which is to bring the entire country under Soviet control. The Kremlin must recognize, however, that it is not in a position to advance directly toward this ultimate objective by political action because of the hostility of the overwhelming majority of Germans to Communism. It must also recognize that an attempt to impose Communist control over all Germany by force would result in general war.

2. We believe that through the period of this estimate the Kremlin will seek by political warfare to prevent or at least to retard the Western program for West German rearmament and the integration of West Germany with the West. The Soviet leaders will probably continue to believe that there is a good chance of thwarting the Western program through a political warfare campaign which plays upon Western European fear of German rearmament and upon German desire for unity. Even if the EDC is ratified and West German rearmament begins, the Kremlin will probably believe that the implementation of the EDC agreements and the rearming of West Germany will proceed slowly, and that there will continue to be opportunities to thwart the Western program. In any case, it is unlikely that by mid-1954 the rearmament of West Germany will have advanced to a point at which the Soviet leaders would regard West Germany as a serious military threat.

3. The Kremlin in its political warfare directed against West Germany will seek to encourage defeatism and neutralism by emphasizing Soviet military might and determination, while at the same time it will use "peace" tactics to counter rearmament sentiment. Soviet propaganda will appeal to German nationalism by exploiting anti-American themes and by seeking to aggravate Franco-German differences. Trade offers and the lure of former German markets in Eastern Europe and mainland China will be dangled before West German businessmen.

4. As part of its "peace" tactics, the Kremlin may during the period of this estimate make proposals for the establishment of a united, independent, and neutralized Germany on the basis of free all-German elections and the withdrawal of all occupation forces from Germany. However, we believe that such proposals would contain conditions which the Kremlin would intend to be unacceptable to the West, or that the Kremlin would intend to prevent the implementation of agreements embodying these proposals.

5. We believe that during the period of this estimate, the Kremlin will not give up or

weaken its control over East Germany even to prevent West German integration with the West or West German rearmament. So long as it retains East Germany, the Kremlin will remain in a position to use East Germany as a lever in negotiations with the West and to prevent German unification on terms unfavorable to the ultimate extension of Soviet control to all Germany. Furthermore, so long as Soviet troops occupy East Germany the USSR will retain a valuable base for either offensive or defensive military operations and for attempts to intimidate the West. Finally, East Germany has great economic and technological importance for the Bloc. For instance, we estimate that East Germany contributes about 40 percent of the Bloc's total production of uranium ores and concentrates. It is unlikely that the Kremlin will surrender the great advantages which it derives from its control over East Germany in return for the establishment of a united and neutral Germany which it might hope subsequently to subvert. The Kremlin almost certainly fears that, even if a united Germany were not only neutralized but disarmed, it would eventually rearm and turn against the USSR.

6. We believe, therefore, that the Kremlin will retain and consolidate its hold on East Germany and will seek to increase East German economic and military power. The Soviet program will be tantamount to making East Germany into a full-fledged Satellite with security measures as rigorous, and isolation of the population almost as complete as in the other Satellite states. However, the Kremlin probably believes that the formal integration of East Germany into the Soviet Bloc as a "People's Democracy" would be likely to hasten the rearmament of West Germany and its integration with the West and to turn the pressure for German unity against the USSR. Therefore, the Kremlin will probably continue to make concessions to the needs of the propaganda campaign for all-German unity by preserving a multi-party facade in East Germany and by allowing some non-governmental groups to maintain tenuous connections with West Germany. On the other hand, if the Soviet "peace" tactics are abandoned and the EDC agreements are ratified, the Kremlin may conclude a separate peace treaty and an alliance with East Germany and incorporate it into the Bloc as a "People's Democracy."

7. The Kremlin probably estimates that the maintenance of Soviet control in East Germany is dependent upon the presence of Soviet forces in East Germany. However, the Kremlin may estimate that it could greatly increase the effectiveness of its political warfare campaign by removing some of its overt control mechanisms from East Germany, including some of its military forces. The Kremlin might expect that such moves would give the impression of Soviet willingness to withdraw entirely from East Germany, thus intensifying German hopes for unification and the expectations in Western Europe, particularly in France, for a satisfactory settlement of the German problem.

8. It is even conceivable that at some stage the Soviet leaders might withdraw all Soviet forces from East Germany, if they were convinced that such a step would lead to the withdrawal of all US forces from Europe and would create conditions favorable to the imposition of Soviet control over all of Germany. This is only a remote possibility, at least for the period of this estimate, but we believe it cannot be excluded entirely.

9. Despite the recent lessening of Soviet pressure on West Berlin, we believe that the Kremlin objective of forcing the withdrawal of the Western Powers from West Berlin remains unchanged. So long as the Kremlin continues its "peace" tactics, it will probably not undertake new harassing measures against West Berlin. However, preparations for sealing off West Berlin from East Germany and East Berlin have been substantially completed. If the "peace" tactics are abandoned, West Berlin will probably be isolated from adjacent Soviet-controlled territory. The likelihood of interference with communications between West Berlin and West Germany, possibly including a surface blockade of West Berlin, will increase substantially if the EDC agreements are ratified. However, we believe that the Kremlin will carefully assess Western reaction to the various forms of pressure employed, and that

the Kremlin is unlikely to adopt courses of action which, in its estimation, would involve grave risk of general war.

10. In conclusion, there can be no doubt that the Kremlin regards West Germany as potentially the most powerful state in Western Europe, and as potentially the most dangerous, both to the realization of Soviet aggressive plans and to the security of the Bloc. During the period of this estimate, the Kremlin is likely to believe that the German situation is not yet dangerous and that there remain opportunities for influencing developments in Germany by political warfare.

13. SNIE 12-2-56, 30 October 1956, *Probable Developments in East Europe and Implications for Soviet Policy*

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30 October 1956

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PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST EUROPE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET POLICY

Submitted by the

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred in by the

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

on 30 October 1956. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

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HRP 93-3

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PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST EUROPE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET POLICY

I. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SATELLITES

1. Events in Poland and Hungary have demonstrated the strength and vitality of anti-Soviet sentiments in these Satellites. Particularly in Hungary, there have been manifestations of strong anti-Communist sentiment as well. The Soviet strategic position in Eastern Europe has been weakened. Soviet policy is now confronted with serious dilemmas: (a) the need to make some accommodation with the increasing pressures of nationalism in the Satellites without losing the essential minimum of control over them; (b) the difficulty of using Soviet armed might to put down nationalist and anti-Communist revolt in the face of world opinion.

Poland

2. A new Communist regime, considerably more independent of Moscow than the previous one, has been established in Poland, with reluctant Soviet acquiescence. This regime is pledged to maintain the alliance with the USSR, including the retention of Soviet forces in Poland as long as NATO forces remain in Germany, but reserving the right to choose whether or not Soviet specialists and military advisors will remain in the Polish army. It is also pledged to introduce certain democratic procedures (presumably compatible with party control), to stop coercive collectivization, and to raise standards of living.

3. The stability of the Gomulka regime rests on its ability to strike a balance between popular Polish aspirations for independence and economic improvement, on the one hand, and the minimum requirements of the USSR with respect both to the maintenance of the Communist system and to Soviet military security, on the other. Developments in Hungary may make a middle road course difficult for Gomulka.

Hungary

4. In Hungary concessions were made so slowly and reluctantly as to intensify rather than satisfy the pressures for change. The regime of the Communist Imre Nagy, once purged from the party for deviationism and only recently restored to party membership, took over with the outbreak of open revolt and the employment of Soviet forces. Nagy promised drastic reforms and announced a government which included non-Communists. The Hungarian army does not appear to have been employed on a large scale, and its allegiance in the struggle is unclear. There have been widespread desertions to the rebels, particularly in the west, and the rebels are in possession of some tanks in other areas; but at least elements of two Hungarian divisions are known to have participated in the repression at the outset.

5. It is unlikely that any Hungarian government will be able to reach a compromise between Soviet security requirements and Hungarian nationalist sentiment. Certain rebel groups appear willing to accept Nagy temporarily and it seems possible that he can gradually establish control if he can reach an accommodation with the rebels with respect to their principal demands: abolition of the secret police, complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country, and changes in the composition of the government. If the rebels refuse to make an accommodation with Nagy, the Soviet Union will be faced with the alternatives of risking the development of a non-Communist and independent Hungary or of intervening with large scale military forces to take over the country by force.

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Other Satellites

6. Signs of nationalistic ferment were seen during the spring in Czechoslovakia. Beginning late last year, a number of non-Communist politicians were released from prison in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria; in the spring a number of prominent Stalin purge victims in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia were cleared of Titoist charges; and conciliatory personnel changes were made, particularly in the Czech defense ministry and the Rumanian police apparatus. But there have been no challenges to Soviet influence by the governments of those Satellites, and few indications of sharp divisions within the local parties. However, in the absence of a Soviet return to a policy of repression, a more autonomous and nationally-oriented regime will probably be evolved for Czechoslovakia and possibly Rumania and Bulgaria. This likelihood would be increased if the Hungarian rebels win most of their demands. Albania, on the other hand, is less likely to press vigorously for independence.

7. East Germany is a special case. Regardless of East German desires, the USSR will almost certainly not tolerate any substantial weakening of controls or the introduction of effective nationalist influence into the government. The USSR regards East Germany as vitally important to Soviet security and maintains a garrison of 22 line divisions there. Moreover, fear among the Poles and Czechs of a reunified Germany with irredentist claims is a factor serving to persuade them of the need to cooperate with the USSR and to prevent them from supporting an East German independence movement.

Economic Considerations

8. Longstanding economic grievances continue to be an important factor behind unrest in the Satellites. Reduced use of repressive measures and an increased candor in discussing economic problems have recently encouraged more overt expression of discontent. In an effort to alleviate the situation, the USSR has recently negotiated modest aid agreements with Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Bulgaria.

9. The Polish and Hungarian governments will almost certainly attempt to lessen their economic dependence on the USSR, by increasing trade with the West, and probably also by seeking economic assistance, especially in the form of credits.

10. The most serious immediate problem for East Europe may be the fuel shortage which will probably result from underfulfillments in the Polish, Czech, and Hungarian coal industries. A severe winter would increase fuel demands and might freeze up East German open pit operations, causing serious shortages which the USSR, with its own coal difficulties, might not be able to alleviate. The bumper Soviet harvest could compensate for the poor Satellite crop of this fall and assure food supplies.

II. IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET POLICY

11. We believe that the Hungarian rebellion came as a surprise to the Soviet leadership. On the basis of the evidence presently available, Soviet policy through the Polish and Hungarian crises appears to have been vacillating. It is too early to be confident on this matter, but we believe that Soviet leadership may be in a state of confusion, and until basic decisions are made, may be unable to conduct policy with sureness of touch. A crisis in Western relationships over the Middle East might make Soviet leaders feel that they had greater freedom of action in the Satellite area.

12. There has for some time been difference of opinion among Soviet leaders about the post-Stalin policy of seeking to reduce apathy at home, disaffection in the Satellites, and distrust in the non-Communist world. Soviet confidence in this policy, generated by gains in morale at home and an improved position in international relations, must now have been shaken by the need to make concessions in Poland and especially by the events in Hungary. It is possible that the Hungarian rebellion will precipitate changes in the composition or structure of the Soviet leadership. If the Hungarian rebels are able to achieve a substantial political victory, pressures for policy changes will almost certainly make the position of the Khrushchev leadership increas-

ingly difficult. The position of advocates of a harder line may be strengthened. Changes in the leadership would be even more likely if the professional military under Zhukov insist that basic Soviet security is being jeopardized by current policies.

Domestic and Foreign Policy

13. Irrespective of any action which Soviet leaders may feel forced to take in Hungary, it is unlikely that they will wish drastically to reverse the course of domestic relaxation which was undertaken largely for pressing internal considerations and has significantly improved party and popular morale. It is also unlikely that Soviet leaders will abandon the effort to woo the uncommitted areas of the world and to weaken Western alliances. Soviet armed action in the Hungarian crisis will have an adverse effect on the credibility of the USSR's propaganda exploitation of anticolonial movements, but the ultimate effect in this area, as well as on the attitudes of the Yugoslav and Chinese Communists promoters of Satellite autonomy, will be determined more by future Soviet policy than by the present emergency action.

Policy Toward the Satellites

14. Evidence at present does not permit an estimate of whether or not the USSR will occupy Hungary with additional military force sufficient to quell the rebellion, in the event that present measures to establish control are unsuccessful. Unless it does so, however, we believe it unlikely that the USSR would find it feasible to impose for any long period a Stalinist system of rigid police and ideological controls over the Satellites. For the present, the USSR will probably endeavor to prevent further outbreaks in the Satellites by insisting on precautionary police measures and the suppression of anti-Soviet ferment. These closer controls will probably be accompanied by ameliorating measures such as Soviet help in meeting food shortages, moratoria on collectivization, and relief from some other economic pressures. East Germany will be watched with particular vigilance.

15. If confronted by strong nationalist pressures in the other Satellites, the USSR will probably attempt to establish Communist regimes which possess a larger measure of internal autonomy but which maintain military and foreign policy solidarity with the USSR.

Military Implications

16. We believe the Soviet leaders estimate that the minimum military requirements for their national security include the maintenance of effective early warning capabilities on the Satellite borders, of powerful Soviet forces in East Germany, and of secure lines of communication from the USSR to East Germany. The developments in Poland and Hungary will probably result in a substantial downward revision in the Soviet estimate of the reliability of most of the Satellite armed forces.[1] We believe these circumstances will dictate a keen Soviet desire to retain its own military forces in the other Satellites in which they are now stationed, especially in Poland. For the immediate future, the possibility of new Satellite rebellions will reinforce this desire. Therefore, the Soviet leaders will almost certainly retain the Warsaw Pact organization in order to preserve the rights which they enjoy under it.

17. It seems unlikely that US action short of overt military intervention or obvious preparation for such intervention would lead the USSR deliberately to take steps which it believed would materially increase the risk of general war. The Soviet leaders probably recognize that the US nuclear-air capability remains superior to that of the USSR, and have probably concluded that at present the USSR, even if it launched a surprise attack, would receive unacceptable damage in a nuclear exchange with the US.

18. Soviet suspicions of US policy and present circumstances which involve Soviet troop movements and alerts probably increase the likelihood of a series of actions and counteractions leading inadvertently to war. Such a series of actions could most readily originate with respect to East Germany.

[1] See Annex.

13. *(Continued)*

ANNEX

	Line divisions	Jet fighters	Jet light bombers	Ground attack aircraft
Satellite forces				
Albania	0 (7 brigades)	40	0	0
Bulgaria	12	225	5	100 (piston)
Czechoslovakia	16 (incl. 2 tank, 3 mech.)	805	40	200 (piston)
Hungary	10 (incl. 1 tank, 1 mech.)	220	20	115 (piston)
Poland	18 (incl. 6 mech.)	400	80	275 (piston)
Rumania	14 (incl. 1 tank, 1 mech.)	240	35	120 (piston)
East Germany	7 (incl. 3 mech.)	40	0	0
	77	1,700	180	800
Soviet forces in East Europe				
East Germany	22 (incl. 8 tank, 10 mech.)	800 25 (recon)	75 21 (recon)	0
Poland	2 (1 tank, 1 mech.)	224	75 21 (recon)	114 (jet)
Hungary	2 (mech.)	213	75	0
Rumania	3 (mech.)	128	0	0
	29	1,000	270	114

	Destroyers	Submarines	Mine warfare and naval vessels
Albania	0	0	17
Bulgaria	1	3	48
Poland	2	0	44
Rumania	4	3	16
East Germany	0	0	40
Soviet naval forces in East Europe (Not including Baltic and Black Sea Fleets)			
East Germany	0	0	30
Poland	0	0	30

The Middle East

The Suez Crisis of October 1956, when Britain and France intervened in the Arab-Israeli war, and growing Soviet support for Arab nationalism are the highlights of Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East during the 1950s. In the Suez Crisis the USSR portrayed itself as a strong anticolonial power restraining the West. After the Suez Crisis the USSR worked to fill the vacuum created by French and British withdrawal from the region.

In July 1956 Egyptian President Gamel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. After international efforts to negotiate a settlement with Nasser failed, Britain and France planned military action against Egypt. Their opportunity came when Israel attacked Egypt on 29 October 1956. The Eisenhower administration strongly condemned the Anglo-French operation and Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin threatened military action to end the fighting.

Special National Intelligence Estimate 11-9-56 of 6 November 1956, *Sino-Soviet Intentions in the Suez Crisis*, was drafted during the height of the crisis and published on the day that President Eisenhower ordered a global alert of all US military forces. This estimate concluded that the Soviets would neither attack Britain or France nor deploy troops to the Middle East.

The French and British withdrawal from the Middle East after the Suez Crisis created a power vacuum that the USSR was eager to fill. Almost immediately after Suez, the CIA evaluated the consequences of the crisis for Soviet policy in SNIE 11-10-56 of 29 November 1956, *Soviet Actions in the Middle East*. This estimate concluded that, having gained a great deal of prestige in the Arab world, the Soviets were likely to enjoy increased influence in Egypt and Syria.

14. SNIE 11-9-56, 6 November 1956, *Sino-Soviet Intentions in the Suez Crisis*

R Rm NOV 15 1956
SNIE 11-9-56
6270 6 November 1956

~~SECRET~~

Nº 230

SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 11-9-56

SINO-SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE SUEZ CRISIS

Submitted by the

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred in by the

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

on 6 November 1956. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

~~SECRET~~

14. *(Continued)*

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SINO-SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE SUEZ CRISIS

THE ESTIMATE

1. The Soviet notes to Eden and Mollet constitute strong threats of military action against the UK, France, and Israel in connection with the Suez crisis. These threats are imprecise, however. They do not include a definite expression of Soviet intent to take unilateral military action; they still specifically call for UN action. Nevertheless, they are clearly intended to imply that the USSR may act alone.

2. There are several reasons for strong Soviet action in the Suez crisis:

a. to reassert the Soviet position as the champion of Egypt and of anticolonial countries generally;

b. to distract attention, both within and outside the Bloc, from the situation in Hungary;

c. to damage the interests and prestige of the UK and France and further divide and weaken the Western Alliances;

d. possibly, to re-establish the fear of the use of Soviet military force as a primary factor in world affairs.

3. We believe that our previous estimate that the USSR wishes to avoid general war continues to be valid.

4. It is our present estimate that the USSR:

a. will almost certainly not attack metropolitan UK or France — primarily because such an attack would make general war practically certain;

b. will probably not employ Soviet forces on a large scale in the Eastern Mediterranean — primarily because their capability to do so at an early date is inadequate, also because the risk of general war arising from such action would be very great;

c. may make small-scale attacks by air or submarine against UK and French forces in the Eastern Mediterranean — for the purpose of creating further pressures towards a UN settlement satisfactory to themselves, and showing themselves as the reliable champion of Egypt;

d. will continue to furnish military aid in the form of materiel, technicians, and logistics to Syria, and through Syria to the other Arab States, probably on an increased scale. They will probably send volunteers;

e. will at the least continue by threats to seek to create alarm in the West, in order to produce a UN settlement tolerable to the USSR.

5. With respect to the implied threat to the UK of using "rockets" (presumably guided missiles with nuclear warheads), the USSR is estimated to have the capability of delivering low yield atomic weapons by ballistic missiles with 800 nautical mile range which could reach the UK if launched from the Satellites. The 800 mile missile could reach major Israeli and Cypriot targets but not Egypt itself. Air-to-surface missiles, and probably submarine launched missiles with nuclear warheads are also within current Soviet capabilities and could pose a threat to all areas. We do not believe that the USSR would employ guided missiles with nuclear warheads in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict.

6. To attack Israel or Franco-British forces in the Eastern Mediterranean (except those on Cyprus) from present Bloc bases, the USSR would have to use aircraft of the Long-Range

Air Force, or use IL-28 jet light bombers on missions involving no return to the Bloc. Establishment of bases for IL-28 bombers in Syria, Jordan, or Iraq is an alternative possibility, but would involve considerable problems of logistical support and defense of such bases, especially if they were used for sustained operations.

7. With respect to the Far East, we believe it possible, though it does not at present seem probable, that the Suez crisis might develop in such a way as to cause the Chinese Communists to take advantage of it by an attack on the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong.

8. This estimate is based on intelligence received up to 1100 hours EST, 6 November. In the fast developing situation our estimates of this situation must be kept under constant review. The flow of events will be drastically affected by day to day decision and action of the main participants, including in particular the USA, and the estimate the Soviet Union reaches as to the probable course of action of the USA, and the UK and France.

15. SNIE 11-10-56, 29 November 1956, *Soviet Actions in the Middle East*

SNIE 11-10-56
29 November 1956

SECRET

6857 Nº 214

SPECIAL

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 11-10-56

SOVIET ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Submitted by the

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred in by the

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

on 29 November 1956. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director, for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission representative to the IAC, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

SECRET

15. *(Continued)*

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Date 7/8/93

HRP 93-3

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SOVIET ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet objectives and probable courses of action in the Middle East, particularly with respect to the Suez Canal and Arab-Israeli controversies.

ASSUMPTION

That the UK, France, and Israel evidence their clear intention to comply with the UN resolution with respect to the withdrawal of their forces.

DISCUSSION

General Soviet Policy

1. The chain of events precipitated by Israeli, French, and British action against Egypt has sharply intensified most Middle East problems, and has created major fresh sources of trouble. For the most part, these recent developments have worked to increase the influence of the USSR in the area, and to enhance considerably Soviet opportunities to undermine the Western position there and elsewhere. The USSR will take advantage of these opportunities, and in doing so will confront the US with critical policy decisions.

2. In determining specific courses of action in the Middle East, the USSR will try in every way to maximize the disruptive effects of this situation on the Atlantic Community as a whole. It will probably pursue this general objective at the expense, if necessary, of immediate Soviet gains in the Middle East.

3. The scale, nature, and timing of Soviet moves will depend on a number of factors including UN action, US policy and action, the course of the Arab-Israeli controversy, and what the UK and France do. The interaction of these factors in the fluid situation makes difficult a forecast of Soviet action. Nevertheless, Soviet objectives and certain possible actions, together with their implications, can be defined.

4. The USSR still almost certainly wishes to avoid precipitating general war over the Middle East crisis. It also probably wishes to avoid overt action which would throw the weight of world opinion against its involvement in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the credit which the USSR gained, particularly in the Middle East, by its pressures on the UK, France, and Israel to halt their action in Egypt, has probably increased its confidence that it can vigorously exploit the present crisis without undue risk.

5. In the present situation over-all Soviet objectives probably are:

a. To consolidate the USSR's position as champion of Arab nationalism against the

Western Powers and Israel and of anticolonialism in general;

b. To use the situation to distract world attention from events in the Satellites, particularly in Hungary;

c. To undermine Western political and military power in the area and to make difficult the maintenance of Western military bases and alliances with Middle East states;

d. To weaken the West economically and strategically, notably through the reduction of Western access to Middle East oil; and

e. To prolong and deepen Western differences.

6. Thus the USSR probably sees in the present situation opportunities not only to expand its influence in the Middle East at Western expense, but also a windfall opportunity to strike at the political, economic, and military strength of the Western governments themselves as well as at the unity of the Western alliance as a whole. The disruption of Middle East oil supplies and the closing of the canal to trade in other commodities as well confronts the NATO powers with serious and immediate economic problems (e. g., layoffs due to oil shortages are inevitable). In addition, the oil shortage now looming up before Europe is virtually certain to increase strains between the Western European governments as they compete: (a) for the limited supplies which are trickling through the usual channels; and (b) for emergency aid from the US in the form of additional oil and financial aid to buy oil. It is almost certain that the USSR will seek to derive maximum advantage from public resentment in Europe against the US because of the oil shortage. The USSR has made offers and will make offers of oil to certain countries in Europe and the Mediterranean area experiencing shortages.[1]

Probable Soviet Courses of Action—Assuming No Further Hostilities in the Area

7. *Vis-a-vis Egypt.* The USSR will almost certainly seek, as a matter of priority, to insure that Nasser remains in power and that he maintains a stiff position regarding both the canal question and Israel:

a. The USSR will almost certainly extend support to help Nasser withstand any political and economic pressures aimed at bringing about his downfall. Such support will probably include assistance designed to offset any Western economic measures against Egypt.

b. The USSR will probably work to stiffen Nasser's resistance to any UN arrangements acceptable to the British, French, and Israelis. It will support Egypt in demanding that UN intervention be limited to restoring the *status quo ante* (e. g., that UN troops should merely oversee the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces, leaving Egypt in control of the canal; and then serve as a temporary shield between Egypt and Israel after a complete withdrawal by Israel behind its former borders).

c. The USSR will encourage Nasser in his insistence that Egypt control the rehabilitation and operation of the canal. It will in this and perhaps other ways seek to delay the reopening of the canal, but will avoid appearing clearly obstructionist in world opinion

[1] The Soviet Bloc now supplies approximately 90,000 barrels per day of petroleum and petroleum products to non-Sino-Soviet Bloc countries. Approximately 50,000 barrels a day are shipped to Western Europe, primarily to Sweden, Finland, and Iceland. Elsewhere, the principal recipients have been Egypt and Yugoslavia. Assuming that tankers were available, the Bloc could export substantially larger amounts of crude oil and/or finished products from its expanding production. Crude oil production in the USSR is currently increasing at an annual rate of 95 million barrels, equivalent to an average of more than 200,000 barrels per day. Any substantial increase in exports would, however, involve some sacrifice of economic activity because of the rapidly expanding domestic requirements for petroleum. In view of these domestic needs and the difficulty of moving oil from producing and storage centers to ports, it is considered unlikely that the Soviet Bloc would maintain exports for long in excess of an additional 100,000 barrels per day. This quantity, equivalent to about four percent of total Western European consumption, would permit a reduction of some 12 to 15 percent in the estimated current deficit. Over a limited period, however, if willing to draw heavily on inventories, the Bloc would be able to augment significantly the additional quantities of petroleum available for export to Western Europe.

and alienating India and other Asian powers which are adversely affected by the closure of the canal.

d. The USSR will continue to encourage and support Nasser in demands that the UK, France, and Israel pay reparations and possibly bear the cost of clearing the canal.

e. As long as progress is being made by the UN and the UN force remains in Egypt, the USSR is unlikely to try to introduce arms and technicians in quantity. However, in spite of the UN resolution, the USSR will probably quietly replace some of Nasser's losses in materiel in order to help his domestic position, to rebuild morale in the Egyptian armed forces, and to bolster his standing in the area. If so, the necessary technicians, probably including Soviet pilots, would accompany the equipment.

8. *Vis-a-vis other Arab States.* The USSR will probably make increasing use of Syria in its anti-Western and anti-Israeli campaign. Pro-Soviet elements are already gaining the ascendancy in Syria, where the conservative, relatively pro-Western leaders are divided and on the defensive. The USSR probably regards these trends in Syria as sufficiently favorable for the purposes of its Middle East policy, and is likely to avoid any open demonstration of control over the Syrian government even if it gains such control.

9. The Bloc has already supplied aircraft and armor to Syria. This includes an estimated 130 T-34 tanks, 200 armored personnel carriers, and 20–25 MIG 15 fighters, which were delivered in Egypt. We believe that most, if not all, of these fighters were destroyed by the UK-French attack. We have no reliable evidence to support reports that additional large quantities of Soviet air and armored equipment and personnel have arrived in Syria. Since 29 October five Soviet Bloc ships have docked at Latakia but we believe that no additional equipment other than small arms has been off-loaded. Future introduction of aircraft, military advisors, and technicians is likely, and possibly some volunteers.[1]

10. Syria thus represents a promising target for Soviet efforts — military, political, and economic — in the Arab world. A continuation of the present extreme nationalist and pro-Soviet trend in Syria would give the USSR a number of advantages. It would, for example:

a. Facilitate Soviet efforts to encourage and aid Syrian blackmail and boycott tactics and further physical sabotage against Western-owned oil pipelines transiting Syria from Iraq and Saudi Arabia — of which only one, the US-owned Tapline, is now in operation. Especially as long as the Western Powers are denied passage through the Suez Canal, this would be of critical importance to the USSR as a strategic and economic weapon against the West.

b. Further weaken the military position of the Baghdad Pact countries and increase the defense problems of Turkey and Iraq.

c. Open up greater political and subversive opportunities in many parts of the Arab world.

d. Provide additional means of exacerbating Arab-Israeli tensions which the USSR can exploit in pursuing its pro-Arab, anti-Israeli, and anti-Western policy.

The establishment of a Soviet-Satellite government in Syria, or even of a government clearly dependent on the USSR would, however, also:

a. Serve to drive Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Iran closer to the West, almost certainly cause Turkey and Iraq to press toward intervention in Syria, and raise fear and suspicions of Soviet intentions in much of Europe and Asia;

b. Confront the USSR with much larger risks of having to participate directly in any local hostilities in the Middle East.

11. Jordan also represents a promising target for Soviet political and subversive efforts. The new, anti-Western Jordanian parliament has recently recommended the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty (and the British

[1] The term "volunteers" is used in this estimate to mean troops, tank drivers, jet pilots, etc., actually employed, or intended to be employed, in combat. They are thus distinguished from advisors, technicians, trainers, etc., who are not in general intended to participate in combat.

subsidy) and the establishment of relations with the Bloc. Implementation of these measures requires only the consent of the weak and unstable Jordanian king who under present circumstances is unlikely to prove able to hold out long against strong popular pressures.

12. *Vis-a-vis Israel.* The USSR probably believes that incurring the enmity of Israel is a cheap price to pay for the gains in the Arab world to be derived from an anti-Israeli policy. The USSR will therefore almost certainly encourage a continuation of Arab-Israeli tensions. It will probably also encourage a belief among the Arabs that the USSR favors the eventual elimination of Israel.

13. We do not believe, however, that the USSR wants to precipitate full-scale hostilities between Israel and the surrounding Arab states. A continuation of high tension short of war probably appears sufficiently advantageous and certainly less risky for Soviet interests, since they probably consider that in present circumstances all-out Arab-Israeli hostilities might lead to the rapid destruction of Arab forces (including those equipped by the USSR) or even to US involvement and general war. Thus, the USSR will probably continue its efforts to intimidate Israel against launching full-scale war against Syria and Jordan.

Probable Soviet Courses of Action—Assuming Further Hostilities in the Area

14. If Arab-Israeli hostilities did develop, the Bloc would probably step up political support and military assistance to the Arab side, possibly including sending volunteers to Syria. In the UN and elsewhere, it would probably seek to take the lead in demanding drastic measures against Israel.

15. If Anglo-French military action against Egypt should be resumed, the Soviets would probably step up political support and military assistance to Egypt. If requested, they would probably send volunteers. They would also probably renew and intensify their threats against Britain and France.

16. The scope of Soviet action, however, in the event of renewed British-French military operations, an Arab-Israeli war, or a conflict over Syria, would depend greatly on the attitude of the US. The USSR would be unlikely to make good on any threats of hostilities against the UK and France or Israel or even to send volunteers if it estimated that such steps would provoke a US reaction which substantially increased the risk of general war.

17. It is obvious, however, that in the critical situation surrounding an outbreak of hostilities there would be serious risks of miscalculation on the part of both the USSR and the West.

GLOBAL ISSUES

152A

The Balance of Power

Some of the most interesting estimates deal with long-term trends. Trying to foresee what the world will look like in five, 10, or 15 years is extremely important to policymakers and defense planners. Drafters of estimates analyzing long-term trends have the luxury of time and can reflect critically on where the evidence leads them.

Special Estimate 46, 8 July 1953, *Probable Long Term Development of the Soviet Bloc and Western Power Positions*, evaluated the "relative development of the Soviet Bloc and Eastern power positions over the next 15 years, with a view to estimating whether or not time is on our side in the East-West conflict." This estimate's attempt to envision the world of 1968 is analogous to an effort today to forecast the world of 2008. Such exercises are admittedly risky, and this estimate offers an opportunity to assess the 1953 Board of Estimate's gifts of prophecy.

16. SE 46, 8 July 1953, *Probable Long Term Development of the Soviet Bloc and Western Power Positions*

Uncl.
[redacted]
SECURITY INFORMATION
21 June 89

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SPECIAL ESTIMATE

PROBABLE LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET BLOC AND WESTERN POWER POSITIONS

SE-46

Approved 3 July 1953

Published 8 July 1953

The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 3 July 1953. The FBI abstained, the subject being outside of its jurisdiction.

The following member organizations of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.

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PROBABLE LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET BLOC AND WESTERN POWER POSITIONS

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the probable relative development of the Soviet Bloc and Western power positions over the next fifteen years, with a view to estimating whether or not time is on our side in the East-West conflict.

ASSUMPTIONS

1. No general war.
2. Continuation of the present general trend of policies of both the Bloc and the Western Powers.[1]

ESTIMATE

3. We believe it essential to state at the outset that there is no unequivocal answer to the question "is time on our side." Even assuming a "continuation of the present general trend of policies of both the Bloc and the Western Powers" (itself an assumption of doubtful validity), there are so many accidental or unpredictable factors which will materially affect the world situation as to prevent any firm estimate of the relative Soviet Bloc and Western power positions fifteen years from now. Moreover on the side of the anti-Communist countries, taking the NATO and so-called neutralist powers together, there are so many divergent trends that it is difficult to speak of a consistent trend of policy. Even within NATO itself, the chief unifying force lies in the agreement of the members to resist aggression against any one of them. However, it is possible to appraise in general terms our likely power position vis-a-vis the Bloc if present trends continue and if various major alternative developments do or do not come to pass. Moreover, by examining the impact of some of these alternatives, we can at least establish certain significant factors which might alter present trends.

PROBABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH OF SOVIET BLOC AND THE WEST

4. *The Soviet Bloc.* At present the over-all economic strength of the Soviet Bloc is far less than that of the Western Powers; in terms of gross national product (GNP), the 1952 output of the entire Bloc is estimated to have been about one-third that of the Western states.[2] However, assuming a continuation of present policies and programs, the economic strength of the Soviet Bloc will increase greatly over the next 10–15 years. For some years the rate of growth of the Soviet economy will almost certainly remain higher than that of any major Western state. However, the past rapid rate of growth, which we estimate averaged 7–8 percent in 1948–1952, is already leveling off and the annual rate toward the end of the

[1] The Western Powers are taken to include the US and its allies.

[2] For the purpose of these economic projections, the Western Powers include the US, the European NATO countries, West Germany, Canada, Australia, and Japan.

period is unlikely to exceed 3–4 percent. Even so, total Soviet GNP will probably almost double within the next fifteen years, while Bloc GNP as a whole will increase around 75 percent.

5. Bloc economic capabilities to wage war are likely to increase substantially since the Bloc will probably continue to place great emphasis on the development of heavy industry, and in particular on military production. Bloc self-sufficiency, already great, will probably become more nearly complete.

6. These projections may be invalidated by other factors. A prolonged struggle for power or internal dissension in the Soviet Bloc might dissipate Soviet energies. A relaxation in the forced pace of heavy industrial development would probably reduce the rate of increase in Bloc capabilities to wage a major war. The difficulty of rapidly increasing the industrial labor force in the USSR and the probable lag in agricultural production may prove more serious limiting factors on general economic growth than we now estimate. On the other hand, the application of known scientific developments to Bloc agriculture, though this would require large-scale investments, would permit greater increases in Bloc agricultural production and the release of agricultural labor for other uses.

7. *The West.* It is more difficult to estimate the probable economic growth of the Western Powers. The freer and less closely integrated Western economies, particularly those of the major US allies, are more vulnerable to economic fluctuations and trends in international trade than are those of the Bloc. Much will depend upon the ability of the Western Powers to establish a pattern of production and of international trade and payments which will provide such countries as the UK, Germany, and Japan with adequate markets, and in general will permit a steady economic growth. US resources and policies will be of critical importance in this field. However, assuming a continuation of present trends and no serious depressions, we estimate the probable growth in US GNP at about 56 percent over the next fifteen years, and at almost 50 percent for the Western Powers as a whole.

8. However, the Western Powers will continue to face much greater difficulties than the Soviet Bloc in allocating and directing their resources toward cold war objectives and peacetime preparations for hot war. Their ability (and desire) to impose peacetime sacrifices will be less, and the problems of agreeing on common objectives and devising effective policies among nations of different and sometimes divergent interests will remain difficult to overcome.

9. While Bloc GNP will probably increase at a higher rate than that of the Western Powers and the ratio of Western superiority will therefore decrease, the GNP of the West is already so much greater than that of the Bloc that the absolute gap between the two will widen despite the lower rate of Western growth.[1] Thus the West will remain for the indefinite future greatly superior to the Soviet Bloc in total economic strength.

10. However, certain factors decrease the significance of over-all economic growth and resources as a factor in the world power balance. The ability of the totalitarian Soviet Bloc to devote a high percentage of its resources both to the cold war and to peacetime military preparations will probably remain greater than that of the West. Moreover, for reasons stated in paragraphs 13–18 the continuing economic superiority of the West, although important, may not be the ruling factor in determining whether time is on our side.

PROBABLE SCIENTIFIC CAPABILITIES OF THE WEST AND THE SOVIET BLOC

11. The over-all scientific assets of the West (numbers and quality of trained personnel, facilities, and equipment) are now far greater than those of the Soviet Bloc, and almost certainly will remain greater over the next fifteen years. However, the USSR is expending great

[1] To project these trends to 1975, Bloc GNP is estimated to increase on the order of 125 percent while Western GNP increases only 70 percent, thus altering the ratio to roughly 2:1 in favor of the West. On the other hand, the actual disparity in favor of the West will become even greater, from around $900 billion in 1960 to some $900 billion by 1975.

efforts to reduce this disparity, and is likely to narrow the gap between it and the West, even though the Western Powers probably will produce more basic scientific advances, and will continue, in general, to be better able to translate prototypes into quantity production of high quality. Moreover, the Bloc may concentrate excessively on the solution of short-term military and economic problems, thus narrowing the range of fundamental research and diminishing the probability of basic scientific advances.

12. It is impossible to estimate whether the power relationships between the Soviet Bloc and the West will be changed during the period of this estimate by any major technological breakthrough by either side, such, for example, as the initial production of the atomic bomb by the US in 1945.

PROBABLE TRENDS IN THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE WEST AND THE SOVIET BLOC

13. We believe that throughout the next fifteen years the West will maintain a substantial absolute advantage in capabilities for atomic warfare, but that the Bloc will gradually reduce this advantage. Within the period of this estimate both US and USSR will produce a sufficient stockpile of atomic and possibly thermonuclear weapons to cripple the other side, if delivered on targets.[4] The US, if it has not already acquired this number of weapons, will do so before the USSR does.

14. Assuming a continuation of present general trends of policies of both the Bloc and the Western Powers, it is likely that within the period of this estimate the West and USSR will each have the means of delivery with which to cripple the other, unless developments in defensive weapons and techniques permit a substantial improvement over present defensive capabilities. At that point the world will have entered a period in which both of the great power blocs have the capacity to cripple the other, though only at equally grave risk of crippling blows in return. Unless it attained complete strategic surprise or achieved an unforeseen technological breakthrough, we believe that neither side would be able to prevent powerful retaliation in kind. In the absence of general war, however, the ruthlessness of the Soviet rulers and the fear which they inspire among many Western peoples may enable them to use the possession of atomic capabilities as an instrument of pressure in the cold war.

15. The US is losing, if it has not already lost, its longstanding invulnerability to crippling attack, and with it the immense strategic advantage of being able to conduct the traditionally deliberate and extensive post-D-Day mobilization. We cannot estimate the time at which the USSR will attain the capability to cripple US war-making capacity, but it is probably well within the period of this estimate. At that time, despite probable US retention of a sizable margin of technological superiority and superior atomic offensive capabilities, this continued disparity will become much less significant, at least in regard to bombardment of strategic targets.

16. On the other hand, the continuing superiority of the West over the Bloc in atomic capabilities will nevertheless represent a considerable advantage, because of developing tactical uses of atomic weapons. It is likely that the West will, during the period of this estimate, remain superior to the Soviet Bloc in capabilities for tactical use of atomic weapons, whether in general or in local war.

17. The development of Bloc and Western power positions during the next fifteen years will be significantly affected by their relative conventional military capabilities, with or without the accompanying use of atomic weapons. Bloc military forces are being continuously modernized and strengthened, and will continue to pose a serious threat to areas around the Bloc periphery. The West will probably remain superior to the Bloc in quality of weapons, in the application of technology to military uses, and in its ability to control the seas. The West will increase substantially its relative power position if it can develop local military capabilities in key areas

[4] For the purpose of this estimate "to cripple" means to destroy quickly a very large proportion of the resources required by the other side to wage continuing general war.

around the Bloc periphery and can maintain forces-in-being capable of quick dispatch to such areas in case of emergency.

18. Moreover, attainment of the capability to defend Western Europe and Japan against Soviet attack would significantly improve the power position of the West. The resources of these areas, their geographical location, and their considerable technological potential, contribute substantially to Western strength. The extent to which the West will attain the capability of defending these areas will depend on Western and other policy decisions. Much will also depend, in this connection, on the degree of progress which is made in regard to the rearmament and anti-Soviet orientation of West Germany and Japan.

PROBABLE TRENDS IN THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STRENGTH AND COHESION OF THE SOVIET BLOC AND THE WEST

19. *Probable Trends in the Soviet Bloc.* Political and social trends will have an important, and perhaps controlling effect on the relative power positions of the Bloc and the West and are most difficult to estimate over so long a period as the next fifteen years. During this period it is possible that a struggle for control within the Kremlin might cause a retraction and decay of Soviet power. Whether such developments will take place or at what extent they would begin to have a material effect on the power position of the Soviet Bloc cannot be estimated at this time. At present, however, we see no indications that the economic and military bases of Soviet power have been affected by Stalin's death.

20. In any case we believe it unsafe to assume that over the next 10–15 years the Soviet regime will lose its stability or the Bloc its cohesion. While the more flexible policies of the post-Stalin regime and the modest relaxation of tight Soviet controls may permit periodic overt manifestations of discontent behind the Iron Curtain, over the long run these very policies may also tend to lengthen the Kremlin's lease on power. The possibility exists that Communist China may attempt to play an increasingly independent role. Should this potential weakness develop into a break between the two chief Communist states, it would be a major loss to Soviet power.

21. *Trends in the Political and Social Strength and Cohesion of the West.* Because of the greater diversity of the looser Western coalition and the variety of forces at play within it, we find it even more difficult to project probable trends in Western strength and cohesion as they affect the global balance of power. However, at no time in the foreseeable future will the Western Powers be likely to attain or to desire to attain the centralized control to mobilize their resources characteristic of the totalitarian Soviet Bloc. In general, they will probably continue to be more subject to internal conflicts, economic fluctuations, and divisive influences than the Bloc. Much will depend on international economic developments, on future Soviet policy, on the future position of major nations like Germany, Japan, and India and, above all, on the role played by the acknowledged leader of the Western coalition, the US itself.

22. As the only single aggregation of resources outside the US itself comparable to the Soviet Bloc, Western Europe plays a major role in the world power balance. Its continued weaknesses, such as dependence on US aid, lack of a sense of urgency regarding the Communist threat, disputes between France and Germany, and French and Italian instability, constitute a major vulnerability of the Western Powers, while Western Europe's acquisition by the Bloc would be a tremendous increment to Soviet power. The reappearance of a strong and viable Western Europe, including Germany, would substantially decrease Western vulnerability and alter the present power relationship between the Soviet Bloc and the West to the advantage of the latter.

23. On the other hand, we see many obstacles to the achievement of this objective. We believe that a primary concern of the Kremlin over the coming period will be to frustrate the development of a viable and defensible West-

ern Europe. In this effort the Kremlin will almost certainly concentrate on the key to the European situation, the German problem. If a shift in Soviet policy on Germany, for example, led the Germans to accept a united, armed, and neutral Germany, it would introduce a new factor of great significance into the world power balance. Such a development, if accepted by our NATO allies, would not necessarily weaken the Western position. A rearmed and neutral Germany would act as a buffer state, and if the Germans were subsequently to abandon neutrality, we believe that they would be more likely to align themselves with the West than with the Bloc.

24. The emergence of a rearmed, anti-Communist Japan would be a major asset in restoring the strategic balance in the Far East. However, the degree of future Japanese cooperation with the US will depend largely on the extent to which the Western alignment not only meets Japan's needs for security and foreign markets, but also satisfies its expectations for economic and military aid and for treatment as an equal.

25. *Probable Trends in the Strength and Alignment of "Gray" Areas.* A major difficulty facing the West is represented by the extreme political and social instability of the underdeveloped areas of the Middle and Far East and Africa, where profound social changes are in progress, entailing in many areas disorder and consequent vulnerability to Communist influences. The anti-Western overtones of this political and social revolution create an additional obstacle to the utilization by the West of the resources of these regions. The consequent danger to the Western position is acute in some areas of Southeast Asia and the Middle East. None of these areas is likely to develop into an important center of power during the period of this estimate, but their loss would nevertheless be a serious blow to the West. For example, the loss of Indochina, which is possible, would probably result in eventual loss of most of mainland Southeast Asia. This in turn would lead to worsened prospects for stability in the Indian subcontinent, and to greatly increased difficulties in maintaining the pro-Western orientation of Japan. A Communist takeover in Iran, which is also possible, would jeopardize the already unstable Western position in the Middle East.

26. On the other hand, the trend toward greater instability and vulnerability to Communist influence in the underdeveloped areas is not irreversible. Western control or influence is still paramount in these areas. Over the next 10–15 years the US and its allies still have the opportunity to undertake actions which might arrest this trend and maintain that influence.

27. *Possible Effects of a Kremlin Shift to Soft Tactics.* We believe that a prolonged Kremlin shift to more moderate tactics would also present a real challenge to further growth in the military strength and the cohesion of Western Powers. To date the US has succeeded in creating and partially rearming a defensive coalition under the impetus of an acute Soviet threat. Should this threat appear to diminish, it will be difficult to maintain the support of Western peoples for continued rearmament, close integration of national policies, and vigorous anti-Communist efforts. The likelihood of divisions among the Western Powers, especially if encouraged by skillful Kremlin action, would markedly increase. It might lead, over the longer run, to some of our allies adopting more neutral positions, or even to the creation of a European "Third Force." On the other hand, a decrease of cold war tensions might allow many Western countries to concentrate on domestic needs and to devote more resources to meeting their own economic and social problems. It is possible, however, that a rearmament slow-down would instead lead to unemployment of manpower and resources.

28. A prolonged relaxation of tensions might also have an adverse effect on the cohesion and vitality of the world Communist apparatus and hence on the Soviet power position. Soviet leaders are under some compulsion to pursue an aggressive policy in order to preserve the Communist ideology as a vital force. Any pronounced subduing of the irreconcilable hostility motif might serve to soften the rank-and-file of foreign Communist parties,

and to breed restlessness in countries under Kremlin control. Moreover, without keeping active the concept of permanent conflict between Communists and non-Communists, Moscow might have difficulty in maintaining voluntary adherence of "socialist states" (e.g., Communist China and Viet Minh) and their willingness to undertake direct action in the interest of the USSR.

IS TIME ON OUR SIDE?

29. We believe that the Soviet Bloc under present policies and programs will over the next 10–15 years decrease the proportion by which its economic and technological capabilities are inferior to those of the West and will acquire sufficient atomic capabilities to cripple the US. Therefore, although the West will probably retain a sizable absolute margin of superiority, we believe that in these respects time must be said to be on the Soviet side.

30. In other respects, time may be on the side of the West. The West's military capabilities will increase during the next fifteen years if conventional rearmament programs and tactical applications of unconventional weapons enhance its present defensive capabilities in overseas areas. The extent to which these developments are likely to occur depends on Western and other policy decisions.

31. Trends can be identified within both the West and the Bloc which might undermine each side's political stability and cohesion. We cannot predict, however, that these trends will have such effects and certainly we cannot say that they would do so within the period of this estimate.

a. Trends now seem to be running against the West in the underdeveloped areas. If these trends cannot be arrested, the consequent growth of instability and Communist influence in these areas may eventually have serious effects on the economic stability and pro-Western orientation of Western Europe and Japan.

b. While there is no reason at this time to predict the Bloc's decay or collapse, the possibility exists of certain changes adverse to its present strength and stability. Internal rigidity may deprive the USSR of that flexibility and vitality which contribute to a political system's survival and growth. Alternatively, the Kremlin may decide to modify and relax its previous policies, only to find that this relaxation adversely affects continuing Soviet economic growth, Satellite stability, and Sino-Soviet cohesion. It would be unsafe, however, to assume that the problems which are inherent in the Soviet system will of themselves have reached critical proportions within the next fifteen years. Unless they do, the totalitarian nature of the Soviet system and the Kremlin's pervasive control or influence over its Bloc partners will continue to provide it with many advantages over the less cohesive coalition led by the US.

32. Even under the assumption of "continuation of the present general trend of policies in both the Bloc and the Western Powers," there are so many accidental or unpredictable factors which could alter present trends, that we are unable to conclude that time is on the side of either the Soviet Bloc or the West. Though a few of the components of power can be projected with fair confidence, the relative over-all development of the power positions of the West and Soviet Bloc cannot be predicted.

General Soviet Capabilities and the Probability of General War

One of the primary concerns of the 1950s was the likelihood of general war, and in the early-to-mid-1950s the CIA regularly published estimates of the probability of war within the next several months. Although the US intelligence community assumed that the Soviet Union would not intentionally begin a general war, the community also recognized that local crises could easily escalate through miscalculation or accident.

To assess the likelihood of war the intelligence community had to understand and evaluate what the USSR could do and what it might do. On 15 November 1950—a few days after it was created—the Office of National Estimates produced NIE 3, *Soviet Capabilities and Intentions*. This estimate addressed "Soviet capabilities and intentions with particular reference to the date at which the USSR might be prepared to engage in a general war." It concluded that Soviet leaders "may deliberately provoke such a war at the time when, in their opinion the relative strength of the USSR is at its maximum. It is estimated that such a period will exist from now through 1954, with the peak of Soviet strength relative to the Western Powers being reached about 1952."

Probable Soviet Courses of Action to Mid-1952, NIE 25 of 2 August 1951, is a landmark estimate. For the first time, the American intelligence community agreed in an estimate that the Soviet Union would not deliberately start a nuclear war against the West if at all avoidable. In the following years the Office of National Estimates issued a series of similar estimates, four of which are included in this collection as documents 19-22.

If war broke out, the CIA planned to encourage resistance groups in the Eastern Bloc countries to attack Communist supply lines and to commit sabotage, much as World War II resistance movements had fought the Nazis in Europe. One of the most fascinating estimates of the decade is *Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc*, NIE 10-58 of 4 March 1958, which attempted to "appraise the intensity and scope of dissidence and resistance in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and to estimate the resistance potential in times of peace and war." Although NIE 10-58 provided a comprehensive country-by-country analysis, in the interests of space only the discussions of the Soviet Union, the Baltics, the Caucasus, and Ukraine appear in this collection. The estimate concluded that, although dissidence was widespread, the likelihood of active resistance in peacetime was negligible. In a general war, as long as the outcome remained in

doubt, resistance probably would be limited to intelligence gathering, minor sabotage, and escape and evasion operations to help Western military personnel. If general war included a nuclear exchange, resistance would vary: "Among population groups suffering direct losses, survivors probably would first be stunned, then concentrate their energies on problems of personal survival." In nontarget areas, resistance activities might increase as dissidents discovered that Communist controls had weakened—or they might decrease if dissidents thought that nuclear war made resistance futile.

17. NIE 3, 15 November 1950, *Soviet Capabilities and Intentions* (Excerpts)



17. *(Continued)*



17. *(Continued)*

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17. *(Continued)*

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS

NIE-3

The present estimate is an editorial adaptation of JIC 531/10 with certain modifications and additions to bring it up to date. The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated in the preparation of this estimate and concur in it. This paper is based on information available on 11 November 1950.

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SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS

THE PROBLEM

1. To estimate Soviet capabilities and intentions with particular reference to the date at which the USSR might be prepared to engage in a general war.

CONCLUSIONS

2. The Soviet rulers are simultaneously motivated by Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist doctrine and by considerations related to the position of the Soviet Union as a world power. Their *ultimate objective* is to establish a Communist world controlled by themselves or their successors. However, their immediate concerns, all consistent with that objective, are:

a. To maintain the control of the Kremlin over the peoples of the Soviet Union.

b. To strengthen the economic and military position and defend the territory of the Soviet Union.

c. To consolidate control over the European and Asian satellites (including Communist China).

d. To make secure the strategic approaches to the Soviet Union, and to prevent the establishment, in Europe and Asia, of forces capable of threatening the Soviet position.

e. To eliminate US influence in Europe and Asia.

f. To establish Soviet domination over Europe and Asia.

g. To weaken and disintegrate the non-Soviet world generally, especially to undermine the power and influence of the US.

The Soviet Union will try to pursue these immediate objectives simultaneously. In case of conflict between one and another of these objectives, however, it may be expected that the Soviet rulers will attach greater importance to the first four listed, and in that order.

3. Inasmuch as the Soviet *ultimate objective* is immutable and dynamic, the Soviet Union will continue relentlessly its aggressive pressures on the non-Soviet world, particularly on the power position of the Western nations. Consequently there is, and will continue to be, grave danger of war between the USSR and its satellites, on the one hand, and the US and its allies on the other.

4. The Soviet rulers could achieve and are achieving the first three of their immediate objectives (para. 2 *a*, *b*, and *c*) without risk of involvement in armed conflict with the United States.

5. Their remaining immediate objectives (para. 2 *d*, *e*, *f*, and *g*) are improbable of achievement without resort to armed force, although there are still factors in the situation which might well lead the Soviet rulers to suppose that, in favorable circumstances, they might eventually achieve these objectives without the use of Soviet forces.

6. In pressing to achieve these latter objectives the Soviet rulers will inevitably impinge upon vital interests of the Western Powers and thus incur the risk of involvement in a general war through Western reaction.

7. In the belief that their object cannot be fully attained without a general war with the Western Powers, the Soviet rulers may deliberately provoke such a war at the time when, in their opinion, the relative strength of the USSR is at its maximum. It is estimated that such a period will exist from now through 1954,[1] with the peak of Soviet

[1] 1954 is assumed to be the date by which North Atlantic Treaty forces in Europe will have been built up to such strength that they could withstand the initial shock of Soviet attack and by which the gap between the military strength of the Western Powers and that of the USSR will have begun to close.

strength relative to the Western Powers being reached about 1952.[1]

8. From the point of view of military forces and economic potential, the Soviet Union is in a position to conduct a general war now (i.e., at least to conduct the campaigns listed in paragraphs 66–68, p. 10), if the Soviet rulers should consider it desirable or expedient to do so.

9. Intelligence is lacking to permit a valid prediction as to whether or when the USSR would actually resort deliberately to a general war. It must be recognized, however, that a grave danger of general war exists now, and will exist hereafter whenever the Soviet rulers may elect to take action which threatens the vital interests of the Western Powers.

10. Specifically with respect to the Korean situation, to date there is insufficient evidence to indicate that the USSR intends to commit Soviet forces overtly in Korea. However, the commitment of Chinese Communist forces, with Soviet material aid, indicates that the USSR considers the Korean situation of sufficient importance to warrant the risk of general war. The probability is that the Soviet Union considers that the US will not launch a general war over Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea and the reaction thereto. The principal risk of general war is through the exercise of Soviet initiative which the Kremlin continues to hold. The probability is that the Soviet Government has not yet made a decision directly to launch a general war over the Korean-Chinese situation. There is a good chance that they will not in the immediate future take such a decision. At what point they *will* take a decision to launch a general war is not now determinable by Intelligence.

[1] After the USSR has made good certain important deficiencies in atomic bomb stockpile and in certain types of aircraft and before the Western economy has been fully geared for a war effort.

Note: The foregoing paragraphs (7–10) represent the best conclusions that can be reached on the basis of the information available at this time. The problem of whether and when the USSR may resort deliberately to general war is under continuing consideration and will be the subject of future reports as pertinent information is developed.

DISCUSSION

I. SOVIET OBJECTIVES

1. The Soviet rulers are simultaneously motivated by Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist doctrine and by considerations related to the position of the Soviet Union as a world power. Their *ultimate objective* is to establish a Communist world controlled by themselves or their successors. However, their immediate concerns, all consistent with that objective, are:

a. To maintain the control of the Kremlin over the peoples of the Soviet Union.

b. To strengthen the economic and military position and defend the territory of the Soviet Union.

c. To consolidate control over the European and Asian satellites (including Communist China).

d. To make secure the strategic approaches to the Soviet Union, and to prevent the establishment, in Europe and Asia, of forces capable of threatening the Soviet position.

e. To eliminate US influence in Europe and Asia.

f. To establish Soviet domination over Europe and Asia.

g. To weaken and disintegrate the non-Soviet world generally, especially to undermine the power and influence of the US.

The Soviet Union will try to pursue these immediate objectives simultaneously. In case of conflict between one and another of these objectives, however, it may be expected that the Soviet rulers will attach greater importance to the first four listed, and in that order.

II. FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS

Political.[1]

2. There is nothing in Soviet ideology, or in the internal situation of the Soviet Union, which requires or precludes either deliberate resort to war or the achievement of any particular objective by any given date.

3. The Soviet rulers appear to believe that, provided the security of the Soviet Union can be assured, time will be on their side in the achievement of their long-term objective of world communization under Kremlin domination.

4. The Soviet rulers have shown, however, that they are more immediately concerned with the power position of the Soviet Union than with their long-term objective. In addition, they have made it clear that they will not rely solely on the operation of historical processes, but will actively and aggressively press for the realization of their aims, using armed force, if necessary, even though serious risks may be involved.

5. A Soviet decision to risk general war by the use of armed force in any particular situation, and, even more, a deliberate resort to general war, would depend on:

a. The Soviet rulers' estimate of the importance of the particular situation in relation to their over-all security.

b. The prospects of accomplishing the objectives involved by other means.

c. Their estimate of their chances of improving their over-all power position in a general war.

Economic.[2]

6. The Soviet Union has already largely mobilized its industry for war. It now has, through manufacturing and stockpiling of war materiel and equipment, a great preponderance of military stocks, which enables it not only to maintain superior military

[1] See also Appendix A for a discussion of political alignments and morale factors in the event of war, Appendix B for a discussion of Soviet objectives and prospects in particular countries.

[2] Excludes consideration of Soviet capabilities in nuclear energy production capacities.

strength in being but also to have at its disposal a readily realizable additional strength. The West, on the other hand, except for a few specialized arms, is only beginning to mobilize its industry for war.

7. The over-all economic war potential of the Western Powers is now, and for an indeterminate number of years will continue to be, superior to that of the Soviet Union and its satellites. However, the Western Powers cannot immediately assert their greatly superior economic war potential, since it will require several years to mobilize their strength.

8. Under these circumstances, the present move among the North Atlantic Treaty countries for gearing part of their industries to production of armaments is a most important consideration, because from 1951 onward, the great preponderance of Soviet military strength, derived from its large holdings of war equipment, will begin to decline, and after 1953 may have ceased to be a significant factor.

9. There are, however, other considerations which might well induce the Soviet rulers to interpret their own economic preparedness for war in a different light. In undertaking a war against the Western Powers at an early date the Soviet rulers could look forward to sweeping initial successes. They must, nevertheless, take into account that such a war would probably be prolonged and become one of attrition, and that the industrial and economic structure of the Soviet Union would be exposed to severe losses, although some of these could be at least partially offset by Soviet control over the resources of Western Europe and other areas obtained as a result of Soviet conquests in the early stage of the war.

10. There are, moreover, indications that in the next and succeeding Five-Year Plans special attention will be given to the strategic problems of bringing the manufacturing industries into better balance with the basic industries, improving the transportation system, and obtaining better results in the planned dispersal of industry.

11. The Soviet rulers may hesitate to risk a global war if they consider that the future economic military strength of the West outweighs the immediate military advantage they hold over the Western Powers. However, the date at which the Soviet rulers might be prepared to take the risks of a major war against the Western Powers is unknown since there is no intelligence available concerning what evaluation the Soviet rulers are making of this factor. Consideration of the known factors indicates that from the point of view of output and stockpiles of war materiel, the period when the Soviet Union could assert its military strength most advantageously against the Western Powers is between now and the end of 1953.

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Scientific Development.

12. The atomic bomb is the only weapon of mass destruction which would be a major factor in a Soviet decision to [illegible] the risk of a major war.

13. The current estimate regarding the Soviet atomic bomb stockpile is as follows:

Mid-1950	22	Mid-1952	95
		Mid-1953	165
Mid-1951	50	Mid-1954	235

14. The Soviet Union has and will have sufficient aircraft, trained crews, and bases of operation to warrant an attempt to deliver in the United States and in the United Kingdom the full stockpile of atomic bombs that are now and will become available. Should local conditions require the dropping of bombs by other than visual means, the efficiency of Soviet bomb placement may be adversely affected. In addition, the Soviet Union has the capability for clandestine atomic explosions in ports and in selected inland areas, and may be able to launch guided missiles with atomic warheads from submarines within the period under consideration.

15. In view of present and future Soviet atomic capability, it is apparent that the total power of the Soviet Union has been and is being increased rapidly.

16. The United States now enjoys a wide margin of superiority in numbers of bombs in stockpile over the Soviet Union. However, it would be illusory to conclude that the United States and Western Europe will remain safe from atomic attack so long as the United

States maintains this numerical superiority. When the Soviet rulers believe that they have produced a sufficient quantity of atomic bombs to be seriously crippling or decisive against the Western Powers, the danger of Soviet attack will be greatly increased. When the Soviets have attained this atomic capability, the US superiority in total numbers of atomic bombs will no longer be a deterrent to the Soviet decision for war, in the same relative degree as before. The extent of Soviet vulnerability to a retaliatory US attack will, however, affect Soviet calculation.

17. It is impossible to state when the Soviets may estimate they have reached this capability. This may occur at any time and the situation may become critical at any time within the next two years.

18. As regards other items of scientific development, it is considered that the Soviet rulers would probably be willing to assume the risk of a major war at any time after the end of 1950.

Ground Forces.

19. The military effectiveness of the Soviet Union is being steadily increased. At present the Soviet Army comprises about 175 line divisions and could rapidly mobilize about 145 more, and subsequently increase this number if required. By about 1954 indicated reorganization, training, and equipment programs will have been completed. By that date the Soviet rulers should be able to place reliance on the satellites to the extent that an increasing proportion can be expected to fight well against hereditary enemies. The Soviet Union possesses the advantage of a concentration of force on interior lines and potentially of exercising the initiative.

20. The state of readiness in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries is far below that of the Soviet Union. Reaction to the Korean conflict caused many of these nations to plan increases in national armed forces. Even by 1954, however, North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries cannot achieve parity with the Soviet Union in numbers of men under arms or in quantities of certain items of equipment.

21. Under the impetus of expected increased aid from the United States, coupled with an increase in appropriations at home, the forces which should be available to North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries for the mid-years commencing 1951 to 1954 are estimated to be 63, 72, 83, and 93 divisions respectively.

22. At present the Soviet Union possesses the capability of initiating hostilities in Western Europe without any additional warning and invading Western Europe with an initial force of about 25 divisions at present located in East Germany and Poland, and of rapidly building this force to about 75 to 90 divisions. In such event the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries are not at present capable of preventing the overrunning of Western Europe, excluding the United Kingdom.

23. It is accepted that it will be found possible progressively to build up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in Europe so that, by 1954, they will be capable of withstanding the initial shock of such a surprise attack.

24. In the Near and Middle East area, the planned improvements in the armies of Turkey, Greece and Iran are largely a matter of modernization rather than expansion. There is, therefore, little military advantage from the viewpoint of the Soviet Union in opening hostilities in this area in any particular year between now and 1954.

25. From purely an army viewpoint, if the Soviet rulers are willing to initiate, to provoke, or to accept the risk of a general war, it would be in their best interests to do so at some time between now and 1954, with the optimum date probably being about the middle of the period.

Air Forces.

26. The authorised military aircraft strength in operational units of the Soviet Air Forces is estimated to be 20,000 aircraft at the present time. While definite information is lacking, it is believed that the actual aircraft strength of the operational units may be ten to fifteen percent below the authorised strength. In addition to the aircraft in operational units it is estimated that there are some 20,000 combat aircraft in stored reserve. Besides the stored reserve, the combat units

would be supported by the semi-military Civil Air Fleet with an operating strength of 1,500 major transports, and an unknown number of concealed aircraft, for example those of the MVD, plus combat aircraft in the training establishment, command support aircraft, and those assigned for test, research, and development. No significant change is expected in the organization of the Soviet Air Forces over the next few years nor is there evidence to suggest that the front line strength will change materially over the same period. However, it is estimated that the proportion of high performance aircraft will increase considerably and advances in bomber interception and strategic bombing capabilities can be expected.

27. The Soviet Military Air Force is numerically superior to Western tactical air forces and is adequate to support all land campaigns which the Soviet Union might be expected to undertake in event of war in the next few years. Its combat value is being increased steadily by re-equipment of fighter and bomber units with high performance jet aircraft.

28. The Soviet Naval Air Force is an effective coastal adjunct to the Soviet Air Force and could be used in direct support of the Soviet Army. It is anticipated that as in the case of the Military Air Force, the combat value of the Naval Air Force will increase as the result of re-equipment in the next year or two and as the result of further training.

29. The Soviet Union possesses in quantity excellent day interceptors for fighter defense, but at present is handicapped in the bomber interception field by the lack of efficient all-weather interceptors and effective ground control interceptor radars. It is anticipated that a good all-weather interceptor will probably be introduced in 1953, and that difficulties with ground control interception radars will have been largely overcome by the time this interceptor appears in service. In 1952, the Soviet Union should have reached a state of training and re-equipment sufficient to provide a relatively effective fighter defense system.

30. The Soviet Union has and will have the capability in aircraft and trained crews to enable it to attempt to deliver in the United Kingdom and North America the full stockpile of atomic bombs that are and will become available. In the next few years the strategic bombing capability of the Soviet Air Forces will increase substantially, particularly in view of the increasing atomic bomb stockpile. The introduction of jet medium bombers in 1952 and heavy bombers in 1953 in the strategic bombing force will increase the effectiveness of this force, although the problems connected with high-speed bombing and navigation may not be fully solved by that time.

31. Based on the above considerations, the Soviet Union may assess its present air capabilities as adequate for the conduct of a major war. It is expected that Soviet air capabilities will be improved steadily and probably reach optimum relative to the Western Powers in 1952. Therefore, a state of readiness which the Soviet Union considers favorable for the conduct of major operations may be reached at any time from the present to 1952.

Naval Forces.

32. The surface naval forces of the Western Powers are so much stronger than those of the Soviet Union that the latter will not be able for many years at least to dispute by surface forces the control of the major ocean communications. The Soviet Submarine Fleet, however, is strong in comparison with the anti-submarine forces of the Western Powers, and Soviet minelaying potential is high in comparison with the minesweeping resources available to the Western Powers.

33. The Submarine Fleet is able now to exert a serious threat to Allied sea communications. This threat will become progressively more serious with the estimated increase in strength and improvement in performance of the Submarine Fleet during the next few years.

34. The Surface Fleets pose no serious threat to Allied control of the sea, but are probably ready now to accept the following roles:

a. Defense of sea frontiers of the Soviet Union.

b. Support of the seaward flanks of the Soviet Army.

35. The Naval Air Forces are capable now of supporting the surface fleets in the above roles.

36. The Soviet Merchant Fleet is capable of providing the lift for short range amphibious operations, and of sustaining the wartime economy of the Soviet Union, except, possibly, in the Far East.

Civil Defense.

37. The knowledge available indicates that neither the Soviet nor NATO blocs have yet taken effective measures of civil defense on a scale sufficient to cope with atomic attack.

III. COURSES OPEN TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT-

General Review.

38. The basic problem here considered is to estimate the courses of action that may be followed by the Soviet rulers in pursuit of their objectives as stated in paragraph 1.

39. It must be recognized that a general war might occur as a result of some Soviet action undertaken without deliberate intention to precipitate a general war and even before the Soviet rulers considered themselves fully ready for it.

40. The Soviet rulers, while so far eschewing the direct use of their own military forces, have shown themselves willing to employ every available means short of this. Further aggression in the face of Western counter-measures will carry with it an increasing danger of general war. Short of abandonment by the West of its policy of resisting Communist aggression, the only circumstance that could remove that danger would be the abandonment by the Soviet Union of its policy of aggression.

41. On the basis of Soviet conduct and declarations of policy since 1945, there is no indication that the Soviet rulers will modify their policy of aggression. In fact, during the last year their actions have shown an apparently increasing disregard of possible Western reactions. In particular, the North Korean attack appears to mark a significant step forward in the Kremlin's strategy, since, even though the Soviet rulers may have originally discounted the risk of US reaction to the North Korean move, they have persisted in their course despite actual US reactions.

42. The Soviet rulers can be expected to continue their aggressive pressures on the power position of the Western countries. In their choice of time, place, and method they will continue to follow a policy of expediency. They can be expected to continue to attempt to exploit every apparent soft spot, employing such weapons and tactics as seem best adapted to particular situations.

43. The Soviet rulers have shown that, while applying the rule of expediency in choosing among the possible courses of action, they will not necessarily reject such courses as carry the risk of armed conflict. Logically, they would prefer not to take action of this nature so long as they believed that they were attaining their immediate objectives without it. If, however, they came to the conclusion that they were failing to obtain these objectives by other means they would be willing to assume the risk of involving their own forces, dependent on their estimate of their chances of success both in attaining their immediate objectives and in coping with any resultant reaction by the Western Powers. Generally, the more closely they considered their objectives related to the security of the Soviet Union the more readily would they risk involving their own military forces.

44. In view of the above, an estimate of the danger and imminence of war can be based only on a review of the critical situations existing and impending, together with a calculation of Soviet aims and prospects in each case, the relative strength and state of over-all preparation of the powers involved, and the impact of likely Western counter-moves on Soviet planning.

45. In dealing with various critical situations existing and pending, Soviet rulers may attempt to achieve their objectives by either:

Course One—means short of deliberate resort to general war, or,

Course Two—deliberate resort to general war.

46. Course One would in turn cover several possible lines of action which might be followed separately or concurrently. These are:

a. To use means other than armed aggression across a frontier.

b. To instigate local military aggression by satellite armed force.

c. To undertake local aggression by Soviet armed force.

47. Course Two could follow either of two alternative lines of action:

a. A direct attack on the United States and its allies; or,

b. A deliberate provocation involving the virtual certainty of general war, and intended to precipitate it.

48. Choice of Course One *b*, or Course One *c*, would seem to depend, at least in large part, upon the urgency of Soviet preoccupation with the area in which such limited aggression were instigated or undertaken. Choice of Course Two, on the other hand, would amount to an attempt to destroy the power position of the Western countries either once and for all, or at least in Europe and Asia, and would depend upon global considerations. From the political standpoint, Course Two *a* is less likely than Course Two *b*.

Course One (Means Short of Deliberate Resort to General War).

49. On the basis of the discussion in Appendix B, and apart from possible long-term considerations such as economic crisis in the West which the Soviet rulers may think will work in their favor, they probably estimate their prospects somewhat as below:

Course One a (Means other than armed aggression across a frontier).

50. Tibet and Indochina appear to be the only countries in which the odds presently favor the establishment of Communist control. In Indochina, Chinese aid for indigenous Communist elements is essential and is being furnished. If Indochina were to come under Communist control, then Siam and Burma would probably quickly follow.

51. The state of public opinion in Western Europe, particularly in France, and in Western Germany may give the Soviet rulers reason to hope that their immediate aim of preventing the development of continental military strength can still be accomplished through agitation and internal pressures. Generally, however, the West European governments do not reflect this state of popular opinion, and public opinion is changing and will continue to change as Western defense measures become effective. From now on, apart from the possible effect of the above-mentioned long-term considerations, any hopes which the Kremlin may now retain for success in Western Europe and Western Germany will probably diminish.

52. The development of the situation in Iran is less predictable, but here again it can be expected that as Western support increases, the prospects for the achievement of Soviet domination of Iran without the use of external force will decline.

53. In Scandinavia, Turkey, the Arab States, Israel, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Indonesia, and Japan, the national authorities are apparently capable of coping with any outbreaks of violence designed to lead to Kremlin control of the country. On the other hand, the Kremlin could, by propaganda and other means, hope to influence, in some cases materially, the political attitude of the Arab States, India, Pakistan, Israel, and Indonesia.

54. In Yugoslavia the government is at present capable of coping with outbreaks of violence designed to lead to Soviet control. However, the economic situation might deteriorate substantially in the next year or two, in which case the authority of the government might be threatened.

55. In Malaya and the Philippines, current Communist guerrilla operations can probably be sustained indefinitely; and in Greece, the Soviet Union may attempt to revive large-scale guerrilla activities at any time. However, the authorities of these countries, supported by the United States or the United Kingdom, should be able to control the situation.

Course One b (Local military aggression by satellite armed forces).

56. *General.* The Soviet Union has already resorted to indirect aggression by means of

satellite forces in the case of Korea. Similar employment of non-Soviet forces could be attempted in the following areas, although the Kremlin would have to recognize that indirect aggression in any of them (except Tibet) would in varying degree carry risk of general war:

In Europe: Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Western Germany, and Berlin.

In Asia: Tibet, Formosa, Hong Kong, Macao, Indochina, and Burma.

57. *Europe.* Military success would be unlikely in the cases of Turkey and Greece, and questionable in the case of Yugoslavia. In Western Germany it would also be unlikely in the present state of development of the *Polizei Bereitschaften.* The incorporation of Berlin is an essential step towards the Soviet aim to secure a unified Germany subservient to the Kremlin. An attack by the *Polizei Bereitschaften* at Soviet instigation upon the Western occupying forces in Berlin might well appear to Soviet rulers to have prospects of local success, although the Soviet rulers would have difficulty in disavowing responsibility for such an attack unless Soviet occupation troops had been previously withdrawn from the Berlin area.

58. *Asia.* Tibet can be occupied at any time without any risk of extension of hostilities. Military success in Formosa is problematical but success could be assured against Burma, Indochina and Hong Kong, and Macao. Domination of Burma and Indochina would outflank Siam and control the major sources of rice to Asiatic countries at present outside the Soviet orbit. Siam could not then avoid coming under Communist domination, and Malaya would thus be directly threatened. Hong Kong would be a lesser strategic prize and the difficulty of localizing the war would be greater than in the case of Burma and Indochina.

Course One c (Local aggression by Soviet armed forces).

59. The Soviet rulers may well consider that only against Finland and Yugoslavia could Soviet forces be used directly without grave danger of immediately precipitating general war, and would recognize that even in those cases their use would bring general war appreciably nearer.

On Balance.

60. The Soviet rulers may have reason to estimate that they can achieve some of their objectives, particularly in South and Southeast Asia, through measures short of armed aggression across a frontier. However, the existing situation, apart from the possible effects of long-term considerations, gives them little reason to hope for achievement, through these means alone, of their major objectives, particularly those related to the rearmament of the West including utilization of West German and Japanese military potential. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that they will continue to exploit every opportunity for the employment of such means in order to retard Western defensive preparations and to weaken and divide the non-Soviet world.

61. A decision to employ indirect or direct military aggression on a local scale will probably depend on developing circumstances, particularly on the progress of Western defensive measures. The Soviet rulers might accept serious risk of general war in order to prevent the actual development of hostile military power on the strategic approaches to the Soviet Union. They would be particularly concerned at the recreation of West German or Japanese military power. It must be emphasized that Soviet rulers may well regard the progressive development of the situation in Korea in the same light and may take local action accordingly.

Course Two (Deliberate Resort to General War).

62. The Soviet rulers might, under certain circumstances, consider that it was to their advantage deliberately to engage in war with the Western Powers. However, it is estimated that they would be unlikely to take this step deliberately unless they were convinced that their most important objectives were plainly jeopardised. In addition, they would have to be confident, either:

(a) of speedy neutralization of US offensive power; or,

(b) of their ability to establish a degree of control over the Eurasian land mass, including the neutralization of the United King-

dom by occupation or otherwise, that would give them the benefit of a considerable proportion of European industrial potential and would present the United States with a military task of such proportions that the United States would be unwilling or unable to make the effort necessary to carry it through.

63. A decision by the Soviet rulers to resort to war under assumption (a) above would presuppose their estimate that they had atomic or other capabilities to deal the United States a blow sufficiently crippling to enable the Soviet Union to attain their war objectives.

64. A decision by the Soviet rulers on the basis of assumption (b) above would presuppose their estimate that, either with or without a limited attack on the United States, the Soviet economy, strengthened by the acquisition of Western European industrial resources, would be capable of supporting a prolonged war, and also their estimate that Soviet defenses could prevent crippling attacks on the resultant Soviet economy.

IV. SOVIET STRATEGIC INTENTIONS AND CAMPAIGNS IN THE EVENT OF GLOBAL WAR

65. In the event of global war between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies, it is considered that Soviet action would follow generally along the lines set forth below.

66. The Soviet plan would be to undertake the following operations:

a. Simultaneously

(1) A campaign against Western Europe including Italy.

(2) An aerial bombardment against the British Isles.

(3) Campaigns against the Near and Middle East including Greece and Turkey.

(4) Campaigns in the Far East.

(5) Attacks against Canada and the United States, including Alaska and the Aleutians.

(6) A sea and air offensive against Anglo-American sea communications.

(7) Subversive activities and sabotage against Anglo-American interests in all parts of the world.

(8) Defense of the Soviet Union against hostile attack.

b. As soon as possible, after the occupation of the Channel Port areas, a full-scale sea and air offensive against the British Isles including an attempted invasion.

c. As soon as feasible, campaigns against Scandinavia and the Iberian Peninsula.

d. As necessary, air attacks against Pakistan.

67. It is believed that the Soviet Union would have sufficient armed forces to undertake all the campaigns listed above and still have sufficient armed forces to form an adequate reserve.

68. Opportunist campaigns by Chinese Communist forces, which may or may not be directed by the Soviet Union, against neighboring territories in Asia might be undertaken at any time.

69. If war occurs during the period under consideration, little or no warning will be received and, therefore, M-Day and D-Day should, for planning purposes, be considered the same. The Soviet armed forces are in an advanced enough state of preparation to achieve the objectives outlined in this estimate without requiring any appreciable period of notice.

18. NIE 25, 2 August 1951, *Probable Soviet Courses of Action to Mid-1952*



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

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION TO MID-1952

NIE-25

The intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate, except for the reservation of the Director of Naval Intelligence noted on page 5.

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CONTENTS

PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION TO MID-1952

THE PROBLEM

To estimate probable Soviet courses of action to mid-1952 with particular reference to the probability of direct hostilities between the US and the USSR.

ESTIMATE

I. Soviet Objectives

1. We believe that the ultimate Soviet objective is a Communist world dominated by the USSR and that the Kremlin believes its vital interests can be assured over the long run only by the elimination of all governments it cannot control. This objective probably reflects a Kremlin conviction that peaceful coexistence of the USSR and its empire on the one hand, and the US and its allies on the other, is impossible and that an armed conflict between them is eventually inevitable.

2. The principal immediate Soviet objectives evidently are:

a. To divide the West;

b. To prevent Western, West German, and Japanese rearmament;

c. To prevent implementation of the US overseas-bases policy.

3. We believe the USSR, in the pursuit of its objectives, will during the period of this estimate:

a. Seek to maintain an advanced state of war-readiness and offset any increase in the capabilities of the US and its allies;

b. Seek to prevent the development of any threat to the vital interests of the USSR or to Soviet control of the Satellites;

c. Seek to expand the territorial limits of the Soviet orbit;

d. Seek to undermine and secure control of governments not yet under Soviet domination;

e. Seek to force countries of the free world to adopt a policy of neutrality in the East-West struggle and to deny their resources, including strategic sites, to the US and its allies.

II. Military Considerations Underlying Soviet Action

4. We estimate that the armed forces of the USSR have the capability of overrunning continental Europe and the Near and Middle East (except India and Pakistan) within a relatively short period.

5. The USSR does not now have and would be unlikely to secure adequate naval forces or sufficient shipping to permit it to mount a successful invasion of the Western Hemisphere, even if it should seize the Eurasian continent and the UK.

6. The Soviet Air Force is capable of providing adequate tactical support of all ground campaigns which the USSR might launch against continental Europe and the Near and Middle East (except India and Pakistan), and simultaneously of attempting a strategic air offensive against the United Kingdom and the North American continent.

7. It is impossible to estimate with any accuracy the Kremlin's conclusion with regard to the relative effectiveness of Soviet and US atomic warfare capabilities or with regard to the relative importance of atomic and conventional weapons in determining the issue of a future general war. We believe it probable,

however, that uncertainty concerning relative atomic warfare capabilities and concerning the effectiveness of atomic weapons in determining the issue of a general war will be a major, though not necessarily a decisive, deterrent to the Kremlin in making a decision to initiate or deliberately provoke a general war with the US during the period of this estimate.

8. The USSR is capable of employing sabotage against a variety of targets and of employing clandestine methods to attack the US and its allies with atomic, biological, and chemical weapons. We believe, however, that those capabilities would be exercised on an appreciable scale only in conjunction with or immediately preceding general military operations and that they would not be a decisive factor in any Soviet decision to initiate a general war.

III. Possible Soviet Courses of Action Without Intent to Precipitate or Incur Serious Risk of General War

9. While in Soviet theory and practice war is an acceptable, and on occasion necessary, instrument for attaining Communist objectives, the Kremlin presumably prefers if possible to attain its objectives by courses of action short of resort to general war. The Kremlin probably estimates that opportunities exist for making limited progress toward both its immediate and long-run objectives, at least during the period of this estimate, without provoking general war, because of:

a. The deterrent effect of the estimated Communist capability to overrun most of Eurasia at will;
b. The deterrent effect of Soviet capabilities for atomic warfare;
c. The divergent interests of the Western Powers; and
d. The general reluctance of the Western Powers to become involved in general war.

10. In discussing courses of action short of general war, it is necessary for clarity to examine each separately. Soviety policy envisages various courses of action—political warfare, limited Satellite or Soviet armed aggression, and even general war. While, therefore, separation for purposes of exposition is essential, the inseparable connection of all possible courses of action must be kept in mind.

A. Political Warfare

11. The Kremlin may consider the prospects of success by political warfare* sufficiently favorable to make other courses of action unnecessary. For example, with the immediate objective of dividing the Western Powers, undermining US mobilization, obstructing the NATO program and frustrating prospective German and Japanse rearmament and with the ultimate objective of paralyzing opposition to Communism, the Kremlin may fraudulently propose peaceful coexistence of the two systems and may encourage the West to hope for a settlement of outstanding issues by mutual agreement. In the vital area of Western Europe the Kremlin will almost certainly continue to press its "peace" campaign, to exploit the fear of war, to intimidate by display of force, to raise hopes of German unification, and to use the Communist Parties of France and Italy in an attempt to confound the political situation and obstruct effective government. Wherever elsewhere in the world non-Communist governments are weak, as in Iran, Indochina, and Burma, the Kremlin will almost certainly seek to strengthen the Communist position and, if favorable situations develop, will support Communist coups.

B. Employment of Chinese Communist Forces

12. The Kremlin might, during the period of this estimate, attempt to achieve some of its objectives by inducing the Chinese Communists to engage in additional military operations. Such operations would involve risk of general war between the US and the USSR, but the Kremlin might estimate that such operations could be so conducted that general war would not be precipitated.

* Political warfare, as here used, includes all manner of political and economic pressure, diplomatic action in the UN and elsewhere, propaganda and front activities, Communist Party and Communist-controlled trade union activities, support of all kinds of revolutionary movements, and psychological warfare.

13. *Indochina and Burma.* In particular, the Kremlin may estimate that a Chinese Communist invasion of Indochina or Burma would not involve a serious risk of general war and that such an invasion would facilitate a Communist advance throughout Southeast Asia and the consequent denial of the resources of that area to the free world. The Chinese Communists almost certainly have the capability for conquering Burma. We consider an invasion of Burma possible, but we do not believe it probable during the period of this estimate. The Chinese Communists are now capable of overrunning virtually all of northern Indochina, and we consider an invasion of Indochina possible at any time.

14. *Taiwan.* The Kremlin probably estimates that the Chinese Communists alone do not have the capabilities for a successful invasion of Taiwan so long as the US policy of employing US fleet units for the defense of Taiwan remains unchanged. Under existing circumstances, the Kremlin must realize that active Soviet participation in an attack on Taiwan would substantially increase the risk of general war without necessarily ensuring the success of the operation. We therefore believe it unlikely that the USSR, in prevailing circumstances, would either encourage or participate in a Chinese Communist attack on Taiwan.

15. *Hong Kong and Macao.* Chinese Communist seizure of Hong Kong and Macao probably would be militarily easy, but would presently entail political and economic disadvantages for the Communists. If present conditions continue, we believe it unlikely that forceful seizure of these ports will take place during the period of this estimate.

C. Employment of European Satellite Forces

16. The Kremlin might, during the period here considered, attempt to achieve some of its objectives through local military operations by European Satellite forces. However, the Kremlin probably estimates that, because of the more direct impact on NATO interests, such operations would involve greater risk of general war between the US and the USSR than similar local operations by Chinese Communist forces.

17. *Yugoslavia.* The Kremlin undoubtedly attaches great importance to regaining control of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is strategically important and is gradually developing close ties with the NATO powers. Titoism continues to be a potential menace to Soviet domination over the Satellites and over the world Communist movement. Satellite capabilities for launching an attack on Yugoslavia are steadily increasing. It is possible that the Kremlin regards the Yugoslav issue as of such importance as to warrant acceptance of the risks involved in a Satellite attack. However, in view of the increasing Western support of Yugoslavia, it is more probable that the Kremlin estimates that a Satellite attack would involve not only serious risk of war between the US or UN and the Satellites, but also the danger that such a conflict would develop into a general war between the US and the USSR. On balance, we believe a Satellite attack on Yugoslavia during the period of this estimate is possible, but not probable.

18. *Greece and Turkey.* Satellite capabilities for attack on Greece and particularly on Turkey are too limited for conquest of those countries. Furthermore, the Kremlin almost certainly realizes that an operation against either of these countries would probably entail US or UN intervention with the possibility of general war developing. We believe, therefore, that the USSR is unlikely to launch a Satellite attack on either Greece or Turkey during the period of this estimate.

19. *Berlin, West Germany, and Austria.* Satellite capabilities for military action against Allied forces in Berlin, West Germany, or Austria will probably remain so limited during the period here considered and the risk of general war involved in such action would be so great that the USSR is unlikely to launch a Satellite attack during this period.

D. Employment of Soviet Forces

20. The Kremlin must realize that commitment of major Soviet forces in any European Satellite or Chinese Communist operation would greatly increase the risk of general war between the US and the USSR. Wherever possible, therefore, the USSR would rely upon European Satellite or Chinese Communist

forces for carrying out military operations against non-Communist areas. It undoubtedly would provide such forces with technical and logistical aid and might participate in rear area operations; if it considered the risk acceptable, it might even provide "volunteer" Soviet forces in the forward areas. Open Soviet military intervention, however, would be unlikely excepting in areas considered of great importance to the USSR and where Satellite forces are either unavailable or incapable of successful action.

21. *Greece and Turkey.* The Kremlin probably aims to secure control of Greece and Turkey in order to eliminate bases that could be used for attack on the Soviet orbit and at the same time to secure bases from which the position of the free world in the Near East might be threatened. However, the available Satellite forces alone are probably not capable of conquering Greece and certainly not capable of conquering Turkey. Therefore, such operations could be accomplished only with the active participation of Soviet forces. The Kremlin probably estimates that the US and UN almost certainly would come to the support of Greece and Turkey and that in those circumstances a general war between the US and the USSR would probably result. An attack on Greece or Turkey is therefore unlikely during the period of this estimate.

22. *Iran.* Of the areas where only Soviet forces are available for immediate employment, Iran is unstable and important. Soviet control of Iran would eliminate a potential base for hostile action against the USSR, would deprive the West of a vast oil supply, and would facilitate the subversion or conquest of the Near and Middle East. However, the Kremlin probably estimates that the political and economic instability and the widespread anti-British feeling offer good prospects of increasing Communist influence and eventually of establishing Communist control without direct Soviet intervention. Under these circumstances we believe it unlikely that the Kremlin would consider it necessary to incur the risk of war with the Western Powers involved in Soviet military intervention. But if the British should use military force in their dispute with Iran, the Kremlin might then invoke the 1921 treaty and occupy at least northern Iran, estimating that it could do so with relatively little risk of general war.

E. Employment of Soviet Forces Against US Forces

23. The Kremlin almost certainly estimates that overt and recognized commitment of Soviet forces against US forces in any area would involve not only a local war with the US, in which the US might well use atomic weapons, but also the strong probability of general war with the US, including a US strategic atomic attack on the USSR. Unless, therefore, the Kremlin had decided to accept general war with the US, we believe a Soviet attack on West Germany, Berlin, Austria, or Japan would be most unlikely during the period of this estimate.

24. If the Korean conflict continues or is renewed after a cease fire, the Kremlin will probably continue to aid the Communists in ways which the Kremlin estimates would not involve serious danger of a break between the USSR and US/UN. If, however, the Communist forces in Korea were threatened with decisive defeat, the Kremlin would probably intensify its aid. This aid might well include the introduction of "volunteer" forces. It might even include the employment of Soviet forces to such an extent that a *de facto* local war between the US/UN and the USSR would exist. At every stage the Kremlin will probably endeavor to keep open the possibility of ending the Korean conflict by political negotiation if the global interests of the USSR would be served by disengagement in Korea.

IV. Possibility of General War

25 Consideration of the degree of probability of Soviet military action in specific areas must be related to over-all Soviet strategy and policy. If the Kremlin should decide to precipitate or to accept general war, it might launch an attack in any area at any time and in any form as a prelude to such general war. Soviet forces are in an advanced state of war-readiness and could initiate general war at any time with little or no warning. The danger of general war exists now and will continue to

exist so long as the USSR is in a position to take action which threatens, wholly or in part, the vital interests of the Western Powers.

26. We believe that the most important immediate objectives of the Kremlin are to divide the West and to halt Western, West German, and Japanese rearmament. If the Kremlin should fail to make sufficient progress toward that end by methods short of general war and if in addition it should become convinced that its superiority in conventional forces were about to be offset (whether through NATO and West German or Japanese rearmament or through Western advances in unconventional armaments), we believe the Kremlin would consider the advisability of precipitating general war. We believe it unlikely that the Kremlin would adopt this course of action so long as Western rearmament appeared to it only as a transitory impediment to further Soviet and Satellite expansion. On the other hand, if the Kremlin were to conclude that this rearmament threatened the vital interests of the USSR, we believe: (a) if it estimated that the USSR had sufficient means to wage war successfully and that the delay would tip the scales of power irretrievably against the USSR, the Kremlin would precipitate general war; but (b) if it estimated it did not have sufficient means to wage war successfully, the Kremlin would modify its policy and attempt to relax international tension until such time as the Western Powers relaxed their vigilance or other factors favorable to the USSR supervened. It is possible, however, that the USSR might precipitate war even under adverse circumstances if it considered the threat to its vital interests sufficiently real and immediate.

27. We do not believe that during the period of this estimate the Kremlin is likely to conclude that US, NATO, West German, and Japanese rearmament constitutes an immediate threat to the vital interests of the USSR. It is possible, however, that the Kremlin may at any time conclude that the Western rearmament program constitutes an eventual but already unacceptable threat to its vital interests, or that the Kremlin may at any time misinterpret Western defensive measures as indicating an imminent attack on the USSR.

28. There is, moreover, a serious possibility of general war developing within the period of this estimate from an action or series of actions not intended to produce that result. The Kremlin might, for example, miscalculate the degree of risk involved in a particular action or underestimate the cumulative effect of several actions. Or, it might regard a particular action as so necessary or so advantageous as to warrant assuming even a serious risk of general war.

29. We recognize the desirability and the importance of concluding this estimate with a simple and direct statement of the likelihood or unlikelihood that the Kremlin will deliberately precipitate or provoke general war between the US and the USSR during the period here covered. Existing intelligence does not enable us to make such a precise forecast. The USSR has the capability to launch general war and may decide to precipitate general war. Moreover, the international situation is so tense that at any time some issue might develop to a point beyond control.*

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* It is the view of the Director of Naval Intelligence, with respect to Section IV above, that the final paragraph of this estimate should read as follows:

"It is recognized that precise information on enemy intentions is rarely available and that enemy counteraction cannot be accurately predicted. However, all aspects of the Soviet problem considered, we believe it unlikely that the USSR will deliberately choose to precipitate or undergo the hazards of general war during the period covered by this estimate. Although the possibility of war by miscalculation cannot be discounted during periods of high international tension, we believe that in pursuing various courses of action short of war with the US, the USSR will seek to increase its power and damage the interests of the US whenever and wherever feasible, but will at every turn attempt to exploit each course of action with such caution as to avoid direct military aggression against the vital interests of the United States."

19. **NIE 48, 8 January 1952.** ***Likelihood of the Deliberate Initiation of Full-Scale War by the USSR Against the US and Its Western Allies Prior to the End of 1952***

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

LIKELIHOOD OF THE DELIBERATE INITIATION OF FULL-SCALE WAR BY THE USSR AGAINST THE US AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES PRIOR TO THE END OF 1952

NIE 48

Published 8 January 1952

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19. *(Continued)*

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

LIKELIHOOD OF THE DELIBERATE INITIATION OF FULL-SCALE WAR BY THE USSR AGAINST THE US AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES PRIOR TO THE END OF 1952

NIE 48

The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 7 January 1952.

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LIKELIHOOD OF THE DELIBERATE INITIATION OF FULL-SCALE WAR BY THE USSR AGAINST THE US AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES PRIOR TO THE END OF 1952

THE PROBLEM

To estimate whether the USSR is likely *deliberately to initiate* general war, i.e., full-scale war against the US and its Western allies, prior to the end of 1952.

CONCLUSION

On balance we believe it unlikely that the Kremlin will *deliberately initiate* general war during 1952. We believe that the Kremlin prefers to pursue its objectives through methods short of deliberate resort to war with the US and its allies, and moreover, probably estimates that possibilities for progress through such methods will continue to exist through 1952. We believe that in these circumstances the Kremlin is likely to be deterred from a deliberate resort to war with the US and its allies in 1952, by the certainty of extensive destruction in the USSR as well as by the risk that the Soviet system might be destroyed.

We recognize, however, the continuing grave danger of a general war in 1952 resulting from a Kremlin action or series of actions not intended to have that result, or even from actions which, in the Kremlin's view, entailed that risk, but not the certainty thereof. We recognize also the danger that general war might arise from Soviet-initiated hostilities which the Kremlin intended to limit to a particular area.

DISCUSSION

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Soviet Objectives

1. The principal immediate Soviet objectives evidently are:

a. To divide the West;

b. To consolidate and extend Soviet power and influence wherever possible. (During the period under consideration Asia appears to offer the best opportunities.);

c. To prevent Western, West German, and Japanese rearmament;

d. To prevent implementation of the US overseas-bases policy.

2. We believe the USSR, in pursuit of its objectives, will during the period of this estimate:

a. Seek to maintain an advanced state of war-readiness and offset any increase in the capabilities of the US and its allies;

b. Seek to prevent the development of any threat to the vital interests of the USSR or to Soviet control of the Satellites;

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c. Seek to expand the territorial limits of the Soviet orbit;

d. Seek to undermine and secure control of governments not yet under Soviet domination;

e. Seek to force countries of the free world to adopt a policy of neutrality in the East-West struggle and to deny their resources, including strategic sites, to the US and its allies.

The Place of War in Soviet Strategy

3. The basic strategy under which the Kremlin appears to have acted in the past employs the following concepts:

a. The preservation of the established communist state, the USSR, is essential to provide a secure base and strong support for revolution in other states. In turn, revolution in other countries is necessary for the preservation and completion of the revolution in the USSR.

b. No permanent accommodation is possible between this State and the capitalist world. The doctrine of the impossibility of peaceful co-existence between communism and capitalism and the inevitability of ultimate frightful collision before one side or the other prevails remains valid.

c. Capitalism, in that it is subject to irreconcilable contradictions, bears within itself the seeds of its own destruction. Depressions, class conflict, economic rivalry, colonial awakening, etc., will weaken the capitalist world and create revolutionary situations. The USSR must provoke and exploit such situations through political warfare* and, if appropriate, through the use of Soviet military force.

d. A grave danger exists and always will exist that the capitalist world, alarmed by the rising revolutionary tide, will unite to attack and destroy the USSR.

e. The USSR must seek to avoid the final world struggle until capitalist power has been sufficiently undermined, but must be ready at all times to assume the offensive if the situation should warrant it.

f. Recent Soviet pronouncements suggest that the Soviet rulers believe that the struggle between capitalism and Communism has reached an advanced stage in which the world is divided into two camps, and that the Western camp is now seeking not only to prevent the spread of the revolution, but also to destroy the Soviet-dominated camp.

4. It would be unsafe to take these Soviet concepts as an infallible guide to Soviet courses of action in the future. The USSR is a totalitarian state and experience suggests that totalitarian states are subject to internal pressures and compulsions which may result, without warning, in the use of foreign war as an instrument of national policy. However, Soviet use of war for this purpose can probably be better controlled than has been the case with respect to other totalitarian states in modern history. Therefore, Soviet courses of action can never be predicted with confidence. In particular the possibility of deliberate initiation of general war cannot be excluded at any time merely because such initiation would contradict past Soviet political strategy. Further, the possibility of deliberate initiation of general war cannot be excluded even if, judged from the outside, it seemed certain that the interests of the USSR would be better served by other courses of action.

5. While Soviet theory and practice offer no sure guide as to when and under what circumstances the USSR would deliberately resort to war against the US and its allies, they leave no doubt that the USSR is the implacable enemy of the non-Communist world. While in Soviet theory and practice war is an acceptable, and on occasion necessary, instrument for attaining Communist objectives, the Kremlin presumably prefers if possible to attain its objectives by courses of action short of resort to general war. However, Soviet theory and practice suggest that it would probably resort to armed attack at any time when:

* Political warfare as here used includes all manner of political and economic pressure, diplomatic action in the UN and elsewhere, propaganda and front activities, Communist Party and Communist-controlled trade union activities, support of all kinds of revolutionary movements, and psychological warfare.

a. Conditions are such that the USSR regarded the situation as highly favorable, or

b. No other method appeared available to counter what the Kremlin considered a threat to the preservation of the USSR.

FACTORS WHICH MIGHT DETER THE KREMLIN FROM DELIBERATELY INITIATING WAR AGAINST THE US AND ITS ALLIES IN 1952

Risks Involved and Uncertainty of Outcome

6. The Kremlin probably estimates that in the initial phase of a general war begun in 1952 Soviet and Soviet-controlled forces could seize and hold extensive and important areas of Europe and Asia and thereby enhance the USSR's power position. It might also estimate that it could, at the very outset, deliver an atomic attack on the continental US of sufficient strength to reduce materially the US capability for countering Soviet operations. However, the Kremlin would probably not expect a Soviet atomic attack on the continental US to eliminate the threat of atomic counterattack and prevent the mobilization of the US industrial and military potential.

7. It is impossible to estimate the Kremlin's conclusion with regard to the relative effectiveness of Soviet and US atomic warfare capabilities or with regard to the relative importance of atomic and conventional weapons in determining the issue of a war. The Kremlin would undoubtedly expect the West to react to Soviet initiation of a general war by launching an immediate atomic attack on the Soviet orbit, with consequent widespread destruction. We believe, however, that the Kremlin probably estimates that the USSR could survive this attack and maintain sufficient relative strength to carry on the war.

8. The Kremlin might believe that after the USSR had extended the areas under its control and survived the initial allied retaliation, it could fortify its newly-won positions and mobilize its newly-acquired resources. It might calculate that the economic and other losses suffered from continuing US attacks would be offset by the industrial and manpower resources it had acquired in Europe and Asia. While the Kremlin would doubtless anticipate difficulties in establishing and maintaining firm control over the defeated populations and would also anticipate internal difficulties, its whole concept of state power suggests that it would expect to cope successfully with these problems.

9. In these circumstances the Kremlin might estimate that the resulting Soviet power position would deter the West from attempting to recover the areas overrun by the USSR. Furthermore, the Kremlin might believe that the loss of European and Asiatic resources, including manpower, might make it impossible for the US to carry the war through to a successful conclusion. The Kremlin would undoubtedly expect the US government to be extremely tenacious and resourceful in its attempt to prosecute the war, even if denied support from Europe and Asia and subjected to increasing domestic pressure for peace. However, it might estimate that as the war dragged on opposition in the US to the war might rise to the point where the people would refuse to make the sacrifices necessary for the continuance of the conflict and thereby oblige the government to accept a compromise settlement.

10. On the other hand, the Kremlin would have to recognize that, despite initial Soviet successes, at least a substantial portion of the power potential of the US would remain, and probably would in time be mobilized and brought to bear in a continuation of the struggle. In these circumstances the Kremlin would expect to be faced with operations of such magnitude as, at the least, to make the war long and costly to the USSR. The Kremlin would have to consider, in this event, whether or not it could survive the political, economic, psychological and military strains of a prolonged war of attrition.*

* The Director of Naval Intelligence would add at this point the following paragraph:

"In weighing this question, the Kremlin would have to recognize the grave danger that in a prolonged war of attrition the USSR would be subjected to persistent and growing air attacks, including atomic attacks, possibly resulting in serious economic breakdowns and the disruption of Soviet administrative and police machinery. With regard to newly-overrun areas the Kremlin would have to

(Footnote continued at bottom of next page)

11. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be assumed that the Kremlin would necessarily expect to suffer defeat in a war with the US initiated in 1952. Nevertheless, the Kremlin would probably estimate that such a war would be a hazardous gamble on its part, involving at a minimum the certainty of widespread destruction in the USSR and at the same time carrying with it the risk that the Soviet system itself would be destroyed. This uncertainty would probably make the Kremlin reluctant deliberately to initiate a general war in 1952.

Prospects For Achieving Soviet Aims By Methods Short of Deliberate Initiation of General War

12. The Kremlin probably estimates that opportunities will continue to exist, at least during the period of this estimate, for furthering both its immediate and long-run objectives by methods short of the deliberate initiation of full-scale war against the US and its allies.

13. Communist doctrine stresses the strategic importance of the so-called "colonial areas," especially in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, which are regarded as having a vital bearing on the world power balance. Bringing these areas under Soviet control, or at least denying their assets to the West, is regarded as one of the most important steps in preparing for the final phase of the world struggle. At present the Kremlin probably sees in the instability of these areas favorable opportunities for early Communist gains.

14. Although probably recognizing that it has little chance in 1952 of making territorial gains in Europe without deliberate resort to general war, the Kremlin probably believes that current and future economic difficulties, particularly in the UK and France, and divergent interests and attitudes among the Western Powers may prevent the establishment of a position of strength in the West. Furthermore these difficulties may make Western Europe increasingly susceptible to various possible Soviet maneuvers, such as the "peace" campaign, the relaxation of tensions, trade overtures, exploitation of the fear of war, and intimidation by the display of military force, and may make possible the growth of the Communist movement in the West.

FACTORS WHICH MIGHT INDUCE THE KREMLIN DELIBERATELY TO INITIATE GENERAL WAR

15. In view of the above considerations we believe it unlikely that the Kremlin would deliberately initiate general war during 1952 solely for the purpose of expanding the area under its control. With respect to China we believe that the USSR would react to the progressive expansion of the present conflict in Korea by giving increased aid to the Chinese Communists, even to the extent of committing Soviet forces and thereby creating a *de facto* war between the US and the USSR in the Far East, but would probably not deliberately initiate general war.

16. If, however, the Kremlin concluded that a Western attack on the USSR were imminent and unavoidable, and that Soviet chances of surviving such attack would be improved by seizing the initiative and attacking first, it would almost certainly do so. We have no way of knowing what interpretation the Soviet leaders may be placing upon the information available to them concerning Western plans and preparations. But in view of apparent long-standing Kremlin concern over any real or imagined threat to Soviet security, of Marxist warnings over the ever-present danger of capitalist attack on the Communist world, of expressed Soviet suspicion of various recent Western military measures, and of various recent statements by Western public figures and of articles in the Western press, we believe that the Kremlin is probably disturbed over Western intentions.

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weigh the logistical and security problems of maintaining, across broad expanses of conquered territory, adequate support and control of extended Soviet forces; the danger of the ideological contamination of Soviet occupation forces; the possibility of widespread guerrilla resistance, probably supported and directed by the Allies; and, perhaps most important, the possibility that Allied bridgeheads on the Continent might be held throughout the initial phase of the war, and might in time be built up sufficiently to permit a major counter-offensive."

17. There are, however, cogent considerations which probably lead the Kremlin to believe that a deliberate Western attack during 1952 is unlikely. The West will still be far from that degree of mobilization which the Kremlin probably considers necessary for a successful attack on the USSR. Western forces on the Eurasian continent will still be far from achieving effective offensive capabilities against the present military power of the USSR and the growing military forces of the Satellites.

18. Even if the Kremlin did not anticipate an imminent attack by the West, it would probably deliberately initiate general war if it came to the conclusion that an irreversible adverse shift in the balance of military power were developing, that it could not otherwise be checked or countered, and that it constituted a grave threat to Soviet security.

19. The Kremlin may estimate that already the balance of military power is shifting to its disadvantage because of: (a) progressive integration of the West; (b) the increase in Western defense production; (c) recent Western mobilization measures and the prospect of German and Japanese rearmament; and (d) the increasing atomic capabilities of the US.

20. However, we believe it unlikely that the Kremlin will, during 1952, conclude that the foregoing developments will necessarily result in a major shift in the balance of military power. The Kremlin probably foresees many difficulties in the implementation of a vigorous, united and lasting Western program for building military strength and corresponding opportunities for exploiting these difficulties. It may estimate that sooner or later such a program will fail because of political and economic difficulties among and within the nations of the free world, and that meanwhile the Soviet bloc, firmly under Kremlin control, can continue to improve its relative power position.

21. On balance we believe it unlikely that the Kremlin will *deliberately initiate* general war during 1952. We believe that the Kremlin prefers to pursue its objectives through methods short of deliberate resort to war with the US and its allies, and, moreover, probably estimates that possibilities for progress through such methods will continue to exist through 1952. We believe that in these circumstances the Kremlin is likely to be deterred from a deliberate resort to war with the US and its allies in 1952 by the certainty of extensive destruction in the USSR as well as by the risk that the Soviet system might be destroyed.

22. We recognize, however, the continuing grave danger of a general war in 1952 resulting from a Kremlin action or series of actions not intended to have that result, or even from actions which, in the Kremlin's view, entailed that risk, but not the certainty thereof. We recognize also the danger that general war might arise from Soviet-initiated hostilities which the Kremlin intended to limit to a particular area.

20. SNIE 11-54, 15 February 1954, *Likelihood of General War Through 1957*

ASSISTANT DIR

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SNIE 11-54

10 February 1954

15 February 1954

Committee concurred in this
1954. Has, however, footnotes
Intelligence, The Joint Staff,
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No. 93-3

LIKELIHOOD OF GENERAL WAR THROUGH 1957

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the likelihood of general war with the USSR during the period through 1957.

ESTIMATE

1. We believe that the Kremlin will remain fundamentally hostile to the US and that the capability of the USSR to wage general war, including its capability to attack the continental US, will continue to increase during the period of this estimate.

2. The Kremlin probably considers that opportunities will continue to exist during the period through 1957 for increasing Soviet influence and perhaps expanding the area of Soviet control by methods short of general war. As its major course of action short of general war the USSR will continue to use the pressure of its growing military capabilities and its international Communist apparatus to try to undermine the political, economic, and psychological strength of the free world in order to give the Kremlin greater initiative in the struggle for its ultimate objective of a Communist world dominated from Moscow and to reduce the freedom of action of the US and its allies to combat it.

3. Soviet Bloc superiority in ground forces employing conventional weapons will continue throughout the period of this estimate. The Soviet stockpile of nuclear weapons will steadily grow. The Kremlin is aware, however, that the West will through 1957 have superior strategic air power and naval power, a larger atomic stockpile, and greater industrial potential. The Kremlin also probably considers that the USSR is making substantial progress toward reducing its disadvantages in these respects, particularly as regards stockpile and types of nuclear weapons.

4. We believe that during the period of this estimate the Communist rulers will continue to consider general war a hazardous gamble, involving at a minimum the certainty of widespread destruction in the USSR and at the same time carrying with it the risk that the Soviet system itself would be destroyed.[1]

5. On the basis of the foregoing, we believe it unlikely that the Kremlin will deliberately initiate general war during the period through 1957. We also believe that the Kremlin will try to avoid courses of action which in its judgment would clearly involve substantial risk of general war.[2]

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[1] In making this estimate it is assumed that there will be no basic change in US policy with respect to the utilization of nuclear weapons for defense against aggression.

[2] It is the view of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, that paragraph 5 should read as follows:

5. It seems logical, therefore, to estimate that the Soviets should prefer to avoid general war as a means of accomplishing their objectives and that the Kremlin should try to avoid courses of action which in its judgment would clearly involve substantial risk of global conflict. We believe it probable that through 1957 the odds are somewhat against Soviet initiation of general war. Nevertheless, the intelligence supporting this estimate is insufficient to warrant a conclusion that the USSR would not resort to such action should the Soviet leaders believe:

a. That they had the capability to neutralize Allied forces and so disrupt and isolate the United States as to provide positive assurance of the success of Soviet efforts on a world-wide basis.

b. That a shift in the balance of power was developing and that it constituted a grave threat to the security of the USSR that could be successfully countered only by general war.

c. That a Western attack on the USSR was imminent and unavoidable and that Soviet chances of surviving such an attack would be improved by seizing the initiative.

6. We believe, however, that the Kremlin would not be deterred by the risk of general war from taking counteractions against a western action which it considered an imminent threat to Soviet security. Moreover, the USSR or one of the Soviet Bloc countries might take action creating a situation in which the US or its allies, rather than yield an important position, might have to take counteraction involving grave risk of general war with the USSR. Thus general war might occur between now and the end of 1957 as the climax of a series of actions and counteractions, initiated by either side, which neither side originally intended to lead to general war.[3]

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[3] It is the view of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, that paragraph 6 should read as follows:

6. In addition, general war might occur between now and the end of 1957 as the climax of a series of actions and counteractions, initiated by either side, which neither side originally intended to lead to general war.

21. NIE 11-5-54, 7 June 1954, *Soviet Capabilities and Main Lines of Policy Through Mid-1959* (Excerpts)

031770
CIA TSC NO.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND MAIN LINES OF POLICY THROUGH MID-1959

NIE 11-5-54
Approved 1 June 1954
Published 7 June 1954

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The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 1 June 1954. The FBI abstained, the subject being outside of its jurisdiction.

The following member organizations of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

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SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND MAIN LINES OF POLICY THROUGH MID-1959[1]

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet capabilities and the main lines of Soviet strategic policy through mid-1959.[1]

CONCLUSIONS

1. We believe that the stability and authority of the Soviet regime will not be affected during the period of this estimate by conflicts for power or differences respecting policy within the ruling group. Soviet authority over the Satellites will almost certainly remain intact. There are potential conflicts of interest between the USSR and Communist China but we believe that during the period of this estimate the cohesive forces in the relationship will be far greater than the divisive forces.

2. The economic policy of the USSR will probably continue to place primary emphasis on the rapid development of heavy industry and war potential, though with more attention than in the past to development of agricultural and consumer goods production. The high rates of economic growth achieved in the immediate postwar years have been declining. We believe that the annual rate for the next two years will be about 6 or 6.5 percent and in 1956-1959 about 5 or 6 percent.

3. We believe that if current economic programs are carried on as planned Soviet defense expenditures will have to remain approximately constant in terms of purchasing power, at least through 1955. However, military procurement, even if it does not rise above the high level reached in 1952 and maintained in 1953, will be sufficient for continuous qualitative improvement of the armed forces in weapons, equipment, and training. Apart from this general qualitative improvement, the most significant changes in Soviet military strength during the period of this estimate are likely to be as follows:

a. Increase in the nuclear weapons stockpile;

b. Increase in the capability to deliver these weapons by various methods;

c. Improvement in weapons systems for air defense;

[1] Although this paper is concerned primarily with the USSR, strengths and capabilities of the other members of the Soviet Bloc (Communist China, Eastern European Satellites, East Germany, and North Korea) are referred to where these add significantly to Soviet power. Consideration is also given to possible Chinese Communist courses of action which may have a direct bearing on the main lines of Soviet policy.

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d. Increase in the long-range submarine force.

4. We believe that the Kremlin probably will continue, at least for a year or two, to avoid courses of action which in its judgment would clearly involve substantial risk of general war. Bloc leaders will try to foster and exploit political weaknesses and, as opportunity offers, armed insurrections within the non-Communist world. Soviet leaders probably believe that, by alternately easing the tension and applying political warfare pressure dexterously, they can increase the chances that in time there will arise new opportunities for Communist strategic advances without substantial risk of general war.

5. While the Kremlin may continue to follow generally its present lines of policy throughout the period of this estimate, it should be borne in mind that the progress being made by the USSR in the development of nuclear weapons, and the increasing Soviet capability to deliver these weapons, are changing the world power situation in important respects. Under these conditions Soviet rulers will almost certainly believe that, as Soviet nuclear capabilities increase, the aversion of the US and its allies to general war will correspondingly increase, and that the Kremlin will therefore have greater freedom of action to pursue its objectives without running substantial risk of general war. Thus the Kremlin will be increasingly ready to apply heavy pressure on the non-Communist world upon any signs of major dissension or weakness among the US and its allies. We believe, however, that the Kremlin will continue to be extremely reluctant to precipitate a contest in which the USSR would be subjected to nuclear attack. At the same time, we believe that the Kremlin would not be deterred by the risk of general war from taking counteraction against an action by the US or its allies which the Kremlin considered an imminent threat to Soviet security. We believe that the extent to which the Kremlin uses the increased freedom of action which its increased nuclear capabilities appear to give it, and the success which it achieves, will depend primarily upon the determination, strength, and cohesiveness of the non-Communist world.

6. We believe the Chinese Communist leaders in general share these Soviet views about the world situation and about opportunities and methods of advancing Communist interests. During the period of this estimate, Communist China will probably be reluctant to undertake courses of action which it considers might involve substantial risk of provoking unlimited war with a major power. The major deterrents will be: (a) China needs time to consolidate the Communist state as well as to modernize her economy; (b) China's strong ground forces are limited in service and support units, China's expanding air force has certain limitations, and China's navy has extremely limited capabilities, and China will remain militarily dependent upon the USSR for logistical, air, and naval support; (c) China's industrial centers will be vulnerable; and (d) the margin of available resources over minimum domestic requirements will be narrow. However, China will probably counter with military force, to the full extent of its capability, any action which it considers to be a military threat to its borders or to constitute an imminent threat to its vital

interests, accepting the risks of war inherent in such action.[1]

7. Both Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders probably feel that Southeast Asia offers particularly favorable opportunities for Communist expansion, not only because of the vulnerability of the states in the area, but because of the possibility of exploiting disagreements between the US and its allies. Continued Communist successes in Indochina, or the consolidation of present Communist gains in Indochina, would probably lead the Chinese Communists to expand their efforts to subvert neighboring countries by political infiltration and covert support of local insurrections, though probably not by the commitment of identifiable combat units of Chinese Communist armed forces. The aggressiveness with which such a policy would be pursued would depend on the vigor and effectiveness of non-Communist reaction.

DISCUSSION

I. BASIC COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES AND BELIEFS

8. The regime now in power in the USSR, or any that is likely to succeed it, almost certainly will continue for the indefinite future to consider its basic objective to be the consolidation and expansion of its own power, internally and externally. In pursuing this policy most Soviet leaders probably envisage ultimately: (a) the elimination of every world power center capable of competing with the USSR; (b) the spread of Communism to all parts of the world; and (c) Soviet domination over all other Communist regimes.

9. Soviet leaders probably are also committed to the following propositions concerning the expansion of the power of the USSR:

a. The struggle between the Communist and the non-Communist worlds is irreconcilable, with one system eventually destroying the other;

b. This struggle may go on for a long time, with periods of strategic retreat possibly intervening before the final Communist triumph;

c. The struggle between the Communist and the non-Communist worlds will not necessarily involve general war;

d. During the period of "coexistence of the two camps" of Communism and capitalism, the Communists must steadily build up the economic and military strength of the USSR and its Satellites while trying to divide and weaken the non-Communist world.

II. SOVIET POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND THE STABILITY OF THE REGIME

10. The regime committed to these basic beliefs is controlled by the small group of less than 10 men in the Presidium (formerly Politburo) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Most of this same group of men exercise authority in governmental policy-making through their ranking positions in the Council of Ministers, the formal seat of executive authority in the USSR. Their joint control over the apparatus of Soviet power is absolute, and the primacy of the regime's interests continues to be enforced rigidly by elaborate party, government, and police controls. The regime may exercise its police powers somewhat more moderately and

[1] The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes that paragraph 6 should read as follows:

"We believe that Chinese Communist leaders in general share these Soviet views about the world situation and about opportunities and methods of advancing Communist interests. Communist China will probably not choose knowingly any course of action likely to expose its fundamental national strengths in war with a major power. However, we believe that Communist China's strength for conducting various kinds of warfare are such, and the motives and judgment of its leaders are such as to make Communist China's courses of action dangerously unpredictable under outside pressure of any appreciable magnitude."

less arbitrarily than in the past, but this restraint would derive from conviction that the regime can best attain its domestic objectives in this way, not from any fear of popular disapproval or any reluctance to use force if necessary to maintain government authority.

11. The most powerful Soviet leader appears to be G. M. Malenkov, ranking member in both the Communist Party Presidium and the Council of Ministers. Party First Secretary N. S. Khrushchev has risen rapidly, particularly since the elimination of Beria, and may now be on a level with Malenkov. Probably, however, neither Malenkov nor Khrushchev, nor any of the other Soviet leaders, is currently in a position as an individual to exercise power independently of the group. The party has so thoroughly penetrated the security police, government machinery, and armed forces that independent action by any one of these organizations at the command of an individual Soviet leader is nearly impossible. We therefore believe it most unlikely that any struggle for power among Soviet rulers will lead to overt or widespread civil strife.

12. While such a system of joint authority in a totalitarian society tends to be unstable, a balance of power among the various leaders may, nevertheless, last for some time, especially if most of them feel that their interests require its preservation. Now that power has been successfully transferred after Stalin's death and Beria has been efficiently disposed of, the Soviet regime may continue with something comparable to the current *modus operandi* for some time. Changes may take place in the composition of the ruling group or in the relative power positions of its members; one man may even succeed in gaining absolute power. We do not believe, however, that any significant disruption or weakening of the system of Soviet power would accompany such shifts in the roles of leading personalities.

13. We believe that whatever conflicts for power or differences respecting policy may develop within the ruling group are unlikely during the period of this estimate to affect the stability of the regime or its authority within the country. Moreover, we believe the regime will not be significantly impaired in its ability to arrive at policy decisions and carry them out effectively. These policies and their implementation will continue to reflect the fundamental agreement which evidently obtains among the leaders concerning the basic objectives of the Communist regime.

III. SOVIET-SATELLITE RELATIONS

14. The appearance of new leadership in Moscow has had no apparent effect on the character of the relations between the USSR and its Satellite states in Eastern Europe. We believe that Soviet authority over the Satellite regimes will remain intact during the period of this estimate. The existence of widespread political discontent and serious difficulties in building up the Satellite economies will continue to delay the process of Sovietization of the area. However, during the next five years the Satellite contribution to Soviet power will gradually increase. Soviet control will continue to depend primarily on the presence or proximity of Soviet armed forces, and in the absence of general war popular dissatisfaction almost certainly will not develop beyond the stage of sporadic noncooperation.

IV. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

15. The relations of the USSR with Communist China are markedly different from those prevailing between the USSR and any other Communist country. Communist China is more a Soviet ally than a Satellite. It possesses some capability for independent action, possibly even for action which the USSR might disapprove but which it would find difficult to repudiate. However, the main outlines of Communist policy in Asia are probably jointly determined by Moscow and Peiping. While the Soviet voice presumably remains preponderant, Communist China appears to be increasing its stature within the Sino-Soviet partnership. Soviet propaganda and diplomacy have recently given great emphasis to China's claim to an acknowledged position in international affairs, and the USSR has given evidence of a willingness to have Communist China assume greater responsibilities in furthering Communist interests in Asia. In particular Communist China seems to have an increasingly important role in the execu-

tion of Communist policy in North Korea and Indochina.

16. The national interests of the USSR and Communist China are in some cases conflicting, and constitute potential sources of friction between the two powers. We believe, however, that throughout the period of this estimate the cohesive forces in the Sino-Soviet relationship will be far greater than the divisive forces. The USSR and Communist China share a common ideology. Both of them regard the US as the chief obstacle to their objectives, and consider that their interests are threatened by US policy and power. Moreover, each partner profits at the present time from its alliance with the other. Communist China receives essential Soviet political, military, and economic support and assistance. Soviet leaders recognize in China a valuable ally, which provides the USSR not only military strength and defense in depth in the Far East, but also a base for further advancing Communist aims in Asia.

E-1, E-14

V. SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH

17. The USSR has maintained its basic policy of forced-draft economic expansion throughout the postwar period, reaching approximately prewar levels of output in 1948 and steadily expanding in nearly every field since that time. The rate of growth of the Soviet economy, however, has declined in the past five years. From 1948 through 1950 Soviet gross national product (GNP) increased at an average annual rate of approximately 10 percent, but this rate fell off to about 6 or 7 percent per annum in the three-year period 1950–1953 and is estimated to have been only about 5 percent in the year 1953. The unusually high rate of growth through 1950 and the slower rate of growth thereafter were due to several factors, chief among which were: (a) during the earlier period the Soviet economy was still being reconstructed and hence capacity was brought into operation by comparatively little investment; (b) average growing conditions in agriculture were more favorable in 1949 and 1950 than in 1951 and 1953; and (c) the nonagricultural labor force grew less rapidly after 1950 than in the 1948–1950 period. In addition, the rate of growth of Soviet GNP in 1953 was reduced as a result of the adjustments required by the revisions of economic plans introduced in that year.

18. It is estimated that in the next two years the rate of growth of the Soviet economy will be about 6 or 6.5 percent per annum and that in the period 1956–1959 it will decline to about 5 or 6 percent per annum. The higher rate of growth in the near term is expected to result from the resumption of a high rate of increase in total investment, including additional investment in the traditionally lagging sectors of the economy — agriculture and consumers' goods industries. On the other hand, the rate of growth in the period 1956–1959 will be somewhat retarded, in part because of a decline in the growth of the labor force resulting from the low birth rate during World War II. Even so, the average annual growth rate for the entire period of this estimate will be nearly double the long-range average annual increase in GNP of the US economy of 3 percent, and substantially above the annual increase of just over 4 percent which the US economy has shown in the 1948–1953 period.

19. Trends for the USSR determine the general character of economic growth rates for the whole Soviet Bloc. Even though the rate of growth of Bloc GNP declines, this rate will almost certainly continue to exceed that of the US and NATO powers. The US-NATO growth rate for GNP is estimated to have been 2.8 percent per year during the first half of the twentieth century. If the latter rate should continue throughout the period of this estimate, then the ratio of Soviet to US national products would increase from about 33 percent in 1953 to about 40 percent in 1959, and the ratio of Bloc to US-NATO national products would increase from about 38 percent to about 45 percent, respectively. However, the absolute difference between the total product of the Bloc and that of US-NATO (as well as between the USSR and the US) would be somewhat greater at the end of the period than it is at present.

VI. TRENDS IN SOVIET ECONOMIC POLICY

20. The present regime in the USSR has not fundamentally changed the traditional Soviet economic policy of placing primary emphasis

on the rapid development of heavy industry and war potential. The new regime has, however, devoted a great deal of its attention and energies to a revision of current economic plans aimed at speeding up the production of agricultural commodities, especially foodstuffs, and manufactured consumers' goods. Soviet leaders have stated that this goal is to be achieved without decreasing the tempo of heavy industrial development, but they apparently intend, at least for the next two years, not to increase defense outlays above the high level reached in 1952 and maintained in 1953. This modification of Soviet economic programs is designed to overcome the lag in the growth of certain sectors of the economy, particularly agriculture, and to bring about a better balanced economic growth over the long run.

21. The promise of Soviet leaders to increase the volume of consumers' goods is being implemented by a serious effort to fulfill or modestly exceed the quotas in the Five-Year Plan as set forth in 1950. If successful, the regime would thus reverse the persistent trend of recent years whereby this sector of the Soviet economy slipped well below planned levels as a result of the priority in the allocation of economic resources granted to heavy industry and defense production. The heart of the new economic program is the effort to increase agricultural output by: (a) providing greater incentives to the peasant population in the form of goods and payments; (b) channeling greater capital investment to agriculture in the form of mechanical draft power, machinery, fertilizer, and building materials; (c) providing the farms with an ample supply of qualified technicians; (d) improving farm organization and practices; and (e) bringing under cultivation vast areas of semiarid virgin land in the eastern USSR and central Asia.

22. An important concern of the Soviet regime is that the inadequacy of agricultural production has been a critical contributing factor in the slowdown in the rate of growth of Soviet industrial labor productivity. The Soviet Union has been getting more and more out of its industrial labor force each year, but the annual increases are getting smaller and smaller. The new economic program aims at increasing the urban supply of food and other consumer goods and — with this incentive for industrial workers — steadily raising the level of labor productivity in Soviet industry. The new agricultural program of greater incentives and increased investment may mark the first step along lines of economic development that Soviet leaders will find it advisable to pursue for a number of years. They will almost certainly continue them through 1955 and in view of the likelihood that achievements will fall far short of plan goals, they may continue them during the whole period through 1959.

23. We believe that agricultural production is unlikely (even with normal weather) to increase by more than about 3 percent annually during the period 1954–1959, making a total increase of 15–20 percent for the whole period 1950–1959 as contrasted with the original Five-Year Plan goal of about 50 percent increase for the period 1950–1955. Even so, the annual increment to the total Soviet gross national product will be large enough to permit moderate increases in standards of living and greater investment in enterprises producing consumers goods (including agriculture) without jeopardizing heavy industrial growth or the maintenance of a high level of military expenditure.

VII. EFFECT OF MODIFIED ECONOMIC PROGRAM ON SOVIET MILITARY EXPENDITURES

24. We believe that if the new economic program is carried on as planned, Soviet defense expenditure will have to remain approximately constant in terms of purchasing power, at least through 1955. Judging by the pattern of budgetary allotments, Soviet annual defense expenditure for 1954–1955 will be approximately the same as for 1952–1953, whereas it increased more than 50 percent between 1950 and 1952. We believe that Soviet defense outlays of all categories in 1953 amounted to about 13 to 16 percent of total Soviet GNP and that the proportion will slightly diminish for at least two or three years and possibly through mid-1959. In any case, over-all war potential will steadily increase as a result of the growth of the economy.

21. *(Continued)*

VIII. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL RESOURCES OF THE SOVIET BLOC

25. Soviet scientific and technological capabilities are sufficiently well developed to provide effective support to industrial and military research and development. At present, the scientific assets of the USSR (the number and quality of trained personnel, facilities, equipment, and financial support) are less than those of the US, and the assets of the Bloc as a whole are far less than those of the West. The consistently strong support given to the development of Soviet science and technology has resulted, especially since World War II, in a rapid increase in Soviet capabilities in this area. We believe that military requirements will continue to have a high priority in the allocation of Soviet scientific resources during the period of this estimate.

IX. MILITARY STRENGTH[2] AND WEAPONS DEVELOPMENTS

26. In the postwar period the USSR has maintained its armed forces at high levels of strength and combat-readiness. During the period of this estimate military procurement, even if continued at the 1952–1953 rate, will be sufficient for continuous qualitative improvement in weapons, equipment, and training. Apart from this general qualitative improvement, the most significant changes in Soviet military strength during the period of this estimate are likely to be as follows:

a. Increase in the nuclear weapons stockpile;

b. Increase in the capability to deliver these weapons by various methods;

c. Improvement in weapons systems for air defense;

d. Increase in the long-range submarine force.

Nuclear Weapons

27. For an estimate of the status of Soviet nuclear research and nuclear weapons stockpiles for the period 1954 through 1957, reference should be made to NIE 11–3A–54.

[2] See Appendix for table giving estimated strengths of Soviet Bloc ground, air, and naval forces.

28. There is no evidence available which indicates the course that the Soviet atomic energy program will take during the period 1957 through 1959, nor are there any specific parameters which can be considered as limiting on the growth of the program during this period. Nevertheless, long-range extrapolations can be carried out on the basis of assumptions of the growth pattern the program might follow during the period in question.

29. Alternate assumptions, which indicate a range of growth capabilities are:

a. No expansion of Soviet fissionable materials production facilities after 1957; or

b. Continued expansion of Soviet fissionable materials production facilities after 1957 at the same rate as estimated in NIE 11–3A–54 for the period 1954 to mid-1957; or

c. Expansion of the Soviet program after 1957 at a rate which will increase its requirement for uranium to approximately 7,000 to 10,000 tons per year by 1964.

30. The Soviet fissionable materials stockpiles estimated for 1959 on the basis of above assumptions can be expressed in terms of weapon technology indicated by their 1953 tests. Examples of such conversion follows:

1959	Assumption A	Assumption B	Assumption C
(1) Unboosted weapons 40 KT each	1,260	1,355	1,760
Total yield (million tons TNT)	50.	54.	68.
OR			
(2) Boosted U-235 1,000 KT each	133	145	168
Boosted PU 60 KT each	350	375	510
Boosted PU 5 KT each	1,050	1,125	1,525
Total yield (million tons TNT)	158.	172.	208.

31. The alternate assumptions on which the above table is based do not consider the possibility of rapid technological advances in the production of fissionable materials, nor do they reflect major advances in weapons development which must be anticipated. Developments in thermonuclear weapons with yields well in excess of one million tons of TNT, which could possibly be tested during 1954, could increase the total energy yield obtainable from the Soviet fissionable materials stockpile by a factor of five to twenty-five over that in example 2. In addition, Soviet nuclear capabilities may be increased by weapon developments which will permit the adaptation of nuclear warheads to many delivery systems.

Jet Bombers

32. It was previously estimated that the USSR would produce: (a) a jet medium bomber having a speed of about 500 knots and a radius/range of about 1,500/2,900 nautical miles, and (b) a jet heavy bomber having a speed of about 450 knots and a radius/range of about 2,500/4,800 nautical miles. At the Moscow Air Show on May Day, 1954, there were observed in flight nine twin-engine jet bombers, designated for intelligence purposes Type-39, and one four-engine swept-wing jet bomber, designated Type-37. On the basis of preliminary analysis [4] of the photographs and observed characteristics of these aircraft we believe that their performance does not exceed, and may fall below, that previously estimated respectively for the jet medium and jet heavy bombers. It is estimated that both aircraft are powered by engines of 15,000-pound thrust.

33. Whether or not the Type-39 now has the performance characteristics of a jet medium bomber set forth above, we believe that the USSR will have about 20 Type-39 bombers in operational units by mid-1954, about 120 by mid-1955, and about 600 by mid-1959. This alters previous estimates to advance by one year the appearance of jet medium bombers in the Soviet Air Force. Whether or not the Type-37 now has the performance characteristics we have estimated for a jet heavy bomber, our estimate as to the development and introduction of such a bomber remains unchanged, that is, a few in operational units by mid-1957 and about 100 by mid-1959. These dates result from a process of calculation which we believe to be basically sound but which in some instances has failed to keep up with Soviet progress. Consequently, substantial numbers of jet heavy bombers may appear in operational units prior to mid-1959 and possibly by mid-1957.

[4] Analysis of presently available evidence on these aircraft is still in progress.

Guided Missiles [5]

34. We have many indications that the USSR is devoting great effort to its program of development of guided missiles. From an assessment of over-all Soviet technical capability, and assuming reasonable progress in Soviet programs based on the World War II Germany effort, we believe that the USSR could within the period of this estimate have considerable numbers of guided missiles in operational use. The type and characteristics of the missiles produced would depend upon the Soviet assessment of military requirements and upon the allocation of priority among the many possible types to be developed.

35. We have no firm evidence that the USSR has any guided missiles ready for operational use at the present time. The most reliable information concerning the Soviet guided missiles program relates to development and improvement of German V-1 and V-2 models acquired at the end of World War II. Based on this information we believe it likely that the USSR will have by 1956 a V-2 type of guided missile with a range of 450-500 nautical miles [6] carrying a warhead of 2,200 pounds.

[5] Detailed studies of this subject are currently in progress and will provide the basis of NIE 11-6-54, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Field of Guided Missiles," scheduled for production in the third quarter of 1954.

[6] The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes that the range of this missile would be on the order of 200-300 nautical miles; however, he believes it is likely that the Soviets will have, by this date, other missiles with ranges on the order of 800 to 900 nautical miles carrying a 3,000 pound warhead.

Development of such a missile is well within Soviet capabilities. It is also well within Soviet capabilities to develop numerous other types of missiles within the period of this estimate, but we have at present no information as to which of these various types the USSR may be developing on a priority basis. Our estimate of probable Soviet military requirements suggests that the priority accorded the development of a surface-to-air missile would be at least as high as that given to development of a surface-to-surface missile.

36. We believe that it will not be within Soviet capability before 1959 to attack continental United States with guided missiles launched from Soviet Bloc territory. In 1959, it would be possible for the USSR to start series production of a pilotless-aircraft type of missile which could reach the US from Bloc territory; we have no evidence of such development now being under way. Even at the present time, it would be technically feasible for the USSR to attack targets within the US with missiles launched from long-range aircraft or from submarines. We have no evidence at present that the USSR has developed this capability.

Air Defense Weapons

37. At present, the USSR does not have an interception capability sufficient to prevent effective bombardment missions under poor visibility conditions. However, an all-weather fighter equipped with AI radar is probably a priority project of Soviet weapons development. It is expected that about 500 such aircraft will be in operational use by mid-1956 and about 2,000 by mid-1959. With the all-weather fighters available in greater numbers starting about mid-1958, along with improvements in early warning and GCI radar and a growing surface-to-air missile capability, it is expected that Soviet Bloc air defense capabilities will be improved substantially by 1959.

Submarines

38. The Soviet Navy is apparently concentrating on the construction of two long-range submarine types developed since World War II. These are equipped with snorkel and have operating radii of about 4,700 and 6,700 miles respectively. By early 1954, 47 of these had joined the fleet and the building rate is estimated as 46 per year. The Soviets are known to have continued development of the Walther closed-cycle engine for submarine propulsion and this engine could be operational by mid-1955. It is also possible that, by mid-1959, nuclear propulsion for submarines will have been developed by the USSR.

X. PROBABLE MAIN LINES OF SOVIET POLICY

39. In making their estimate of the world strategic situation Soviet leaders probably calculate that: (a) the US is irreconcilably hostile to the Soviet system and is intent on the formation of a world-wide anti-Communist coalition; (b) the US will meet increasing problems in attempting to create and give military substance to such a coalition; (c) frustration of this effort might lead the US either to adopt a policy of isolation or to undertake preventive war; (d) fears of nuclear warfare, particularly as Soviet delivery capabilities grow, will increase pressure in the West for avoidance of war with the USSR; (e) the continuing conflict with the US can be restricted to areas and issues involving less than an all-out military effort, in which case the USSR will eventually triumph.

40. The Kremlin probably considers that there is at present a rough strategic equilibrium between the Soviet Bloc and the US-NATO coalition. On the one hand, Western strength in air and ground forces has grown, over-all Western naval superiority has been maintained, and the US has retained its superior nuclear capabilities while improving its defensive posture. On the other hand, the Soviet Union, while retaining its strength in ground forces, has reduced the margin of Western naval superiority, and has built an air force capable of using nuclear weapons in attacks on US allies, US forward air bases, and even — under comparatively difficult operational circumstances — in attacks on the continental US. Soviet leaders probably believe that they cannot be certain of winning a war, but they show no indication of feeling that the

balance of world power is developing unfavorably to their basic interests.

41. We believe that the Kremlin probably will continue, at least for a year or two, to estimate the relative military capabilities of the Soviet Bloc and the US-NATO coalition substantially as described above. The Soviet leaders probably believe that general war would be a hazardous gamble for them, possibly involving the destruction of the Soviet system. On this basis, the Kremlin probably would conclude that the USSR should try during this period to avoid courses of action which in its judgment would clearly involve substantial risk of general war. The Kremlin will, however, probably continue to consider general war a possibility that cannot be excluded, and the USSR will almost certainly continue to build up its military and economic strength against this eventuality. We believe that the Kremlin would not be deterred by the risk of general war from taking counteraction against an action by the US or its allies which the Kremlin considered an imminent threat to Soviet security.

42. During the period of this estimate the Kremlin will try to foster and exploit weaknesses and, as opportunity offers, armed insurrections within the non-Communist nations, while encouraging political or economic conflicts among them. Soviet leaders probably believe that, by alternately easing the tension and applying political warfare pressures dexterously, they can increase the chances that in time there will arise new opportunities for Communist strategic advances without substantial risk of general war. Meanwhile, they will almost certainly continue to devote great effort to building a better balanced economic and military strength in the Soviet Union and the Satellites.

43. The Kremlin may continue to follow generally its present lines of policy throughout the period of this estimate. However, the progress being made by the USSR in the development of nuclear weapons, and the increasing Soviet capability to deliver these weapons, are changing the world power situation in important respects. As these Soviet capabilities increase, the US is losing a great advantage which it has heretofore held in the struggle. Unless defensive capabilities develop beyond the degree now foreseen, both the US and the USSR within the period of this estimate probably will have sufficient nuclear capabilities to cripple each other, though only at grave risk of receiving crippling blows in return.

44. Soviet rulers will almost certainly believe that, as Soviet nuclear capabilities increase, the aversion of the US and of its allies to general war will correspondingly increase, and that the Kremlin will therefore have greater freedom of action to pursue its objectives without running substantial risk of general war. It may employ the threat of nuclear devastation as an instrument of political warfare. It may attempt to gain some of its objectives by local military actions, calculating that the US and its allies will be more anxious than before to keep such local conflicts from expanding into general war. It will be increasingly ready to apply heavy pressure on the non-Communist world upon any signs of major dissension or weakness among the US and its allies. On the other hand, we believe that the Kremlin will continue to be extremely reluctant to precipitate a contest in which the USSR would be subjected to nuclear attack. We believe that the extent to which the Kremlin uses the increased freedom of action which its increased nuclear capabilities appear to give it, and the success which it achieves, will depend primarily upon the determination, strength, and cohesiveness of the non-Communist world.

Chinese Communist Courses of Action

45. We believe the Chinese Communist leaders in general share these Soviet views about the world situation and about opportunities and methods of advancing Communist interests. During the period of this estimate, Communist China will probably be reluctant to undertake courses of action which it considers might involve substantial risk of provoking unlimited war with a major power. The major deterrents will be: (a) China needs time to consolidate the Communist state as

well as to modernize her economy; (b) China's strong ground forces are limited in service and support units, China's expanding air force has certain limitations, and China's navy has extremely limited capabilities, and China will remain militarily dependent upon the USSR for logistical, air, and naval support; (c) China's industrial centers will be vulnerable; and (d) the margin of available resources over minimum domestic requirements will be narrow. However, China will probably counter with military force, to the full extent of its capability, any action which it considers to be a military threat to its borders or to constitute an imminent threat to its vital interests, accepting the risks of war inherent in such action.[7]

46. Both Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders probably feel that Southeast Asia offers the most favorable opportunities for Communist expansion, not only because of the vulnerability of the states in the area, but because of the possibility of exploiting disagreements between the US and its allies. The continuation of Communist successes in Indochina or the consolidation of present Communist gains there would in Communist China's view open up enlarged opportunities for a more aggressive policy in Southeast Asia. Chinese Communist leaders would probably expand their efforts to subvert neighboring countries by political infiltration and covert support of local insurrections, but probably not by the commitment of identifiable combat units of Chinese Communist armed forces. The aggressiveness with which such a policy would be pursued would depend upon the vigor and effectiveness of non-Communist reaction.

[7] The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes that paragraph 45 should read as follows:

"We believe that Chinese Communist leaders in general share these Soviet views about the world situation and about opportunities and methods of advancing Communists interests. Communist China will probably not choose knowingly any course of action likely to expose its fundamental national strengths in war with a major power. However, we believe that Communist China's strength for conducting various kinds of warfare are such, and the motives and judgment of its leaders are such as to make Communist China's courses of action dangerously unpredictable under outside pressure of any appreciable magnitude."

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22. SNIE 11-10-55, 2 August 1955, *Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attacks on the US and Key Overseas Installations and Forces in 1965*



Submitted by the

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Joint Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Concurred in by the

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

[illegible] Department, [illegible] the Director of Intelligence, [illegible] Joint Staff, the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, USAEC, the Deputy Director for Intelligence, TAC, [illegible] and the Assistant Director, Division of Research and Reports, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstaining, the matter being outside the jurisdiction of the FBI.

[redacted]

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TOP SECRET

22. *(Continued)*



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SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACKS ON THE US AND KEY OVERSEAS INSTALLATIONS AND FORCES IN 1965

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet gross capabilities for attacks on the US and key overseas installations and forces in 1965, without taking into account the effectiveness of allied defenses and countermeasures.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Soviet plans for attack on the US and key US overseas installations and forces would be made in connection with an over-all strategy for general war. Accordingly, some Soviet forces and materiel, including mass destruction and latest delivery weapons, would almost certainly be earmarked for use against US allies and for reserve. This estimate does not consider the problem of such allocation nor of over-all Soviet strategy, but confines itself essentially to the *gross capabilities* for attack on the US and key US overseas installations and forces as indicated by the estimated state of USSR weapons, equipment, and facilities in 1965.

In arriving at such an estimate for 1965 it has been necessary to rely essentially upon our current knowledge of the Soviet military establishment and its shorter-range developmental programs, and to extrapolate this knowledge — guided by estimates of military requirements and a general awareness of future US military development — into the future. It has been assumed that the USSR: (a) will continue to make a large and probably increasing annual economic outlay for military purposes; (b) will continue to improve its military capabilities, including its ability to conduct offensive operations; and (c) will not achieve a technological breakthrough in the sense of producing weapons systems other than those now foreseen or of greatly reducing the time required for development of anticipated weapons.

The following judgments with respect to the capabilities of the Soviet military forces in 1965 are thus highly speculative. This is particularly true since in a period as long as ten years the above assumptions may be seriously undermined by political, economic, and technical developments, the nature and significance of which cannot be gauged at this time. For example, whereas we believe it unlikely that the USSR will achieve a decisive breakthrough on the technological level, such technological advance — beyond Western development or anticipation — is certainly within reason and cannot be entirely excluded.

CONCLUSIONS

1. In attacking the US and key US overseas installations the major Soviet objectives in 1965 will probably be: (a) to destroy or neutralize as quickly as possible US continental and overseas capabilities for nuclear retaliation; (b) to deliver attacks on urban, industrial, political, and psychological targets in the US which would prevent, or at least hinder, the mobilization of US war potential; and (c) to inflict such destruction on US overseas installations as would hamper or prevent the US from reinforcing or resupplying its forces.

2. The Soviet leaders would probably calculate that in order to achieve these objectives initial attacks would have to be accomplished with the maximum degree of surprise consistent with the required scale of attack, and, therefore, would place chief reliance on nuclear attacks by bomber aircraft and guided missiles. They could also employ biological and chemical weapons in overt attacks. The USSR will also be capable of clandestinely introducing nuclear, BW, and CW weapons, and employing them against highly critical targets. *(Paras. 21, 25)*

3. We estimate that Soviet capability to produce fissionable materials will almost certainly be more than sufficient to provide for the requirements of attack on the US and key overseas installations and forces in 1965. All sizes of nuclear weapons, including those of the largest yield, will be deliverable by the aircraft estimated to be then in use. Nuclear warheads could be available for the surface-to-surface and the air-to-surface guided missiles which could be used for offensive action against the US. *(Para. 7)*

4. We estimate that it would be within Soviet *production capacity* to have a large inventory of surface-to-surface guided missiles of all ranges in stockpile by 1965, including sufficient quantities of the two-stage ballistic missile (1,900 nm) and the ICBM to constitute a major and unprecedented threat to the US and key overseas installations and forces.[1] ICBM attacks against the continental US could be launched from sites in the vicinity of widely dispersed assembly plants located in the interior of the USSR. Although there is no basis for estimating the number of such launching sites which might be available in 1965, we believe ICBMs could be launched in an initial attack against many US targets. The entire Soviet heavy bomber force also could be launched from interior bases and, with inflight refueling where necessary, reach any target in the US on two-way missions. There would probably be a reduction in the numbers of Soviet bomber aircraft, however, if reliable and accurate guided missiles became available in sufficient quantities. Guided missiles with nuclear warheads could be launched from submarines and conceivably also from surface vessels against targets several hundred miles inland. *(Paras. 13, 22–24)*

5. Attacks on US overseas installations and forces could be carried out simul-

[1] The D/I USAF believes that because of the estimates contained in NIE 11-6-54 as to the dates of operational availability of both a two-stage medium-range ballistic missile and an ICBM, there will be ample time by 1965 for Soviet production capacity to produce several thousand of the two-stage missiles but not enough time to produce more than several hundred ICBMs. There appear to be no factors which necessarily limit this production capacity except time.

taneously with intercontinental attacks. The aircraft available could consist of the heavy bombers not committed against the US, and the medium and light bomber forces. Virtually all of the targets in these areas could also be reached by medium or short-range guided missiles launched from within the USSR or Soviet-dominated territory. Sizeable Soviet ground and tactical air forces, airborne forces, and surface fleets will also be available for such attacks and a large number of Soviet submarines would probably be employed against naval striking forces. These Soviet forces could use nuclear weapons. *(Paras. 26–28)*

6. It is clear that by 1965, even assuming no technological breakthrough, the development of Soviet weapons will greatly enhance the USSR's gross capability to attack the US and US overseas forces and installations. Perhaps even more important, the USSR's capability to attack with surprise will probably increase. It is important to note, however, that we are estimating the USSR's *gross* capability, and have not taken into account the present or future effectiveness of allied defenses, countermeasures, or intelligence.

DISCUSSION

I. AVAILABILITY OF SOVIET MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS

Nuclear Weapons[1]

7. There is no evidence on the USSR's specific plans for developing its atomic energy program during 1958–1965, nor are there any specific parameters to which the growth of the program during this period can be tied. Direction of the program and actual allocations of fissionable material to weapons and other uses will depend on Soviet planning decisions. We estimate that Soviet capability to produce fissionable materials will almost certainly be more than sufficient to provide for the requirements of attack on the US and key overseas installations and forces in 1965. The principal problems in connection with use of nuclear weapons will be those of adaptation to various delivery systems. By 1965 all sizes of nuclear weapons, including those of the largest yield, will be deliverable by the aircraft estimated to be then in use. Nuclear warheads could be available for the surface-to-surface and the air-to-surface guided missiles which could be used for offensive action against the US.

[1] See NIE 11-3-58, Restricted Data, "The Soviet Atomic Energy Program," dated 30 April 1958.

Biological Weapons

8. By 1965 the USSR will probably have an improved capability to produce antipersonnel, anticrop, and antilivestock BW weapons systems for use against the US. Since it is not possible to stockpile large quantities of most BW agents in prolonged storage, most operational requirements would still have to be supplied directly from production facilities. BW agents would probably be disseminated by means known at present, including aerosol generators, insect vectors, bombs, and spore impregnated material. The choice of means would depend primarily upon the type of target and whether overt or covert dissemination is used.

9. The Soviets will be capable of employing antipersonnel BW agents singly, in combinations, or concurrently with CW agents. The BW agents which the Soviets can develop and are most likely to have for antipersonnel use by 1965 are the bacterial agents causing anthrax, brucellosis, glanders, and tularemia; the stable viral and rickettsial agents causing

Q-fever, psittacosis and various forms of encephalitis; the toxins causing botulism and enteric disorders; and fungal toxins. Until antipersonnel BW weapons are used on a mass basis there will be only partial data from which to judge the efficacy of such weapons. Variations of the numerous physical factors (effectiveness of delivery, climatic conditions, immunological resistance, etc.) upon which the efficacy of BW attack depends would cause its effectiveness against the personnel attacked to range from virtually zero to nearly 100 percent.

Chemical Weapons

10. The USSR has available chemical warfare weapons of World War II which are adequate for the dissemination of standard CW agents and are potentially adaptable to other agents. We estimate that the Soviets have the facilities and scientific knowledge to produce two nerve gases (GA and GB). Therefore, if chemical warfare were utilized, the USSR would almost certainly be able to employ these as well as the standard CW agents. Soviet research in the biochemical sciences may also result in the development of toxic compounds of military significance, such as substances which would incapacitate people without killing them or cause temporary mental disorders. Such agents may be sufficiently developed for military use in 1965.

Radiological Weapons

11. The USSR will possess nuclear weapons capable of producing wide radioactive fall-out, and which it could use primarily for this purpose. Other than this, we believe it unlikely that the USSR will be able to develop radiological warfare weapons by 1965 that will possess offensive military significance.

II. MEANS OF WEAPONS DELIVERY

Guided Missiles

12. A guided missile program which would probably meet Soviet missile requirements and be within Soviet scientific capability by 1965 could include the following:

a. a two-stage ballistic missile with a maximum range of about 1,900 nautical miles with inertial guidance and a CEP of 3 to 4 nautical miles;

b. an intercontinental ballistic missile with a maximum range of 5,500 nautical miles and a CEP possibly less than the five miles presently estimated for the period 1960–1963;

c. a submarine-launched supersonic missile which would have a range up to 1,000 nautical miles; and

d. an air-to-surface missile with a range of approximately 100 nautical miles.

13. We believe that the USSR will probably concentrate effort on the ballistic missile because of its relative immunity to countermeasures and its greater capability for surprise. The number of missiles which might be available cannot be estimated with confidence. It would depend on many factors now impossible to determine, including the Soviet estimate of requirements and allocation of resources for these weapons. However, assuming successful development and adequate priority we estimate that it would be within Soviet *production capacity* to have a large inventory of surface-to-surface guided missiles of all ranges in stockpile by 1965, including sufficient quantities of the two-stage ballistic missile (1,900 nm) and the ICBM to constitute a major and unprecedented threat to the US and its key overseas installations and forces.[1]

14. By 1965, the USSR may be able to develop an unmanned satellite vehicle. At that date, it would have psychological and research significance, and possibly military surveillance significance.

Aircraft

15. There would probably be a reduction in the numbers of Soviet bomber aircraft if reliable and accurate guided missiles became available

[1] D/I USAF believes that because of the estimates contained in NIE 11-6-54 as to the dates of operational availability of both a two-stage medium-range ballistic missile and an ICBM, there will be ample time by 1965 for Soviet production capacity to produce several thousand of the two-stage missiles but not enough time to produce more than several hundred ICBMs. There appear to be no factors which necessarily limit this production capacity except time.

in sufficient quantities. However, if such missiles do not become available in sufficient quantity, the Soviet long-range bomber force will probably be maintained at about 1,400 aircraft, composed of roughly equal numbers of medium and heavy bombers. Versions of existing heavy bombers, the BISON and BEAR, and the medium bomber, the BADGER, with slightly improved performance characteristics will probably still be operational in 1965. We believe that a medium-range jet bomber with supersonic dash capabilities, and possibly a long-range jet bomber with supersonic dash capabilities, will also be available in 1965. It is also possible that the USSR could have a few nuclear-powered heavy bombers which would have, for all practical purposes, unlimited range, but only subsonic speed. In addition, the USSR will probably have a light bomber force of about 3,000 aircraft, consisting of aircraft with performance superior to that of the current BEAGLE and including some light bombers with a high subsonic cruise and supersonic dash capability.

16. In 1965 Soviet bombers will be able to reach all parts of the US on two-way missions, employing inflight refueling where necessary or desirable. We also estimate that the USSR will develop increasingly advanced ECM techniques by 1965, possibly including techniques capable of seriously degrading the performance of conventional early warning and gun-laying radars. Moreover, Soviet bombers available in 1965 will probably utilize bomb-aiming equipment giving an accuracy of 750–1,500 feet CEP visually and 1,200–3,000 feet CEP by radar.

Naval Forces

17. Soviet surface vessels could employ nuclear weapons such as mines and torpedoes, and could be modified for launching guided missiles with nuclear warheads. The performance characteristics of Soviet surface ships are comparable to those of Western navies. By 1965 nuclear powered vessels are a possibility, and could include aircraft carriers and guided missile ships. However, we think it unlikely that by 1965 the Soviet surface fleet will present a serious threat to the continental US.

18. The naval vessel most likely to be selected by the USSR for attack on the US or its bases and forces is the submarine. We estimate that in 1965 the USSR will have a submarine fleet of some 400 to 600 craft. A very large proportion will be modern long-range boats, snorkel equipped; a limited number could be nuclear propelled. A number of long-range submarines could be designed for or converted to guided missile work, and as such could carry up to six turbojet-powered guided missiles. Conventional submarines could carry 25 to 50 mines or 15 to 24 torpedoes, or combinations of the two.

19. The long-range submarines will have an operating radius under combat conditions of 3,700 nautical miles (W type) or 5,400 nautical miles (Z type). Submarines equipped with auxiliary propulsion for high underwater speeds, i.e., about 25 knots, will have a shorter range, and will be sharply limited in the length of time they can operate at such speeds. Nuclear-powered submarines will probably attain submerged speeds approaching 30 knots, and will probably have a submerged endurance limited only by personnel capabilities.

Ground Forces

20. During this period the Soviet Army will probably continue to modernize its ground force systems, and by 1965 will probably have considerable numbers of improved weapons including tanks, self-propelled guns, surface-to-surface guided missiles and artillery projectiles with nuclear warheads, and an anti-tank guided missile. These new weapons, together with improved support and related materiel, including equipment for airborne forces, will probably greatly increase Soviet Army capabilities to conduct highly mobile operations under conditons of either nuclear or conventional warfare.

III. PROBABLE GROSS SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK IN 1965

21. Soviet capability to attack the US and overseas forces in 1965 will derive primarily from its ability to deliver nuclear weapons by

bomber aircraft or guided missiles. The manner in which the USSR would combine or coordinate guided missiles and bomber aircraft in carrying out attacks in this period cannot be estimated with either confidence or precision. The USSR would probably use both aircraft and missiles in such attacks—missiles because of their relative invulnerability to air defenses and aircraft because of their greater accuracy of weapons delivery. Aircraft would also be required for reconnaissance.

Attacks Against the Continental US

22. Because of the range of the ICBM estimated to be available in 1965, these missiles could be launched from sites in the vicinity of widely dispersed assembly plants located in the interior of the USSR. This would greatly simplify logistic problems while providing for an optimum degree of security. Although there is no basis for estimating the number of such launching sites which might be available in 1965, we believe that ICBMs could be launched in an initial attack against many US targets.

23. Intercontinental attacks by aircraft in 1965 will probably be conducted by heavy bombers only. A sizeable force of up to 700 heavy bomber aircraft could be launched from interior bases and, with inflight refueling where necessary, reach any target in the US on two-way missions. Air-to-surface missiles with nuclear warheads will probably greatly increase the capability of these aircraft for attacking heavily defended targets.

24. Guided missiles with nuclear warheads could be launched from submarines against targets several hundred miles inland; conceivably this could also be done from surface vessels. Torpedoes could be used to deliver a nuclear attack on some major seaports and naval bases. Such torpedoes might be modified to sink after a predetermined length of run and explode after a time delay.

25. The USSR will also be capable of clandestinely employing nuclear, BW, and CW weapons against the US. The scale of attack by such methods would be small as compared with the primary delivery methods discussed above. However, this capability could be employed against highly critical targets.

Attacks on US Forces and Installations Overseas

26. Attacks on targets in the European, African, and Asiatic areas could be carried out simultaneously with intercontinental attacks. The number of aircraft available could consist of the heavy bombers not committed against the US, and the medium and light bomber forces. Virtually all of the targets in these areas could also be reached by medium or short-range guided missiles launched from within the USSR or Soviet-dominated territory.

27. Many key US installations and forces overseas will continue to be vulnerable to attack by Soviet ground and tactical air forces. By 1965 the combined Soviet airborne and mechanised forces could also present a serious threat to certain overseas installations which might not be vulnerable to other forms of ground or air attack, or which the USSR might want to seize intact.

28. Soviet naval forces — aircraft, surface vessels, and submarines — could be used to support the primary air and ground campaigns in overseas areas and would undertake a major effort to interdict sea communications. A large number of Soviet submarines would probably be employed in a combined reconnaissance and attack role against naval striking forces.

23. NIE 10-58, 4 March 1958, *Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc* (Excerpts)



[illegible] INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

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ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC

Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred in by the INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE on 4 March 1958. Concurring were The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

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

ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC

THE PROBLEM

To appraise the intensity and scope of dissidence and resistance in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and to estimate the resistance potential in times of peace and war.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Like its predecessor,[1] this estimate is a brief appraisal of the causes, nature, and extent of anti-regime dissidence and resistance within the Sino-Soviet Bloc. It is based upon eleven country studies prepared by the inter-agency Resistance Intelligence Committee established by the IAC. These studies, which analyze dissidence and resistance in each country of the Bloc, have been noted but not individually approved by the IAC; they are appended as annexes to the estimate itself.

In the estimate and the annexes, the following terminology is used:

Dissidence — a state of mind involving discontent or disaffection with the regime.

Resistance — dissidence translated into action.

Organized resistance — resistance which is carried out by a group of individuals who have accepted a common purpose, agreed upon leadership, and worked out a communications system.

Unorganized resistance — resistance carried out by individuals or loosely associated groups which may have been formed spontaneously for certain limited objectives, without over-all plan or strategy.

Passive resistance — resistance, organized or unorganized, which is conducted within the framework of the resister's normal life and duties, and involves deliberate nonperformance or malperformance of acts which would benefit the regime, or deliberate nonconformity with standards of conduct established by the regime.

Active resistance — resistance, organized or unorganized, which expresses itself in positive acts against the regime. It may or may not involve violence, and may be conducted openly or clandestinely. It may take such forms as intelligence collection, psychological warfare, sabotage, guerrilla warfare, assistance in

[1] NIE 10-55, "Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc," 12 April 1955.

escape and evasion, open defiance of authority, or preparatory activity for any of the above.

With the progressive consolidation of Communist control, however, active resistance has in general tended to take less the forms mentioned above, and to be expressed more in such forms as strikes, demonstrations, and open manifestations of intellectual and other dissent. While in many cases these activities are not wholly motivated by anti-regime attitudes, they nevertheless have anti-regime connotations.

ESTIMATE

Scope and Intensity of Dissidence and Resistance

1. Dissidence continues to be widespread in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Improvements in living standards and such relaxation of regime controls as took place during the last three years have been, except perhaps in the USSR, insufficient to reduce substantially general discontent. Save in semi-independent Poland, nationalist anti-regime feelings in Eastern Europe are as strong as ever. In addition to common grievances, various population elements harbor special resentments, such as those of peasants towards collectivization, workers towards Communist labor discipline, intellectuals and students towards enforced ideological conformity, believers towards anti-religious measures.

2. The scope and intensity of dissidence, however, varies widely from country to country. One of the most important distinctions in both peacetime and wartime resistance potential is whether or not the regime is viewed as representing the national rather than an alien interest. Except among certain of its own national minorities, the Soviet regime has succeeded in identifying itself among its own population as a legitimate national government. But Communist regimes in the Far East have made somewhat less progress in this respect, and those in Eastern Europe, again excepting Poland, have failed almost completely. In the divided countries, the existence of a functioning alternative government exercises some attraction which operates to increase dissidence, but this appears to be a major factor only in East Germany. Other variations in resistance potential arise from differences in national character, in historical traditions, in economic conditions, and in religious attitudes.

3. In the last few years most Bloc regimes have sought to reduce popular discontent and to narrow the rifts between the regimes and their peoples. The leashing of the Soviet secret police, the decollectivization of Polish agriculture, and efforts to improve living standards are cases in point. These policies have had some success. On the other hand, the very trend toward relaxation of controls and resulting confusion as to regime policies have given greater scope to overt manifestations of discontent. Sharp criticism arose, for example, among Moscow writers and Chinese intellectuals when the regimes experimented with a looser application of controls. In Hungary and Poland, inhibitions upon the use of police terror and serious splits within the Communist parties permitted dissidence to swell into active resistance, in Hungary on a mass scale. In reaction, the Bloc regimes have tightened their controls, and in Hungary after the bloody suppression of the revolt the regime reverted to harsh repression. The Bloc leaders have striven to insure party unity, to circumscribe the range of permissible criticism, and to provide various reminders of their physical power. As a result, organized active resistance is negligible in the Bloc at the present time.

Resistance Potential in Peacetime

4. During the next few years, conditions of life probably will not improve sufficiently to

reduce dissidence significantly in most countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This dissidence will probably continue to be expressed primarily in various forms of passive resistance — noncompliance with regime orders, economic malingering, other low-risk ways of expressing individual opposition. So long as the regimes do not revert to all-out repression, there is also likely to be some continuation of those forms of active resistance — strikes, demonstrations, open expressions of intellectual dissent — which have characterized the past few years. In particular, such manifestations are likely in parts of Eastern Europe. In Communist China, some disturbances by peasants and ethnic minorities are also likely.

5. Moreover, many Bloc regimes recognize that the cultivation of popular support and the eliciting of broader initiative would require not only economic betterment but some degree of liberalization of controls. However, they also recognize that such steps increase the difficulty of maintaining party unity and complete control over the populace. Thus they will probably accede to popular pressures only in those cases in which they regard it as relatively safe to do so. But any relaxation of controls will tend to give dissident elements opportunities to press their grievances in indirect ways.

6. Further, each regime's problems may be increased and complicated by developments elsewhere in the Bloc and influences from the Free World. The repercussions of the USSR's de-Stalinization campaign and the events in Hungary and Poland have agitated dissidents throughout the Bloc, in some cases to the point of stimulating various forms of resistance. Intra-Bloc variations in ideology and policy have contributed to dissatisfaction and ferment among intellectuals and students. As contacts with non-Bloc countries increase, unfavorable comparisons will arise. In consequence, campaigns against dissidence, while primarily concerned with its domestic sources, must also contend with unsettling influences from abroad.

7. The difficulties of dealing with dissidence, various forms of resistance, and foreign influences may lead to policy vacillations between "hard" and "soft" lines or to intra-party disputes. These developments might evoke greater resistance activity. This activity, however, would tend to be directed towards the elimination of specific grievances rather than to the overthrow of the existing regimes, since the latter course would seem highly unpromising unless there were a serious prior weakening of party and police.

8. For these reasons we regard major outbreaks of active resistance as unlikely, although these cannot be excluded in certain volatile situations in Eastern Europe. Sporadic local outbreaks will probably recur, but they will almost certainly be within the capabilities of security forces to repress. The regime's counter-weapons — primarily the monopoly of physical force (coupled with an evident willingness to use it) and a near-monopoly of means of communication — will remain formidable. In Poland the regime has shown less reliance on these weapons, but a primary safeguard against violent resistance is the widespread recognition, to which the Catholic Church lends important support, that it would provoke Soviet intervention. Here, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt and the absence of Western assistance have underlined the futility of violent resistance.

9. Emigré organizations of former Bloc nationals have, in general, lost effective contact with their homelands and are little known to Bloc populations. Virtually all of them have suffered from internal bickering, and many have been penetrated by Communist agents. Emigré groups do not significantly contribute to resistance potential, and with rare exceptions their leaders would not be welcomed to positions of power after liberation.

Resistance Potential in Event of General War

10. At the outset of a general war, patriotism would act to diminish sharply the resistance potential in most of the USSR and to some extent in Communist China, though in the latter case this would depend more on the nature of the conflict. In the Far Eastern satellites, any increase in resistance potential

probably would be only marginal. But in the satellite states of Eastern Europe, as well as in certain minority areas of the USSR and Communist China (e.g. the Baltic States, Georgia, Western Ukraine, Tibet), the outbreak of war would rekindle hopes of liberation and immediately increase the resistance potential. This potential probably would be highest in Poland, Hungary, and East Germany. We believe, however, that unless the tide of war ran sharply against the Bloc and its military and security forces were significantly weakened, resistance activities of a para-military nature could be prevented or at least confined to manageable proportions.

11. While we conclude that resistance activities probably would not be a major factor so long as the outcome of the main conflict remained dubious, resistance activity probably could be expected, especially in Eastern Europe, in the form of intelligence collection and transmission, aid to Western personnel in escape and evasion operations, and minor sabotage. The level of such activity would vary considerably, because of differences in resistance potential, and also as a result of the amount of outside assistance available and the location of battle lines.

12. Only conjectures can be made concerning the impact on resistance activity of the use of nuclear weapons. Much would depend on such factors as the extent and locale of the attacks, the types of weapons used, the damage caused, the extent to which regime controls were disrupted, etc. Among population groups suffering direct losses, survivors probably would first be stunned, then concentrate their energies exclusively on problems of personal survival. In areas sufficiently distant from attack to be largely unaffected, resistance might increase as dissident elements found that Communist controls had been weakened; on the other hand, they might conclude that nuclear weapons were so decisive that extensive resistance was irrelevant or unnecessary. Groups outside the attack area but sufficiently close to be caught in the resulting chaos would be subject to all these effects. It is possible that, in certain cases, attacks against selected targets might weaken the regime's anti-resistance capabilities more than they impaired resistance potential.

13. The question of responsibility for the initiation of general war probably would not substantially affect the will to resist the regimes in the Bloc countries. Nor would the nationality of attacking forces be likely, in the majority of cases, to have great bearing upon the cooperation offered by resistance elements. Exceptions would be cases in which long-standing national antipathies might conflict to an important degree with anti-regime feelings, e.g. (a) German forces in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the USSR; (b) Yugoslav, Greek, and Turkish forces in Bulgaria; (c) Greek, Italian, and Yugoslav forces in Albania; and (d) Japanese forces in North Korea and Communist China. On the other hand, in the divided countries anti-regime resistance might increase if military forces of the non-Communist government were used.

ANNEX K—USSR

PREAMBLE

1. Although dissatisfaction with various aspects of the Soviet system is widespread, the gulf between such dissidence and resistance, except among certain national minorities, is greater in the USSR than in any other Bloc state. Such dissidence as exists in the USSR does not necessarily indicate opposition to Communist ideology or the Soviet system. It is rather a manifestation of discontent over the neglect or denial by the regime of popular needs or desires. Since the death of Stalin, dissidence in the Soviet Union appears to have decreased, except in some of the recently annexed areas. There has been grumbling and criticism, particularly following the 20th CPSU Congress in early 1956. But, on the whole, most of this criticism is not "counter-revolutionary" nor does it seem to envisage the overthrow of the Soviet state. On the contrary, there has unquestionably developed during the past four decades a widespread identification with the Soviet national state and many of its institutional features and the people have come to identify the Soviet state with the Marxist-Leninist ideology which has shaped its character. Moreover, the successes of the USSR during and after World War II, and particularly the security reforms, economic improvements and technological achievements since 1953, have engendered a pride in the Soviet state and have almost certainly strengthened the loyalty of the population toward the regime, again excepting the recently acquired Western territories. Generally, Soviet citizens appear to feel that their lot has improved and is going to improve further. Therefore many of them, especially the hard-core followers of the Communist gospel, are probably quite willing to accept privations in the name of Soviet patriotism. Such are the premises for an examination of dissidence in the USSR. They do not rule out the existence of a resistance potential but they obviously put it on a level that differs considerably from that of the other Sino-Soviet Bloc countries.

BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE

2. The people of the USSR have had to endure extraordinary hardships for many years. Improvements in their standards of living and the relaxation of political terror since 1953 have served to decrease the intensity of dissidence and considerably whittled down, if not eliminated for the time being, actual resistance potential. Thus, while the improvement of living standards has lagged far behind the over-all rates of economic growth, there is evidence that the Kremlin now favors such improvement, mainly in order to increase labor productivity, to remove the stigma of poverty from Communism, and to generate more active support by Soviet citizens. Heavy industry, military requirements, and technological developments will continue to have priority but, barring unforeseen complications, the present regime's economic reforms and increased production will at least give the people the reassurance that something is being done for them. Many probably feel already that they are better off now than they have been for years. Discontent arising from economic causes is likely to diminish as consumer welfare improves over the next several years, although this effect will be partially offset if expectations which have been aroused by regime promises are disappointed and if familiarity with Western standards grows. However, the spectacular successes of Soviet science have almost certainly strengthened the allegiance of the people to the regime and are probably attributed by many to the Soviet system itself. Therefore it should not necessarily be assumed that closer contacts with the West would inevitably generate more dissatisfaction

among the Soviet rank and file, which may have come to believe that the eventual supremacy of the USSR is certain and that ultimately the Russian people will be better off than the peoples in the free world.

3. There remain, however, some causes of dissidence that may continue to create difficulties for the regime. One is the agricultural collectivization policy. Russian peasants remain overwhelmingly opposed to it, especially so the peasants in the newly acquired Western territories who have lived under Soviet rule only since 1944. Realizing this, the Kremlin has introduced reform measures that may pacify many peasants and at the same time raise their output. With the older generation dying out, the younger agricultural workers will probably not have as high a resistance potential, at least as long as the USSR remains generally successful in stabilizing and furthering its economic and political position. Another problem is thought control. The party, more powerful than ever, continues to control virtually every facet of human thought. Adherence or at least lip service to the Party-sanctioned theories, laws, methods, and esthetic positions is required eventually of all. The loosening of intellectual stringency during the past few years has relieved a certain amount of pressure, but the Party has made it quite clear, after the "thaw" set in, that it will not tolerate deviations. Intellectuals are no longer liquidated, however, they are "persuaded" to return to the rightful path. While most of them return to conformity, their public repentances appear extorted and they probably nourish their grievances in secret perhaps more intensely than before.

4. The most disgruntled elements are almost certainly the national minorities. The reintroduction of the policy of russification which began in the thirties has created ill will toward the Russians, especially since some of the minorities were incorporated into or annexed by the USSR against their wishes. Although some of the more blatant forms of russification have been abandoned by the post-Stalin regime, the basic policy has been retained. Russification now involves the spread of the Russian language and culture throughout the Soviet Union, praise of the Russian people as the leading nationality in the USSR, and the imposition of Russian administrators and officials in key posts throughout minority areas. Anti-Semitism, though not as rampant as in the years just before Stalin's death, is still widespread and the regime not only does little to combat it but by its attacks on Zionism actually encourages it. (For a more detailed discussion of the more important minority areas, see the appendixes on the Baltic, Ukraine and Caucasus.)

MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS

5. *Forced Labor and Exiles.* There may still be as many as 2,500,000 forced laborers — including both political and criminal elements — in prison camps and an indeterminate number of exiles who unquestionably constitute a group that harbors the strongest resistance potential. Although the number of political prisoners has been reduced and prison conditions ameliorated since 1953, the forced laborers still live under very harsh circumstances, and the exiles are denied many rights and opportunities accorded ordinary Soviet citizens. Resistance potential is inherent in these elements, as reflected in the Vorkuta and other labor camp strikes which, incidentally, were organized and led by the political prisoners. It is also possible that large numbers of the many millions of labor camp inmates who have been discharged have a strong hatred for a government that mistreated them and might swell the ranks of potential resisters.

6. *Peasants.* Dissidence among peasants has traditionally been strong and has focussed upon collectivization and the low living standards identified with it. These living standards have risen substantially since 1953 because of successive increases in the prices paid for compulsory state deliveries, but they generally remain below what the peasant thinks he could obtain from a free market. In addition, bureaucratic rigidities and frequent attempts to eliminate their private plots and personal livestock offend the peasants' sense of individuality and tend to alienate them

from the regime. Nevertheless, they have been relatively free from police terror in recent years, and while many peasants resent the anti-religious policy of the government, they probably care little about ideological preachings and thought control.

7. *Intellectuals.* The intelligentsia, in general, stands high in Soviet society in terms of income and prestige, and many of them, particularly among the bureaucrats and engineers, have a vested interest in the regime. Most scientists, moreover, seem to enjoy both official support and relative freedom of pursuit in their fields. The limited relaxation of controls following Stalin's denigration emboldened intellectuals in many less favored fields to protest against party controls, though usually by implication only. These protests revealed that virtually all prominent writers, artists, composers, and scholars would welcome more freedom of expression. Although the post-Stalin regime has somewhat relaxed the extremely stringent Stalinist conformism, it has basically maintained its doctrines, and merely enforces them with greater flexibility and leniency. Strictures on creative expression remain tight enough to cause widespread dissidence among the more sensitive intellectuals. However, the dissidence of Soviet intellectuals is not necessarily one of hostility against the Soviet system but is often directed against the methods and interpretations of the Communist gospel by the Soviet leaders.

8. *Students, Youth.* There has been evidence of student dissidence, and there were demonstrations in 1956 and 1957 by young people against the discipline and the drabness of Soviet life. These demonstrations were all the more striking as youth has for years been considered among the firmest supporters of the regime. Nevertheless, it appeared that as a result of a higher intellectual level achieved by improved Soviet education, of the atmosphere of relaxation following the death of Stalin, the 20th CPSU Congress, and the Hungarian revolution youth has turned a critical eye on the disparity between Communist theory and practice. But in spite of the fact that students at least are now better equipped to think for themselves and that the regime apparently allows for greater leniency in dealing with young deviationists, it would be incorrect to consider Soviet youth a generally disloyal group. Youths remain Soviet patriots even though their understanding of ideology may be superficial and their adherence to it perfunctory. The fact remains that they as yet know little outside the USSR and that their thinking is done through a filter of state-defined ideological premises. It is doubtful, therefore, that their dissidence constitutes a serious threat to the regime's future; it is much more likely to be directed towards gradual reform of the regime than its overthrow.

9. *National minorities,* constituting 45 percent of the Soviet population of 206,300,000,[1] have for many years provided centers of resistance to Soviet Communism. Though the degree of dissidence has varied sharply among minority groups, no other groups inside the USSR have fought so grimly against overwhelming odds. In the first postwar years, a reported 200,000 partisans in the Ukraine and probably 100,000 in Lithuania battled Soviet troops. The process of russification and sovietization was carried out with determination by Moscow; entire minorities were transplanted from home areas and, in the process, more or less destroyed as groups. By 1949, the back of the resistance was broken, and following the death of Stalin, a policy of appeasement was instituted. As will be seen in the appendices, the minorities which had been part of the Tsarist empire and thus become components of the USSR have calmed down and are not, at this time, believed to constitute a threat to the Moscow regime. However, the Western territories which were annexed during or after World War II, while forcibly pacified, still rank high in potential resistance groups.

10. *Industrial workers'* grievances stem mainly from low pay, strict discipline, and bureaucratic arbitrariness. Among the workers, the semi-skilled and unskilled ones, receiving

[1] Population estimate as of January 1, 1958, from "The 1958 Annual Estimates. Political and Demographic Composition of the Sino-Soviet Bloc," (SECRET), prepared by the Air Research Division, Library of Congress.

much lower pay and fewer privileges than the highly skilled, are probably the more disaffected element. However, their living standard has recently improved and there is now less emphasis on the harsh labor discipline that was once a chief factor of dissidence among workers during Stalin's rule. Generally, the resistance potential of this social group cannot be presumed to be high and, with further economic improvements as well as over-all successes of the regime, may further decrease.

11. *Armed Forces.* There is no evidence of serious dissidence in the Soviet armed forces. The permanent cadre of officers and noncommissioned officers (constituting about 20 percent of total strength) is composed of apparently reliable men who have been thoroughly indoctrinated; most of the officers are Communist Party members. There is some dissatisfaction among the conscripts, much of which stems from the normal soldier's customary causes of discontent — low pay, strict discipline, limited opportunities for social activities, etc. Further, the attitude of the conscripts reflects the various causes of discontent among the populace at large, but no anti-regime activities have developed. The increase of party control following the removal of Marshal Zhukov has undoubtedly irritated some elements of the military but not enough to produce serious dissidence. Whether harsh military discipline and the wide cleavage between the status of the officers and enlisted men, and again between the junior and senior officers, actually contributes to dissidence directed against the regime is doubtful. Although it may be true that soldiers do not like compulsory indoctrination, it is also true that at least some of it will sink into their consciousness and that they regard such exercises as an inevitable duty to their nation, of whose achievements they are proud. On the whole, it can be assumed that there is little if any resistance potential to be found in the Soviet armed forces.

INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE

12. Dissidence exists on nearly every level of Soviet society, extending from simple grumbling to the rejection of the regime and its ideology. It is believed, however, that the latter extreme occurs most often among people who have suffered at the hands of the regime by arrest, imprisonment, or persecution, or those whose close relatives and friends have suffered. The overwhelming majority of the people, particularly in the Russian component of the USSR, are complaining mainly about personal discomforts, which some, however, may well attribute to the faults of the system. Even before the Malenkov-Khrushchev innovations and reforms contributed to a general decline of dissidence, the regime had already established such pervasive authority that the people were forced to devote their energies to coping with existing conditions rather than taking steps to achieve an alternate solution. Although active resistance ceased by 1950, dissidence is still widespread. On the other hand, much of what appears to be passive resistance may be in large part nothing more than a demonstration of time-honored Russian indifference or apathy.

13. Dissidence in many areas of the USSR is not a factor of real significance, and the gulf between dissidence and resistance is far wider than elsewhere in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. In the first place, the Soviet population has experienced Communist rule for four decades and has, by and large, become accustomed to it. In the second place, this rule is exercised by compatriots, not by foreigners, and the grievances of Soviet peoples, particularly the Russians, are not reinforced by the emotional power of injured nationalism. Whether a crisis would change this attitude and create or stimulate a resistance potential, would depend on the type and duration of the crisis. In a war, the vast majority of the Soviet people could be expected to set aside their complaints and defend their homeland. If, as a result of a crisis, improvement of the living standard should decline, it is possible that, at least among some groups, minor types of dissidence could grow into more serious ones. In any event, opposition to the present regime or its methods does not imply a desire on the part of the people to reject all fundamental concepts on which the Soviet state is built.

TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953

14. Since the death of Stalin and the demise of Beria, a more relaxed political climate and a number of measures taken to alleviate the most serious causes of dissidence have contributed to a decrease in dissidence, particularly in the prewar territories of the USSR but perhaps even, to some degree, in the newly annexed territories. Among these measures were efforts to raise the living standards, the easing of arbitrary police state methods, a gradual decrease of the labor camp population, somewhat more freedom of expression combined with a less fear-laden atmosphere, and, though in a very limited way, increased contact with countries outside the Bloc. The 20th CPSU Congress constituted the climax of these developments and made all previous relaxation moves by the Kremlin leaders official.

15. However, some of the new methods proved to be counter-productive inasmuch as they stimulated questioning by Soviet citizens, who began to express their doubts about the workings of the Soviet system and its tactics. The events in Poland and Hungary caused considerable interest and questioning, particularly among the intelligentsia. These events among others hastened a certain retrenchment by the regime, of which the theoretical bases were announced in the middle of 1956. Mao's "hundred flowers" doctrine, too, led to retrenchment in China, which must have been added evidence that, whatever the nature of their questioning and doubts, expression of dissent and dissidence would meet with regime counteraction.

16. Whether dissidence in the USSR will increase or decrease in the future is hard to predict. Continued improvements in living standards and further gains in Soviet prestige through technological or diplomatic successes will tend to diminish it, particularly among the majority which is largely unconcerned with ideological issues or abstract considerations of freedom. Students and intellectuals, whose ranks are growing, pose a greater problem, since many of their questionings are more fundamental. The regime, while ready to retrench from its more liberal policies when dissidence finds mounting expression, apparently still desires to refrain from total repression in this area lest it stifle the "positive" initiative which it is seeking to encourage. Thus an opportunity has appeared for dissidence to grow so long as it remains quiescent and does not seem likely, in the regime's view, to assume active forms. If the current stabilization program should succeed, dissidence may peter out even in the new Western territories. If not, the security apparatus of the Soviet regime could easily keep such dissidence from growing into resistance.

RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE

17. Active and organized resistance was a serious problem during and just after World War II. Thereafter, severe Stalinist repression prevented any active resistance of significance. Stalin's death gave new impetus to resistance as demonstrated by large-scale unrest in some Siberian prison camps. Again, some active resistance erupted in 1956, such as riots in Tbilisi, strike and work stoppages in Moscow's Kaganovich Ball-Bearing Plant, and nationalist demonstrations in Vilnyus and Kaunas in Lithuania. These outbreaks were spontaneous and not necessarily subversive. Otherwise, no organized resistance groups are believed to exist in the USSR, with the possible exception of such religious sects as the Jehovah's Witnesses, the Monashi, and others. The Witnesses have been most active in the western Ukraine and in Moldavia. The sect was accused of taking orders from its parent organization in Brooklyn, of preaching that the United States is a democratic country, of encouraging pacifism among draft-age youth, and having advised its members during the Hungarian revolution to fight against the Soviet government. The group apparently was able to survive as a tight-knit organization for several years because of the total dedication of its members but its continued existence as an organization is questionable.

18. Whatever resistance still exists in the USSR is almost certainly unorganized and passive. Much evidence of unorganized resistance to specific policies or ideological tenets has come to light during the past two years. It often has taken the form of public

criticism of policies or concepts, mostly as criticism of less basic matters; attempts by writers, artists, and scholars to break through official controls; insubordination toward official discipline, from refusal to attend propaganda lectures to hooliganism and crime; and nationalistic grumbling by minorities. Unorganized resistance is most likely to occur in intellectual and student circles and has as its object the greater liberalization of the Soviet regime toward individual freedom.

19. Unorganized resistance is hard to evaluate because it depends on the motivation of the person who performs a particular act. Much of what might be considered resistance probably consists of individual criminal acts, such as looting, robbing, and murder. The murder or beating up of police informants, tax collectors, and administrative officials may perhaps be unorganized resistance but it may also be an act of vengeance of an individual in reponse to a particular situation and not really pertinent to the question of unorganized resistance. Reports of acts of violence in the Soviet Union should be regarded cautiously before being considered indicative of unorganized resistance. Since the death of Stalin, the population of the labor camps has been tremendously reduced and various amnesties, beginning with that of April 1953, released a large number of habitual criminals. That individuals of this sort turn to violence when released can be explained in too many other ways for their actions to be considered indicative of resistance potential.

ROLE OF EMIGRÉS

20. Anti-Soviet emigrés seem to have played a negligible role in directing or even inspiring recent resistance activity within the Soviet Union. The regime seems to have succeeded in isolating potential leaders of resistance from foreign contacts. Most Soviet citizens seem to have little knowledge of emigré activities. Even if the Soviet public were better informed concerning emigrés, it is doubtful that the latter could gain substantial support inside the Soviet Union. The feeling is widespread that emigrés have lost touch with Soviet reality and no longer understand the real problems facing the Soviet citizenry. Many, in addition, would resent what they consider the emigrés flight to luxurious living while their compatriots at home languished in poverty. Some minorities, particularly the Baltic peoples, may have more sympathy for their emigrés than the Russians do.

REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE

21. The regime seeks to inhibit dissidence by a vast propaganda campaign designed to popularize the Communist Party and the Soviet system and to discredit all Western countries in the eyes of the populace. The regime also maintains an ubiquitous secret police organization under the control of the Committee of State Security (KGB) of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, for the purpose of maintaining complete surveillance over the population and ferreting out any individuals or organizations exhibiting actual or potential anti-regime tendencies. An estimated 400,000 militarized security forces (most of them Border and Interior Troops) are kept in constant readiness to quell summarily any anti-regime uprisings. Punitive measures, including mass deportation and forced labor in remote areas of the USSR, serve both to remove active resistance elements and to discourage further resistance activity. Such measures have been applied with special force in the Baltic States, the western Ukraine, and the Caucasus. The effectiveness of the government's actions is reflected in the apparent stability of the regime. While the present trend in the Soviet Union appears to be toward a less stringent application of security controls than during the Stalin era, there is every indication that the security apparatus itself has lost none of its effectiveness.

CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS REVOLT

22. The regime has shown its ability to control local and sporadic disturbances. In the event of a revolt in a national minority area, Soviet military units in the area, which usually consist of cross sections of many Soviet nationalities, would hardly be vulnerable, as were the Hungarian and Polish forces, to any

nationalist appeal. In case of a simultaneous or rapidly spreading revolt in several heavily populated areas, the Soviet regime, due to its formidable security apparatus, would appear to be in a better position to defend itself than any other government in the world, unless it were dangerously weakened. While even then it cannot be predicted that the entire Soviet control system would collapse, it is possible that the effectiveness of the security apparatus would be greatly weakened.

MODIFICATION OF SECURITY APPARATUS

23. The Soviet security apparatus has undergone some modification since the death of Stalin in 1953. That year the Ministry of State Security (MGB) was absorbed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and in 1954 the Committee of State Security (KGB) of the Council of Ministers was formed, although without some functions formerly held by the MGB. The MVD which inherited some of the regulatory apparatus from the MGB, including the militia (civil police) and the security troops, lost some of its functions, and control over local operations of some of its remaining functions was decentralized. While the ostensible purpose of these modifications was to restore "socialist legality" to the police system and to increase the responsibility of local governments for law and order, Moscow is in a position to assert its direct control over all security and law enforcement agencies.

24. Modifications in the apparatus have been primarily undertaken with two aims in view: First, to deny to any given individual in the Soviet hierarchy total control over the organs of the secret police and to circumscribe to some degree their power in society. The second concern has been primarily one of allowing Soviet citizens to relax as a whole and to eliminate those secret police functions that seemed ineffective in their coercive aspects for the efficient operation of Soviet society. There has been no indication of a greater hesitation in undertaking investigation of significant causes of subversion and treason. The size of the security police apparatus was reduced significantly after Stalin's death, but in the summer of 1957 these forces were increased. Available information does not indicate whether the reductions of 1953–1954 period exceeded the increase of the summer of 1957.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE

25. Present capabilities for organized resistance are virtually nonexistent. Even somewhat liberalized security controls are probably more than adequate to stamp out any incipient organized attempt to resist. Unorganized resistance, chiefly passive, is likely to diminish as the USSR becomes militarily and economically stronger. With the exception of some national minorities, the maximum that can be expected from the overwhelming majority of the Soviet people, and particularly the Russians, is dissidence of a type that is not necessarily directed against the system as such. On the other hand, in a monolithic state, opposition to a part of the system can be regarded as tantamount to opposition to the system as a whole; the Soviet leaders almost certainly so consider it. A steady improvement in the living standard would almost certainly reduce an important source of dissidence, but not that of intellectuals and students, for example. A deterioration in living conditions would add to other sources of dissidence and raise resistance potential in time of crisis.

26. The relation between the level of dissidence and a change in the degree of East-West tensions is difficult to predict. Major developments in international relations will certainly affect the level of dissidence, but whether it will increase or decrease depends on the specifics of any given case. Tensions attributable to Soviet foreign policy may well raise the level of dissidence while tensions resulting from moves generally considered to be Western provocation may lower the level of dissidence. A reduction in tension may reduce the amount of dissidence or at least deepen the apathy of national minority groups, but on the other hand it is likely to stimulate further dissidence from intellectuals and artists and in other of the elite levels of Soviet society by turning their attention from external dangers to internal problems.

27. Whatever doubts in the regime and its ideology might have been aroused by the de-Stalinization campaign and the ensuing ideological controversy, the loyalty of the people to the Soviet state was not shaken. Furthermore, some of the doubts now existing may be assuaged as the regime continues its stabilization drive. In any case, independent thinking and a more objective approach to Marxism-Leninism could not be expected to strengthen resistance potential to the degree that it would endanger the Soviet state. The regime, while fostering a "creative," i.e., non-dogmatic, approach to these problems, will attempt to keep the arguments within a regime-approved framework and to restrict the scope and nature of the changes sought. The regime, however, will not hesitate to revert to harsher, oppressive measures to keep the people in line if it appears necessary.

28. Certain kinds of external support, notably those stimulating active, violent, and futile resistance to the Communist regime, would almost certainly be counter-productive in respect to nearly all dissident elements in the Soviet Union. However, support designed to serve more modest aims, such as continued liberalization, would be welcomed by disaffected individuals and groups. The acceptability and success of external support depend on many factors such as the kind of support, identity and source of support, the safety of the recipient, the nature of "resistance" asked for, the kind of reward involved, etc. General expressions of encouragement designed for the peaceful evolution of the system as are possible for radio broadcasts, may also be welcome to some elements of the population, but be taken by other, more militant dissidents as abandonment by the West.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR

29. Anti-Communist or anti-regime resistance in the USSR in wartime would depend largely on the length, severity, and location of the war and on the course of its military operations. The mere initiation of hostilities would not *ipso facto* increase the resistance potential. It is almost certain that the regime's appeal to Soviet patriotism would not fall on deaf ears and that most of the Soviet peoples, with the exception of some national minorities, would work and fight for the defense of their homeland. Moreover, security control would undoubtedly be stepped up and dissidents would find it more difficult to organize and more dangerous to state their views than in peacetime.

30. If the war were prolonged and the USSR suffered major reverses, resistance potential would probably increase. In view of Soviet behavior during World War II and considering the fact that since then the USSR has become far stronger and has acquired much more prestige, it cannot be assumed that popular suffering from great hardships, tensions, and tighter controls would in itself catalyze dissidence into resistance. Only if war damage were sufficient to cause a breakdown of central authority would organized resistance develop. Short of this contingency, even if the regime were weakened, anti-regime resistance would still be regarded as treason and enough security controls would remain to render organization or resistance very difficult.

31. Active resistance would become much more likely if the tide of the war turned definitely against the USSR and foreign troops entered the USSR. Until that point, many anti-Soviet elements would be afraid to act, remembering the severe penalties imposed on collaborators with the Germans after World War II. Particularly in minority areas along the border, extensive anti-Soviet activity could be expected as anti-Soviet forces approached. Many natives inspired with the vision of liberation would take to the woods and form partisan bands, as they did during and after World War II, raiding supply lines, performing acts of sabotage, providing intelligence and helping in escape and evasion operations. Some groups in other parts of the USSR would be willing to offer assistance if communication could be established with them. For example, forced labor camps and colonies, representing as they do concentrations of anti-Soviet elements, might be able to create disturbances in the hinterland. Many exiled Germans, North Caucasians, Crimean Tatars, and Balts in Central Asia, the Altai territory, and Siberia probably would be willing intelligence collec-

tors. However, it would be difficult to organize active resistance in areas still under Soviet control. Even if hard pressed on military fronts, the Soviet leaders would make a determined, and probably successful, effort to maintain control in the hinterland to prevent resistance elements from becoming active behind their lines.

32. In the event of an impending collapse of the Soviet government, anti-Soviet elements of the population, together with forced labor camp inmates and forced exiles, could attain significant resistance capabilities, particularly with external support. But apart from these elements, resistance among the broad masses of the Great Russian people would be difficult to organize. Patriotism, indoctrinated respect for Soviet authority, and apathy probably would render them passive and disinclined to active opposition. Therefore, even if the security apparatus were seriously weakened, little resistance activity could be expected from the mass of the Great Russian population beyond local harassing operations and defections. Similarly, the most common reaction to a foreign occupation of Soviet territory probably would be passivity and suspicion. Memories of the last war are still fresh and the people have not forgotten the brutality of the German occupation, as well as the subsequent Soviet revenge for collaboration. Since Soviet propaganda would try to equate the activities of the invaders with those of the Germans in the last war, occupation policies would be crucial in determining the attitude of the masses.

33. A limited amount of information on nuclear weapons effects has been released to the Soviet public since 1954, but the campaign appears to have minimized the effects of atomic warfare. This effort has been accompanied by propaganda, probably to arouse patriotism, picturing a nuclear war purely as a measure in defense of the homeland and reassuring the people of Soviet victory in such a conflict. Although popular reaction to atomic attack is extremely difficult to estimate, such a familiarization program may have the effect of leaving the populace so unprepared for the actual destruction and dislocation that survivors would be demoralized and that patriotic fervor might be overwhelmed.

34. A nuclear attack on any scale is unlikely immediately to either increase or decrease resistance activities among the survivors to any appreciable extent. However, within a short period of time the extreme hardships brought about by even a small nuclear attack would tend to create actions of desperate elements which, whether intended or not, would have the effect of resistance. At the same time inevitable disruption of the control structure resulting from such an attack would reduce the regime's capability to deal with such elements. If a limited nuclear attack were planned and executed so as to reduce Soviet administrative, political and military control but to minimize general population casualties in national minority areas, such as the Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian SSR's, the Georgian SSR, and to a lesser extent the Ukraine, it is probable that resistance activities in these areas would become greatly intensified, particularly if they received external support.

35. Such resistance potential as does exist would probably not be affected by the question of which side started the war. It can be taken for granted that the Soviet government would do all it could to shift the blame to the free world in general and the United States in particular. It may be assumed that potential resisters as well as many dissidents would anticipate such propaganda and not pay too much attention to it. The population as a whole, even if impressed with Soviet arguments at the beginning of the war, would in the long run be influenced by the trend of the war rather than by the question as to who attacked whom first. Also, the nationality of the attacking forces would probably have little effect on long-range popular attitudes, except that popular opposition to the invaders would almost certainly be much stronger against Germans than other nationalities.

APPENDIX A

ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE BALTIC REPUBLICS

BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE

1. All the factors which engender dissidence in the USSR are present in the Baltic republics — collectivised agriculture, low standards of living, pronounced income inequalities, state control of thought and expression, and fresh memories and continuing fear of police terror. These alienating factors are intensified manyfold, however, by the national consciousness and historic experience of the Baltic peoples.[1] Resistance potential is probably nowhere higher in the Soviet Union than in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

2. The most important single factor in Baltic opposition to Soviet rule is the experience of national independence between the world wars. The bitter memory of forced Soviet annexation is intensified by the brutality of Soviet rule, which brought the exile or liquidation of hundreds of thousands of natives, by the radical depression of living standards, and by the imposition of the rule and immigration of the traditionally hated and feared Russians. Thus, anti-Soviet and anti-Russian sentiments pervade all Baltic social strata and groups. Outright Communist sympathisers comprise only a minute fraction of the native population. Many native Communist Party leaders lived in the USSR when the Baltic states were independent and returned only upon Soviet annexation of their native countries; Balts in general look on them as renegades.

3. The near unanimity of anti-Soviet feelings among native Balts is to a certain degree offset by the greater political reliability of ethnic Russians brought into the area since World War II. The estimated proportion of the non-indigenous population of Russians in the Baltic republics ranges from a high of 40 percent in Latvia to a low of 20 percent in Lithuania. Since the position of Russians in these countries is dependent entirely on Soviet rule, they have a strong vested interest in maintaining the present regime.

4. Despite the intensity of anti-Soviet feeling among most Balts, Soviet security measures at present prevent any resistance greater than individual or small-group passive resistance and an occasional mass demonstration. Only a radical alteration of the present situation, such as war, a sharp relaxation of security controls, or a breakdown of the Soviet system itself would seem to make possible organised resistance on a large scale.

5. The de-Stalinization campaign and the partial liberalization of the Soviet system since Stalin's death (both of which were more limited in the Baltic republics than in most other areas of the USSR) brought some hope to Balts, expressed mainly in the form of rumors during the spring of 1956 that the Soviet leadership might restore the Baltic republics to autonomous, although satellite, status. The events in Poland and Hungary in the autumn of 1956 encouraged a few nationalist demonstrations in Lithuania and open anti-Soviet talk elsewhere. The regime easily curtailed such public manifestations of nationalism, however.

RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE

6. Reports in 1952 and 1953 indicated the possibility of small groups of organised resistance in Lithuania. However, as in northwestern Latvia, the few remaining groups were be-

[1] Although in a strict ethnic sense the terms "Baltic" and "Balt" should be applied only to Latvians and Lithuanians, Estonians being of Finnish stock, the term is used in this paper to apply to all three, for convenience and on geographic grounds.

ing successfully penetrated by MVD provocateurs. It is doubtful if any unpenetrated group existed after 1954. As a result, there are no known organized resistance groups in the Baltic area at this time. While there is reason to believe that some former resistance group members may still live in the forests of southeastern Lithuania, there is no recent evidence to indicate that an organization as such exists. Acts of sabotage that occasionally occurred up until 1953 appear to have been the work of isolated persons.

7. The immediate objectives of any remaining groups in the Baltic states probably would be personal and organizational survival. A secondary objective would be harassment of Soviet forces and collaborators. Their ultimate objective presumably would be the creation of a national state in which they could resume a normal life. There is no known organized anti-Communist infiltration of the armed forces, bureaucracy, or war industry. Nonviolent resistance in the Baltic republics, such as occurred during the Hungarian revolt, when there was what appeared to be a spontaneous expression of nationalism, was probably not the work of organized resistance groups.

8. The extent and nature of unorganized resistance is unknown but believed to be decreasing in over-all significance. Students appear to exhibit a potential for unorganized resistance. In all three republics student unrest in the universities has been expressed during 1956 and 1957 in demonstrations and in the distribution of leaflets. Party leaders have been criticized for neglecting student ideological education.

9. Dissidence and passive resistance also appear to exist, but there is not sufficient evidence to evaluate their extent and significance. Newspapers in the Baltic states criticize nonproduction in factories and kolkhoses and there is the usual amount of self-criticism in the papers. While these items indicate that the Soviet regime is not satisfied with conditions in the Baltic republics, only a part of the acts can be attributed to purposeful resistance. Passive resistance in the form of a slow-down of production cannot be increased perceptibly without incurring danger of deportation or other acts of reprisal and control.

10. Dissidence is widespread, but difficult to detect and to evaluate except when the stimulus of external events changes dissidence into action. During the Hungarian revolt in 1956 widespread unorganized resistance was shown in the overturning of a Stalin statue, in demonstrations demanding withdrawal of Red Army troops, in staging of parades, and in singing the national anthems, most noticeably in Lithuania, but reportedly in Estonia and Latvia also. From these actions dissidence appears to be widespread. The independence spirit is still alive in the Baltic states, but there is little opportunity to express it effectively. Expression of dissident feelings has been more successful in Lithuania than in Estonia and Latvia. Moreover, Soviet population transfers have reduced the number of ethnic Estonians to about 75 percent of the population, and ethnic Latvians to about 60 percent and Lithuanians to about 80 percent. Replacement population transferees cannot be expected to participate in resistance activities.

ROLE OF EMIGRÉS

11. Balts seem to know comparatively little about the activities of emigrés, and attempts to resist Soviet domination do not seem to be directly inspired by emigré activity. Many Balts, however, derive satisfaction and encouragement from the knowledge that emigré groups exist abroad, that many nations (including the United States) do not recognize the Soviet annexation of their countries, and that the Baltic states still have formal diplomatic representation in exile.

REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE

12. The regime brought the organized resistance of the Baltic states under control through the use of militarized security forces and Army troops. Suspect elements of the population were deported during the 1945–1950 period and later replaced by other ethnic groups, mainly Russian. Subsequent penetration of resistance groups by security organs along with the individual deportations, depleted the Baltic states of resistance leader-

ship, organization, and activity. Russification of government organizations has proved effective in keeping potential resistance in check. Unorganized resistance has been controlled in a similar manner. Passive resistance has been inhibited through threatened deportations, pardons to some deportees, and improvement in the standard of living. Feelings of dissidence are widespread but cannot be evaluated accurately because the populations have little opportunity to translate dissidence into action. Until recently, even mildly anti-Soviet statements were punished by arrest and long imprisonment. Even now, persons who show evidence of leading nationalistic activity are arrested — as were the leaders of the November 1956 demonstrations in Lithuania. Both because of the strategic position of the area and the known disaffection of the native population, security measures in the Baltic have been even more stringent than elsewhere in the USSR.

13. Milder methods are also employed by the regime to reduce dissidence and achieve ideological conformity. Party propaganda, agitation, and indoctrination are continual and virtually omnipresent. The regime offers enticing rewards in terms of power and advancement to Balts who collaborate with it, but the threat or exercise of repression remains the most important means of preventing active resistance in the Baltic republics.

CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS REVOLT

14. The individual Baltic republic governments can suppress any localized revolt at this time. Soviet troops and militarized security forces stationed in the Baltic republics are of ethnic origins other than the local republic in which they are stationed, and can be expected to cooperate in the suppression of any local revolt. It is therefore unlikely that a Hungarian-type uprising could take place in any of the Baltic states. The majority of Balts live in rural areas while most of the Russians and other non-Balts live in cities, although in Estonia one can find in nearly every kolkhoz some persons who are not Baltic. Russians and non-Balts form at least half the population of the Baltic capitals.

15. In both Estonia and Latvia revolts would be difficult because there is no contiguous land border with a foreign country that might supply help. Of all the Baltic countries, Lithuania has the best conditions for staging a spontaneous mass uprising of some duration. In addition to bordering on Poland, a foreign country with a volatile and Catholic population, the Lithuanians have a long history of independence and of fighting for their rights as they see them. Besides, the geography of southeastern Lithuania, particularly the forests and hills, provides a refuge from which partisans can operate.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE

16. There are no known organized resistance groups in the Baltic states. Local capabilities for resistance activities do not go beyond unorganized, mainly passive, resistance or — under the most favorable conditions — occasional demonstrations with nationalist overtones. More violent types of demonstrations, such as holding up Soviet supply vehicles, were reported through 1954 but not since. Such acts probably were the work of outlaw elements, most of whom could not be depended on at the present for specific action or for organized action in the future.

17. A marked increase in East-West tensions furnishing hope of liberation would probably encourage more determined attempts at active resistance. Such a development, however, would probably be accompanied by an intensification of security measures and terror which might neutralize most practical effects of the increased determination to resist. A decrease of East-West tensions would be likely to discourage any sort of active resistance and to increase fatalistic acquiescence to Soviet rule. If accompanied by a liberalization of security precautions and thought control, it might, however, facilitate the spread and development of nationalist sentiment.

18. While it is believed that there is no substantial organized resistance, either active or passive, it is conceivable that some very small isolated groups do exist, particularly in southeastern Lithuania. But it would be extremely

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difficult for them to expand. They have no contact with the West and have lost contact with friendly local populations through the deportation of identifiable sympathisers. Their survival efforts constantly require theft and other unlawful acts which increase the partisans' vulnerability and constantly increase their isolation from any possible sources of help, supply, or recruits. At the present time, resistance in new forms is virtually impossible because resistance groups or potential members must be supplied with funds and equipment and, most important, an effective communications system with each other and the West. The lack of communications prevents the identification and location of real or potential resistance members. Until an effective means of communication is established, resistance in the Baltic states will probably further decrease.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR

19. The outbreak of war between the Soviet Bloc and the West would undoubtedly increase resistance potential in the Baltic states. Contrary to the passionate desire for peace in almost every other portion of the Soviet Union, many Balts hope for an East-West war since they see in it their only hope for liberation. It cannot be assumed, however, that in any future war Baltic resistance could be as widespread and effective as it was when Germany attacked the USSR in 1941, at which time the Baltic states had been under Soviet rule less than a year and the Soviet armies had to beat a hasty retreat.

20. The possibilities for active Baltic resistance in any future war would depend largely on whether a fighting front were located in or near the area. If the front were remote, anti-Soviet Balts might be able to form small partisan bands in the forests to harass supply lines and perform acts of sabotage. Many Balts would be willing to assist evasion and escape operations, although the presence of non-Balts on collectivized farms would compound the difficulties of such assistance. Given an opportunity, many Balts would probably be willing to perform espionage. Soviet security measures, however, would probably be able to prevent large-scale organization or military and political warfare of more than nuisance value.

21. If an active front approached the area, on the other hand, more widespread resistance could be expected, though not approaching the Baltic performance in 1941. Under anti-Soviet occupation, native Balts would be unlikely to participate in pro-Soviet partisan activity and most would lend their hearty support to the liquidation of Russian partisans or pro-Soviet native elements in the area.

22. Baltic resistance potential in wartime would be little affected by such matters as the nationality of the attacking forces or which side initiated hostilities. Even German rule would be considered preferable to Soviet (the Nazi occupation of the area having been comparatively mild), although Balts might resist Soviet rule with somewhat greater determination if the attacking forces were non-German.

APPENDIX B

ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE CAUCASUS

BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE

1. Any evaluation of disaffection in the Caucasus must take into account the differing peoples of this area. While there are elements of discontent common to all the indigenous peoples of the area which unite them against the regime, there are also factors which set the Georgians, Armenians, and Azerbaidzhani peoples apart from each other. The Georgians and Armenians, for reasons of longer independent nationhood and a common religion (Christianity), feel superior to the Azerbaidzhani, a Moslem people. At the same time, the Georgians, because of a longer and more unbroken period of independence than the Armenians, feel superior to the latter, who harbor a latent distrust of their mountain neighbors.

2. The underlying basis for dissatisfaction and discontent in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaidzhan is to be found in an anti-Russian attitude on the part of the native populations. Such factors as non-Slavic lineage, distinct languages, acceptance of Christianity in the case of Georgia and Armenia antedating Russian acceptance by several centuries, and different cultural and historical heritages have imparted to the Georgians and Armenians, particularly the former, a sense of national distinctiveness which makes them look upon the Russians as interlopers and late-comers. The assistance rendered to the Georgian and Armenian nations during critical periods in their histories by the Tsarist regime has not eliminated this feeling. In the case of the Azerbaidzhani people, who prior to the Bolshevik Revolution had no real sense of nationhood, the anti-Russian bias stems from Russian colonization. This began in the eighteenth century, and reached its peak in the late 1800's with Russian exploitation of the oil resources around Baku. The ensuing development of the area meant a dislocation of native groups, a disruption of their traditional way of life, and an incipient second-class citizenship.

3. While difficult to document as to scope and intensity, anti-Russianism is demonstrated by the limited amount of social contact between minorities and Russians. Certain areas of large Caucasian cities appear to be separated into Slavic and non-Slavic sections. Intermarriage does not appear to be too common and is frequently frowned on. A more immediate source for disaffection is Soviet Communism in practice — material hardships, low living standards, the collective farm system, the antireligious nature of the regime, thought control, and the stifling of nationalism — all of which also engender discontent in other parts of the Soviet Union.

4. Apart from the Party and government elite, discontent would appear to extend to all strata of the population in varying degrees. The politically more mature Georgians have been most vocal in expressing dissidence in the post-Stalin period, followed by the Armenians and the Azerbaidzhani in that order. Among the Georgians, students and intellectuals are the most noteworthy dissident elements. In Armenia, the most disaffected group appears to be the Armenians who returned to Soviet Armenia in the early post-World War II period. Estimates of the numbers who returned range from 25,000 to 100,000. Their disaffection results mainly from very poor economic conditions and the fact that they are not completely accepted by the local population.

5. Discontent, though widespread, does not appear to be intense enough to translate itself into resistance activity, particularly on

an organized basis. Furthermore, the postwar history of dissidence in the Caucasus suggests that while there has been some resistance, it has been on an unorganized basis and without particular goals in mind. A new pattern of dissidence as a result of the post-Stalin policies of the regime is not discernible. The relaxation of stringent police controls has been welcomed. People express their doubts and criticisms of the regime more openly now. Such events as the de-Stalinization campaign, the Polish-Hungarian events, and the Soviet leadership ousters of June 1957 have caused confusion and doubt about the present policies of the regime. There are, however, no signs of increased dissidence or resistance. The population is aware that the regime is willing and able to eradicate any evidence of resistance.

RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE

6. A few small organized resistance groups are believed to exist in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaidzhan. There is no available information on their strength, discipline, training, facilities, or equipment. Furthermore, there is no means of communication with these alleged resistance groups. Such groups would almost certainly be nationalistic in motivation. They would operate within the boundaries of their own national republics in most cases.

7. Unorganized active resistance to some degree by the people of the Georgian and Azerbaidzhan SSR's has been reported. The most serious known disturbance occurred in Tbilisi in March 1956 when student meetings to mark the anniversary of Stalin's death grew into nationalistic demonstrations as a result of the regime's refusal to permit honors to Stalin. The demonstrations were eventually put down by force, with casualties estimated by various sources at from dozens to 500. Apart from this incident, it is often difficult to differentiate other reports of unorganized active resistance from criminal, speculative and blackmarket activities. Available evidence indicates a great deal of dissatisfaction with the Moscow regime. Intellectual dissidence also has been shown in many Caucasian literary publications which have been severely criticized during the last year for nationalistic deviations. Certain examples of this literature reflect a tone of criticism even stronger than that which has been directed against the regime by Russian writers.

ROLE OF EMIGRÉS

8. Although emigré groups have claimed contact with resistance organizations inside Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaidzhan, such claims have not been substantiated in the post-Stalin era. There was a contact between an internal Georgian opposition element and the Georgian government-in-exile, but this has not been maintained in recent years. No other external sources appear to have influenced any of the internal resistance groups since World War II.

REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE

9. In the past the Soviet government has dispersed from the Caucasus entire ethnic populations which it believed to be disloyal. Many persons have been executed or given sentences in labor camps in Siberia or Central Asia. Moreover, the Soviet Union has a very effective internal security organization, with informers in all walks of life and all ethnic groups. These measures have been very effective in controlling active resistance. It is improbable that any national minority resistance group of significant size could exist without coming to the attention of the Soviet security service. It follows that any major uprising or riot must be essentially spontaneous in origin, because any organization large enough, with good communications, to foment such an event would have been penetrated and neutralized before the event could take place. Since the death of Stalin, the technique of dispersion of people has not been employed and it is possible that the informant system has been relaxed somewhat, but either of these methods could be revitalized at any moment.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE

10. Even under present conditions of somewhat relaxed police controls, the Soviet security system is more than adequate to prevent

or stamp out any organized resistance activity in the Caucasus. While individual, unorganized resistance might be encouraged by the regime's relaxation of the rigid police terror of the Stalin era, any indication that such acts were becoming common or organized would be enough to bring about increased security controls to prevent the formation of organized resistance. The factor most likely to affect resistance potential would appear to be a breakdown of the police and security control system. Short of this, or of a fundamental change in the leadership of the Soviet Union, such events as an increase or decrease in East-West tensions or ideological disputes within the "socialist camp" would have little effect on resistance activity. Any deterioration in the economic condition of the population would lead to increased discontent, but the regime could easily prevent any organized opposition to regime policies. Signs of external support in any form to resistance groups in the Caucasus would bring the sharpest reaction and punitive measures against such groups.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR

11. The opportunity for anti-regime resistance under conditions of actual warfare would depend considerably on the type and location of war being fought. The outbreak of hostilities would bring extraordinary security precautions into play on the part of the state. As long as the theater of operations remained outside the Caucasus, the likelihood of increased resistance operations would remain small because of the increased security measures. While some resistance groups might become active, most likely in Georgia, as soon as hostilities broke out, the vast majority of the Caucasian population would probably adopt a "wait-and-see" attitude. If the tide of battle turned conclusively against the Soviet regime, the potential for organized resistance on an expanded basis would increase accordingly. Otherwise, the memory of Soviet punishment of World War II collaborators would militate against large-scale organized resistance movements.

12. The optimum conditions for organized resistance would, of course, occur if the Caucasus became a theater of war or if the collapse of central authority were imminent. If either should occur, resistance activities would probably range from disobedience of Soviet laws to assistance to enemy forces in providing intelligence information, harassment of Soviet security and armed forces, and help in escape and evasion operations. Independent military activity against Soviet forces probably would be beyond the capacity of resistance groups, unless large-scale units defected along with equipment and material. Such military action would depend on direct outside support. Moreover, the troops of this area are ethnic non-Caucasians.

13. With the exception of the Germans who might encounter hostility because of their World War II policies, only the Turks might arouse Armenian antagonism; the Armenian massacres in the late 1890's and during World War I are not yet forgotten. The question of the responsibility for the instigation of hostilities would have little effect on resistance activities. However, the occupation policies of the invading forces would have a strong impact on the local populations as far as their willingness to engage in resistance activities would be concerned. The Soviet postwar propaganda campaign depicting the horrors of German occupation in other parts of the country was designed in part to overcome any latent sympathy in such areas as the Caucasus for future "liberating" forces.

APPENDIX C

ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE UKRAINE

BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE

1. Ukrainian nationalism continues to be an important political problem with which the Soviet regime must reckon. The Ukrainians are the largest minority group in the USSR. The political, economic and strategic importance of the Ukraine is second only to the RSFSR. The best evidence of Soviet concern over Ukrainian nationalism and its counterpart, anti-Russian sentiment, is found in recurring appeals to root out "bourgeois nationalism."

2. The economic and political grievances common throughout the Soviet Union are at the core of opposition in the Ukraine to Soviet rule. Soviet sponsorship of the liquidation of the rich peasant and of the collective farm is probably resented more there than in some other parts of the Soviet Union since the Ukraine had a fairly large proportion of prosperous peasants. These various grievances, shared with other Soviet peoples, count far more in explaining existing dissidence in the Ukraine than Soviet suppression of Ukrainian nationalist aspirations. Opposition to the regime there is first anti-Communist, and only second anti-Russian.

3. Ukrainian reaction to the russification efforts of the Soviet regime remains, however, considerable. Ukrainians, whether Party members or not, remember with bitterness Stalin's purge of leading Ukrainian Communists who stood up for Ukrainian cultural autonomy in the 1930's and resent the continuation of the calculated policy of staffing a good portion of leading Party and government positions in the Ukraine with Russians. Stalin's glorification of Russian heroes and the continued identification of Russian history with the Soviet state hurt Ukrainian pride. While religious attitudes may be of diminishing importance in the Ukraine as elsewhere in the USSR, the liquidation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church in 1930 and of the Uniate Church in the newly acquired western Ukraine after the war is a further cause for resentment.

INTENSITY AND CHARACTER OF DISSIDENCE

4. Ukrainian nationalist tensions, although a continuing nuisance for the Soviet administration, do not now represent any serious threat to the regime. The nationalist resistance organizations active in the years immediately following World War II are now largely, if not completely, quiescent. Only in the event of a disintegration of Soviet central controls might Ukrainian nationalism rise to the surface and serve as a focus for an anti-Soviet resistance movement.

5. The intensity of Ukrainian nationalist feeling is difficult to measure. A great many Ukrainians, probably the majority, are loyal members of Soviet society, particularly now that living standards are gradually rising and police controls have been slightly relaxed. Russification has probably gone further in the eastern Ukraine than in any other of the non-Russian lands and has been much more successful in industrial cities, which now contain large numbers of Great Russians, than in towns and villages. Russians and Ukrainians have mingled together there for hundreds of years and the educated members of society know both languages equally well. Nationalistic sentiments increase as one moves westward in the Ukraine away from the Russian lands. Opposition to Soviet rule is believed to be most intense in the territories absorbed during World War II along the Soviet Union's

western borders, where memories of Sovietization are freshest. Resentment of the Russians is not confined here to Ukrainians alone, but is shared by such other minority groups in the area as Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, and Rumanians.

RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE

6. Armed resistance to the Soviet regime after World War II was most intense in these western territories, particularly in the Carpathian mountains. Ukrainian nationalist organizations active in German-occupied Europe during the war mounted guerrilla operations there against Soviet units, communications lines, and collective farms in 1946 and 1947. The Soviet authorities had crushed these organizations by the late 1940's, but reports received from Soviet defectors as late as 1956 indicating that the Banderovtsy (followers of the Ukrainian nationalist Stefan Bandera), are still active, remain unconfirmed. Most likely there is no nationalist resistance movement of any significance in the Ukraine at this time, but the reports suggest that continued popular *belief* in the existence of these organizations may be widespread. Although there has been no evidence of an upsurge of resistance activities since the death of Stalin, such activities seem to have been implied in radio and press appeals, as late as 1956, that partisans in the Volynskaya Oblast surrender voluntarily and receive pardons for their past actions.

7. Unorganized resistance in the Ukraine exists primarily in the western oblasts and is conducted mainly by intellectuals. It is passive in nature and is manifested in resisting russification, e.g., by advocating the use of Ukrainian national feeling in literature. Recent attacks on Ukrainian writers as being national deviationists tend to confirm these trends.

8. Since the suppression of nationalist aspirations and resistance movements during the Stalin regime, there is now no evidence to indicate any nationalist movement. Since the death of Stalin, the Soviets have treated the issue of nationalism cautiously in the Ukraine. Some attempts to conciliate national feeling can be found in their liberation of former partisans from labor camps, the rehabilitation of former Ukrainian Communist writers suspected of nationalistic tendencies, and the disappearance of some Party and KGB officials who had been engaged in the suppression of resistance. The celebration of the 300th anniversary of the Union of the Ukraine with Russia was officially observed with considerable deference paid to the loyalty and heroism of the Ukrainian peoples.

ROLE OF EMIGRÉS

9. Emigré groups have been of no material assistance to resistance groups in the Ukraine. The little contact that did exist with persons in the Ukraine has been broken by capture and/or liquidation of the Ukrainian individuals involved. The contact between groups in the Ukraine and emigré groups tends to become unilateral; escapees augment the emigré colony and intensify anti-Soviet feeling in the non-Bloc countries, but there has been no significant reverse flow or intensification of anti-regime feeling in the Ukraine. However, the mere existence of an active emigré group may tend to buoy the hopes of those people inside the Ukraine who are bitterly opposed to the Soviet regime. Concern expressed by the Soviets in this matter is reflected in Soviet intelligence activities against Ukraine emigré groups and the propaganda attacks in the Soviet press and radio attempting to belittle and thereby diminish any potential effectiveness of these groups.

CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS REVOLT

10. Any revolt in the Ukraine could be easily suppressed by the Soviet regime at the present time. The existence of satellite regimes on the western borders of the Ukraine has increasingly tended to isolate this earlier hotbed of resistance, both materially and morally. The ruthless suppression of the Hungarian revolt has served as an illuminating example of what would happen to a revolt that is not materially aided by the West. The existence of large numbers of border troops along the entire western border of the USSR provides

immediate forces to counter any revolt. In addition, Soviet army divisions stationed throughout the Ukraine can aid in suppression of revolts. Zakarpatskaya Oblast appears to offer the best terrain for possible resistance, but its isolation from the remainder of the Ukraine would probably localize any revolt.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE

11. As long as Soviet police and security controls remain relatively intact, there appears to be no prospect for a resumption of active resistance in the Ukraine. Barring an internal upheaval, these controls are likely to remain in force for the foreseeable future. Since the suppression of the Hungarian revolt, there is reportedly little sympathy for a violent form of resistance. Instead, sophisticated Ukrainian nationalists engage in a subtle form of resistance by staying within the bounds of the law and officially approved behavior. This type of resistance is directed against further russification and has as its objective the maintenance and fostering of a Ukrainian national feeling. Apparently it is hoped that this nationalism can be kept alive and that it will serve as an ideological basis for a free Ukraine in the future. Meanwhile, through concessions gained by legal methods, life within the Ukraine, although under a Communist system, is becoming more tolerable, thus further decreasing resistance potential.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR

12. In the event of war, Ukrainians would probably not try to engage in large-scale resistance activities while Soviet military controls remained in force. They remember the tragic results of their resistance to the Soviet regime during World War II. They would be unlikely to commit themselves to resistance against the Soviet regime unless they were convinced the USSR would lose the war. In other words, Ukrainian dissidence could not be expected to serve a potential enemy of the USSR until the outcome of a war were largely determined. In fact, most Ukrainian soldiers would probably fight fiercely on the Russian side.

13. As long as security controls remained firm, an enemy could expect little or no help from the inside. If, however, the political structure should begin to crumble under the impact of a war, resistance could and might very well become active again. Pent-up opposition to the Soviet regime could quite naturally be channeled into demands for the dismemberment of the USSR. The Carpathian mountains on the border of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, where Soviet controls are less firmly established than elsewhere in the Ukraine, would provide a convenient base for launching resistance activities in the area. Such a move would almost certainly require foreign assistance.

14. The question as to who initiated the war probably would matter little, nor would the nationality of invading forces, with the exception of Germans, who almost certainly would be fiercely resented even as a part of an international force. Their presence on Ukrainian soil would seriously impair the development of anti-Communist resistance

15. While certain resistance activities such as intelligence collection or escape and evasion operations might be possible on a small scale, no large-scale underground movement in the Ukraine is likely to gain momentum until Soviet power had been shaken at its foundations.

Part A

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

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Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament

On 15 November 1945 the United States, Great Britain, and Canada issued a joint declaration calling the atomic bomb a "means of destruction hitherto unknown, against which there can be no adequate military defense." The elusive search for effective nuclear disarmament—or at least control—began.

American proposals, dating from the Baruch Plan of 14 June 1946 and continuing throughout the 1950s, called for strict international verification and control over nuclear technology, ending the production of atomic weapons, disposing of nuclear stockpiles, and surrendering all nuclear technology information to an international authority. Soviet counterproposals called for immediately and unconditionally banning the manufacture and use of atomic weapons, destroying existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and establishing a national (not international) system of verification.

These principles are the backdrop for the estimates in this section. From 1954 to the end of the decade the USSR stressed disarmament issues as part of its strategy of peaceful competition with the West. The documents in this section, which date from 1955 through 1958, cover the Soviet Union's reaction to its own and the West's growing nuclear capabilities, the possible deployment of US intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) around the periphery of the Soviet Union, and disarmament proposals. In general they concluded that the USSR would mount a vigorous propaganda campaign against the production and deployment of nuclear weapons.

The CIA's SNIE 11-6-58 of 24 June 1958, *The Soviet Attitude Toward Disarmament*, which attempted to summarize the Soviet position on this issue, faced an unusually acrimonious coordination process because the US Air Force held strong views on the subject. The final estimate stated that, even though the Soviet Union publicly advocated disarmament and arms control, it would retain a minimal deterrent force to meet its security needs. A disarmament agreement, the estimate concluded, would not prevent the USSR from enhancing its military capabilities.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, United States Air Force, dissented. His rewritten paragraph (which appears as footnote two in the estimate) presents a more alarmist view:

> Any agreements made by the Soviets in the field of disarmament will be entered into with the intention of improving their relative military strength and of furthering their drive toward world domination. In addition, any agreement will in no way lead them to lessen their efforts to achieve an overpowering nuclear delivery capability at the earliest possible time.

The Air Force's view of Soviet motivation notwithstanding, the estimate predicted that the USSR would show increasing interest in disarmament negotiations and did not discount the possibility of a sudden and dramatic unilateral Soviet proposal. Although the Soviets would be tough negotiators and would not give up more than they got, the drafters saw some hope for agreement in the future.

24. NIE 100-5-55, 14 June 1955, *Implications of Growing Nuclear Capabilities for the Communist Bloc and the Free World*



24. *(Continued)*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~~SECRET~~

IMPLICATIONS OF GROWING NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES FOR THE COMMUNIST BLOC AND THE FREE WORLD

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the effects of increasing nuclear capabilities on public attitudes and national policies in the Communist and non-Communist world (excluding the US).

ASSUMPTION

That no international agreement is reached to restrict or prohibit the production, testing, or use of nuclear weapons.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The most important effect in non-Communist countries of growing nuclear capabilities is to diminish the willingness of most governments and peoples to incur risks of war. A second effect is to increase public desire for a reduction of international tensions, and for the use of all possible means, even including those which the governments themselves may consider ill-advised, to work towards a settlement with the Communist powers. Finally, there is increased public pressure on governments to find some means of international disarmament, and especially some means of insuring that nuclear weapons will not be used in war. *(Para. 18)*

2. Evidence from the USSR indicates that the Soviet rulers are well aware of the nature and the power of nuclear weapons, which had generally been minimized publicly in Stalin's time. We believe that they are deeply concerned by the implication of these weapons. US nuclear capabilities almost certainly constitute a major deterrent to overt military aggression by the USSR. *(Paras. 13–14, 22)*

3. As nuclear capabilities further increase, and the possibilities of mutual devastation grow, the tendencies to caution and compromise presently discernible in non-Communist countries will probably be accentuated. Aversion to risks of war, pressures for disarmament, and fear of general war, will almost certainly be more marked than now. The difficulties of conducting policy against such adversaries as the Communist leaders will probably be increased, and the chances may become greater of a weakening of the non-Communist position by successive concessions. At the same time the Soviet leaders themselves, because of their recognition of the devastating effects of nuclear weapons, will still almost certainly be concerned not to

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pursue aggressive actions to the point of incurring substantial risk of general war. *(Para. 26)*

4. We believe that the allies of the US, and especially the major allies, will continue in the alliance despite the increase of nuclear capabilities, at least as long as general war does not appear imminent. If general war appeared imminent or actually occurred, their policies would depend in large measure on the course of events. Some of the allies might have no choice, and could not remain uninvolved even if they wished to do so. Some might consider the issues at stake insufficiently important to risk general war, and might therefore declare themselves neutral at an early stage of the crisis. Some governments might estimate that full-scale nuclear war between the US and the USSR would end with complete or near-complete destruction of the war-making potential of both powers, and therefore that neutrality might be both a safe and a profitable position. If events developed in such a way as to confront governments with a clear and immediate choice between nuclear devastation and neutrality, we believe that practically all would choose neutrality. *(Paras. 27, 30)*

5. As its nuclear capabilities grow, the USSR will have a greatly increased capability to inflict destruction, particularly on the US itself. Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders will probably still not be confident that they could attack the US with nuclear weapons without exposing the USSR to an even more devastating counterblow. We believe, therefore, that the USSR will continue to try to avoid substantial risks of general war despite the increase of its nuclear capabilities. However, as these capabilities grow, Soviet leaders may come to estimate that the US, because of fear for itself or for its allies, or because of pressure by its allies, will be increasingly deterred from initiating full-scale nuclear war. They may therefore come to believe that local wars will be less likely than at present to expand into general war, and thus that superior Bloc military capabilities in certain local areas can be exercised without substantial risk of provoking general war. *(Para. 31)*

DISCUSSION

I. CURRENT OPINION CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

6. During the past year public concern about nuclear weapons has increased considerably in most of the non-Communist world. The enormous explosive power of the newer types of weapons and the lethal character of radioactive fall-out have been brought vividly to attention by popular and scientific publicity accompanying recent tests. Depictions of nuclear war are dismaying; in addition, well-qualified scientists frequently issue warnings of the biologic and genetic perils which might arise from continued experimentation with nuclear weapons. The public has been the recipient of accurate information which is disquieting, and of misinformation which is alarming. Its reaction has varied in intensity from time to time and from country to country, but a few clear and powerful trends have emerged among the people of nearly all the principal countries of the non-Communist world.

7. The first of these is an increased fear of war. This feeling is general rather than specific; it is fear of war in principle rather than panic arising from a clear and present danger. Most people appear to believe that general

war is not likely within the next few years. However, their aversion to war, heightened as it is by consciousness of the appalling power of nuclear weapons, creates abnormally strong opposition to courses of action which present even a minor risk of war, and produces support for courses of action which offer even a hope of peace, however illusory. If general war became imminent these popular feelings in the non-Communist nations could be a major factor in influencing government action.

8. A second trend in mass opinion, vigorously exploited by the Communists, is one of growing opposition to the manufacture, testing, and use of nuclear weapons. According to US-sponsored polls in Western Europe, an overwhelming majority of the people favor an East-West agreement prohibiting the manufacture of all nuclear weapons.[1] There is even significant popular support for vague proposals to "ban the bomb," without adequate guarantees that the USSR would observe the ban. In West Germany and Italy the poll showed a substantial minority of opinion against the employment of nuclear weapons even in the assumed circumstance that invasion and occupation of the country could be prevented in no other way, and that the weapons would be used only against military forces. The polls also indicate that there is little public recognition in Western Europe of the importance of nuclear weapons to Western defense concepts, and little realization that the military plans of NATO contemplate use of such weapons.

9. In opposing the use of nuclear weapons, little distinction is made between "tactical" and "strategic" employment. There is a great deal of feeling that the next combat use of nuclear weapons, of whatever size and for whatever purpose, would forthwith break through inhibitions which now exist and which might otherwise prevent any use of such weapons. Moreover, there is a feeling that employment of nuclear weapons would carry grave risk of turning a small war into general war. This feeling seems to be based in part on the ground that use of a weapon of such unprecedented power would surely provoke retaliation and counter-retaliation on an ascending scale. It also seems to stem from some of the more publicized statements concerning modern warfare, which give the impression that any limitation of the scope or area of air attacks would be militarily unsound.

10. Together with the broad trends of public opinion concerning nuclear weapons, more complex and sophisticated views are held by individuals or groups in official, scientific, military, and generally better-informed circles. Perhaps the most widespread of these opinions is that general war will never again occur, because the destructive force of nuclear weapons has made it so obviously unprofitable. A variant of this is the idea that even if general war should occur, nuclear weapons would not be used because the combatants would not be disposed to invoke the almost unlimited destruction that their use would entail. Contrary views are also freely expressed. It is argued that nuclear weapons, destructive as they are, now constitute merely another item in the arsenal of a military establishment, and must be considered as "conventional" implements of war. It is pointed out that general war is as apt to happen by miscalculation as by design, and that considerations of profitability may not be the decisive factor in determining its occurrence.

11. The deterrent value of nuclear weapons is generally recognized by the better-informed, even by those who do not think that it is so great as to make general war out of the question. It is widely believed that the overwhelming nuclear superiority of the US in the past has been an important deterrent to the aggressive tendencies of the USSR, and thus an important protection to the liberties of free nations. As Soviet nuclear capabilities grow the picture changes, but Western nuclear capabilities continue to be considered as a deterrent to major Soviet military aggression. These views constitute an important check on the uncritical "ban the bomb" senti-

[1] These polls were taken in late 1954 and early 1955 in the UK, France, West Germany, and Italy. They were conducted by competent agencies, and gave results considered to be accurate within a margin of plus or minus six percent.

ments which are assiduously nourished by Communist propaganda. We do not believe that official or educated opinion in any major Western nation presently favors an outlawing of nuclear weapons without adequate guarantees. It is probable that most informed opinion is tending to the conclusion that control of nuclear weapons by inspection is technically impossible, and that guarantees to be effective would have to be of a different nature.

12. The intensity of public feeling about nuclear weapons, and the extent of knowledge, differ greatly in various parts of the non-Communist world. In Japan feelings were aroused almost to hysteria at the time of the accidental fall-out on a Japanese fishing vessel from the Bikini tests; in no other country of the world have there been so many pronouncements — some highly emotional, some cooler and more rational — against the existence and the testing and the use of nuclear weapons. In the UK there has been profound concern, much well-informed debate, and, almost uniquely in the western world, a definite attempt at guidance from the government, offered by Sir Winston Churchill himself. In the other countries of Western Europe agitation has been somewhat less, and the level of debate much lower, than in the UK. Among the neutralist countries, India has exhibited the greatest degree of concern on the subject of nuclear weapons, though this has been more evident on official levels than among the general public. It is particularly notable that vigorous condemnation of nuclear weapons in India has involved more manifestations of feeling against the US than against the USSR.

13. In the Sino-Soviet Bloc there has until lately been comparatively little diffusion of information about the nature of nuclear weapons. Recently, however, the Soviet regime has begun to make some information available, at first for a limited, largely military, audience but later to the general public. The government has not yet undertaken the intensive publicity program that would appear to be necessary for an effective civil defense effort. In Communist China, radio broadcasts on nuclear subjects increased greatly during the early months of 1955; these broadcasts emphasized the feasibility of defense against nuclear weapons and belittled the effect of such weapons on the outcome of a war. Most of the propaganda, however, was related to the campaign to get 400,000,000 signatures to a petition for the banning of nuclear weapons. It is unlikely that many Chinese will understand the petition that they sign. Nevertheless, there is no reason to doubt that in the Communist countries the people fear nuclear weapons, insofar as they understand what such weapons are. It should also be noted that the Communist rulers, within as well as outside their own empires, have given publicity to discussions of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and to descriptions of the advantages to be derived from such uses if the "capitalist war-mongers" can be restrained. However, within the entire Bloc the effectiveness of popular attitudes in influencing governmental policies is slight.

14. Public discussion of nuclear weapons by the highest Communist authorities has been comparatively scanty. During the Stalin period the military significance of these weapons was generally played down, probably because the Communist rulers initially desired to minimize the importance of a weapon they did not possess and subsequently wanted to deny that the possession of greater nuclear capabilities gave the US a decisive military advantage. In March 1954, however, Malenkov declared in a notable speech that a full-scale nuclear war would lead to the destruction of civilization, both Communist and non-Communist. This view has since been officially and emphatically repudiated by the Communist leadership. The Soviet leaders now assert that full-scale nuclear war would involve the destruction only of capitalist civilization, while Communism would survive even though badly battered. Nevertheless, Malenkov's remarks were the first public acknowledgment by Soviet leaders of the terrible power of the new weapons. It may be that their own weapons tests played some part in this expressed attitude. We believe that the Soviet rulers, though not the Soviet people, are now well

acquainted with the nature of nuclear weapons, and are deeply concerned about their implications.

II. INFLUENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES ON CURRENT NATIONAL POLICIES

15. The influence of nuclear capabilities on current national policies is best considered in the context of two other factors which distinguish the present era of international relations. The first of these lies in the character of the Communist movement and of the rulers of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Professing as they do a belief in the eventual triumph of Communism throughout the world, and in their mission to strive toward this triumph, the Communist leaders characterize their relation to the non-Communist world as one of unremitting and permanent hostility. Coexistence can be for them only temporary; aggression is a duty when it can be undertaken with good chance of success. When one party to a quarrel feels this way, the procedures of adjustment and compromise between nations become difficult and even dangerous; conflict is normal, stability is only temporary, but there still remains the question of what form the conflict may take.

16. The second factor is the bi-polarization of world power — the division of the world into two camps, with almost no nation of military consequence left outside the alignments. As a result of this division there is a great rigidity and lack of room for maneuver in international relations. There is no third force of sufficient strength to manipulate and perhaps alter the balance of international power. The disputes of lesser states have come increasingly to involve the conflicting interests of the two great power centers. The danger that small wars will grow into general war is greater than it was when power was more evenly distributed in the world, and restraint on the part of the great powers is the only effective influence which may act to prevent a war of limited objectives from becoming a general war.

17. To a considerable degree the existence of nuclear weapons tends to accentuate the bi-polarization of power, for no nation or group of nations can pretend to constitute a strong third force without possessing such weapons in quantity, together with adequate delivery capabilities. However, the primary significance of these weapons is not that they have shaped the structure of the current international situation, but rather that they have enormously increased the potential destructiveness of the wars which are likely to arise out of that situation. From this fact flow practically all the influences which nuclear weapons exert on national policies at the present day.

18. The most important effect of the nuclear weapons situation on the current national policies of most non-Communist nations is to diminish the willingness of their governments and peoples to incur risks of war, even though it is virtually impossible to protect the interests of free nations in the present world without running such risks. A second effect is to increase public desire for a reduction of international tensions, and for the use of all possible means, even including those which the governments themselves may consider ill-advised, to work towards a general settlement with the Communist powers. Finally, there is increased public pressure on governments to find some means of disarmament, and especially some means of insuring that nuclear weapons will not be used in combat. Desire for disarmament is of course no new thing; it is intensified and magnified at present, however, by the pervading fear of nuclear weapons.

19. These considerations do not, of course, hold true in equal measure for all countries. For some — Nationalist China, South Korea, and perhaps others — they do not seem to hold true at all. The great question, however, is whether they operate on the Communist rulers to approximately the same degree that they do on non-Communist governments. We believe that both Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders desire to avoid substantial risks of general war, and that this desire arises in great measure from their recognition of significantly superior US nuclear capabilities and of the probable consequences of nuclear war-

fare to them. They probably also believe that under present circumstances overt military aggression over recognized national frontiers by substantial Soviet, Satellite, or Chinese Communist forces would present substantial risks of general war, and we therefore believe that they will avoid such aggression in the near future. It may be, however, that the Communist rulers do not to the same degree as non-Communist governments and peoples believe that small wars tend to expand. The Communist rulers also may count heavily on a diminished willingness of non-Communist governments and peoples to risk general war as a factor inhibiting the expansive tendency of small wars. We believe that such differences of view could hold grave dangers for the West.

20. Few current national policies are traceable exclusively to the existence of nuclear weapons. These include primarily changes in military equipment, organization, and doctrine. Most important are the USSR's manufacture of nuclear weapons, its creation of means for delivering these weapons against distant targets, and its efforts to construct a more effective air defense system. Along with this have come changes in the equipment and tactical doctrine of Soviet forces, largely for the purpose of adapting them to the requirements of nuclear warfare. With the same end in view the French are, for example, reducing the size and increasing the mobility of their ground divisions. The UK is devoting greatly increased attention to the problem of defending the British Isles against air attack, and for the first time has given the largest share of military appropriations to the RAF.

21. A notable act of policy directly related to the nuclear situation is the British decision to make their own thermonuclear weapons. This decision has had the approval of the leaders of both parties, and of the nation generally. Churchill explained that possession of these weapons constituted the most important deterrent to an attack by the USSR on the United Kingdom, and that if such an attack was to be averted it would almost certainly have to be primarily through such deterrent force rather than through the weapons and techniques of defense. Secondly, he declared that the UK could not expect to exert much influence upon the policies of other countries if it remained dependent for its defense upon the deterrent power of US weapons. Finally, he remarked that while the British could rely on the US as an ally if war came, they could not be certain that the war plans of the US would include such an employment of thermonuclear weapons as would be most effective for the defense of the British Isles.

22. We believe it virtually certain that US nuclear capabilities constitute a major deterrent to overt military aggression by the USSR. Apart from this we cannot estimate with confidence the broader effects of the nuclear situation on current Soviet policies. It does not seem likely that US nuclear capabilities are primarily responsible for the present conciliatory tone of Soviet policy or for such manifestations as the agreement to withdraw from Austria. We believe, however, though it is not demonstrable, that the Soviet leaders are seriously concerned about the prospect of a Western Germany armed at some future date not only with conventional forces but with nuclear capabilities as well.

23. On 10 May 1955 the USSR submitted new disarmament proposals which departed from some of its previous positions on the subject. Soviet motivation in advancing these proposals is probably highly complex, and we cannot yet estimate whether there is a direct relation between them and Soviet concern over possible nuclear warfare.

III. PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

24. If the nuclear capabilities of the US and the USSR continue to develop along present lines, and adequate defenses are not devised, each nation will acquire weapons, carriers, and techniques sufficient to destroy progressively all the important strengths of the other. The exact degree to which such destruction might be carried would be related to the courses of action which each side felt compelled to prevent or frustrate. In a general war situation such courses of action to be prevented or frustrated would probably be initially comprehensive for both sides even if dissimilar in

many respects. Therefore destruction could be carried as far as to eliminate progressively the source of all important courses of action by both sides. Such destruction could kill a large proportion of both populations, destroy the principal cities, communications systems and administrative apparatus, and at least temporarily put an end to coherent and organised national existence. This destruction could be extended to the allies and satellites of both major powers. However, if one side should be able rapidly to prevent or frustrate the most critical actions of the other the overall destruction to be expected to both sides might be reduced materially.

25. We do not undertake to estimate, in this paper, how far the defense systems of the two countries and their associates might be able to cut down this gross capability for mutual destruction. Some competent authorities predict that an attack by either side on the other would inevitably result in the destruction of both, regardless of defense systems or the degree of surprise attained in the initial operation. If such a view became generally accepted nuclear war would appear to be almost out of the question, for no nation is likely to seek inevitable destruction. We think it much more likely, however, that there will always be a considerable element of doubt about the matter in the US and the USSR if not in smaller countries. Certainty of destruction is unlikely to be accepted. There will probably always appear on each side to be a chance, even if only a slim one, of surviving as an effective national entity while achieving the destruction of the enemy. It appears inevitable, however, that both the US and the USSR would have to expect a degree of devastation unparalleled in modern times, and that lesser nations involved in the conflict might have to expect that if the US or USSR considered them important they would suffer something approaching total destruction of national existence. Over the very long term, the trend of weapons development will probably further sharpen the advantage of tactical surprise.

26. Under such circumstances the public and governmental attitudes described above and evident today would probably be intensified. Aversion to risks of war, pressures for disarmament and for compromises and settlements, and fear of general war, would almost certainly be more marked then than now. The difficulties of conducting policy against such adversaries as the Soviet leaders would probably grow, and the chances increase of a weakening of the non-Communist position by successive concessions. At the same time the Soviet leaders themselves, because of their recognition of the devastating effects of nuclear weapons will still almost certainly be concerned not to pursue aggressive actions to the point of incurring substantial risk of general war.

27. We believe that the allies of the US, and especially the major allies, will continue in the alliance, at least as long as general war does not appear imminent. Their reasons for doing so would be: to keep their interests under the protection of US power, to contribute to a countervailing force sufficient to deter the Soviets from launching war, and to be in a position to exert influence on the policies of the US and of other members of the alliance. Under the new circumstances they would probably try to increase their influence over US policies. Many of them would even more vigorously than at present counsel caution, urge compromise, and advise the avoidance of risk, particularly if their own vital interests were not involved. They would be aware that the US itself was for the first time exposed to major devastation if it became involved in general war, and they might consider that the US would therefore be somewhat easier to influence in the direction of caution than it had sometimes previously appeared to be.

28. This disposition to caution would be modified if the conviction grew that the USSR and the US both so clearly recognised the disastrousness of general war that they would be constrained to avoid it even if they became involved in localised conflict. In these circumstances there would be a lessening of the fear of general war and a much greater flexibility in international relations. There would be greater willingness to accept the

risks of small wars, especially by the countries whose interests were directly involved. It is conceivable that in time there might even be a willingness to accept limited employment of nuclear weapons in such wars, if it were virtually certain that the risk of general war developing was negligible.

29. Another development which could alter the international situation would be the acquisition of significant nuclear capabilities by a number of nations in addition to the US and the USSR. The British are already building up their strength in this respect. The Canadians, West Germans, French, and some other nations clearly have the scientific and engineering capacity to do so, although the effort would be costly. It is thus possible that in a decade or more nuclear capabilities may be much more widely distributed among nations than they are at present. The results of such a development cannot be predicted. It appears almost certain, however, that the dominating influence of the US and the USSR would be somewhat reduced.

30. Whether the allies of the US would remain allies if general war became imminent or actually occurred is uncertain. The events leading to war might be such that some of the allies had no choice, and could not remain uninvolved even if they wished to do so. Or they might be such that most of the allies considered the issues at stake insufficiently important to risk general war, and therefore declared themselves neutral at an early stage of the crisis. Some governments might estimate that full-scale nuclear war between the US and the USSR would end with complete or near-complete destruction of the war-making potential of both powers, and therefore that neutrality might be both a safe and a profitable position. If events developed in such a way as to confront governments with a clear and immediate choice between nuclear devastation and neutrality, we believe that practically all would choose neutrality.

31. As nuclear capabilities grow, the USSR will have a greatly increased capability to inflict destruction, particularly on the US itself. Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders will probably still not be confident that they could attack the US with nuclear weapons without exposing the USSR to an even more devastating counterblow. We believe, therefore, that the USSR will continue to try to avoid substantial risks of general war despite the increase of its nuclear capabilities. However, as these capabilities grow, Soviet leaders may come to estimate that the US, because of fear for itself or for its allies, or because of pressure by its allies, will be increasingly deterred from initiating full-scale nuclear war. They may therefore come to believe that local wars will be less likely than at present to expand into general war, and thus that superior Bloc military capabilities in certain local areas can be exercised without substantial risk of provoking general war.

32. In diplomatic negotiations the Soviet leaders will almost certainly try to take advantage of the increased urgency with which Western governments, pressed by their better-informed public opinion, will strive to escape nuclear war through peaceful solutions. We believe it likely that in a situation of sharp and general international crisis the USSR would seek to undermine Western determination by reminders of the consequences of the employment of nuclear weapons. We believe it unlikely, however, that the USSR would make open and direct threats of nuclear attack since the Soviet leaders would probably fear that such tactics might bring about a situation in which general war would become unavoidable, and they might even fear that they would provoke a preventive attack by the US.

25. SNIE 11-7-57, 10 December 1957, *Feasibility and Likelihood of Soviet Evasion of a Nuclear Test Moratorium*

10 Dec 57

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SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 11-7-57

FEASIBILITY AND LIKELIHOOD OF SOVIET EVASION OF A NUCLEAR TEST MORATORIUM

Submitted by the

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Concurred in by the

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

on 10 December 1957. Concurring were The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; and the Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC. The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.

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FEASIBILITY AND LIKELIHOOD OF SOVIET EVASION OF A NUCLEAR TEST MORATORIUM[1]

THE PROBLEM

To estimate whether the USSR would attempt to evade a two-year nuclear test moratorium beginning 1 January 1959, and to assess the capability of present and future detection systems to identify and provide evidence of an evasion.

CONCLUSIONS

1. We believe that, if the USSR agrees to a moratorium on nuclear tests, its initial policy will be to abide by the terms of the moratorium. We believe this because the Soviet leaders not only would not wish to receive the opprobrium which would follow a violation but because they probably would hope that the effect of the moratorium would give them political and strategic advantages. During the early days of the moratorium they probably would not be seriously tempted to deviate from this intention, in the light of our judgment that, between now and 1 January 1959, they have sufficient time to complete the tests they probably feel essential and feasible.

2. The Soviet scientists probably have a fairly accurate estimate of present US detection capabilities. They would recognize that some types of tests would almost certainly be detected. They would probably also realize that some tests could not be detected and that in some cases it could not be demonstrated that detected explosions were nuclear in origin. Nevertheless, there would be some uncertainty in Soviet calculations of their ability to escape detection and proof of their responsibility.

3. If, contrary to our present estimate, the Soviets had not completed their minimum testing program prior to the entry into effect of the moratorium or if, as the period of the moratorium advanced, they developed designs for much more effective and economical nuclear warheads, we still believe it unlikely that the USSR

[1] The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee is publishing separately a report (Restricted Data) which discusses in detail the importance to the USSR of continued testing and evaluates detection systems.

would evade the prohibition except by ways they considered unlikely to be detected. We cannot, however, wholly exclude the possibility that they would take some risks.

4. We conclude that the Soviet leaders would almost certainly regard the political consequences of getting caught red-handed as unacceptable, except in extraordinary circumstances. Such circumstances might be either a clear opportunity to gain a great advantage over the US in nuclear weapons capabilities through some now unforeseen development, or a situation in which the West had gained a clear advantage over the USSR. If such cases did arise, we believe the Soviet leaders would quite possibly not observe the moratorium since they would probably feel that the military advantages to be gained by testing would outweigh any adverse political effects. They would probably attempt to minimize the political disadvantages of evasion by false accusations prior to open denunciation of the agreement — in the hope of inducing the West to take the initiative itself in denunciation.

DISCUSSION

SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN AGREEING TO A TEST MORATORIUM

5. Active exploitation of the disarmament issue is one of the key aspects of present Soviet external policy. The USSR clearly regards this issue not only as an essential part of its pose of "peaceful co-existence" but, even more important, as a possible means of neutralizing Western nuclear striking power and inducing its withdrawal from around the periphery of the Bloc. It is probably also concerned over the potential threat to its position in the satellites from US and NATO military power in Europe. For these reasons the USSR has tended to concentrate on such disarmament proposals as nuclear test suspension, a ban on use of nuclear weapons, liquidation of foreign bases, and troop withdrawals from Europe.

6. By its maneuvers on such issues the USSR clearly hopes to encourage the relaxation of Western defense efforts, help undermine NATO and create divisions among its partners, and above all create a climate inhibiting Western use of nuclear weapons. In addition the USSR is probably concerned about the enormous cost of its military establishment and would welcome a measure of disarmament which would permit some diversion of resources to meet other pressing needs. It may also have some concern over the possible development of nuclear capabilities by "fourth countries," particularly in Europe. However, we do not believe that either of the latter two concerns would be compelling in Soviet thinking.[2]

7. In agreeing to a nuclear test moratorium the USSR would be motivated by the belief that such an agreement would be an important first step toward these Soviet objectives in the field of disarmament. Through its consistent and unambiguous advocacy of a test ban the USSR has already gained considerable propaganda advantage. It would gain much further credit if tests were actually suspended, especially in the eyes of the considerable number of persons in all countries who favor such a ban out of concern with atmospheric pollution or as a first step toward curbing the danger of nuclear war. The Soviet pose as the strongest exponent of disarmament would thus be strengthened. Above all, a nuclear test ban would create immediately a greater psychological barrier to the use of nuclear weapons, and over the longer

[2] Soviet policy toward disarmament is discussed more comprehensively in paragraphs 213–216 of NIE 11-4-57, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies 1957-1962."

term offer the prospect of increasing pressures for legally circumscribing the use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the USSR would recognize that a test moratorium would not prevent it from continuing to manufacture fissionable materials, to apply tested principles to new weapons production, to improve its delivery capabilities, and to continue weapons research and development for testing at the end of the two-year period.

FACTORS AFFECTING THE FEASIBILITY AND LIKELIHOOD OF EVASION

8. Whether the Soviet leaders would attempt to evade a test moratorium agreement would depend largely upon the relative weights they attached to the following factors: (a) the political disadvantages of getting caught, (b) the military advantages to be gained from further testing, and (c) the effectiveness of the monitoring system in identifying and producing evidence of an evasion.

The Political Disadvantages

9. If a violation by the USSR were demonstrated to the satisfaction of the bulk of the free world nations, the Soviet propaganda position and peaceful pose would suffer substantially, and the USSR would jeopardize the gains it sought in agreeing to a two-year moratorium. The Soviet leaders would probably recognize that, under such circumstances, they would alienate much of the support and acceptance they have won in uncommitted countries, that defense preparations in Western countries would probably be intensified, and that the US in particular would resume its test program. More significantly, if the USSR were clearly shown to have acted in bad faith, the chances would be greatly reduced that other countries would accept a more comprehensive agreement which would gain for the USSR the more important objectives of forcing a retraction of US military power and legally circumscribing the uses of nuclear weapons.

The Military Advantages

10. Study of the results of the Soviet nuclear tests which have been detected shows clearly that the USSR has tested a wide range of fundamental weapons concepts, that it has achieved a high level of sophistication in both weapons theory and technology, and that it now possesses an extensive capability to produce a family of weapons capable of satisfying to a reasonable extent most of its major military needs. The USSR almost certainly still has a great need for further testing in order to improve current weapons and to develop certain additional types of weapons and weapons designs. However, before the end of 1958, the USSR, by continuing an intensive program on the 1956–57 scale, can probably complete the tests which we estimate are necessary in order to produce workable, though perhaps not optimum, solutions to most of these additional requirements. Specifically, the Soviets would probably be able to improve their current weapons to remove shortcomings, to develop efficient air defense warheads, and to develop weapons making more economical use of fissionable material. On the other hand, they probably would not be able to complete the tests necessary either to refine these warheads or to assure the most economical use of fissionable material.[3]

11. We believe the Soviets would regard the above results as the minimum necessary prior to a test moratorium, and that they would probably carry through the required intensive program, if they were now prepared to accept a moratorium effective on 1 January 1959 or now foresaw such a moratorium as likely. If, contrary to our estimate, they should fail to carry through this minimum program, they would probably attempt to postpone the entry into effect of the moratorium until the necessary tests were completed.

12. On the assumption that their minimum testing program was successful, Soviet sci-

[3] Specific Soviet nuclear weapons requirements and the tests associated with them are discussed in detail in the JAEIC paper noted on page 1. The capability of the USSR to produce warheads suitable for ICBMs is discussed in NIE 11-10-57, "The Soviet ICBM Program," and general nuclear weapons capabilities are discussed in NIE 11-3-57, "The Soviet Atomic Energy Program," and will be further considered in the forthcoming NIE 11-3-58, "The Soviet Atomic Energy Program."

entists and technicians would probably be fairly well occupied during the early part of the moratorium in evaluating their data and applying these data to weapons design. As the period continued, the Soviets might have a military need for testing in at least two possible respects:

a. Although the Soviets would have developed an efficient air defense warhead for use against aircraft, they would not have conducted the tests necessary to develop the most effective warhead for an anti-missile missile. If the Soviets had the other elements necessary for an effective anti-missile missile system in an advanced stage of development, we believe they would regard such a warhead as a major military requirement.[4] The testing required would involve at least medium-yield explosions.

b. The Soviets have given no indication of an attempt to develop "clean" weapons, i.e., weapons involving entirely or almost entirely thermonuclear reactions. They might regard such weapons as desirable to reduce the dangers of world-wide contamination, or to reduce local contamination in operations where a surface burst is desired or where fallout might affect Soviet-controlled territory or future operations. However, they would probably not conclude that such weapons were crucial to an effective nuclear posture in the short run, especially since the existence of a test moratorium would appear to reduce the chances of general war. Thus, the Soviet leaders probably do not have an urgent requirement to develop "clean" weapons during a test moratorium period.

In addition, other motivations might arise as a result of new requirements, new theories, or other unforeseen developments.

[4] In NIE 11-5-57, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missiles Field," (12 March 1957), we estimated that the USSR could probably develop a missile system of some capability against the ICBM for operational use during the period 1963–1966. We believe the USSR might be able to advance this date somewhat and that it might make great efforts to do so if the US deployed substantial numbers of IRBMs and/or ICBMs.

Effectiveness of the Monitoring System[5]

13. The Soviet view of the effectiveness of the monitoring system would play an important role in any Soviet decision regarding evasion of a test moratorium since it will establish the degree of risk which the Soviet leaders would have to accept in carrying out various kinds of tests. The monitoring problem has two aspects: (a) detecting the fact of an explosion (and estimating time, location, and yield); (b) demonstrating that an explosion was nuclear. In both respects, the ultimate test is the production of usable evidence convincing to other nations.

14. At the present time, the various parts of the existing US Atomic Energy Detection System, working together, are able, within certain limits, to detect the fact of an explosion and to determine its approximate time, location, and yield. Other intelligence collection methods may contribute to this determination. The existing system has an excellent capability (90–100 percent) for detecting air bursts of 10 KT or above, a good capability (60–90 percent) for detecting air bursts of 5–10 KT, a fair capability (30–60 percent) for detecting air bursts of 3–5 KT, and a poor capability (0–30 percent) for detecting air bursts of less than 3 KT. The present detection system, in addition to its unreliability for detecting low-yield air bursts, might be unable to detect tests occurring at altitudes in excess of about 100,000 feet. In the case of tests conducted in some other unique environments, such as deep underground or underwater, the fact of an explosion might be detected, primarily by seismic means, but there would be difficulty in separating such phenomena from natural disturbances.

[5] The "monitoring system" discussed in this section is one which would operate only in the Northern Hemisphere in areas not remote from the USSR. Conceivably tests could be staged in remote areas such as Antarctica or southern waters, but such possibilities would probably be excluded by the Soviets, since various intelligence collection efforts would be almost certain to spot the activities which would be associated with test preparations, if not the test itself.

15. In order to establish conclusively that a given explosion was nuclear in origin, it is necessary to obtain radioactive debris. This is generally possible for tests conducted between the surface and the tropopause (35,000–45,000 feet) involving substantial fission reactions. However, tests in unique environments and tests involving entirely or almost entirely thermonuclear reactions might not produce radioactive debris that could be collected in quantities sufficient to establish the fact of a nuclear explosion, under any known or foreseeable monitoring system.

16. In order to estimate the likelihood of a Soviet evasion it is necessary to measure Soviet testing requirements against the present and expanded monitoring systems. The following paragraphs describing the effectiveness of various assumed monitoring systems provide some guide to the likelihood of detection in the event the USSR does not complete its pre-moratorium testing program or decides to test designs relevant to warheads for anti-missile missiles, the development of a "clean" weapon, or other designs.

17. *Present monitoring capabilities.* It is possible that a moratorium agreement might go into effect without providing sufficient time to put into place any additional detection equipment in or adjacent to the USSR, and therefore that it might be necessary in an initial period to rely upon substantially the existing system. Considering the limitations of this system as defined above, the USSR might be able to avoid detection and verification of the low-yield fission tests we estimate that it requires in order to develop certain air defense warheads and to achieve more efficient use of fissionable materials. If the Soviet leaders should decide to conduct tests in the medium or high kiloton ranges, these tests would have to be conducted in unique environments in order to avoid detection. If conducted at extremely high altitudes, they might be particularly difficult to detect.

18. *Effect of peripheral expansion of monitoring capabilities.* If additional facilities were established around the periphery of the USSR, the range of Soviet maneuverability would be slightly less, but these facilities would still not provide consistent detection of the kinds of tests noted in the preceding paragraph.

19. *Effect of limited inspection within the USSR.* The Soviet leaders have announced their willingness to accept international control posts within the USSR on a reciprocal basis. The effectiveness of inspection within the USSR would largely depend upon the extent to which these control posts could gain access to areas of suspected activity and upon the extent to which they were alerted by other detection methods. It would be possible for the USSR, by denying mobility or access to particular areas, to reserve for itself an area in which it could carry out, with no greater risk of detection, the tests which we have noted in paragraph 17.

20. *Effect of a comprehensive system of inspection within the USSR.* If it is assumed that the USSR accepted a substantial number of installations properly placed within the USSR and that these installations could be equipped and staffed in time,[6] it would be possible to get at least 50 percent reliability on fission tests in conventional environments as low as one kiloton, in the detection system as a whole. However, not even this expanded system could consistently detect and identify low-yield explosions occurring deep underground or underwater, or possibly sizeable yields at altitudes in excess of 100,000 feet. Thus the USSR could, even in this maximum situation, carry out some tests with a good chance of escaping detection.

21. *International manning of the monitoring system.* In assessing the effectiveness of any form of monitoring system for the purpose of producing evidence convincing to other nations, it is important to note that international manning of the system would, as a practical matter, greatly assist in meeting this need. For example, if the existing collection system, unimproved, were in operation, international participation in the pro-

[6] Since such a comprehensive system would take from 18 to 24 months following its approval to reach maximum effectiveness, it is questionable whether it could play a role in a two-year moratorium.

curement and analysis of radioactive debris would add substantially to the chances of convincing a UN monitoring commission and a majority of UN members. Moreover, in attempting to prove the nuclear origin of those types of tests not likely to produce debris, international manning of detection facilities would assist in putting pressure on the USSR to produce an explanation of detected explosions (for example, underground explosions detected by seismic means).

22. *Soviet estimate of the risk of detection.* The Soviet scientists probably have a fairly accurate estimate of the present capabilities of the US detection system, and they would therefore be able to project the effect of expanding US capabilities in the ways indicated above. They are probably aware that our detection capabilities even under maximum conditions could not detect all sorts of nuclear explosions or adduce proof that all detected explosions were nuclear. They would also recognize that certain types of tests would be virtually certain of detection. They could probably estimate the test-site locations, yields, and environmental conditions within which there would be a reasonable chance of escaping detection under varying types of monitoring arrangements. Yet, they could never be certain of the capabilities of the US detection system. They would realize that new techniques for detection or improvements in existing methods, about which they were unaware, were always possible. Thus, there would be some uncertainty in Soviet calculations of their ability to escape detection and proof of their responsibility.

PROBABLE SOVIET POLICY

23. We believe that, if the USSR agrees to a moratorium on nuclear tests, its policy initially will be to abide by the terms of the moratorium. We believe this because the Soviet leaders not only would not wish to receive the opprobrium which would follow a violation but because they probably would hope that the effect of the moratorium would give them political and strategic advantages. During the early days of the moratorium they probably would not be seriously tempted to deviate from this intention, in the light of our judgment that, between now and 1 January 1959, they have sufficient time to complete the tests they probably feel essential and feasible. Moreover, they would recognize at the outset that there was a substantial category of tests which they could not conduct without a high risk of detection.

24. If, contrary to our estimate, the Soviets had failed to complete their essential pre-1959 test program, and had also failed to obtain postponement of the agreed moratorium, then the Soviets would confront a grave choice between urgent military needs and the political disadvantages of getting caught in evasion. We conclude that the Soviet decision would probably be substantially influenced by the likelihood of getting caught, and that the Soviets would not conduct tests in the categories where there would be a substantial chance that the world at large would conclude that they had broken the moratorium. Some of the tests required to complete the program could probably be conducted in the low-yield category or in unique environments — where the chances of detection and evidence were small — and the Soviets might conceivably decide to evade the moratorium to the extent of a very small number of tests of these types. However, our present judgment is that the possibility is slight that the USSR will not complete its essential testing program prior to 1 January 1959. If, nevertheless, the beginning of the moratorium should antedate the completion of the program, we believe it unlikely that the USSR would evade the prohibition, except by ways they considered unlikely to be detected. We cannot, however, wholly exclude the possibility that they would take some risks.

25. As the period of the moratorium advanced, the military motivations for violations might increase, particularly if the Soviet scientists had developed designs and theories which, if satisfactorily tested, would provide much more effective and economical warheads, such as those for an anti-missile missile. This and other foreseeable testing needs might be considered by the Soviets so substantial as to argue against Soviet acceptance of an uninterrupted continuation of the moratorium. However, we believe that the Soviets would

not estimate these needs as so urgent as to compel testing involving any substantial degree of risk within the two-year period.

26. We conclude that the Soviet leaders would almost certainly regard the political consequences of getting caught red-handed as unacceptable, except in extraordinary circumstances. Apart from failure to complete their pre-1959 test program, discussed above, circumstances in which the Soviet leaders would consider risking detection are: (a) if, through some now unforeseen development, there were a clear opportunity to gain a great advantage over the US in nuclear weapons capabilities, or (b) if the West had an enormous military advantage over the USSR as a consequence of advances in Western military technology and deployment. If such cases did arise, we believe the Soviet leaders would quite possibly not observe the moratorium since they would probably feel that the military advantages to be gained by testing would outweigh any adverse political effects. They would probably attempt to minimize the political disadvantages of evasion by false accusations prior to open denunciation of the agreement — in the hope of inducing the West to take the initiative itself in denunciation.

26. SNIE 100-4-58, 15 April 1958, *Probable Sino-Soviet Reactions to US Deployment of IRBMs on the Soviet Bloc Periphery*

SECRET

SPECIAL

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 100-4-58

PROBABLE SINO-SOVIET REACTIONS TO US DEPLOYMENT OF IRBMs ON THE SOVIET BLOC PERIPHERY

Submitted by the

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred in by the

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

on 15 April 1958. Concurring were The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; and the Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC. The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.

SECRET

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

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

PROBABLE SINO-SOVIET REACTIONS TO US DEPLOYMENT OF IRBMs ON THE SOVIET BLOC PERIPHERY

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the Sino-Soviet reaction to anticipated and actual US deployment of IRBMs to various areas around the Bloc periphery during the next two or three years.

SCOPE

For purposes of this estimate, it is assumed that IRBMs will be deployed, either under sole US or shared control, initially in the UK and then elsewhere in the NATO area, including France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, and perhaps West Germany. The effect of possible deployments to certain Middle and Far Eastern countries (for example, Iran, Pakistan, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines) is also considered. The magnitude of initial deployment is assumed to be four missile battalions of 15 weapons each to the UK and six to ten additional battalions elsewhere.

CONCLUSIONS

1. We believe that the Bloc leaders would regard US deployment of IRBMs assumed in this estimate as a substantial addition to Western capabilities. But they are unlikely to conclude either that this action indicates a change in US intentions or would basically alter the relative military strength of East and West.

2. Thus we believe that the Bloc, while taking vigorous diplomatic and propaganda measures aimed at preventing or delaying these deployments, and making them politically costly, would not resort to the use of force to do so.

DISCUSSION

Bloc Appraisal of US Intentions

3. The Soviet leaders have almost certainly long foreseen deployment of IRBMs around the Bloc periphery. They probably interpret the vigor with which the US is now pressing this program as an effort to offset Soviet ICBM capabilities during the interim before American ICBMs become available in quantity. They probably also see in it an effort to bolster the capabilities of NATO in order

to reduce pressures within some European countries for accommodation or tendencies toward neutralism. Further, they probably look upon the IRBM program as indicating that the US intends to continue to refuse disarmament on Soviet terms and is maintaining its efforts to deal with the USSR from a position of strength.

4. Despite Soviet apprehension over IRBM deployments, we do not believe that the Soviet leaders will interpret them as involving so radical a change in US intentions or in the East-West balance of military power as to require a major shift in Soviet policy. They will be mindful in this connection of their own present deterrent power, and, if our estimates of their ICBM progress are correct, they will calculate that their own ICBM capabilities will have reached considerable proportions by the time a substantial IRBM threat to them develops. They are unlikely to conclude that the US would subsequently pursue more aggressive courses of action or initiate general war. Moreover, they will reckon that, even if the assumed IRBM deployment did not occur, a similar threat would later develop from naval-launched IRBMs and US-based ICBMs. In the light of this appraisal, and because of continued Soviet respect for existing US deterrent power, we believe that the USSR would not attempt to prevent IRBM deployments by such risky measures as the use of force.

Bloc Appraisal of Military and Political Consequences

5. Nevertheless, the Soviets have already given ample evidence of their concern over prospective US deployment of IRBMs around the periphery of the Bloc. Militarily, the Soviets would regard successful US deployment of IRBMs as a substantial addition to Western nuclear delivery capabilities (see map for IRBM coverage of the Bloc from twelve selected countries), even though it did not basically alter the relative strength of East and West. Deployment to the UK alone would bring within missile range the USSR's two largest cities, many other important centers, and many of the home bases of Soviet Long Range Aviation. Deployment to other NATO countries, particularly Greece and Turkey, would considerably expand this coverage. If IRBMs were deployed to certain Middle and Far Eastern states as well, all Sino-Soviet Bloc territory would be brought within range save a large but sparsely populated area of the central USSR (see map). Soviet planners would recognize that each additional deployment, even if it largely duplicated previous coverage, would complicate their defensive problems. Among other things IRBM deployment would put greater urgency behind the requirement for an anti-missile capability.

6. In our view the Soviets are also concerned over the political impact of IRBM deployment on NATO and possibly other US alliances. The Soviet leaders probably fear that IRBM deployment, by strengthening deterrent capabilities in Western Europe, will make Western Europe less vulnerable to military fears and therefore less susceptible to political and psychological efforts designed to play on their anxieties. The Soviets might also estimate that, in the long run, IRBMs in the territories of US allies would probably come, in fact, under the sole control of the recipient countries. For this reason they might look upon the initial US

IRBM deployment as marking an important step toward growth of an independent European nuclear capability. The achievement of such a capability would, in their view, further reduce Western European susceptibility to Soviet threats and would increase the number of countries able to trigger a nuclear war.

7. The USSR would recognize that even under conditions of US control the decreased warning time available in the case of missile attacks and the consequent pressures for quick reaction create an inherently greater risk of misinterpretation of warning signs resulting in a decision to counter-attack. Thus they will foresee an increase in the risks of war by miscalculation. In addition, if other countries obtained an independent missile capability, the Soviets would foresee a further increase in these risks. However, we believe that the USSR would regard these risks as unavoidable and would rely on its own deterrent capabilities to enforce caution on the West. The same factors would probably also act to induce caution on the part of the USSR.

8. We believe that Peiping would also be seriously concerned over the consequences of US deployment of IRBMs. In general it would fear lest the increase in over-all US deterrent capabilities impose some additional limits on the courses of action available to the Bloc as a whole. In particular it might fear that the increase in over-all US deterrent capabilities would reduce Soviet willingness to support Peiping in event of a crisis in the Far East. Moreover, Peiping would be worried about its own vulnerability to IRBMs stationed in the Far East in view of its present lack of any counter-capability.

Bloc Courses of Action Prior to Deployment

9. As a result we foresee a continuation of the major Bloc effort to prevent, limit, or at least delay US IRBM deployment, or failing this, to make it politically costly to the West. In this connection the already emerging reactions in various potential recipients and other countries are creating vulnerabilities which the Bloc is exploiting. Growing popular awareness of the destructive power of nuclear weapons and of Soviet capabilities for delivering them is accentuating fears of nuclear conflict. Among many it is nourishing the feeling, allied to this fear, that East-West accommodation is essential and should not be jeopardized by such measures as accepting IRBMs. In some cases there are substantial rifts in national opinion which may be widened. Moreover, the IRBM program is construed as lending credence to Soviet claims, already accepted by a substantial body of opinion in the neutralist countries, that the US is preoccupied with military competition in contrast to Soviet concern for ending the cold war.

10. To exploit these opportunities, the USSR is employing and will continue to employ a wide range of tactics, involving both blandishments and intimidation. In our judgment, however, the USSR will at least for a while rely primarily on its broad campaign to relax international tensions, while at the same time seeking to bring about US withdrawal from overseas bases and otherwise undermine the Western politico-military position. In Soviet eyes, this campaign will also serve to counter the deployment of US IRBMs; indeed, their prospective deployment is probably an additional factor impelling the USSR to press it. The

object is to create a climate in which the rationale for IRBM deployments would be obscured, or their use, if once installed, would be inhibited.

11. Primary Soviet reliance on this campaign is suggested by a somewhat less bellicose approach thus far to the IRBM issue than that of last year's campaign against the stationing of US atomic units abroad. The element of intimidation, while not absent, apparently has been subdued in favor of stress upon Soviet sincerity in seeking a relaxation of tensions which would make unnecessary US deployment of IRBMs. Major efforts are being concentrated upon creating popular hopes for top-level negotiations, disarmament agreements, or various forms of disengagement. For example, the Soviets are pressing for establishment of nuclear-free zones which would, among other things, serve to block IRBM deployments to the areas concerned. As another tactic, the USSR has announced the unilateral suspension of nuclear weapons testing. These efforts are intended to create a climate of opposition to Western military moves on the grounds that they would destroy the chances for a general relaxation of tensions.

12. The element of intimidation will tend to come more to the fore, however, wherever these other approaches appear to be ineffective or where special opportunities exist. The Soviets may issue warnings so worded as to make it difficult for the US and its allies to determine whether or not they were meant to indicate an intention to resort to force. They will also try to capitalize on the view expressed in Europe and elsewhere that the deployment of IRBMs is an asset only to the US and a liability to the country where they are located.

13. This dual approach will be applied throughout the NATO area. In the UK, attempts will be made to exploit the opposition of the Liberal and part of the Labor party to IRBM acceptance as well as current pacifist and neutralist agitation. Similar campaigns in France and Italy will be spearheaded by their large Communist parties. Appeals will also be made to neutralist elements in Greece. In the case of Turkey, Moscow will probably use blunt and simple threats.

14. The USSR has already demonstrated particular concern over the nuclear arming of West Germany, and will react more vigorously to the prospect of IRBM stationing here than in the case of any other NATO country. Not only does Moscow continue to fear a revival of the German threat, but it senses in West German political dissension particular opportunities for forestalling action. The methods which will be employed are already apparent: intimidation of the West Germans and encouragement of popular protests; overtures to the political opposition; warnings to neighbors that German irredentism could pull all Europe into atomic war; and threats that accepting IRBMs would make reunification impossible, perhaps combined with hints that the USSR might otherwise become more flexible on this issue. Also on the positive side, the USSR is offering an atom-free zone and other forms of disengagement.

15. Outside the NATO area, the strongest Soviet reaction would probably be evoked by the prospective stationing of IRBMs in Iran, owing to Soviet sensitivity over this area and because the Soviets would esti-

mate that Iran was highly susceptible to intimidation. In the case of Pakistan, the Bloc would probably focus on threats of inevitable involvement in any East-West war, and on exploiting the strongly adverse Indian reaction. A proposal to station IRBMs in South Korea or Taiwan would be used as the basis for generating general Asian pressure on the US to forebear from such deployment. The stationing of US Matador units on Taiwan was moderately exploited along these lines, and with only limited effect. A campaign against deployment to Japan or the Philippines would be aimed primarily at neutralist and anti-American sentiment, together with reminders of inevitable retaliation in case of war. Peiping would take a major part in these Far Eastern campaigns.

16. The USSR will also attempt to induce third countries to exert pressures against IRBM bases. Throughout Europe, Soviet propaganda will play on a legacy of anti-German feeling and argue that IRBM deployment there would preclude "disengagement." Neighbors of potential recipients, e.g. Yugoslavia, India, the UAR, will be prodded not only with the general arguments employed elsewhere but with reminders that the missiles might involve them in general war or even be turned against them.

17. Despite these opportunities, the Bloc leaders probably expect that if the US persistently seeks IRBM bases around the Bloc periphery it will eventually obtain substantial and in many areas multiple coverage of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. They might expect to make deployments politically costly to the US, in terms of unfavorable foreign reactions. They would hope that, even where their efforts to prevent deployment were unsuccessful, the scars left by the deployment controversy would be assets for future exploitation.

Subsequent Bloc Courses of Action

18. As we have already suggested, actual or imminent deployment of US IRBMs might tend to heighten Soviet fears of war by miscalculation and lead the USSR to conclude that its freedom of cold war maneuver was being somewhat narrowed. We believe that the Soviets, in view of their own growing deterrent capabilities, would not regard such deployment — by itself — as involving so radical a change in East-West power or in the risks of war by miscalculation as to require a major shift in the Soviet attitude towards disarmament. Moreover, they would still regard themselves as retaining considerable leeway for political maneuver, aimed in part at hamstringing possible use of IRBMs. In a larger context, however, US deployment of IRBMs — when considered together with other developing US military capabilities, e.g., the likely US acquisition of ICBMs and naval-launched IRBMs — might be looked upon by the USSR as adding sufficiently to the risks already inherent in the East-West military confrontation as to influence the USSR to take a more flexible position in disarmament negotiations.[1] The question of whether or not these developments would have such a cumulative impact on the Soviet disarmament posture — involving, as it does, many factors

[1] The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that this sentence tends to prejudge an important estimate which is to be considered in SNIE 11-6-58. He therefore believes that the last two sentences should be omitted.

not considered in this paper — will be examined in our forthcoming SNIE 11-6-58.

19. The deployment of IRBMs might increase the urgency attached to various Soviet offensive and defensive countermeasures. In addition, the USSR might announce the stationing of missiles in Eastern Europe, though keeping control firmly in Soviet hands. However, it might better suit the Soviet peace campaign to claim instead that, although sorely tried, the USSR refused to be provoked into countermeasures which would still further increase the dangers of war. Moreover, considering the range and deterrent power of Soviet ICBMs and other nuclear strike capabilities, the Soviet planners might not consider it militarily necessary to station long-range missiles in Satellite territory. Therefore we do not think that deploying IRBMs to NATO would necessarily lead the USSR to make similar counter-deployments in Eastern Europe, although the anti-deployment campaign will contain hints of such a response and a few token deployments might be carried out for bargaining and psychological purposes.

20. In the case of Communist China, IRBM deployments to the Far East would strengthen the pressure which Peiping is probably already exerting upon Moscow for the allocation of advanced weapons. In response to these pressures, the USSR might deploy advanced weapons to Communist China under arrangements preserving Soviet control.

27. SNIE 11-6-58, 24 June 1958, *The Soviet Attitude Toward Disarmament*



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

THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD DISARMAMENT

THE PROBLEM

To assess the underlying motivations of Soviet disarmament policy and the probable Soviet position on the main disarmament issues.[1]

CONCLUSIONS

1. Since about 1954 the USSR has laid increasing stress on disarmament issues as part of its peaceful competition strategy. The most significant factors underlying this development are: (a) increasing Soviet awareness of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, which, reinforced by growing confidence that the USSR can ultimately outstrip the US by peaceful competition, leads to a desire to reduce the risks of nuclear war; (b) the Soviet belief that the exploitation of disarmament issues can contribute materially toward the achievement of key foreign policy goals — including relative weakening of the West, militarily and otherwise; (c) the attractiveness of diverting significant resources from military to other uses, so long as the USSR's relative military position is not impaired.

2. To date, however, the Soviet attitude toward disarmament agreements seems to be dominated by several major restraining factors, which add to the difficulty of reaching such agreements on any basis acceptable to the West. Chief among these are: (a) the caution of the Soviet leaders over risking the compromise of their newly gained nuclear posture by moving too far too fast in an untried and highly speculative field; (b) their deeply ingrained suspicion that the West is as yet interested in arms limitations only on a basis advantageous to itself; (c) their basic aversion to inspection, especially within their own frontiers; and (d) their probable belief that the USSR can still gain considerably by propaganda and unilateral actions, at minimum real cost to itself.

3. Hence we doubt that the Soviet leadership has yet arrived at any hard and fast position on disarmament issues. The Kremlin is now actively seeking negotiations on a nuclear test moratorium, a "nuclear-free" zone in Central Europe, and troop reductions in Europe — which it regards as lending verisimilitude to its disarmament posture, placing further pressure on the Western position, and

[1] We use the term disarmament in this estimate to describe the whole complex of issues connected with arms limitations and controls, force reductions and withdrawals, etc., and not in the absolute sense of abolition of armaments.

having other tangible advantages. We believe it is prepared to make some concessions, including limited inspection, for agreements on these issues, considering that it will gain more than compensatory advantages.

4. Soviet readiness to make concessions to obtain agreements on other issues will largely depend on how much the USSR can accomplish by its present tactics in achieving a unilateral weakening of the West. To the extent that Moscow can inhibit the use and deployment of nuclear weapons and create strong pressures for US withdrawal without further concessions, it may see little gain in modifying its present disarmament position, except in a tactical sense.

5. But if the West's deterrent power is maintained and strengthened, the Soviet leaders will almost certainly become more concerned over the prospective piling up of advanced nuclear armaments, with the heightened dangers of war by miscalculation. If at the same time they remain confident that they can achieve their ultimate objectives through "peaceful competition," the desirability of diminishing the threat of nuclear war by disarmament agreements may loom larger in their minds. In fact they would probably look upon progress toward certain disarmament measures as facilitating the "peaceful competition" strategy itself. Thus both foreign policy and security motivations may lead to growing Soviet interest in expanding the areas of serious disarmament negotiations and a corresponding willingness to pay a higher price for agreements than hitherto.

6. However, their basic view of Western hostility will impel the Soviet leaders to retain at least sufficient military deterrent power to meet what they regard as their minimum security needs. Furthermore, we believe that the USSR will enter any disarmament agreement with the intent at the same time to seek constantly to enhance its military capabilities and to achieve an eventual military superiority over the US.[2]

[2] The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that paragraph 6 suggests a Soviet willingness to curtail or limit the development of their military capabilities to a level of deterrence rather than to seek the early attainment of an overpowering military superiority. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes the paragraph should read as follows:

"Any agreements made by the Soviets in the field of disarmament will be entered into with the intention of improving their relative military strength and of furthering their drive toward world domination. In addition, any agreement will in no way lead them to lessen their efforts to achieve an overpowering nuclear delivery capability at the earliest possible time."

Closely related to the above judgment is the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, preferred expression of paragraph 18 which sets forth more fully the reasoning which leads to these judgments.

DISCUSSION

I. UNDERLYING MOTIVATIONS

7. The disarmament issue has traditionally occupied a prominent place in Soviet diplomacy and propaganda, especially since World War II. Since about 1954, along with numerous other steps designed to give a less aggressive appearance to Soviet policy, Moscow has laid increasing stress on disarmament moves. The most significant factors underlying this development appear to have been: (1) a growing awareness of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons and a consequent

desire to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war; (2) a growing belief that less aggressive behavior would be more likely to undermine free world unity and resistance to Soviet policies; (3) a growing confidence that the Soviet Union will ultimately outstrip its principal opponent, the US, without recourse to war; and (4) a belief that in a situation of generally lessened tension significant economic resources could be diverted from purely military to other important uses.

A. Reducing the Risks of Nuclear War

8. There is little doubt as to the serious concern with which the post-Stalin generation of Soviet leaders have come to view the consequences of a nuclear war. Though Malenkov's assertion in March 1954 that another world war would mean "the end of world civilization" (not just the collapse of capitalism) was repudiated, recent statements by the Soviet leaders suggest that they are well aware that widespread mutual devastation would ensue. The USSR's post-Stalin shift in emphasis from expansion by local aggression to peaceful coexistence tactics probably reflects at least in part this concern over the risks of nuclear war.

9. An important element in the Soviet desire to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war is the apparently growing confidence of the present Soviet leaders that the USSR will within a finite period outstrip the US in a "peaceful" competition for influence and power. This confidence rests upon the rapid growth of Soviet power and the spread of Soviet influence abroad, and upon successes in the fields of science and technology. It is further reinforced by the doctrine that Communist victory is historically inevitable and by the Soviet leaders' belief that they have the will and capacity to realize this goal. This present mood of confidence makes them all the more reluctant to see this prospect jeopardized by the one development which could spell immediate disaster — thermonuclear war.

10. At the same time we do not mean to suggest that Soviet conduct is shaped by an overriding fear that nuclear war is likely. On the contrary, the Soviet leaders probably believe that the West is not disposed to undertake such a war, and that even if it were, their own nuclear capabilities have already become such that the Western powers are highly unlikely to take the risk for any but the gravest reasons. They are probably also reasonably confident that they can conduct their own policy in such a way as to limit the risks involved.

11. Nevertheless, they must be disturbed over the possibility of war by miscalculation, perhaps arising out of local conflict, or even by accident. Among other things, they are concerned that the West would use nuclear weapons in local war, with the resultant danger of expanded hostilities. Perhaps for this reason published Soviet statements deny any distinction between the consequences of tactical and strategic use of nuclear weapons, and assert that any use of nuclear weapons in a limited war is bound to broaden the conflict. These statements may or may not represent the true Soviet belief; in either case they are probably designed to inhibit us from such use of nuclear weapons.

12. The Soviet leaders are probably also concerned that the advent of advanced delivery systems, and the consequent pressure for an ever higher state of readiness on both sides, will increase the danger of accident or miscalculation. While their recent complaints about SAC bomber flights were largely for propaganda purposes, we regard them as at least partly reflecting genuine concern. Finally, the Soviet view of the West is such that they cannot rule out the chance of a desperate Western effort to reverse "the tide of history" by attacking the USSR.

13. Hence we see such security concerns as being an important factor underlying the Soviet attitude toward disarmament. The Soviets probably consider that, because of mounting worldwide anxiety over the dangers of nuclear holocaust, and the resultant pressures for disarmament, the disarmament issue offers valuable potentialities for reducing the likelihood of nuclear war, above all by inhibiting the use of Western nuclear weapons and by helping to induce their withdrawal from around the periphery of the Bloc.

B. Promoting the Strategy of Peaceful Competition

14. While the Soviet leaders cannot consider the subject of disarmament without reference to the foregoing security concerns, they at the same time look upon the issues as an integral and effective element of an aggressive foreign policy designed to expand Soviet influence and power by "peaceful competition." Indeed, these two aspects of the subject are inseparably related in Soviet political strategy. For example, by playing on popular anxieties regarding nuclear weapons, Moscow seeks to impede US plans to deploy these weapons overseas; by calling for the liquidation of foreign bases, it hopes to make US tenure of such bases difficult; by stressing the dangers incurred by countries in which US forces and nuclear weapons are stationed, it hopes to undermine the unity of Western alliances; by simultaneously declaring itself willing to settle outstanding problems and interested only in peaceful competition, it hopes to undercut the rationale of Western military preparedness. To the extent that these aims can be achieved, Western will and ability to respond to Soviet pressures are reduced and Moscow's freedom of maneuver vis-a-vis the West increased. Recognizing the likelihood of recurrent crises in the course of the East-West conflict, the Soviet leaders desire to undermine as much as possible Western power to react.

15. The mere agitation of these issues serves Soviet foreign policy objectives, regardless of the extent of progress toward a disarmament agreement, or even toward formal negotiations for one. The image of a peace-loving and constructive USSR is projected, and contrasted with that of a bellicose and intransigent US. Through this projection, the USSR hopes to gain in respectability and influence. Moreover, if the West could be persuaded to negotiate on Soviet terms, the resultant atmosphere of *détente* would, in parliamentary countries, make the maintenance of an adequate military posture difficult, possibly leading, in effect, to some degree of unilateral Western disarmament without compensatory Soviet concessions or effective safeguards.

16. The Soviet leaders may hope that the maintenance of psychological pressures for disarmament will eventually force Western governments to negotiate some kinds of disarmament agreements with them. They probably estimate that almost any disarmament agreement would tend to reduce international tensions, and thus reduce the effectiveness and cohesion of Western resistance to Soviet aggrandizement. Again, it is likely that Moscow hopes that some sort of European regional disarmament measure would initiate a course of events leading toward dissolution of NATO and the exclusion of US military power from the continent of Europe. Thus through the political as well as the directly military effects of a disarmament agreement the Soviet leaders might expect to improve their international position and to increase their freedom of maneuver vis-a-vis the West.

C. Soviet View of the Military Balance of Power

17. Another key factor in the Soviet attitude is their view of the potential effect of disarmament measures on the balance of military power between the Bloc and the West. The Soviets could calculate that the elimination of nuclear weapons on both sides would be greatly to their advantage, being confident that they would retain a preponderance in conventional military strength. But we believe that the Soviets realize that this objective is realistically unobtainable, and that, whatever progress they can make toward reducing Western nuclear deterrent power or inhibiting its use, they must still calculate on a major Western nuclear capability for the foreseeable future. For this reason, among others, we conclude that the USSR will remain determined to retain and improve its own nuclear capability.

18. However, the Soviets probably estimate that the time has either already arrived, or will shortly, when neither side will be able to attack the other without receiving unacceptable damage in return. They may also regard it as unlikely that this state of affairs will be basically modified (except possibly through unforeseen technological breakthrough), de-

spite a continued buildup in more advanced armaments on both sides. While they are seeking to develop a major intercontinental missile capability before the US does, we do not believe they can realistically count on being able to achieve a decisive superiority in overall strategic delivery capability. On the other hand, as we have already suggested, they may regard the advent of advanced weapons systems as increasing the danger of war by miscalculation.[5]

19. Under these circumstances the Soviet leaders may not see any overriding military objection to certain forms or kinds of arms limitations so long as these would not compromise the deterrent posture, both nuclear and non-nuclear, which they deem necessary, nor the continued development of the military capabilities which they are determined to pursue. Indeed, because of their concern over the possibility of war by miscalculation and of their confidence in their current politico-economic strategy, they might see considerable value in entering negotiations with respect to the stabilization of the nuclear balance of power at a certain level, if this were technically possible.

20. In this connection, our estimates of Soviet nuclear capabilities[4] do not indicate that the Soviet nuclear stockpile is yet at a level which the Soviets would be likely to regard as adequate — although we cannot entirely dismiss Khrushchev's recent suggestions that the USSR may be approaching "nuclear sufficiency." Our evidence on Soviet nuclear tests indicates that the USSR probably has developed a sufficient variety of nuclear weapons types to satisfy most of its major military needs. While sufficient numbers of weapons to support a major strategic attack probably exist, current stockpiles of fissionable material are believed insufficient for wide-scale air defense and tactical as well as strategic uses. Moreover, fissionable material production facilities are currently being expanded. Accordingly, we think it unlikely that the Soviets would wish to stabilize their nuclear weapons or fissionable materials stockpile at its present level. In the course of the next few years, however, the stockpile may have increased to a point at which the Soviets will consider stabilizing it by an agreement with the West.

D. Internal Political and Economic Factors

21. While the economic burden of the Soviet military establishment does not appear so great as to exert compelling pressure for arms reduction, the Soviet leaders may well see more profitable uses for some of the resources now devoted to military purposes, provided that Soviet security would not be impaired. The allocation of production, research, and manpower resources to military use necessarily curtails economic growth and competes with consumer goods expansion and availabilities for foreign trade and aid. Moreover,

[5] The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that the Soviets' apparent intention to develop an overpowering military capability — and the potentialities they must perceive for the success of their efforts — make the above paragraph unacceptable. While the statement, "they may also regard it as unlikely that this state of affairs will be basically modified . . ." is manifestly not a statement of probability, as it is employed in the development of the paragraph it strongly suggests or implies probability. To this implication the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, dissents. Moreover, he does not agree that the Soviets cannot realistically "count on being able to achieve a decisive superiority in overall strategic delivery capability." Soviet advances in the field of nuclear weapons and advanced delivery systems strongly indicate that the Soviets intend to build up their military capabilities as rapidly as possible and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, has been unable to perceive any indication that the Soviets believe their objective of achieving decisive superiority is unattainable. Accordingly, he believes that paragraph 18 should read as follows:

"Within this general context, the Soviets probably estimate that within the near future and for a comparatively short time thereafter neither side will be able to attack the other without receiving unacceptable damage in return. They probably regard it as likely that this impending state of affairs can be basically modified in their favor through an accelerated buildup in more advanced weapons systems."

[4] NIE 11-3-58, *The Soviet Atomic Energy Program*, 14 January 1958.

the Soviet leaders, in view of their numerous other requirements for economic resources, cannot but be concerned over the growing cost and complexity of modern weapons systems. In this respect they face the same problems as do their counterparts in the West. Finally, if the Soviets believe their own doctrine that the capitalist economies of the Western states are artificially buoyed up by armaments production, they may believe that arms reduction could hasten the ultimate economic collapse of the capitalist world, at the same time as it assisted in Communist economic growth.

22. We do not believe that there are any compelling domestic political pressures underlying the Soviet position on disarmament. While the Soviet people undoubtedly share the worldwide fear of nuclear conflict, public opinion on this issue can hardly be considered a major operative force on leadership attitudes. Of more significance may be divergent views within the leadership itself, to which we shall refer later.

E. The Fourth Country Problem*

23. Although we believe that the Soviets are concerned over the Fourth Country problem, we do not consider that it plays a major role in Soviet calculations except insofar as West Germany and possibly Communist China are concerned. The repeated demonstrations of Soviet hyper-sensitivity over revival of a German threat lead us to give much credence to their expressed concern over Bonn's acquiring nuclear weapons. While the problem of Communist China is not as immediate, we estimate that Soviet failure to date to provide their Chinese partners with nuclear weapons probably betokens some fear lest this development increase the likelihood of Chinese adventurism, with all the risks involved. Aside from these cases, the Soviets have shown far less concern over the risks that fourth countries possessing nuclear weapons might trigger off a nuclear war than over the risks inherent in the US-Soviet nuclear confrontation. Indeed we suspect that their hints of interest in this issue are based at least in part on their belief that we ourselves are much concerned.

*For a discussion of the "fourth country" problem, see the forthcoming NIE 100-2-58, *Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Fourth Countries.*

II. RESTRAINING FACTORS IN THE SOVIET ATTITUDE

24. In sum, then, several powerful motivations underlie the USSR's increasing stress on disarmament issues over the last few years. But several other factors remain to be assessed before we can address ourselves to the key questions — how far do the Soviets desire to go in reaching agreement on specific disarmament measures, as opposed to unilateral actions and propaganda exploitation of the issue? — what risks as well as advantages do they see in such agreed measures? — and finally, what price are they willing to pay? Among these factors are the caution of the leaders, their acute fear of weakening the relative Soviet power position, their strong suspicion of the West, their aversion to inspection, and their probable belief that they can still gain considerably by propaganda and unilateral actions at little cost to themselves — all of which add to the difficulty of reaching agreements on any basis acceptable to the West.

25. Having so recently obtained what they probably regard as a substantial nuclear posture, the Soviets are almost certainly highly reluctant to risk compromising it by moving too far too fast in an untried and highly speculative field. We believe that they are feeling their way in an area where the ultimate implications of decisions are highly uncertain.

26. Powerfully reinforcing this attitude of caution is a deeply ingrained suspicion of the disarmament position taken by the West. Khrushchev himself has alleged that our proposals are designed to enhance our own military position while weakening that of the USSR. In short, the Soviet leadership apparently does not believe that we are interested in reaching agreements on arms limitations on the basis of what they believe to be the actual balance of power. In part, of course, they simply do not view the merits of our proposals in the same light as we do. (See Appendix). In some cases where they have partially accepted our proposals, they claim

that our subsequent withdrawal of them indicates a lack of serious intent. Closely related to the above two points is a probable Soviet belief that the West would interpret any signs of Soviet willingness to compromise as indicating overeagerness to reach agreement and would press for further concessions from the USSR.

27. One of the most important obstacles to agreement is the USSR's basic aversion to extensive inspection within its frontiers. We do not believe that an intention to evade the terms of an agreement is the chief reason for Soviet aversion to inspection, although this motive cannot be ignored. Rather we regard the chief factors to be their genuine fear of espionage, their deeply ingrained security consciousness, and their conviction that secrecy is an asset. Since they probably regard themselves as far better informed on our military situation than we are on theirs, they must look upon many forms of inspection as benefitting us far more than them. This is suggested by their denunciations of our inspection proposals as gigantic intelligence gathering schemes. In addition, they have reservations as to the effectiveness of inspection procedures in assuring that commitments are being observed. Finally, the Soviet leaders probably also fear the disturbing effects on a tightly controlled society which might result from the presence of foreign inspectors within the USSR.

28. However, the USSR has always expressed willingness to consider certain forms of ground inspection, although stressing arrangements which would minimize contacts with the population. We believe, moreover, that their sensitivity on this issue might diminish somewhat with time. We note, for example, the increased Soviet flexibility on tourist travel and exchanges, the opening of areas hitherto closed to foreign visitors, more open publications, and the like. These straws in the wind suggest at least that Soviet fear of ideological contamination is decreasing, and that their earlier fear of letting outsiders see their poverty is giving way to pride in showing off their accomplishments. The prospective advent of reconnaissance satellites may also cause reconsideration of Soviet views on inspection.[6]

29. Another restraining factor in the Soviet conduct of negotiations is their probable view that they can still gain considerably by propaganda and other forms of pressure, at little cost to themselves. Underlying this is their belief that over a period of time Western public opinion may force at least some Western governments to cut back their military establishments as well as to soften their positions on arms limitations, without corresponding Soviet concessions. They probably also expect that further exploitable fissures will develop among the Western powers.

III. THE SOVIET POSITION ON DISARMAMENT

30. We doubt that the Soviet leadership, in balancing off the various factors discussed above, has as yet arrived at any hard and fast position on the disarmament issue. Indeed we would be surprised if there were not certain differences in point of view among the top leadership groups themselves. In this respect, it is difficult to separate the disarmament issue from the general post-Stalin strategy of "peaceful competition," of which Soviet disarmament policy forms an integral part. More doctrinaire elements may fear that this entire approach endangers the maintenance of revolutionary *élan* and the fabric of Soviet control in the Satellites and is ultimately incompatible with the degree of tension and vigilance required to justify the Party's dictatorship in the USSR. These groups, probably reinforced by most of the military, may be particularly sceptical of the benefits to be derived from disarmament moves and fearful of the risks which inspection would involve.

31. To date Soviet disarmament policy seems dominated by such an attitude of caution, by acute suspicion of Western motives, and by the feeling that the vulnerability of the Western position can continue to be exploited at minimum cost to the Soviets themselves. The principal tactics involved are broadly those of propaganda, though ostensible and in some cases actual willingness to negotiate is also

[6] See the forthcoming NIE 100-6-58, *Implications of Certain US Satellite Programs.*

involved. These tactics are typified by the vagueness and superficial attractiveness of Soviet proposals, most of which seem designed more for propaganda purposes than to lead to agreement. We are also struck by the "unilateralism" of such steps as the announcements of force reductions and nuclear test suspension, which seem designed as much to create pressures on the West through dramatic initiatives as to lead to negotiated agreements.

32. As to negotiations, the Soviets probably believe that the West is not yet ready to agree to arms limitations on any basis which seems equitable to the USSR. They see the US as not yet having reconciled itself to the Bloc's enhanced power position, which the Soviets insist must be recognized. For their own part, believing that time is working in their favor, they may see advantages in postponing serious negotiations on broad disarmament issues — as distinguished from essentially marginal issues like test suspension — until their position is further strengthened, especially through the advent of a substantial ICBM capability. Moreover, they may expect that the Western position will be further eroded by this time.

33. However, on certain limited issues the Kremlin is actively seeking to conclude agreements in order to lend verisimilitude to its position and place further pressure on the Western governments' position, among other more specific advantages. In this category we place a nuclear test moratorium, a "nuclear-free" zone in Europe, and troop reductions in Central Europe, all of which we discuss in detail in the Appendix. Moreover, the Soviets appear willing to pay a certain price for these agreements; in all three cases, for example, they are probably willing to accept some degree of inspection.

34. While this may be as far as the USSR is currently willing to go in actual controlled arms agreements, it does not necessarily represent the ultimate extent of Soviet willingness to negotiate seriously, particularly as time goes on. We regard the USSR's disarmament policy as still in transition, a view supported by the flexibility shown since 1955. The most recent indications are the USSR's announcement of nuclear test suspension and its willingness to open technical negotiations on policing a test ban. Even Moscow's complaint about SAC flights, while clearly motivated by propaganda considerations, is probably symptomatic of its growing concern over the risks of nuclear conflict, although its handling of this particular issue did not suggest sufficient uneasiness to impel the USSR to enter meaningful negotiations on it.

35. Of course, a great deal will depend on how much the USSR can accomplish by its present tactics in achieving a largely unilateral weakening of the West. To the extent that these tactics tend to inhibit the use and deployment of nuclear weapons, and to create strong pressures for US withdrawal — and provided the Soviets do not become more concerned over the risks of miscalculation — Moscow may see little gain in modifying its present position on disarmament, except in a tactical sense.

36. But if the West's deterrent power is maintained and strengthened and the Soviets see only minimal possibilities of unilaterally weakening us, there may be some further change in the Soviet position. As time passes, the various motivations already discussed may exert greater influence to this end. The Soviet leaders will almost certainly become more concerned over the prospective continued piling up of advanced nuclear armaments, with the heightened dangers of war by miscalculation. They will almost certainly become increasingly disturbed over US IRBM deployments, the advent of the Polaris system, and US acquisition of first and then second generation ICBMs. If at the same time they remain confident that they can achieve their objectives by "peaceful competition," the desirability of diminishing the likelihood of general war by disarmament agreements may loom larger in their minds. In fact they would probably look upon progress toward certain disarmament measures as facilitating the peaceful competition strategy itself. For these reasons the Soviets might become willing to pay a higher price to obtain disarmament agreements than they have heretofore been willing to pay.

37. We see two independent factors which could contribute to eventual increased Soviet willingness to reach disarmament agreements. First, the Soviets may come around more to the point of view that the West is really interested in some arms limitations on terms which would be regarded as equitable by the USSR. Second, as we have already suggested, there might be some diminution in Moscow's traditional aversion to the presence of foreign inspectors on Soviet soil.

38. Thus we see some possibility of a growing Soviet interest in expanding the area of serious disarmament negotiations with the West. We cannot predict when or on what issues this might occur. By and large we expect that Soviet caution and suspicion on such risk-impregnated issues will die slowly, if at all, and that any change will be gradual. We also foresee a variety of factors which might cause Soviet policy to move back and forth from time to time. For example, such shifts might be forced by differences among the Soviet leaders, by problems in the Satellites, by reversion to a tough line for internal reasons, or perhaps by fear the West is interpreting willingness to negotiate as a sign of weakness. We can also expect the traditional hard Soviet bargaining tactics, including great reluctance to show their hand prior to much probing of our position. At the same time, there is a good chance of further dramatic unilateral moves, particularly while Khrushchev is at the helm.

39. In any event, we can estimate with some confidence the limits beyond which, in the foreseeable future, Soviet policy will not go. They will be very careful not to give more than they get. They will not allow inspection except within limits which are carefully circumscribed. Third, and most important, the basic Soviet view of Western hostility will impel the Soviet leaders to retain at least sufficient military deterrent power to meet what they regard as their minimum security needs. Indeed, we believe that the USSR will enter any disarmament agreement with the intent at the same time to seek constantly to enhance its military capabilities and to achieve an eventual military superiority over the US.

APPENDIX

SOVIET VIEWS ON MAJOR DISARMAMENT ISSUES

A. Control and Limitation of Mass Destruction Weapons

1. The Soviets almost certainly regard Western nuclear strength as the chief threat to their security and as a major obstacle to achievement of their external aims. Thus to them the key disarmament problem is that posed by nuclear weapons. Aside from developing their own nuclear power, the Soviets are seeking to meet this problem by an intensive propaganda campaign and a series of disarmament proposals, both designed to keep the nuclear weapons issue in the forefront of negotiations. The goal is to create a climate of concern over the dangers created by nuclear weapons, to underline the USSR's initiative in seeking to do something about this problem, and to inhibit the use of such weapons by the West.

2. *Cessation of Nuclear Tests.* The USSR's recently announced suspension of nuclear tests is intended to focus pressure on the West for a similar halt, as part of its broad campaign to stigmatize nuclear weapons and inhibit their use. Widespread anxieties over the effect of continued tests and growing Western popular pressures to stop testing made this issue readily exploitable. The Soviets maximized this pressure by timing their announcement to precede a long planned US test series; the timing was also arranged to follow their own intensive test series.

3. While the Soviets have left themselves free to resume testing at any time, we believe that they are actually seeking an agreed test moratorium with minimum controls. Their desire to put pressure on the US to accept cessation on these terms largely accounts for the unilateral nature of their move. They probably expect that the US and the UK will now be compelled to negotiate a moratorium. Although their test program is not yet as far advanced as ours (and technical motivations exist for further testing), they probably felt that their present test achievements had placed them in a sufficiently good military posture that the need for testing was outweighed by the positive factors mentioned above. Moreover, Moscow was probably motivated by a desire to impede future US testing of improved missile warheads, including one for the anti-ICBM missile, judging this advantage would outweigh gains from their own future tests. A desire to forestall "fourth country" nuclear weapons development probably also played some part.

4. Moscow has agreed in principle to controls, but there are numerous indications that it will seek to minimize the need for them. We believe that the USSR would accept a small number of fixed inspection sites, perhaps with some provision for limited mobility of inspectors. By emphasizing the ease with which a test ban can be monitored, it is seeking to create the impression that this limited system will suffice to detect evasions, and thereby to undercut any Western insistence on more elaborate inspection. If the West were to insist on a more elaborate system, the Kremlin would probably condemn this as demonstrating lack of good faith and as an intelligence-gathering scheme. It would probably let negotiations rupture on this issue, calculating that the blame for the deadlock would attach primarily to the West.

5. Assuming an agreed test moratorium, the Soviets would be unlikely to attempt to evade it, at least for some time.[1] With the completion of their recent intensive test series, they must be reasonably satisfied with the position they have reached. Moreover, they would have to balance the risks of detection against the obvious value they have seen in a test ban. We have already estimated that the Soviet leaders would almost certainly regard the political consequences of getting caught red-handed as unacceptable, except in such extraordinary circumstances as a clear opportunity to gain a great advantage over the US or, conversely, if the US had gained a clear advantage over the USSR. In such cases we regard denunciation of the test ban as more likely than attempted evasion.

6. *Ban on Use of Nuclear Weapons.* The long-standing Soviet campaign to obtain a ban on use of nuclear weapons originated as a defensive ploy to counter the US monopoly and later great superiority in such weapons. The theme is still being actively employed by the Soviets, and probably would be pushed even harder following agreement on a test suspension. However, it must be clear to them that Western agreement to prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons almost certainly cannot be obtained in any event. Hence, the Soviets may press for a more limited agreement or even unilateral declarations that nuclear weapons not be used "first," but only, if at all, in retaliation for an aggressor's prior use of nuclear weapons.

7. The Soviets have also strongly condemned any attempts to distinguish between the consequences of "strategic" and "tactical" employment of nuclear weapons, primarily because they want to inhibit us from concluding that we can be free to use nuclear weapons in less than total war. This stand does not preclude the Soviets from later admitting such distinctions in practice, but — as they intend — it leaves their reaction in doubt.

8. *Nuclear Production Cessation and Reduction of Stockpiles.* A key question in estimating Soviet views on ceasing production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and on reducing existing stockpiles is their view of what constitutes nuclear sufficiency. While we cannot ascertain the Soviet estimate of their stockpile requirements, we know that they are expanding their fissionable materials production. It is true that certain remarks made by Khrushchev in March indicated his belief that the Soviets were approaching, and may have already reached, sufficiency in nuclear weapons stockpiles; however, more recently he indicated that this judgment applied only to large-yield weapons.

9. Although the USSR might enter negotiations on cessation of weapons material production, we do not believe that it would either unilaterally cease such production or agree to mutual cessation until its minimum stockpile requirements had been met. Moreover, the Soviet view as to how much inspection should be permitted under any agreement would almost certainly be far less extensive than our own. Evasion might depend in part upon their knowledge of our intelligence on all production facilities, but the Soviets would probably consider it unnecessary to run the risk of detection if they had already assured their minimum requirements.

10. The Soviets might agree to mutual reduction of stockpiles so long as their relative power position vis-a-vis the US was at no stage impaired by reductions of their own stockpile below a minimum deterrent capability.

11. *Control of Other Weapons of Mass Destruction.* The Soviets consistently treat these weapons (including "radiological weapons" as distinguished from nuclear explosive weapons) as "weapons of mass destruction" which should be banned along with nuclear weapons. However, they appear to regard the problem as much less important than that of controlling nuclear explosive weapons.

B. Control over Advanced Delivery Systems

12. Khrushchev has made clear that the USSR regards the US proposals on control of outer space vehicles as an attempt to limit

[1] See NIE 11-7-57, *Feasibility and Likelihood of Attempted Soviet Evasion of a Nuclear Test Moratorium*, 10 December 1957.

the USSR's advantage in the field of rocketry and to preserve the geographic advantage which its peripheral base structure gives to the US. Hence he has countered by proposing that control of outer space and withdrawal from overseas bases must be closely linked. In Soviet eyes their achievement of an ICBM capability will greatly enhance their military position vis-a-vis the US by drastically reducing the US geographical advantage. So long as even a substantial portion of US striking power is dependent on overseas bases, we believe that the USSR will insist on linking the two issues.

13. In the more distant future, when the primary strategic strike capabilities of both sides have become truly intercontinental in nature, the Soviet calculation of the relative advantages and disadvantages of agreed controls and inspection might tend to shift. An additional factor would be the risks of miscalculation involved in the almost instantaneous readiness of second generation missiles. However, we are almost certain that they would still insist on considering all forms of strategic striking power simultaneously, including manned aircraft and naval vessels as well as missiles. Even in this case, the problem of international supervision would remain a powerful inhibitory factor in Soviet thinking. They would recognise that an extremely elaborate inspection apparatus would be required, on a world-wide basis. However, the development of reconnaissance satellites might affect their view of this problem.

C. Prevention of Surprise Attack by Inspection

14. For a period in 1954–55, Soviet statements appeared to indicate a mounting awareness of Soviet vulnerability to surprise attack, which may explain the inclusion in the Soviet proposals of May 10, 1955 of a ground warning system for this purpose. The subject has been included in most subsequent Soviet disarmament and Summit conference proposals, but always in quite vague terms. It may be that the Soviets have included this item to give an appearance of receptivity in view of the obvious US interest in it. They probably consider that they have less need for such safeguards than the West, because of the openness of Western society and the political limitations upon Western ability to launch a surprise attack; nevertheless we believe they are also somewhat concerned.

15. The Soviets have obviously regarded our proposals on various zones of inspection — including the Arctic Zone — as designed to maximize our own advantage. Similarly their own proposal for an 800 km. inspection zone on each side of the East-West line in Europe seemed designed to maximize their advantage. We are unable to say what the USSR would regard as equitable zonal boundaries, but we believe that there may be some flexibility in their position on this score.

16. However, another obstacle to Soviet acceptance of various inspection zones, particularly any including Soviet territory, lies in their aversion to inspection, which we have previously discussed. Beyond this, they do not seem persuaded of the efficacy of inspection in preventing strategic surprise. Soviet spokesmen, including Khrushchev, have in recent months reaffirmed their view that even the most complex inspection system could not, because of the vast areas and great variety of weapons involved, rule out violations or give warning of an attack deliberately and secretly prepared. Thus, the Soviets probably view adequate safeguards as involving an extremely elaborate inspection system, one even then of doubtful effectiveness, and one which by its very nature would most completely expose them to Western inspectors and controls.

17. Nonetheless, there may be a gradual shift in the Soviet attitude toward measures to prevent surprise attack, particularly if their concern over the risks of war by miscalculation mounts. It is perhaps significant that the Soviets already appear prepared to accept a greater degree of inspection in Eastern Europe (in connection with their disengagement proposals) than in the USSR. But at best we believe that their initial approach to any inspection scheme would be grudging and extremely cautious, and confined to an area where they felt they would be only minimally exposed.

D. Limitations on Manpower and Conventional Arms

18. At least in their negotiating position, the Soviets have shown themselves rather flexible on manpower strengths and conventional force cuts. They are doubtless aware of the much greater combat force which they have shown themselves able to field from an equivalent force level. Of the various force levels of 1.5, 1.7, 2.1, or 2.5 million men, they have favored the lower limit probably in order to induce a maximum reduction of Western strength in forward areas, including abandonment of some overseas bases, and also to gain the maximum from manpower and cost reduction for domestic economic expansion and aid and trade abroad. We believe that Moscow would probably consider seriously an offer of considerable manpower reductions if it were not tied to political and other conditions and if only modest controls were involved.

19. Limitations on conventional arms have not been stressed in Soviet proposals or propaganda for some time, although Moscow has made occasional references to their desirability. The Soviets probably feel that the West has more to gain than they from such reductions.

20. The USSR has frequently called for a freeze on or a percentage reduction in arms outlays, probably largely for propaganda reasons. By playing on Free World popular dissatisfaction with burdensome taxation, it may expect to add to the political difficulties of Western governments. Here too, Soviet reluctance to permit effective inspection would be a major bar. The Kremlin would doubtless be reluctant to reveal the extent to which past budgets have concealed military expenditures.

E. Disengagement

21. The Soviets apparently see distinct advantages in certain forms of disengagement — primarily in Europe — which would hasten the retraction of US power from this key area. They are prepared to pay some price for what they probably regard as more than compensatory gains. In this connection we regard their concern over the situation in Eastern Europe, and their resultant desire to minimize the risks of Western intervention in event of another Satellite explosion, as an important motive. Beyond this, they are all too well aware of the potential impact on Western Europe of the withdrawal of US deterrent power or even the nuclear component thereof. Finally, the threat posed by a nuclear-armed West Germany undoubtedly weighs heavily on Soviet minds, and probably has considerable impact on their desire to prevent West German acquisition of nuclear arms and delivery systems, particularly IRBMs.

22. We do not believe the USSR or Poland expected acceptance of the Rapacki plan for barring nuclear weapons from Central Europe. While Polish motives were reportedly somewhat different, Moscow probably saw in the the proposal an additional lever for generating opposition to the NATO nuclear deterrent program and a useful gambit for Summit discussion. Nevertheless, the scheme has such advantages from the Soviet standpoint that they would probably be prepared to implement it and to accept a good deal in the way of inspection. Among other things, Moscow would see in an agreed nuclear-free zone in Central Europe a compelling precedent for Western acceptance of further measures along these lines.

23. We believe that a mutually agreed thinning out of conventional forces in Europe would hold considerable attractions for the USSR. They would probably expect it to impair the NATO shield without correspondingly weakening the Soviet position, to start a trend toward US withdrawal, and to reduce the likelihood of Western intervention in any Satellite revolt. We doubt, however, that Moscow would agree to a mutual withdrawal of all US and Soviet forces from foreign soil in Europe, despite the many advantages involved. In our view the USSR will retain a sufficient military presence in key areas of Eastern Europe to minimize the risks of Satellite uprisings and underline Soviet determination to intervene in that event, as well as to maintain the military threat created by their present forward position in Europe.

27. *(Continued)*

34. Inspection would again be regarded as undesirable under either of the above alternatives, but the Soviets have shown willingness to make concessions in this respect. Though regarding the presence of Western inspectors in the Satellites as a likely stimulus to popular dissidence and as a complicating factor in event of another uprising, Moscow probably believes that these inspectors can be sufficiently insulated from the local populace to make these risks manageable.

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Original Members of the Board of National Estimates

Foster, Maxwell	Foster was a Boston lawyer with an LL.B. from Harvard. Foster served on the Board only six months and resigned in June 1951.
Hoover, Calvin	Hoover received his Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin and was an economics professor at Duke University. An expert on Soviet and German affairs, he served with William Langer in the Research and Analysis Branch of the OSS. Like Foster, Hoover served on the Board only a short time, resigning after eight months.
Huebner, Lt. Gen. Clarence, US Army	Huebner had just retired as commanding general of all US forces in Europe. A forceful combat commander in World War II, he provided a military perspective to the BNE.
Kent, Sherman	Kent, a history professor at Yale and an authority on intelligence, received his Ph.D. from Yale. His book *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (1949) remains influential. Kent succeeded William Langer as Chairman of the BNE and head of ONE in 1952.
Langer, William	DCI Walter Bedell Smith appointed Langer (Ph.D., Harvard) as first head of the Office of National Estimates in November 1950. Langer, a history professor at Harvard, had been Director of the Research and Analysis Branch of the OSS from 1942 to 1945.
Montague, Ludwell	Montague (Ph.D., Duke) had been the Chief of the Intelligence Staff, Office of Research and Evaluation, from 1946 to 1947.
Sontag, Raymond	Sontag (Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania) was a history professor at the University of California at Berkeley and a specialist in German foreign relations.
Van Slyck, DeForest	Van Slyck (Ph.D., Yale) was a history professor at Yale from 1920 to 1929, when he left to head the economic research section of an investment banking firm. After military service from 1942 to 1945, he joined the Central Intelligence Group in March 1946.